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This thesis attempts to understand why a number of recent documentaries that deal with 
traumatic personal histories, include fictional interludes: fictional films within the non-
fictional documentary frame. Something in the nature of trauma seems to demand the 
deployment of fictions as a route to truths or meanings about the real, non-fictional world. 
 
I borrow the idea of a ‘bait of falsehood’ that can take a ‘carp of truth’ as my central 
organising principle. It draws on a clinical technique first suggested in Freud’s radical 1937 
paper Constructions in Analysis – itself drawing on speculations in Hamlet about the power 
of enacted, embodied fictions – where a fiction acts as a bait to take an otherwise 
unavailable truth about the “real” world. It is a technique that recognises the profound 
difficulty in representing trauma whilst rejecting the idea that trauma is unrepresentable 
and beyond the reach of understanding.  
 
These fictions, when viewed and reflected on with diegetic others over filmic time, are 
capable of producing psychic insights, “truths” or meanings for the documentary 
protagonist that might ameliorate the pain of traumatic experience. It is a contention that 
sees the documentary-making process as having the potential to be a dynamic, therapeutic 
process which bears comparison with the clinical practice of psychoanalysis including the 
practice of self-analysis: an inter- and intra-personal exploration, where a trauma rooted in 
the past is revivified in current relationships and where it is necessary to deploy fictions to 
bring representational content to otherwise unrepresented aspects of traumatic 
experience. It is an argument that insists that certain documentaries do not just show 
something but do something. These films are records of a creative act playing out over 
time, in which things that happen in the filmic present, transform (and can be seen and felt 
by the viewer to transform) fixed and intractable psychic patterns. To make this argument, 
I draw on film phenomenology and (especially) on post-Lacanian French psychoanalytic 
theory, developing a counter-transferential model for the emergence of psychic meaning in 
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A fictional melodrama of 1912: Léonce Perret’s The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador  
 
Suzanne de Lormel is catatonic. An intertitle tells us she has suffered ‘une démence’;1 a 
catastrophic physical and mental collapse. She is mute and affectless – seemingly without 
will. She is led into a room, where she fails to notice the presence of her lover, Jean 
d’Erquy, whom she believes has been shot dead: the event that precipitated her démence.  
 
The ‘celebrated foreign alienist physician’,2 Professor Pierre Williams, guides her to a seat 
and positions her head so she is looking towards a cinema screen: ‘– Regardez, Suzanne…’. 
He is about to conduct the novel treatment he has set out in his pamphlet Lecture to the 
Academy of Medicine on the observations of Professor Williams regarding the application 
of the Cinematography to Psychotherapy.3  
 
The curtains are drawn and now we can see only Suzanne and the screen (see figure 1 in 
Illustrations). Suzanne is to be shown a film, directed by Williams, that re-enacts the events 
that have so disturbed her: her lover’s apparent murder on a lonely beach and her 
discovery of his “dead” body next to her in a rowing boat that has drifted out to sea. She 
gazes blankly as a film flickers into life. The inert Suzanne watches as her lover (who did not 
die at the beach and has since recovered), plays himself on the screen. He rows towards a 
beach in an isolated cove. Suzanne begins to stir, her blank gaze replaced by an intent stare 
of recognition. Landing his boat, d’Erquy is felled by a bullet from an unseen, would-be 
assassin and collapses beneath the towering cliffs of the rocks of Kador. Suzanne begins to 
breathe heavily. The wounded on-screen d’Erquy struggles up the beach and discovers 
“Suzanne” (who has been drugged by the same assassin) lying motionless in the sand; her 
role in this filmed re-enactment taken by an actress. D’Erquy drags her into the boat, 
 
1 All quotations in this brief synopsis of the film’s climactic scene, are taken from the film’s intertitles 
(some translated). Original title of this French-made silent film: Le Mystère des Roches de Kador. 
2 Despite the odd description, Williams is clearly modelled on psychiatrists and proto-psychoanalysts 
then working in Paris. In an earlier scene, the character d’Erquy has chosen Williams from a group of 
psychological experts listed in a telephone directory – the directory listings clearly visible to the 
viewer – all of whom (excepting Williams) were real, practising physicians (e.g. Henri Claude who 
introduced Freudian theories into French psychiatry and Pierre Janet who deployed 
psychotherapeutic techniques in cases of dissociation and traumatic memory). The character, 
Williams, combines the new ideas of psychoanalysis with the new technology of film.  
3 d’Erquy has been given a copy of this pamphlet in an earlier scene. 
 11 
where they both lose consciousness. The real Suzanne watching Williams’s film (the film-
within-the-film), becomes more disturbed and animated: her hands clasp her head; her 
breathing quickens further. As the boat floats out to sea with the apparently dead d’Erquy 
aboard next to an actress playing a now comatose Suzanne, the real Suzanne rises to her 
feet, approaches the screen and clasps her throat. She looks behind the screen as if 
searching for the source of the images.  
 
The lights now come on in the room with the screen. A highly agitated Suzanne, both arms 
raised above her head, backs away from the screen and collapses. Revived with smelling 
salts, Suzanne comes-to in her lover’s arms. She is now able to recognise him: she grasps 
his head in her hands, weeps, and kisses him. The démence has gone: ‘– Elle pleure…Elle est 













A documentary of 2007: Guy Maddin’s My Winnipeg 
 
All a dream, all a dream.  
I need to wake up.  
Keep my eyes open somehow.  
I need to get out of here.  
Out of here!  
What if… 
I film my way out of here? 
 
These are the opening words of first-person narrator and director, Guy Maddin, in his 
autobiographical documentary My Winnipeg. Depressed and feeling trapped in isolated 
Winnipeg, Maddin hits on the idea of filming his way out of his depression and so out of 
Winnipeg (or vice versa). Maddin’s means of escape is not merely the making of the 
documentary My Winnipeg but the making of a film within that film. He casts his mother to 
play his mother (although she ultimately pulls out to be replaced by a menacing, controlling 
Ann Savage reprising some of her famous film-noir, femmes fatales of the 1940s) and rents 
the house he grew up in to provide the set for the film-within-the-film. Narrator Maddin 
tells us: 
 
Only here can I properly recreate the archetypal episodes from my family history. 
Only here can I isolate the essence of what in this dynamic is keeping me in 
Winnipeg.  
And perhaps once this isolation through filmed re-enactment is complete, I can 
free myself from the heinous power of family and city and escape once and for all.  
[…]  
It’s 1963…ish. The time I believe most likely to conceal the key to all the memories 
and feelings which enervate me to this day. 
 
 
Alas, there is to be no ‘– He is crying…He is saved!’ moment for Maddin. Relentlessly ironic 
and sardonic about his current predicament and his traumatic childhood (his elder brother, 
Cameron, committed suicide when Guy was seven in 1963), Maddin displaces the film-
within-the-film (the filmed re-enactment within My Winnipeg) to a rather peripheral role, 
building instead a humorous autobiographical portrait which is simultaneously the 
biography of a city. But what was it that Maddin had hoped to achieve when he started on 
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this film project that he describes as a ‘docu-fantasia’? (Ebiri 2008).4 How was a film-within-
the-film – ‘this strange plunge-back in time’5 – this quasi-historical but ultimately fictional 
interlude within the documentary frame – going to release him from the enervating 






4 Interviewer (Bilge Ebiri): ‘You’ve described My Winnipeg as a “docu-fantasia”. Can you explain?’ 
Maddin: ‘That’s just a label I threw on because I wanted to avoid arguments over whether it’s a 
documentary or not. But it’s a useful starting point. Rather than having to research facts, I just 
conducted all my research in my memory and in my heart. I got to rant, I got to squirt some bile.’ 




It is striking that in both Perret’s fictional melodrama of 1912 and Maddin’s documentary 
of almost a hundred years later, a fictional film-within-the-film plays such a similar role. The 
film-within makes, or in Maddin’s case was initially expected to make, a radical 
intervention in a traumatic story and to have the power to alleviate the diegetic 
protagonist’s symptoms and psychic pain if past events can be represented and 
understood.  
 
Maddin’s documentary addresses a real traumatic personal history whilst in Perret’s film 
the real world of Suzanne is a conceit (she and her story are fictional) but nevertheless 
both films suggest that there may be parallels between the filmic and the psychoanalytic 
process. Can certain documentary films claim – as analysis claims – to be able to make an 
active, therapeutic intervention in a traumatic history? In what follows, the central 
question is whether a fictional film within a documentary can precipitate a psychic 
transformation in the diegetic protagonist’s experience of trauma. The Mystery of the 
Rocks of Kador has been described as ‘the first psychoanalytic film’ (programme notes from 
the ‘Pordenone Silent Film Festival’, 1995, quoted in: Bergstrom 1999: 15) in which 
‘[p]sychoanalysis and cinema join forces to cure a female subject’ (Bergstrom 1999: 15). 
Can the documentary filmmaking process make a similar intervention in the real world and 
real experience of a traumatised documentary protagonist? 
 
In the last couple of decades, a few documentaries have explored the impact and 
continuing ramifications of traumatic events in the life of a protagonist who appears in the 
film and who also often directs it.6 These films deploy fictional interludes (films-within-the-
film or “fictional” films within the “non-fictional” frame of the documentary) that range 
from attempts to meticulously retell – to re-present – a past event to approximate as 
closely as possible to the known, assumed, remembered or part-remembered details of an 
historical occurrence (the role Professor Williams’s film performs within the albeit fictional 
frame of The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador) through to fantastical sequences, often 
 
6 The appearance in the film is sometimes not in picture but just in voice (or in an actor’s voice-over 
of the protagonist/director’s words) especially where animation is extensively employed: for 
example, Rithy Panh’s The Missing Picture (2013) and Ari Folman’s Waltz with Bashir (2008) – two 
films where the traumatised protagonist is also the director. 
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employing explicitly non-indexical representational techniques such as animation, which 
could never be mistaken for straightforward re-enactments of past events.  
 
The fictional interludes are deployed in what seems to be an attempt to prompt the 
emergence of meanings within the documentary diegesis for the documentary protagonist: 
meanings that may or may not help to ameliorate (to lessen) the pain of the protagonist’s 
current psychological experience of the trauma. We, as viewers, are witnesses to an 
evolving filmic present as the protagonist engages with an “other” (whether a “real” other 
such as the director or an other conjured from within the protagonist). These 
documentaries seem to do something and not just show something. Viewers of the 
documentary watch an active, self-reflexive process playing out over time – an active 
process that I will argue is set in motion and kept in motion by a desire for meaning in the 
wake of trauma. The changing perceptions or emerging meanings that are made possible 
by the very process of film production itself, seem to echo the changing perceptions made 
possible by clinical psychoanalysis as a traumatic history is explored in a self-reflexive, 
evolving temporal process, in an encounter between a traumatised protagonist and an 
external (or internal in the case of self-analysis) other.  
 
Of course, all of the films I look at in detail are complex cultural artefacts, art works, 
exercises in aesthetics and much else besides but my focus here is on the therapeutic 
potential of the filmmaking process: how involvement in the act of making a film has been 
utilised by certain documentary filmmakers and documentary protagonists to work through 
a traumatic past. I want to understand what Ari Folman meant when he described the 
process of making Waltz with Bashir (2008), as ‘four years of therapy’ (Folman in interview 
quoted in: Schäuble 2011: 210). 
 
This condensed description begs more questions than it answers; questions which will need 
to be teased out. The questions fall into three areas.  
 
First, how has trauma been theorised in psychoanalysis and in post-structuralism (the two 
major accounts) and to what extent can trauma be represented and understood? This 
opens up profound epistemological and ontological issues about the possibility of meaning 
and “truth” in relation to trauma (indeed the possibility of meaning or truth at all). Where 
post-structuralism forecloses on the possibility of meaning (and indeed representation), 
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psychoanalysis deploys strategies for the recovery of meaning through dynamic inter- and 
intra-personal encounters (and the intense identifications generated in these encounters), 
and through the construction of fictions (to represent the apparently unrepresentable). 
These encounters and fictions are the focus of my two more specific areas of questioning 
below. 
 
The second area concerns documentary practice and how documentary makers have 
expanded the boundaries of what we understand by documentary to the point where it is 
capable of approaching the complex psychological phenomenon of trauma; developments 
that seem to mirror aspects of clinical psychoanalytic practice, particularly the attempt to 
gain access to the past through an examination of the structure of experience in the 
present as it plays out in current relationships with external or internal others (a 
phenomenological approach to the generation of knowledge).  
 
The third area concerns the potentially creative power of fictions to open up a route to 
understanding trauma. Again, there seems to be a parallel between psychoanalytic practice 
and documentary practice. Both deploy fictional representations of trauma in an effort to 
find or create a meaningful account of an overwhelming past and, perhaps, through 
understanding, to ameliorate the debilitating impact of the trauma in the life of the 
analysand or documentary protagonist (as Professor Williams’s fictional film-within-the-
film succeeds in doing for Suzanne in The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador). 
 
In what follows I will point to parallels, echoes and mirrorings between psychoanalytic 
practice and a certain sort of documentary filmmaking, but in doing so I am not suggesting 
that filmmakers are trying to “do” psychoanalysis. Rather, I want to draw attention to the 
similarities of approach to the psychological complexities of trauma: the generation of 
fictions in the face of trauma’s tendency to blank or evade representation; the use of 
fictions to start a process of the reflection; the necessity of that process taking place within 
inter- (and intra-) personal exchanges in a dynamic “present” playing out over time; and an 
underlying assumption that representation leading to understanding (symbolisation) might 
be part of a process that starts to lessen the pain of traumatic experience (a process of 
“working through”). Perhaps there is something in the nature of trauma itself that 
demands these responses. A few filmmakers do explicitly compare their practice to that of 
psychoanalysis: Perret in The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador (1912); Rithy Panh in The 
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Missing Picture (2013); and Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin in statements they have made 
about their filmmaking practice. But, more generally, the parallels perhaps reflect the 
cultures or intellectual milieux in which these films were produced: cultures saturated with 
psychoanalytic categories and forms of thinking. Each of the directors of the films at the 
heart of this study is from a country where psychoanalysis has a deeply-rooted cultural 
presence: Rouch and Morin from France, Panh from Cambodia but educated in France, 
Maddin from Canada, Oppenheimer from the US, Carri from Argentina and Ari Folman 
from Israel.  
 
My argument is set out over six chapters, with the last two chapters devoted to two 
detailed case studies of individual documentaries: Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing 
(2012) and Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003).  
 
In Chapter One, I lay out the theoretical framework for what follows. In the first section, I 
explore two models for the fictional film-within-the-film in documentary: an out-and-out 
fiction (a construction) and a quasi-historical re-enactment of past, traumatic events (a 
reconstruction). These two “competing” models are foreshadowed in Shakespeare’s 
deployment of the device of the play-within-the-play in Hamlet and find echoes in the two 
competing methods that Freud offered for exploring trauma: the first required the analyst 
to invent a fictional narrative to replace a past that seemed to have left no tangible traces 
(Freud called these invented narratives, ‘constructions in analysis’ (1937b)); the second 
required the analyst to deploy forensic skills in reconstructing, from the surviving traces, an 
account that might pass as something like the traumatic historical events (the so-called 
‘archaeological method’).7 In the second section, I describe the particular body of 
psychoanalytic theory that I have adopted in approaching documentary film, which could 
be described as post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis. It is an approach that sees 
psychoanalysis as a meaning-seeking enterprise that emphasises the theatrical, enacted, 
somatic and affective (often non-linguistic) aspects of the analysand’s encounter with 
trauma and provides a way to approach the enacted, embodied, affective, theatrical 
“performances” we witness in documentary’s film-within-the-film. In the third section, I 
survey the rise since the 1990s of phenomenological and psychoanalytic (largely Lacanian) 
approaches to the study of documentary film in scholarly documentary theory and explain 
 
7 Freud first compared psychoanalysis to archaeology (with both practices said to uncover 
something hidden or buried) in his 1896 essay The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896: 192). Freud 
continued to make this comparison throughout his career (Thomas 2009). 
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how these ideas have informed and guided my approach to the film-within-the-film in 
documentary. 
 
Chapter Two explores how definitions of documentary have expanded in recent years to 
encompass more explicitly subjective approaches; a shift accompanied by a growing 
acceptance that fictions can be compatible with the documentary project without the need 
to abandon belief in documentary’s non-fictionality. Much of the chapter is taken up with 
attempts to define fiction and non-fiction (both within and beyond documentary). 
Borrowing from film phenomenology, I pursue the idea that in perceiving the documentary 
object as a whole as non-fictional (even if it contains conventionally fictional elements) we 
change the nature of our engagement with that object and can ask different questions and 
glean different meanings from those that would be available with a fictional object. These 
different meanings include speculations about the sorts of meanings that emerge not just 
for us, the viewer, but for on-screen protagonists as well. As viewers we witness in the 
filmic present, changes in on-screen protagonists’ relation to their own traumatic past or 
traumatic state. As viewers, we see through the filmic text to the real lives of protagonists 
beyond or behind the screen. 
 
Fictional interludes (films-within) often appear in documentaries that explore traumatic 
personal histories and so in Chapter Three I ask whether there is something peculiar to 
trauma that demands fictions and, if so, how would a fiction advance our understanding of 
a “real-world”, non-fictional trauma? The two major theoretical accounts of trauma – the 
post-structuralist and the psychoanalytic – produce very different constructions of trauma 
at the level of epistemology (what we can know of trauma) and make competing 
ontological claims about the nature of trauma.8 In post-structuralist accounts, trauma is 
unrepresentable and experienced as inchoate pain and horror which, it is claimed, is a 
manifestation of the traumatic “Real” (both sublime and veridical). The timeless repetition 
of the traumatic is beyond understanding and unclaimable (cannot be assimilated) to 
thought or meaning. Psychoanalytic accounts concur with this description of the 
experience of trauma but go on to deploy a variety of fictions to find representational form 
for traumatic experience. These fictional or quasi-fictional representations may begin a 
 
8 There is of course a third major account, the psychiatric account of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
It is of less interest to me here as it comes without philosophical elaboration, focusing more on 
diagnosis and treatment.  
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process that eventually precipitates the emergence of a meaningful account of the 
traumatic; an account that has therapeutic potential.  
 
In the second half of the chapter, I consider the nature of the meaning(s) that emerge from 
the deployment of fictional representations in psychoanalysis and documentary. Perhaps 
these meanings themselves are fictional; an invention or fantasy that tell us nothing about 
the real world and the real trauma. Drawing on André Green’s reworking of Donald 
Winnicott’s notions of potential space and the transitional object (Green 1978a; Winnicott 
1990 [1971]a), I suggest that the fictional representations of analysis and documentary 
produce meanings that are suspended between the created and the found, between fiction 
and truth; contingent, tentative meanings (significations) that can neither claim to be the 
truth nor be written-off as fiction. It is a cautious account of the meaning that can emerge 
in relation to traumatic experience; steering between the Scylla of meaninglessness and 
the Charybdis of possessing the truth (the “Real” of trauma) that remains beyond 
understanding. In the final section of the chapter, I apply Green’s and Winnicott’s ideas to 
documentary films that deploy fictional films-within-the-film. In these documentaries, 
meanings might emerge not only for the extra-diegetic audience (you or I watching the film 
with its film-within) but also for the onscreen documentary protagonist who reacts to the 
fictional representations of the diegetic film (the film-within). 
 
In the first section of Chapter Four, I look back to the documentary practice of Jean Rouch 
and especially to the 1961 documentary Chronique d’un été made with Edgar Morin. 
Chronique pioneered many of the practices and approaches to documentary filmmaking 
that are still (or once again) being deployed by contemporary documentary makers 
exploring traumatic histories: a reflexive and self-reflexive style of filmmaking; a belief that 
documentary does not just record the world but produces something new and potentially 
transformative in the filmic present (a phenomenological account of the generation of 
knowledge); an implicit understanding that documentary works like a psychoanalytic 
stimulant, unearthing hidden meanings; and an attempt to access the past through 
dramatic, embodied performances of fictions in the filmic present. These films seem to 




Beyond Rouch, it is apparent that many recent films exploring a protagonist’s traumatic 
history are autobiographical (made by a director who is also the subject of the film). And 
so, in the second section of the chapter, I ask how it is possible in autobiographical film to 
gain the necessary distance to generate a meaningful account of a traumatic past without 
the key inter-personal encounter between a separate director and protagonist. Taking 
psychoanalytic self-analysis as a model, I argue that in autobiographical films the 
director/protagonist finds a variety of real or imagined external others (crew, audience, 
etc) who are available as part of the process of filmmaking. They also, crucially, find or 
create internal others, parts of themselves that they strive to view like an outsider – a self-
observing-self or a self-made-other-to-the-self – to produce an intra-personal space in 
which meaning might emerge. 
 
Both sections of the chapter are illustrated by reference to films by Rithy Panh. In S21: The 
Khmer Rouge Killing Machine (2003) – a documentary in the vérité tradition – Panh deploys 
embodied dramatisations of past events to re-activate the traumatic past in the filmmaking 
present; whilst in the autobiographical The Missing Picture (2013), Panh explores self-
analysis through a fictional dramatisation of his own self-analysis, which takes place under 
the watchful eye of a portrait of Sigmund Freud. 
 
Chapters Five and Six are devoted to case studies of two individual documentary films with 
central protagonists who explore their traumatic pasts and traumatic experience through 
fictions which they generate though film and then witness and reflect on within the 
diegesis. Meaning emerges for these diegetic protagonists, not inside the film-within itself 
but rather the fictional film-within acts as a catalyst that provokes the emergence of 
meaning in the documentary frame (in the film-without).  
 
Beyond this, these are two very different films. Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing is a 
third-person documentary where the director is not the traumatised protagonist. The 
principal protagonist, Anwar Congo, is a “guilty” protagonist, his trauma arising out of his 
own murderous actions in the past; a past he remembers in quite precise detail but tries to 
evade through elaborate self-deceptions. By contrast, Albertina Carri’s The Blonds is a first-
person (autobiographical) film where a brutally honest director explores a trauma in her 
own childhood that comes with no secure memories and where the historic traumatic 
events were not of her making. Carri’s film deploys fantasised scenes with animated toys, 
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no reconstructions of the events that trouble her (she is without memory) and has herself 
substituted by an actor-double for much of the film. Oppenheimer’s film by contrast makes 
extensive use of reconstruction and role reversal – techniques common in psychodrama (as 
is Carri’s doubling) – where the principal protagonist swops places with his own 
remembered historical victims.  
 
And just as the films are very different, I reach for different bodies of psychoanalytic theory 
to conduct my readings. With Carri, I look to André Green’s version of Winnicott; with 
Oppenheimer to Mária Török’s theoretical discussions of introjection and incorporation 
(Abraham and Török 1986; 1994). What unites the readings is a belief that these films can 
be read through what might broadly be described as post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis.  
 
Across all the chapters, this is an exploration of the power of filmic fictions (things that 
never happened) to transform the diegetic protagonists’ experience of real trauma (things 
that really happened). This transformed experience is not measured extra-diegetically9 but 
rather is to be grasped in the marks and traces that remain legible in the filmic text and so 




9 By, for example, using extra-filmic methodological techniques such as interviewing protagonists 









1.1 Freud, Hamlet and the play-within-the-play as a ‘bait of falsehood’ 
 
Sitting behind the formal chapter-by-chapter structure, and threading its way through all 
the chapters, is the idea of the dramatic device of the play-within-the-play that 
Shakespeare deploys in Hamlet. It offers a way to theorise the fictional films-within-the-
film of documentary makers attempting to represent and understand traumatic personal 
histories. In 1937, Shakespeare’s dramatic device is taken up by Freud to explain a radically 
new method of approaching the most intractable cases of trauma, which come without 
memory, without representation. 
 
 
1.1.1 Two models for the fictional film-within-the-film in Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
 
Hamlet offers at least two models of a fiction – a fictional play-within – performing an 
active, creative role in uncovering hidden “truths” about the “real” world: truths that are 
prompted into existence by the provocation of the play-within and which reveal 
themselves in the real world of the play-without.10 The first is a quasi-historical re-
enactment of past events and the second is an out-and-out fiction.  
 
The first model – which we see performed as a play directed by Hamlet which he calls The 
Murder of Gonzago or The Mouse-trap (Act III Scene II) – closely follows what Hamlet 
believes to be real, non-fictional, historical events that have taken place in Elsinore: the 
 
10 The device of the play-within-the-play in Shakespeare, and before Shakespeare in Thomas Kyd’s 
plays (e.g. The Spanish Tragedy of c.1587), are themselves examples in theatrical form of the literary 
device of the story-within-the-story which dates back to the birth of literature, where the inner story 
is used to entertain, to provide a moral example or to be of symbolic or psychological significance to 
the characters in the outer story and where often the “fictional” inner story is a vehicle for revealing 
a “truth” in the outer story. 
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murder of his father by his uncle Claudius. The play could be viewed as a reconstruction of 
the historical events. Hamlet hopes that in performing the play in front of his uncle, his 
uncle will reveal the truth not in words but in a spontaneous bodily ‘blench’11 or in being 
‘struck […] to the soul’;12 that is, in involuntary affective and somatic reactions to watching 
a performance of his crime. And this is what happens; Claudius storms out of the 
production in anger. It is only later in the play-without that Claudius is able to articulate (to 
provide a meaningful account of) his involuntary, essentially non-representational response 
to the play-within. His initial response is revealing but affective and performative and 
awaits reflection and interpretation. 
 
But we should also be aware that this apparently historical account is inextricably bound up 
with imaginings, conjectures and unconscious re-workings which render the present 
theatrical re-articulation of the past closer to fiction than the re-presentation of historical 
truth (or render it at most a quasi-historical re-presentation). Hamlet seems to recognise 
this himself when he says: ‘I’ll have these players / Play something like the murder of my 
father’ (Act II Scene II). It is at best, only ‘something like’ the supposed historical event. 
After all, The Murder of Gonzago tells the story not of a brother murdering a brother who is 
King and marrying the brother’s wife but instead it tells of ‘one Lucianus, nephew to the 
King’ (Act III Scene II) who murders his uncle. As Hamlet is nephew to the current king, 
Claudius, one is forced to speculate about the meaning of this transposed relationship. 
Perhaps the play-within is less a re-staging of the traumatic past and more a revenge 
fantasy in which Hamlet (with Lucianus as his double) murders his usurping uncle. Or it 
could be read as an Oedipal fantasy in which a nephew murders his uncle and goes on to 
marry his aunt: a reading in which “nephew”, “uncle” and “aunt” are thin disguises for son, 
father and mother. In taking The Murder of Gonzago as a model for those films-within in 
documentary that re-enact past events, we must be aware of its fictionalisation of the past 
and how the past is distorted by a complex set of present psychic imperatives and 
identifications. Re-stagings of the “past” in the filmic present reveal the structure of 
 
11 ‘I’ll observe his looks; / […] if he but blench, / I know my course’ (Hamlet: Act II Scene II). 
12 ‘I have heard / That guilty creatures sitting at a play / Have by the very cunning of the scene / 
Been struck so to the soul that presently / They have proclaim’d their malefactions’ (Hamlet: Act II 
Scene II). 
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experience in the present; they are a present experience of the past and inseparable from 
fantasy and projections.13 
 
The second model is intentionally fictional and makes no pretence of being a re-enactment 
of real events. Polonius, wanting to know what his son Laertes is up to whilst away from 
home, instructs his servant Reynaldo to conceal his identity and then to tell Laertes’s 
friends a series of scurrilous lies about his son (which Polonius calls ‘forgeries’, ‘slight 
sullies’ and ‘taints’ (Act II Scene I)). Polonius hopes that on hearing the lies, Laertes’s 
friends will correct Reynaldo’s stories and in so doing will inadvertently reveal the truth 
about what Laertes is really up to. Reynaldo is to play a part in a drama conceived and 
directed by Polonius although it is a drama which we, as the audience of Hamlet, never see. 
Polonius describes the lies Reynaldo is to tell as a ‘bait of falsehood’ designed to take the 
‘carp of truth’.14 A fiction (a ‘falsehood’) is constructed in order to uncover a truth about 
the real world. 
 
 
1.1.2 Two models for the fictional film-within-the-film in psychoanalysis 
 
The two models in Hamlet for flushing out a truth about the real world are mirrored closely 
in the two models that Freud offered for approaching trauma. In the most familiar model – 
which Freud described as his archaeological method – trauma is to be understood through 
a careful reconstruction of the historical events that seem to lie at the root of the trauma. 
But like Hamlet’s theatrical production before his uncle, it is a reconstruction of the past in 
a dynamic present and subject to distortions, uncertainties, forgettings, fantasies and 
unconscious projections and so, to some degree, a fictionalisation.  
 
The second model – which Freud calls a construction – was articulated late in his career. In 
a short paper, Constructions in Analysis (1937b),15 Freud came to consider the most 
intractable cases of trauma – where the trauma comes without conscious registration or 
 
13 Lacan described this same process in analysis: ‘history is not the past’ but ‘is the past in so far as it 
is historicised in the present [of the analysis]’ – it is a ‘present synthesis of the past which we call 
history’ (Lacan 1988: 12; 36).  
14 Polonius (to Reynaldo): ‘Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth; / And thus do we of 
wisdom and of reach, / With windlasses and with assays of bias, / By indirections find directions out.’ 
(Act II Scene I). 
15 Freud describes both reconstruction (the archaeological method) and construction in this paper. 
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memory and yields no representations through the normal analytic procedures of free 
association, dreams, etc. He turned to Polonius’s ‘forgeries’ as a model for a radical (even 
revolutionary) analytic procedure. With no conventional interpretation possible, its place 
must be taken by what Freud’s calls a ‘construction’ which he equates with Polonius’s ‘bait 
of falsehood’; a coherent fictional narrative that the analyst invents.16 It is ostensibly an 
entirely fictional account, constructed to fit the gaps and absences in the analysand’s 
account and to conform to the analyst’s intuitive grasp of the nature of the trauma (it is 
grasped in the analyst’s counter-transference although Freud does not use the term in this 
paper). If the construction is productive, then (as Freud put it): ‘to borrow the words of 
Polonius, our bait of falsehood had taken a carp of truth’ (1937b: 262). Freud also offers 
some advice as to how the analyst will know that the ‘carp’ has been taken: a failed 
construction will leave the patient ‘untouched’17, implying that if confronted with a 
successful construction, the patient will be touched. However we interpret a touch, it 
seems that Freud did not expect the fictional narrative to prompt a considered, conscious 
and articulated response from the patient but rather was looking for non-verbal, somatic 
and affective clues as to the construction’s productiveness. 
 
What unites Freud’s models of reconstruction and construction – and what unites Hamlet’s 
play which is ‘something like’ the murder of his father and Polonius’s ‘bait of falsehood’ – is 
that both seek to generate a “truth” (what I will call a meaning) in the real world through 
the catalyst of a fiction which is performed and witnessed. The fiction is the bait or mouse-
trap: truth the quarry. Both methods generate meaning in a dynamic present encounter 
with a fiction and both generate meaning indirectly. Neither Hamlet nor Freud expect their 
fictions to prompt the immediate emergence of meaning or the instantaneous revelation of 
the truth but rather hope that the fiction will provoke a reaction – a blench or a touch – 
from the fiction’s intended recipient. 
 
 
16 An idea first put forward by Freud in his 1919 essay A Child is Being Beaten but not fully worked 
through until the 1937 Constructions in Analysis essay. 
17 ‘no damage is done if […] we make a mistake and offer the patient a wrong construction […] What 
in fact occurs in such an event is […] that the patient remains as though he were untouched by what 
has been said and reacts to it with neither a “Yes” nor a “No”. This may possibly mean no more than 
that his reaction is postponed; but if nothing further develops we may conclude that we have made 
a mistake and we shall admit as much to the patient […] [A]n opportunity will arise when some new 
material has come to light which allows us to make a better construction and so to correct our error. 
In this way, the false construction drops out, as if it had never been made; and, indeed, we often get 
an impression as though, to borrow the words of Polonius, our bait of falsehood had taken a carp of 
truth’ (Freud 1937b: 260-1). 
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1.1.3 Two models for the fictional film-within-the-film in documentary 
 
The fictional films-within in documentaries that seek to explore traumatic personal 
histories, appear to perform a similar function both to the plays-within in Hamlet and to 
the constructions and reconstructions of clinical psychoanalysis. The traumatised 
documentary protagonists in The Blonds and The Act of Killing recreate events from the 
traumatic past and stage filmic fantasies that never occurred in the real world. These 
representations of the trauma provoke somatic and affective responses in the protagonists 
(blenches and touches) and generate intense identifications as they witness their own 
films-within; responses that in turn require reflection and interpretation in the framing 
documentary for meaning to emerge. The complex projections, role reversals and 
doublings of the fictional plays-within in Hamlet, hint at the immensely creative and 
creatively destabilising function of the play-within – the fictional construction or 





1.2 Post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis 
 
My theoretical approach to the fictions of documentary is informed by a particular version 
of psychoanalysis which, for the most part, could be described as post-Lacanian “French” 
psychoanalysis.18 Insights derived from this body of thought are deployed in three contexts. 
First, in interpreting the body: its blenches and touches, its symptoms, its performances. 
Secondly, in providing a means to resolve contradictions between apparently conflicting 
understandings of representation and meaning. Thirdly, in insisting that meaning emerges 
in and through a dynamic counter-transferential encounter. This entangled, meaning-
making process is what the French analyst-theorist, Alain Gibeault, describes as the process 




18 A heterogenous collection of analyst-theorists (not necessarily French nationals) working in France 
or influenced by ideas emerging from “French” psychoanalytic institutions. See the edited volume: 
Dana Birksted-Breen, Sara Flanders, and Alain Gibeault, eds. 2010. Reading French Psychoanalysis.  
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1.2.1 Interpreting the body: psychoanalysis as theatre and the body as a stage 
 
Post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis has placed a particular emphasis on the theatrical, 
enacted, embodied, somatic and affective (often non-linguistic) aspects of the analysand’s 
encounter with trauma (Birksted-Breen and Flanders 2010: 1-51). It is an approach to the 
analytic encounter which, although rigorously conforming to the Freudian notion of 
analysis as the talking cure, believes that the talking may only become possible once non-
representational, performative and somatic aspects of the analysand’s traumatic 
experience have been recognised and made into objects for reflection and interpretation – 
that is, they must first achieve representation. André Green encourages the analyst to be 
aware of a disparate array of clues, many non-linguistic, including ‘thing-representation, 
word-representation, affect, corporal [sic] states, acts, and so forth’ which he describes as 
the ‘heterogeneity of the signifier’ (Green in interview in: Kohon and Perelberg 2017: 119). 
It is only in recognising that these non-representational states and actions are indeed 
signifiers of the trauma (and not mute facts in the here-and-now) that the analysis can 
move towards interpretation and symbolisation. It is an approach to trauma that works 
through the blenches and touches towards representation and finally symbolisation; 
towards a meaningful account in words.  
 
Recently, a number of psychoanalytic practitioners who work with severely traumatised 
patients, have stressed the importance of the body in finding representational form for 
non-symbolised traumatic experience. Sverre Varvin, a psychoanalyst specialising in 
violence-induced trauma, argues that:  
 
Treatment must address this [disturbance of symbolisation caused by trauma] and 
provide a setting where experiences that have been insufficiently symbolised 
(expressed in somatisation, acting, non-verbal characteristics of speech, procedural 
aspects of transference, etc.) can be placed in context through a process of 
historisation [sic]. 
(Varvin 2003: 5)  
 
Varvin rejects the notion that trauma is unrepresentable and compares bodily 
manifestations of trauma to Bion’s thoughts without a thinker; that is ‘wild’, disorganised 




This approach to trauma seems particularly suited to documentary, which gives access to 
the bodies and actions as well as the words of protagonists and provides a stage for the 
performance of traumatic experience in the fictionalised films-within (and indeed in the 
documentary frame). André Green explicitly compares the analytic encounter to theatre 
(1979: 3-4) and Joyce McDougall takes theatre, plays, playing, acting, acting out, staging, 
performing, etc, as more than just metaphors for the analytic encounter: the analytic 
encounter is a form of theatre (McDougall 1986; 1989). As Birksted-Breen and Flanders 
remind us, the  
 
metaphor of the theatre is a recurring theme in French psychoanalysis. 
Psychoanalysis is conceived of and represented as a three-dimensional space, a 
theatre where unconscious scenes are staged. The […] patient and analyst are, in a 
sense, both spectators to this stage. 
(2010: 43)  
 
Like analysis, documentary provides a stage on which the protagonist can perform whilst 
the protagonist’s body (like the analysand’s body) provides a stage on which the psyche 
can perform its distress through somatisation.  
 
That said, this approach to the analytic encounter was not invented in France – it is evident 
in the first analytic case studies – but has received persistent and sustained elucidation in 
French psychoanalytic thinking. The first (proto-) psychoanalytic patient, ‘Anna O’ (Bertha 
Pappenheim), described her inner psychic reality – her daydreams, fantasies and other free 
associations – as her ‘private theatre’ (Breuer 1955 [1893]: 22, 41). By bringing these 
private productions to her analysis with Josef Breuer, these inner private plays were given a 
semi-public performance where, arguably, as part of an inter-personal transaction, they 
could reveal formerly concealed meanings. Anna O’s description of her fantasy life as 
theatre is echoed in Laplanche and Pontalis’s definition of fantasies as ‘scripts of organised 
scenes which are capable of dramatisation, usually in a visual form […] in which the subject 
has his [sic] own part to play and in which permutations of roles and attributions are 
possible’ (1988 [1967]: 318). Laplanche and Pontalis are referring here specifically to the 
role-play Freud sees in the fantasies of the child in A Child is being Beaten (1919a); an essay 
I will return to in Chapter Five in relation to Anwar Congo’s role-playing in the documentary 
The Act of Killing (2012). 
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One of the theatrical aspects of analysis, acting out, is still frequently considered to be an 
impediment to the progress of an analysis as the past, rather than being remembered, is 
dissipated in actions which the analysand does not associate with the past. But Green 
recognises the repetition of the past in action (‘acts’) as one of those heterogeneous 
signifiers that demand attention and, for McDougall (1986: 110-3), understanding these 
acts is central to the analytic process.  
 
‘Acting out’ has a rather confused and confusing history in psychoanalytic literature that 
can be traced back to the coining of the term ‘agieren’ by Freud19 in his case study of ‘Dora’ 
(Ida Bauer) (1905 [1901]). Dora both acts out in the transference with Freud aspects of a 
past relationship with someone identified in the case study as ‘Herr K’ and also breaks off 
her treatment with Freud. As a consequence, since ‘Dora’ acting out has been used to 
denote either a performative aspect of the transferential relationship (acting out past 
relationships repetitively in the present in place of remembering those relationships)20 or 
the action of bodily flight from something that is proving too difficult psychically.21 
McDougall considers both manifestations of acting out as both are enactments – non-
verbal bodily communications – between the analytic pair which carry the analysis beyond 
talking into the realm of the bodily and the performative. For McDougall, acting out 
(discharging or expelling psychic distress into the external world) is a valuable clue to 
understanding the analysand’s psychic state and a clue which can ultimately be brought 
back within the representational sphere (the web of words that is the talking cure) by 
turning it into an object for consideration by the analytic pair (1986: 110-3). Repetition 
compulsion – a morbid, melancholic response to loss and trauma revealed in acting out – 
becomes another potential route to insight. 
 
Acting out in both its forms is a performance that documentary can capture. In Albertina 
Carri’s The Blonds (2003), the director, feeling trapped and controlled by other people’s 
 
19 Conventionally translated into English as to act out or acting out (this is the translation adopted in 
the English Standard Edition of Freud’s work). 
20 As Freud puts it in Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (1914a: 150-1): ‘we may say 
that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it 
out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing 
that he is repeating it’ and so ‘the compulsion to repeat […] replaces the impulsion to remember.’ 
21 This is confirmed by Laplanche and Pontalis: ‘The term “acting out” enshrines an ambiguity that is 
actually intrinsic to Freud's thinking here: he fails to distinguish the element of actualisation in the 
transference from the resort to motor action which the transference does not necessarily entail’ 
(1988 [1967]: 4).  
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accounts of her traumatic past, replicates that experience in the rigid control she exerts 
over the actor-double who plays the part of Albertina Carri in the film-within. And perhaps 
the famous scene in Shoah (1985) where Abraham Bomba attempts to end the interview 
with director Claude Lanzmann, was an attempted acting out in the second sense. Placed in 
an intolerable situation by Lanzmann – cutting hair in a barber’s shop in Jerusalem whilst 
being asked to recount the story of how in Treblinka he cut the hair of women about to be 
gassed – Bomba is overwhelmed perhaps by guilt and certainly by the horror of the past. 
He seeks flight. In his recent book, The Play Within the Play: The Enacted Dimension of 
Psychoanalytic Process, psychoanalyst Gil Katz (2014) relates acting out in the sense of 
flight to Claudius storming out of Hamlet’s production of The Murder of Gonzago. Claudius 
acts rather than confront his own past as it is presented to him in the fictionalised form of 
the play-within. Katz argues (as McDougall had done) for the performative, bodily act of 
acting out in both senses to be embraced by psychoanalysis as a valuable heuristic tool – 
not as an obstruction in the path of a successful analysis.22 
 
Eugene Mahon in reviewing Katz’s book, succinctly summarises Katz’s contention:  
 
The more the enacted dimension in adult psychoanalytic process can be considered 
a playful extension of childhood ludic experimentation rather than a destructive 
force that can threaten, even destroy, the analytic frame, the more likely we are as 
practitioners to embrace its therapeutic potential and understand its anarchic 
energies […] this play within a play is a piece of theatre that analysts must now 
study and incorporate into their thinking. 
(2016: 1263) 
 
I am making a similar case for documentary. Documentary’s film-within-the-film, where the 
protagonist can watch back and react to their own embodied performances, offers a similar 
heuristic and therapeutic potential within the filmmaking process that Katz and McDougall 
seek to explore within the analytic process. Acting out as bodily flight, ludic play or the 
repetition of the structure of past relationships in the present of the analytic encounter can 
be incorporated into documentary when the documentary encounter is pursued as a self-
consciously reflexive process.  
 
22 Despite Katz’s call to embrace acting out, a recent study of analytic practice reveals that many 
practising analysts from a variety of schools still consider acting out to be an impediment to an 
analysis (a position that the authors of the study do not share) and the study concludes that still: 
‘[t]he rule of psychoanalysis is “speech not action”.’ (Bohleber, Fonagy, Jiménez, Scarfone, Varvin, 
and Zysman. 2013: 518). See also Wilhelm Skogstad’s 2015 paper “Speaking through Action, Acting 
through Speech: Acting and Enacting in the Analytic Process”. 
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And when the body is not acting and acting out it is often acted on; the body itself becomes 
a stage for the trauma. The French psychoanalytic tradition has been highly attuned to the 
corporeal and psychosomatic manifestations of trauma – the body’s rigidities, ailments, 
malfunctions, symptoms, affects – where trauma remains unrepresented except as it is 
“written” on the body.23  
 
For McDougall ‘[t]he body speaks no known language, yet it serves, time and again, as a 
framework for communicating the psychic scenes of the internal theatre’ (1986: 53). In the 
‘psychosomatic theatre’ the ‘psyche appears to have given up the struggle, letting the 
soma stage its own essentially wordless show’ (1986: 11-2). By paying attention to the 
body, McDougall allows unrepresented aspects of traumatic experience to enter the 
analysis, where they can be recognised by the analyst, discussed by the analytic pair, and 
so acquire representational form (that is, be seen to be representations). Having been 
recognised as signifiers (things that stand in for something that is absent) rather than as 
mute bodily facts, the analysis can then pursue a signified; the possibility of finding a 
meaningful account of the body’s wordless performance as part of a process of 
symbolisation.  
 
Documentary, like analysis, is able to stage past traumas not only in the present of the 
telling (through voice) but through the presence of the body of the traumatised protagonist 
which is available to the viewer and, in certain documentaries through the device of the 
film-within-the-film which the protagonist watches, to the traumatised protagonist as well. 
Both viewer and protagonist are able to view the body’s performance captured on film, to 
recognise that what is embodied might be a mute representation of something that is not 
present (something psychic that is missing). In McDougall’s account (and potentially in 
documentary) the body is a silent signifier of psychic trauma and by recognising this, a 
process can begin that might unearth previously hidden meanings. 
 
Perhaps the most radical (or the least “classical”) way in which French psychoanalysis has 
tried to exploit the theatrical aspects of the analytic encounter is by incorporating the 
 
23 Psychosomatics is institutionalised in France in the École psychosomatique de Paris, whose 
members have included many leading analyst-theorists. Individual “French” analysts who have 
stressed the centrality of psychosomatics to analysis include Joyce McDougall, Pierre Marty, Didier 
Anzieu, Michel Fain, Christian David and Michel de M’Uzan.  
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techniques of the separate but related discipline of psychodrama into psychoanalysis, 
where circumstances demand. When conventional representations in words seem to be 
entirely absent, a number of French practitioners have turned to psychodrama to construct 
representations through dramatic (re-)enactments.24 
 
[F]or many French psychoanalysts, only neurotic patients are suitable for 
psychoanalysis. This […] was Lacan’s view, since there was no analysis outside of 
language only the neurotic patient is capable of the symbolic activity required for 
the analysis of “signifiers”. To non-neurotic patients (psychosomatic, borderline or 
psychotic) French analysts will propose either psychotherapy face to face in order 
to avoid regression and potential disintegration, or a very French form of 
treatment, psychodrama […] Sometimes this comes as a prelude to a classical 
analysis. 
(Birksted-Breen and Flanders 2010: 41) 
 
The practice of psychodrame psychanalytique individuel 25 begins with the work of Evelyne 
Kestemberg, René Diatkine and Serge Lebovici in the immediate post-war period, with 
Didier Anzieu (2004 [1957]) credited with making psychodrama ‘truly psychoanalytic’ 
(Birksted-Breen, Flanders, and Gibeault 2010: 477). More recently, Marilia Aisenstein 
(2017: 191-4) has been an influential and enthusiastic advocate of psychodrama in certain 
“difficult” cases as a prelude to classical analysis, and Nadine Amar (1988; 2005) has 
promoted psychodrama’s re-enactments as giving ‘access to representability’ as ‘the fiction 
created by the [psychodrama] play lifts certain inhibitions and facilitates access to 
unconscious conflicts’ (Amar 2005: 78).  
 
When Jacob L. Moreno devised psychodrama in Vienna in the 1920s, he drew on categories 
developed within psychoanalysis. Psychodrama attempts to harness the ‘spontaneity-
creativity’ (Schact 2007)26 of theatrical improvisation in the hope that this will reveal 
buried, disowned, unrecognised, unacknowledged or unknown parts of the self and give 
representational form to psychic residues that have evaded representation in words. It is 
frequently used today in the treatment of abuse and trauma in children who might be 
unable to express themselves through purely talking therapies (Bannister 2007) and so has 
 
24 The practice has attracted its most extensive theoretical elaboration by analysts in France but has 
been deployed in other countries e.g. in (Albertina Carri’s) Argentina since the early 1960s. 
25 Psychoanalytic psychodrama is a group activity but differs from psychodrama in that the working 
group is made up of several analysts and one protagonist (hence the label ‘individuel’) rather than 
one specialist working with a group of non-specialists. 
26 Moreno described his new practice as the ‘theatre of improvisation’ and the ‘theatre of 
spontaneity’ (Schact 2007) as knowledge is generated in a dynamic, theatrical present (a 
phenomenological epistemology). 
 34 
echoes of Klein’s introduction of play into child analysis. The spontaneity hoped for from 
psychodrama mirrors, through action as well as speech, the spontaneity hoped for from 
free association in the talking cure. In part, the practice of psychodrama – which involves 
role-playing in a group setting – can be seen as a controlled and creative use of acting out; 
acting out that might come to be seen as a representation of something missing when, in 
the final segment of the psychodrama session known as integration, the group reflects 
upon the performances that have been witnessed. 
 
In documentary, the enacted dramas of the film-within give documentary access to exactly 
this route to representation, with the watching back of the film-within by the protagonist 
(or director-protagonist) mirroring the integration session that concludes a psychodrama 
session. Psychodrama, whether within classical analysis or in documentary, addresses one 
of the most intractable problems of traumatic experience: its escape from representation 
as trauma returns as either aporia, where memory is missing but disturbance is present, or 
as a so-called veridical memory, experienced not as memory but as the event happening in 
the present. Both these manifestations of trauma come without understanding (as all the 
major theoretical accounts of trauma attest). 
 
The psychodrama of documentary or of analysis may precipitate the recovery of a lost 
memory but is perhaps more likely to unearth identifications (projections, introjections, 
historic hatreds, empathies, etc) that reveal the structures of past relationships and the 
complex interactions between the protagonist’s internal and external worlds: 
identifications that may reveal something of the trauma if they can become an object for 
consideration by analyst-analysand or documentary protagonist. Equally, the psychodrama 
may precipitate affective and somatic reactions in the protagonist/analysand (either within 
the drama or in reflecting upon the psychodrama after its conclusion) which are 
themselves not yet representations but, again, if they can become objects for 
consideration might precipitate a process that leads to a representation in words.  
 
The performative practices that have been experimented with in documentaries treating 
traumatic histories, bear similarities to the five core techniques of psychodrama. First there 
is mirroring, where the participant acts out an experience and is then replaced on stage by 
another participant who re-enacts the scene allowing the original participant to view their 
own action – their own psychic play – like an outsider. Doubling is a similar technique but it 
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attempts to enact what is unspoken and repressed. The original participant will mount a 
performance and then their place will be taken by a double, who attempts to make 
conscious and give form to under-expressed material in the original performance. In 
psychoanalytic terms, it is an attempt to unearth the latent content of the original 
performance; content that appears to the double to have been repressed. Both mirroring 
and doubling are deployed throughout Albertina Carri’s autobiographical documentary The 
Blonds (2003) where the director has herself played by an actor-double. Thirdly there is 
role playing where the participant plays the role of a person (or object) who is or has been 
of significance. In psychoanalytic terms, it gives scope for the participant to take the role of 
one of their own internal objects. Fourthly, there is soliloquy, where a participant 
articulates their normally unexpressed thoughts to the group. There are obvious 
connections here to the analysand’s speech in analysis and to the practice of self-analysis 
where, as Didier Anzieu insists, the practice can only be effective if it is communicated to 
‘someone else’ – to an outsider (1986 [1959 & 1975]: 569). That someone-else is 
manifested by the other members of the psychodrama group or in documentary by the 
director and film crew through conversation or interview, or even in solitary, imaginative 
reflection by the protagonist on how the putative (implied) documentary audience might 
eventually respond to what they see and hear in the psychodrama. Finally, there is role 
reversal, where one participant attempts to portray another participant, who in turn 
attempts to portray the first participant; they swop roles. Role playing and role reversal are 
used again and again by Anwar Congo in the short films he devises and which are shown 
within the frame of Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentary, The Act of Killing (2012).  
 
All five techniques could be viewed as differing means to produce a play-within-a-play; a 
psychodrama play within the frame of the protagonist’s everyday life. Each protagonist 
puts on stage and in front of an audience, a spontaneously scripted aspect of their life, 
which can then be recast, re-scripted and re-staged by others. Documentary is able to offer 
a similar opportunity to present a personal psychodrama to an audience within the diegesis 






1.2.2 Representation and meaning as simultaneously created and found 
 
Beyond the mechanics of post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis (that is, its techniques and 
its attention to a heterogeneous range of signifiers which include bodies and affects as well 
as words), certain practitioners offer a synthesis of some of the apparent dichotomies in 
classical Freudian psychoanalysis. Dichotomies that express themselves in analytic practice, 
in the apparent objectives of analysis, and in its theory (theories) of meaning. In skeletal 
form: do we construct or reconstruct our representations of trauma?; do certain traumas 
have their roots in seduction (historical sexual assault) or unconscious fantasy?; is analysis 
process or archaeology?; is analysis a phenomenological enterprise concerned with the 
structure of experience in the present or is it an historical enterprise that finds its answers 
in the events of the past?; do we provoke meaning through representations that are 
‘something like the murder of my father’ as Hamlet proposes or do we provoke it through 
the outright fiction of Polonius’s ‘bait of falsehood’?; do we create or find meaning?; does 
meaning emerge newly-created like Aphrodite rising from the waves or do we have to find 
it like a Sleeping Beauty who needs to be awoken (André Green’s two-part simile (1986b: 
293))? 
 
César and Sara Botella see Freud’s work breaking into two not fully integrated phases. For 
the Botellas, the bulk of Freud’s writing from around 1900 to 1937 deals with the recovery 
of memories in the face of neurotic conditions and follows the archaeological method of 
recovering the past. The answer is to be found in the past. This middle phase of his writing 
is bookended by a more radical Freud (in his writings of 1900 and before and from 1937) 
who constructs representations to take the place of pasts that have gone missing in the 
face of catastrophic trauma, producing psychotic or borderline states in the sufferer. The 
answer must be created. The Botellas see this radical early/late phase as a quest for 
representation whether or not it can be linked to the past, with constructions (essentially 
imaginative fictions) based on dreamwork not as wish fulfillment, but as a form of work 
that brings something into being that had never existed (Botella and Botella 2005; 2013). In 
the Constructions paper, Freud himself did offer some sort of bridge (synthesis) between 
the two techniques (and the two forms of representation) from these two theoretical 
phases: 
 
Quite often we do not succeed in bringing the patient to recollect what has been 
repressed. Instead of that, if the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him 
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an assured conviction of the truth of the construction which achieves the same 
therapeutic result as a recaptured memory. 
        (1937b: 265-6) 
 
César Botella takes this notion further suggesting that it is not just the outcomes (the 
therapeutic results) that are the ‘same’ but that the techniques of construction and 
reconstruction themselves are often indistinguishable: the construction being a 
reconstruction of a memory without recollection (without content) and the reconstruction 
(following Winnicott’s work), being a regression to a structure of dependence and not 
strictly a recollection of past events at all (Botella 2014: 911-6). I have followed this 
synthesis in my readings of fictions in documentary by refusing a too rigid distinction 
between reconstructed and constructed fictions. 
 
More central to my purposes is André Green’s reworking of Winnicott’s ideas about play, 
the transitional object and potential space that allow me to view the meaning that emerges 
from both the analytic and the documentary process as being simultaneously, and 
inseparably, both created and found, both constructed and reconstructed, both fiction and 
truth. A crude distinction between “fictional” and “true” meanings is discarded (as we can 
never know if we possess the truth), replacing it with a pragmatic evaluation of meaning. 
Not is it true?; but does it lessen the pain of traumatic experience and help to work through 
the trauma?  
 
 
1.2.3 Symbolisation: meaning emerging out of a counter-transferential encounter 
 
Finally, I draw on French psychoanalytic theorists when I argue that the representations 
and subsequently the meanings that emerge in both documentary and analysis, emerge in 
– and out of – a mutual, entangled, counter-transferential space. I am not suggesting that it 
is only in post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis that counter-transference has a central 
place (far from it), but simply acknowledging that I have turned to Green, to César and Sara 
Botella, to Michel Neyraut and to other French analyst-theorists when thinking about 
counter-transference. As the elements of transference and counter-transference are often 
so hard to distinguish (see my note on Neyraut in section 1.3.3 of this chapter), I 
sometimes follow the practice of using the conjoined term transference/counter-
transference with its nod towards that mysterious entity that Thomas Ogden (2004) calls 
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the ‘analytic third’ or, to de-personify the notion, the co-transference that exists between 
the analytic actors. 
 
Sara and César Botella (2013) develop the embryonic ideas outlined in Constructions in 
Analysis, and make explicit what Freud left unsaid. In cases where representations have 
gone missing or only ever registered as fragments, representation (and subsequently 
understanding) can be achieved through regredient dreaming; the grasping of the trauma 
(the intuiting of the trauma) in the transferential/counter-transferential space that exists 
between the analyst and the analysand through the creation of an imaginative fiction.27 
André Green reaches a similar conclusion when considering similarly intractable cases of 
trauma. What is required is ‘another system of reference which gives pride of place to the 
countertransference. […] The analyst ought to either use his imagination, or resign’ (1986b: 
294).28 Once again, an imaginative fiction that emerges out of the counter-transference, 
gives representational form to the trauma and can potentially, through a temporal process, 
lead to the emergence of meaning for analysis’s “diegetic protagonist”, the analysand. 
 
In considering documentaries about personal traumatic histories there is an additional 
location for meaning to emerge. As viewers, we witness the intra-diegetic struggle for 
meaning as the protagonist engages with others within the diegesis (the struggle the 
Botellas and Green describe within the analytic setting) but we also experience our own 
struggle for meaning as we engage with the documentary object and the characters in the 
diegesis, and this engagement generates its own set of identifications and empathetic 
encounters. Although my main focus is the meanings that are created or found by the 
diegetic protagonist, the meanings that we (the viewer) create or find are generated in a 
similarly entangled counter-transferential space. In what follows, I sometimes bracket out 
meaning for the viewer in order to focus on the meanings that become available to the 
diegetic protagonist. But we must always be aware that it is we, as viewers, who ascribe 
meanings to the protagonist. After all, the protagonist only exists for us as light on a screen 
and sound on tape and so the two loci for the emergence of meaning are ultimately 
 
27 There are parallels to Bion’s notion that ‘[t]he analyst must be able to dream the session’ (1992: 
120). 
28 Green makes it clear that this creative use of the counter-transference is an elaboration of what 
Freud implied but never fully realised, as he adds that ‘[h]ere we have evidently reached the limits 
of Freudian practice and theory’ (1986b: 294). 
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inseparable as the meanings we find or create as viewers include the meanings we intuit 
and assign to the diegetic protagonist. 
 
Green does provide some indication of how this interaction between extra-diegetic viewer 
and filmic text might work, in one of his rare forays into applied psychoanalysis. In a paper, 
“The Unbinding Process” originally published in 1971, Green examines the reader’s 
engagement with a literary text (and I think his speculations about the reader of literature 
can be transferred across to the viewer of documentary): ‘[T]he analyst [that is, the reader] 
reacts to the text as if it were a product of the unconscious. The analyst [reader] then 
becomes the analyzed of the text. It is within himself-as-text that he must find an answer’. 
Green is describing a counter-transferential process in which the analyst as reader must 
excavate his/her unconscious response to the text (as the text awakens ‘both an idea and 
an affect in the reader’) and then proceed to interrogate that response in a process that 
moves towards interpretation (an ‘interpretation that he [the reader] must give himself of 
the effects of the text in his own unconscious’). Green calls this process an ‘exercise in self-
analysis’ (1980 [1971]: 18).29 The text is analysed by the reader and the reader is analysed 
by the text in a radical two-way movement, with the reader ultimately producing a text 
that is his/her own ‘construction’ (1980 [1971]: 21).  
 
This extra-diegetic process and the process I am attempting to describe within the 
documentary diegesis (my main focus), is a counter-transferential process of symbolisation. 
It starts with a fictional representation which substitutes for the missing trauma and acts as 
a catalyst or provocation or bait or trap, setting in motion a process which, if productive, 
leads to symbolisation: the emergence of a meaningful account of the trauma. Again, it is in 
French psychoanalytic theory that I find a description of this process that most closely 
mirrors the processes I discern in certain documentary films. French psychoanalyst, Alain 
Gibeault, provides a succinct description of the process, beginning with the creation of an 
essentially fictional representation: 
 
We can define symbolization as the operation by which something comes to 
represent something else for someone. While it may appear as the substitution of 
one object for another, it is primarily the result of a process that assumes both the 
 
29 Throughout this paper, Green refers to the ‘analyst’ but he is always concerned with the analyst as 
reader (and is merely signalling his belief that analysts make particularly acute readers of literary 
texts). Notwithstanding, this paper is about the reader and the act of reading a text (not about the 
analyst qua analyst). 
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ability to represent an absent object and a subject capable of knowing that the 
symbol is not the symbolized object. In this sense it promotes the ability to 
fantasize and the organization of mental space.  
 
Gibeault then describes how meaning emerges:  
 
Aside from allowing one term to substitute for another [i.e. a form of 
fictionalisation or metaphorisation], symbolization designates back and forth flow 
of meaning between subject and object, between mental reality and external 
reality, between past and present. This is the effect of the symbolization process,  
which makes possible a system of intra- and intersubjective exchanges. 
(Gibeault 2005: 1712-4)  
 
For Gibeault, meaning emerges out of counter-transferential entanglements organised 
around fictions that substitute for the traumatic content that has gone missing. The 
meaning-making process is both a temporal and an inter-/intra-personal one, in which 
barriers between apparently separate entities dissolve: barriers between self and other, 





1.3 Documentary theory 
 
In ‘theorizing documentary’30 – and here in placing my work within the scholarly literature 
on documentary – I have been informed by two bodies of theory: by film phenomenology 
and by psychoanalytically-informed approaches to documentary. There is overlap between 
the two bodies of theory even if expressed in different technical language, and both bodies 
of theory dovetail with the approaches to documentary I derive directly from 
psychoanalytic theory. 
 
Both groups of scholars insist that the documentary object differs from the fictional film; it 
is a non-fictional object (even when deploying fictions and fictionalisations) and as such 
demands a different sort of engagement, can be asked different questions and gives access 
to different meanings about the world than those available in fictional films. Both groups 
maintain that something unique and potentially meaningful is created in the present of the 
 
30 I borrow this term from Renov: it is the title of his 1993 monograph. 
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filming. And both groups have imported approaches developed in relation to fictional films, 
repurposing and redeploying these theoretical approaches for documentary.  
 
 
1.3.1 Phenomenological approaches to documentary 
 
The application of film phenomenology to documentary has offered me three approaches 
that I adopt in pursuing my argument.31 First, it recognises that documentary gives the 
viewer access to a unique, embodied encounter32 that creates something new and 
potentially meaningful in the filmic present. Secondly, it offers a way to theorise the 
complex entanglements that characterise the interaction between subject and object, 
between viewer and film (including the diegetic protagonist’s interaction with the internal 
film – documentary’s film-within-the-film); an interaction that I then conceptualise as 
counter-transferential. The film (and the film-within-the-film) cannot be grasped 
objectively, as separate from its viewer, as a thing-in-itself: it is grasped in the flow and 
counter-flow between an experiencing-subject (the viewer) engaging with – and acted-on 
by – an experienced-object (the film or a protagonist within the film) (Sobchack 1999; also 
see gloss of Sobchack’s work in: Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich, eds, 2016: 22). In Vivian 
Sobchack’s words: ‘objective phenomena [the film] and subjective consciousness [of the 
perceiving viewer] are entailed in an irreducible correlation.’ […] ‘a film and its spectator 
[are] two active and differently situated viewers viewing in intersubjective, dialectical, and 
dialogic conjunction’ (2009: 436, 443; Sobchack’s italics). Neither subject nor object exist in 
isolation, each is always in dialogue with the other in – to borrow Gibeault’s phrase – a 
‘back and forth flow of meaning between subject and object’ (2005: 1713). This encounter 
is inseparable from the viewer’s fantasies, projections, introjections, identifications, 
whether that viewer is us as the viewer of the documentary or the intra-diegetic viewer 
who watches the fictional films-within. The film comes to the viewer through the filter of 
his or her senses, conceived broadly to include the psychology of the perceiving mind. And 
finally, film phenomenology as described by Vivian Sobchack (1999, and also 1992), has 
encouraged me in my belief that documentary offers us a glimpse into the real lives of 
 
31 Vivian Sobchack (along with Alain Casebier) was central not only to the revival of 
phenomenological approaches to film in the 1990s (much neglected since the 1960s in the face of 
semiotic approaches to film) but in the application of film phenomenology to documentary.  
32 As regards embodied approaches to documentary, I have drawn on the work of Vivian Sobchack 
and Linda Williams in particular (beginning with a number of articles published in the 1990s). The 
spectator’s body and the protagonist’s body become key elements in cinematic perception and 
interpretation. 
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protagonists beyond or behind the screen. That is, for all its fictions and for all the 
entanglements between viewer and viewed (or, more accurately, because of what these 
fictions and entanglements reveal), documentary can tell us something about the real 
world and the real lives of documentary protagonists that exist independently of the film. 
 
 
1.3.2 Psychoanalytic approaches to documentary 
 
In common with phenomenological approaches to documentary, psychoanalytic 
approaches to documentary were rare until the 1990s (Renov 2004 [1996]: 93),33 when a 
few scholars began to repurpose and redeploy predominantly Lacanian approaches to 
fictional film developed in the late 1960s and 1970s,34 and to explore the complex 
subjective and psychological mechanisms at work both in documentary reception and in 
documentary production.  
 
Beginning in the 1990s, Michael Renov and Elizabeth Cowie reconsider the nature of 
documentary reception, challenging the dominant conception of documentary as an 
exclusively sober, realist genre that satisfied a demand in the viewing public for rational, 
objective, informative accounts of a real, non-fictional world. Renov and Cowie question 
both “halves” of this equation: the nature of the documentary object and the nature of the 
viewer’s engagement with that object.35 
 
Cowie (1999: 19-20) argues that documentary had never been straightforwardly realist and 
had always encompassed elements of fantasy. She questions the conventional distinction 
between the supposedly separate cinematic traditions spawned by Louis Lumière and 
Georges Méliès (a realist, “scientific”, empirical tradition and a tradition of filmic fantasy) 
and so, as Stella Bruzzi puts it in her review of Cowie’s Recording Reality, Desiring the Real, 
 
33 Renov makes this point in his 2004 introduction to the republication of his 1996 essay “Charged 
Vision” where he also reflects on the call he made for a psychoanalytic approach to documentary in 
Theorizing Documentary (1993).  
34 Theoretical approaches developed by scholars such as the Christian Metz, Roland Barthes, Ann 
Kaplan, Laura Mulvey and others writing in the journals Screen, m/f, Cahiers du Cinéma and 
elsewhere. 
35 Renov began setting out his ideas in Theorizing Documentary (1993) and the essay “Charged 
Vision” (2004 [1996]) and continues to pursue these ideas in, for example, his 2015 essay 
“Documentary and Psychoanalysis: Putting the Love Back in Epistephilia”. Elizabeth Cowie entered 
the fray with her 1999 essay “The Spectacle of Actuality” and explores this field at book length in 
Recording Reality, Desiring the Real (2011). 
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‘collapses some of the differences between fictional and nonfictional cinema’ (Bruzzi 
2015b: 384-7). This collapsing of boundaries through the exploration of fantasy is explicitly 
espoused by the documentary-makers I consider in what follows: fantasy does not creep 
into the documentary frame unacknowledged and unnoticed as an unwanted alien 
incursion but is deployed as a way – perhaps the only available way when trauma is in play 
– to uncover certain “truths” about the real world.  
 
Renov and Cowie also question the nature of the viewer’s engagement with this more 
complicated documentary object, by introducing the notion of a documentary viewer 
‘incited by unconscious drives as had been argued for the audience of the fiction film’ 
(Renov 2004 [1996]: 93). Neither Renov nor Cowie abandon the conventional notion of a 
documentary viewer animated by epistemophilia and intellectual curiosity but argue that 
this knowledge-seeking viewer is also animated by unconscious desires; desires which 
Renov and Cowie theorise through Lacanian categories.36 As viewers we are not simply 
disinterested, rational observers of the world presented in the documentary but are 
subject to unconscious forces as we (for example) identify with ‘the social actors in the 
documentary as stand-ins for ourselves’ (Cowie 1999: 31). There is an entanglement 
between viewer and viewed which not only requires acknowledgment but which, if 
explored and interrogated, might afford us a deeper understanding of what unfolds on the 
screen.  
 
Other scholars have sought to deploy insights gleaned from psychoanalysis inside the 
filmmaking process: a shift of focus from the psychology of documentary reception to that 
of documentary production. Rather than explore the play of fantasy and desire in the 
documentary viewer who (at least nominally) sits outside the film and responds to – and 
identifies with – what unfolds on screen, the focus shifted to the unconscious forces that 




36 In Cowie’s account (1999: 19), there are twin motivational desires: ‘On the one hand there is a 
desire for reality held and reviewable for analysis as a world of materiality available to scientific and 
rational knowledge […] On the other hand there is a desire for the real not as knowledge but as 
spectacle’. 
37 In the reflexive and self-reflexive films I consider here, the documentary maker has a presence 
within the diegesis (as well, of course, as having an extra-diegetic existence as the unseen maker of 
the film which is common to all documentaries).  
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Diane Waldman and Janet Walker made early incursions into this field in their seminal 
editors’ introduction to Feminism and Documentary (1999b). They saw a powerful parallel 
between the analyst-analysand encounter in clinical psychoanalysis and the encounters 
between characters in the documentary diegesis: in both encounters, something of the 
absent past re-emerges and ‘is made operative in actions and resistances in the present’ 
(1999b: 25). In this transferential model, meaning emerges in the filmic or analytic present 
in and through the inter-personal relations between the diegetic “actors”. A similar agenda 
is pursued by psychotherapist Emanuel Berman, following interviews he conducted with 
documentary-makers. Berman began to consider the unconscious motivations that affect 
the director’s choice of subject and that continue to animate the filmmaker throughout the 
filmmaking process. Berman was particularly interested in the relationship that develops 
between director and protagonist during filmmaking: an inter-personal process that he felt 
was akin to the inter-personal processes at play in analysis: ‘the process of transference 
and counter-transference’ (Berman quoted in: Chanan 2007: 216; see also: Berman et al 
2003). 
 
But perhaps unsurprisingly, it is two film scholars who are also filmmakers who have most 
energetically pursued this line of enquiry, deploying insights derived from their reading of 
Lacan in an attempt to understand what drove their own filmmaking practice. Alisa Lebow 
(2008) explores the unconscious forces at play in the filmmaking process as she considers 
the desire of the filmmaker in making the film and in her characterisation of filmmaking as 
an active, creative attempt to come to terms with loss: an argument she pursues in part 
through a consideration of her own experience in making the autobiographical (or, to use 
her preferred term, ‘first-person’) film, Treyf (Lebow and Madansky 1998). It is Agnieszka 
Piotrowska, though, who most extensively explores the “internal”, psychological mechanics 
of filmmaking (again, in part, through an examination of her own filmmaking practice).38 At 
the heart of Piotrowska’s account (2014), is the complex relationship between the 
documentary director and protagonist which is cast as an unequal transferential 
relationship of love which inevitably ends in betrayal. It is a relationship that begins (or at 
least begins in the imagination) from the moment the idea of the film first enters the 
director’s head and, for the protagonist, from the moment when they are first contacted by 
the director, and it persists throughout the production of the film. This entangled, 
 
38 Piotrowska’s and Lebow’s accounts of their own practice differ markedly in that Lebow was the 
director of a first-person film whilst Piotrowska’s films have always been third-person films (with a 
separate director and protagonist). I consider these two modes of address in Chapter Four. 
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transferential relationship profoundly influences the shape, content and tone of the 
finished documentary but leaves few concrete traces. As Piotrowska writes: ‘Very often the 
actual mechanics of the documentary encounter are concealed from the viewer and hard 
to investigate’ (2014: 11). 
 
I want to make a similar incursion “inside” the documentary to the one Piotrowska and 
Lebow make, in order to investigate the unconscious mechanics of the documentary-
making process. But it takes a particular sort of documentary text for the traces of these 
internal mechanics to remain legible and available to the viewer; that is, for these 
mechanics not to be concealed or only to become available retrospectively and “extra-
textually” in director’s or protagonist’s reminiscences. In certain films, the viewer is 
afforded privileged access to the complex psychological factors at play during the 
production of the documentary, circumventing the lack of visibility that Piotrowska 
identifies. Reflexive films (that unmask the mechanics of the filmmaking process) and 
especially self-reflexive films (where the documentary itself becomes a subject of the 
documentary) can give the viewer this privileged access to the desires and identifications 
that drove the diegetic protagonists during the making of the film. The device of the film-
within-the-film – a fiction within the documentary created by, watched by, and reflected-
on by the diegetic protagonists – has the power to provoke or catalyse responses within 
the diegesis that facilitate our access to these complex psychological mechanics, revealing 
the inter-personal processes through which the diegetic protagonists struggle towards a 
meaningful account of a traumatic history. 
 
In what follows I want to build on these psychoanalytic readings of both documentary 
reception and documentary production. My principal focus of attention is the intra-diegetic 
emergence of meaning in the filmic present as protagonists respond to fictional 
representations of trauma within an inter- or intra-personal frame playing out over filmic 
time. To achieve this I am influenced by the work of those who have written about the 
psychology of documentary production. But as the meanings we assign to the protagonists 
cannot be separated from the meanings we as viewers make through our engagement with 
the filmic text (that is, we cannot evade the possibility that we have created – invented – 
the meanings that we assign to protagonists), my readings draw on the work of those who 
have examined documentary reception through a psychoanalytic lens and this must involve 
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an examination of our own identifications, projections and affective responses as viewers 
to watching the film.  
 
 
1.3.3 Afterword on Lacanian approaches to documentary 
 
Where I differ from most of those who have developed psychoanalytic approaches to 
documentary reception and production, is that my readings are not rooted in Lacanian 
theory. That said, my readings are not anti-Lacanian and I acknowledge that it is 
“Lacanians” who have opened up this field and who have written about it with deep 
insight. But I have chosen to draw instead on a different body of psychoanalytic theory – 
post-Lacanian French psychoanalytic theory – because I have found it more closely 
addresses the phenomena that documentary (and especially documentary that explores 
trauma) seems to make available. Of course, the talking head has been a basic component 
of documentary at least since Rouch and Morin made Chronique d’un été (1961), and 
words and speech are the basic transactional material of Lacanian psychoanalysis (with the 
unconscious itself said to be structured like a language).39 But documentary gives us much 
beyond language even if we apply quite a broad definition of language – and sometimes 
language is not available.  
 
In cases of profound trauma both in analysis and in documentary – with representational 
capacities fractured or disabled – a linguistic transaction may, at first, not be possible (even 
if the ultimate goal – meaning – will take linguistic form if it is ever to be achieved). We 
might instead be presented with the shattered fragments of traumatic experience that 
manifest themselves only as bodily epiphenomena (somatisation, acting out, affect, 
physical paralysis, etc) or as the bizarre objects of Bion’s theoretical speculations (Bion 
1957). These manifestations of trauma are at the very least extra-linguistic (perhaps non-
linguistic) and suggest that parts of the psyche are alien to the structuring influence of 
language.40 Profound traumatic experience seems to create psychic states that are 
 
39 For Lacan: ‘psychoanalysis is understood in theory and practice to be a linguistic enterprise. Words 
are its medium, the process is a discourse, words produce the illumination which is its product. 
More radically, Lacan claimed that the unconscious is structured like a language’ (Birksted-Breen and 
Flanders 2010: 31).  
40 This is the implication of Freud’s introduction of the tripartite division of the psyche in 1923 in The 
Ego and the Id. The Id stands outside representation and language.  
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variously described as psychotic, schizophrenic or borderline and which fail to manifest 
themselves in those linguistic forms that are available in the face of neurosis.  
 
Post-Lacanian French psychoanalysis, which emphasises the embodied, theatrical, somatic 
and affective41 (non-linguistic) aspects of the analysand’s presentations in analysis, seems 
to provide a good theoretical fit with the heterogeneous range of signifiers42 that the 
physical presence of the traumatised protagonist makes available in documentary. As 
viewers we must pay attention to the embodied, corporeal manifestations of trauma which 
protagonists exhibited during the filmmaking process. We must pay attention to the 
blenches and touches generated in the protagonist’s confrontation with the fictional 
representations of the film-within. 
 
And finally, in my preferred version of psychoanalysis – following the Freud of 
Constructions in Analysis, the Botellas, André Green, Berman in his speculations on the 
documentary encounter, and many post-Lacanian French analysts – a fundamental 
interpretive tool (perhaps the fundamental interpretive tool) of the psychoanalytic 
encounter is the counter-transference, if the feelings generated in the counter-
transference can be made into an object of enquiry. Many of the documentary theorists 
who pursue a psychoanalytic approach to documentary, make transference a central 
component of their interpretive strategies but I would argue that even more fundamental 
is the counter-transference which, following the argument of Michel Neyraut (2010: 218-
32), is either indistinguishable from the transference or precedes it and takes precedence 
over it (the transference is only activated in the context of the counter-transference). Lacan 
often expressed a negative view of the impact of counter-transference on an analysis, 
describing it as ‘the sum of the prejudices, passions, perplexities, and even insufficient 
information of the analyst at a certain moment in the dialectical process of the treatment’ 
(Lacan 1966: 225). I agree with Lacan to the extent that unacknowledged and unexamined 
 
41 With Lacan, there is ‘the virtual elimination of affect from the psychoanalytic field’ (Birksted-Breen 
and Flanders 2010: 32). André Green concurs: ‘affect has no place in it [Lacan’s work]’ (Green 1999b: 
99). The only affect which does find a place in Lacan’s thought is anxiety to which he devoted his 
1962-3 seminar but it is clearly singled out as the only affect that does not deceive and so the only 
one which deserves attention. And, even in admitting anxiety as an affect worthy of attention, Lacan 
set limits to its legitimate range, confining it to the anxiety that we do not know what we are for the 
other.  
42 André Green coined the phrase the ‘heterogeneity of the psychoanalytic signifier’ to counter 
Lacan’s conception of an unconscious structured like a language and composed homogeneously of 
linguistic signifiers (Green 1999b: 299; and: Kohon and Perelberg 2017: 119). 
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counter-transference is an impediment to an analysis (and interpreting it is difficult as 
counter-transference both elucidates unconscious phenomena and simultaneously resists 
interpretation (Neyraut 2010: 226)). But if the analyst applies a rigorously self-reflexive 
approach to his or her counter-transference – constantly interrogating and questioning 
what is felt and perceived – then the counter-transference can be more than a marker of 
the analyst’s failure or a product of an early phase of the analysis (which will fade away as 
the analyst begins to grasp the true nature of the analysand’s psychic landscape). Before 
the 1960s, Lacan expressed an interest in counter-transference as indicative of ‘the desire 
of the analyst’ (as a subject not only supposed to know but a subject supposed to desire) 
but from the early 1960s, Lacan became openly hostile to the suggestion that analysts 
should work in the counter-transference (Evans 1996: 31) – a symmetrical relationship – 
insisting it was sufficient to speak of the different ways analyst and analysand were 
implicated in the powerfully asymmetrical relationship of the transference (Lacan 1991 
[1960-1]: 233). For me, it is the very symmetricality of the counter-transferential 
relationship that allows it to be psychoanalysis’s most powerful heuristic tool and a highly 
productive conceptualisation of the identificatory entanglements of subject and object in 
life, in film and in analysis. It is central to my readings of my two case studies in Chapters 





1.4 The deployment and definition of terms 
 
In what follows, I deploy a number of terms which require definition (including but not 
limited to): meaning, fiction and non-fiction, affect (and other manifestations of the 
somatic), fantasy, play (playing) and the transitional, various forms of identification 
(including empathy, projective identification, incorporation and introjection), counter-
transference, representation (and the debate over the very possibility of achieving 
representation at all in the wake of trauma) and the idea of a “cure” for trauma. The key 
terms – because of the way in which I have framed the question at the heart of this enquiry 




Many of these terms are contested, with little consensus as to their definition either 
between disciplines or within individual disciplines. I have attempted to define how I am 
using each term at the point in the thesis where it is most central to the argument and is 
carrying the maximum theoretical load. The fiction/non-fiction divide is the subject of the 
next chapter and so I will avoid comment here. But for other terms, some preliminary 
comments seem appropriate. 
 
Trauma is described in very similar terms across a number of disciplines (post-
structuralism, psychoanalysis, psychiatry). There is agreement as to the causes and the 
symptoms of trauma, including a general appreciation that trauma tends to blank 
representational capacities, leaving the sufferer with intense negative feelings but nothing 
tangible – no representation or signifier – in which to locate the trauma so it can begin to 
become an object of thought. But although at this descriptive level the major accounts of 
trauma are in agreement, beneath the surface they are profoundly at odds, fleshing out 
their accounts with incompatible, divergent ontologies. For post-structuralism, trauma is 
unrepresentable, placing a meaningful account of trauma permanently out of reach: the 
absence of signifiers means that no signified (no meaning) can ever be achieved. 
Conversely, the psychoanalytic account concedes that trauma is often unrepresented but 
refuses the notion that it is a priori unrepresentable and pours all its resources into creating 
representations to replace (to create or find) the absent representations; representations 
that have the appearance of fictions. 
 
Traces of the trauma can be found in bodily responses to the traumatic such as affect (a 
force of “feeling” that lies on the boundary between the psychic and the somatic) and in 
other “pure” somatisations from illness to acting out. These traces (which André Green 
describes as a heterogeneous range of signifiers – non-linguistic, non-cognitive markers of 
the trauma – and which I would describe as proto-signifiers as first they must be recognised 
as signifiers so they cease to be brute bodily facts) provide the raw materials from which an 
account of the absent trauma can be constructed. These affects and somatisations are the 
blenches and touches that Hamlet and Freud describe. 
 
Other representations are created through activities that involve the re-arrangement of 
psychic (and not simply somatic) traces of the trauma. This is where fantasy and play have 
a role, with both involving imagination and with both capable of revealing (or indeed 
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concealing) traces of the trauma. Both these activities can only function (can only generate 
representations) in a transitional space where – at least initially – they are not subjected to 
empirical objections such as is this really true? – blurring the boundaries between fact and 
fiction. My conception of play draws on the work of Winnicott and on the further 
elaboration of Winnicott’s ideas by André Green. For Winnicott, the psychoanalytic process 
itself is a form of playing: ‘[P]sychoanalysis has been developed as a highly specialised form 
of playing in the service of communication with oneself and others’ (1990 [1971]c: 41), 
whilst Green (2005b: 8) makes explicit the value of play in understanding and coming to 
terms with the traumatic, arguing that ‘it is in the presence of horror that we understand 
the necessity of play in making it bearable’. And Winnicott stresses, in the context of a 
therapy, the centrality of the inter-personal in play or playing: ‘Psychotherapy takes place 
in the overlap of two areas of playing, that of the patient and that of the therapist.  
Psychotherapy has to do with two people playing together’ (1990 [1971]c: 38; Winnicott’s 
italics). 
 
Other technical terms that are deployed in what follows, are concerned not with the 
creation of representational content (fictions) through inter-personal encounters but with 
the structure or form of the inter-personal. States of identification involve the most 
entangled of all species of interpersonal encounter, where two psyches become as one. 
The concept of identification entails the idea that what is apprehended by, or present in, 
one psyche can become the property of another psyche, helping one psyche to recover the 
missing traces of the trauma through contact with an untraumatised, apprehending 
psyche. My conception of counter-transference extends this idea, defining counter-
transference as a symmetrical relationship of intense identification that can become a 
route to a meaningful account of trauma, where another mind grasps the nature of the 
trauma and then offers the insight or the feelings generated in the counter-transference 
back to the traumatised subject who is experiencing trauma with no representational 
content. 
 
What emerges from all these interpersonal encounters may be meaning. The 
representations or signifiers generated and shared in these interpersonal encounters may 
begin to point to a signified. And it is meaning (the signified) itself – the final technical term 
I want to deal with here – that has the potential to have an ameliorative impact on the 
protagonist’s experience of trauma. Meaning brings a bonus of pleasure and it is this that 
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helps to explain why the traumatised protagonist will subject themselves to the painful re-
experiencing of trauma in play or in fantasy or in analysis. Like Ernst in Freud’s fort-da story 
(1920: 14-7), the protagonist gains a form of mastery over the trauma through the 
reworking of the trauma in fictional play, and this mastering of the inchoate (through 
knowledge or understanding or the recovery of agency or meaning) has an ameliorative 
bonus of pleasure that can be wrung from what is otherwise an experience of pain and 
horror. Knowledge in itself – what Bion (1994 [1962]) describes as ‘K’ as opposed to the 
deeply troubling experience of ‘-K’ or what Freud (1917b: 327-8) sees as the satisfaction of 
an innate ‘epistemophilic instinct’ – is not a “cure” for trauma but it is a form of coming to 







The fictionality of fiction and the non-fictionality of non-fiction 
 
 
My argument in this and succeeding chapters – that fictions within the documentary frame 
can provoke meanings for the diegetic protagonist which have the potential to ameliorate 
the pain of traumatic experience – depends upon maintaining some sort of distinction 
between fiction and non-fiction both in documentary and more broadly. In this chapter I 
ask to what extent can documentary – a highly-constructed form and not a simple window 
on reality – be said to be non-fictional and what makes the filmic interlude (the film-within-
the-film) fictional? Before considering the fictionality of the fictional interlude, I first want 
to consider the non-fictionality of the documentary frame.  
 
 
2.1 The non-fictionality of documentary  
 
Non-fiction claims a fidelity to something beyond itself; it refers to something independent 
of the non-fictional narrative that exists or existed. Fiction makes no such claim. It is a 
product of the imagination and although it must work with elements we recognise from a 
real world beyond the imagination, the most it can claim is to be like the real world.43 
Despite the appeal of this commonsense definition, it is grounded in claims about 
referentiality which are deeply contested. In recent decades, poststructuralist theorists 
have stressed the fictionality of all forms of narration (and indeed of all forms of meaning-
making) including those that make referential claims like historiography and documentary. 
The binary of fiction/non-fiction is collapsed into fiction. This is deeply problematic for 
documentary which has been defined since its inception as cinema’s non-fictional form. 
‘Documentary arises, with Grierson and Dziga Vertov, in response to fiction’ according to 
Bill Nichols (1994: 94). It is the fiction film’s binary other and documentary is routinely 
defined as non-fiction film.  
 
 
43 Fiction film and documentary maker, Lindsay Anderson, made the same distinction when defining 
documentary (in 1971): ‘If the material is actual, then it is documentary. If the material is invented, 
then it is not documentary’ (quoted in: Minh-Ha 1990: 78). 
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2.1.1 The blurring of the fiction/non-fiction boundary 
 
Even for critics, like Nichols, who are not convinced by the post-structuralist case, the 
division between fiction and non-fiction in documentary is extremely difficult to draw: ‘One 
of the most blurred of recent boundaries lies precisely between fiction and nonfiction’ 
(1994: x). Nichols uses the word ‘recent’ as, in common with numerous critics44 from a 
number of theoretical backgrounds, there seems to be a consensus that documentary has 
been expanding the range of filmic devices and representational forms that it is able to 
draw on in creating its narratives: devices and forms that were once more commonly 
associated with fictional narratives or at least more with declaredly subjective narratives 
than had been common in documentary. This process has only accelerated since Nichols 
wrote about it in Blurred Boundaries in 1994.  
 
I have included the notion of subjectivity alongside fictionality not because the two can be 
directly mapped on to each other but because their binary opposites, objectivity and non-
fictionality, have been frequently paired together in descriptions of the nature of 
documentary film. Recently, Nichols (2017) noted the increasing prevalence of 
documentaries that adopt a reflexive mode (documentaries that are self-conscious about 
their own constructedness) or a performative mode (emphasising the subjective or 
expressive aspect of the filmmaker’s own involvement in the subject). Michael Renov 
(2008) has written about a particular sort of subjective approach in tracing the 
revolutionary impact of the rise of the autobiographical documentary in the 1990s,45 
claiming ‘the VERY IDEA of autobiography reinvents the VERY IDEA of documentary’, whilst 
noting the reluctance of ‘some documentary scholars’ to accept the autobiographical 
impulse within the tradition of non-fiction as, for them, it compromises the non-fiction 
enterprise. For Renov, the opposite is true. Autobiographical documentary gives 
documentary access to non-fictional private truths and inner realities; subjective, 
 
44 Including (but certainly not limited to) Janet Walker, Alisa Lebow and Stella Bruzzi. Michael Renov 
was one of the first scholars to identify these changes in documentary practice and has published 
several essays on the subject (for example: Renov 1999).  
45 In a later essay (2015: 148), Renov makes it clear he was thinking particularly about 
documentaries of the late 1980s and early 1990s that dealt with the personal experience of AIDS, 
familial dysfunction, and gendered and racial oppression. Amongst these first-person 
(autobiographical) filmmakers, Renov includes Issac Julien, Marlon Riggs, Su Friedrich, Gregg 
Bordowitz, Richard Fung, Rea Tajiri, etc.  
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psychological truths on the ‘psychoanalytic model’ (2008: 41-2; Renov’s capitals and 
italics).46  
 
In recent years, documentary-makers addressing traumatic histories have adopted modes 
of representation more commonly associated with fictional film: animation, sequences 
using toys, dioramas with clay models, re-enactment, the use of actors (who sometimes 
take the place of the principal protagonist who is also present in the diegesis) and dream, 
fantasy and hallucinatory sequences.47 Of course, none of these devices or representational 
techniques are entirely new to documentary. The first animated documentary48 even 
predates Grierson’s coining of the term ‘documentary’ in 1926 (Grierson 1966); and the use 
of the term docu-fiction, which has come to prominence since the millennium to describe 
an apparently “new” form of documentary, has been traced back to 1980 by Jean-Pierre 
Candeloro (2000), with examples of the sub-genre extending back (in all but name) to the 
birth of documentary and Robert Flaherty’s Moana of 1926. And documentary and fiction 
film have a long history of borrowing and counter-borrowing of filmic styles and tones of 
voice. What I think is new in the last twenty years or so, is a new permissiveness in the 
range of filmic devices, representational forms and subjective modes of address (including 
the autobiographical), that documentary filmmakers can adopt and mix together. 
Perceptions have shifted as to what documentary is, what documentary is allowed to be, 
before it crosses an invisible but nonetheless powerful taxonomic boundary and is no 
longer considered to be a documentary by either its makers or its audience.  
 
 
2.1.2 Non-fictionality as ethical contract 
 
For all the greater range of representational styles and more subjective voices that are now 
permissible in documentary, and even the inclusion of fictional interludes within the frame 
 
46 Of course, film autobiography pre-dates the 1990s but Renov argues that before then it fell 
‘outside the consensual limits of documentary’ (2008: 44). I will return to autobiography in Chapter 
Four when considering the authorship of the fictions that operate within the documentary frame: 
those created by a third-person director versus those created by a first-person director/protagonist.  
47 For example: Albertina Carri’s The Blonds 2003; Guy Maddin’s My Winnipeg 2007; Ari Folman’s 
Waltz with Bashir 2008; Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing 2012; Rithy Panh’s The Missing 
Picture 2013. 
48 Conventionally this is thought to be Winsor McCay’s The Sinking of the Lusitania (1918) but in her 
recent book, Donna Kornhaber (2020) suggests the title should go to a short animation designed to 
solicit donations for the Second Boer War. 
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of the documentary, there remains a sense amongst viewers of documentary that they are 
not watching fiction and that they can distinguish between the fictional interlude and the 
non-fictional frame. There is an unspoken contract between documentary viewers and 
documentary makers that for all the blurring of boundaries between fiction and non-
fiction, what is being presented is in essence non-fictional and that the documentary film 
affords us access to a real world beyond the film, even if that real world is mediated and 
constructed by the documentary maker and cannot be grasped directly but only 
approached obliquely and subjectively.  
 
Documentary-maker, Jean Rouch, invoked this contract when asked in interview about the 
nature of cinéma vérité: 
 
[I]t would be better to call it cinema-sincerity […] you ask the audience to have 
confidence in the evidence, to say to the audience, “This is what I saw. I didn't fake 
it, this is what happened … I look at what happened with my subjective eye and 
this is what I believe took place … It's a question of honesty.”  
       (Rouch quoted in: Levin 1971: 135) 
 
Carl Plantinga makes a similar point claiming that producers and viewers of documentary 
make ‘an implicit contract to view a work as documentary’ (1987: 46; Plantinga’s italics) 
whilst Elizabeth Cowie argues, that for all its ‘deformations’ and ‘fabrications’, 
documentary film ‘sets out a contract with its audience by its self-declaration as a 
documentary. Its fabrications do not thereby make it not nonfiction’ (2011: 45).  
 
I want to build on this idea of an honest, ethical contract between documentary maker and 
documentary viewer and place it within the broader frame of a phenomenological account 
of documentary which teases out the consequences of contracting to perceive the object as 
non-fictional. It allows me to construct an account of how the act of perceiving the object 
as non-fictional changes how the object is understood (it changes the meanings that can be 
drawn from the object). This is crucial to my contention that in documentary we can 
witness the emergence of new meanings in the real lives of documentary protagonists 
within the diegesis. It allows me to advance an argument about the non-fictionality of 
documentary’s fictions as they give access to non-fictional meanings. That said, I will return 
to the problem of fiction (invented) and non-fiction (real) at the end of the next chapter, 
not in the context of the object of study but at a profounder metaphysical level where I will 
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suggest that we can never know if the meanings we draw from the world are created 
(fictional) or found (non-fictional).  
 
 
2.1.3 A phenomenological account of non-fictionality 
 
My approach takes its cue from Vivian Sobchack’s 1999 essay Toward a Phenomenology of 
Nonfictional Film Experience, where, rather than treating all film as text to be decoded, 
Sobchack distinguishes between filmic objects on the grounds of the different ways they 
are experienced by the viewer based on inherent differences between different genres of 
film as intentional objects. It is a phenomenological horses-for-courses approach to the 
filmic object. Sobchack frames her argument in opposition to what she calls ‘that 
foundational theory of cinematic identification based on Lacanian psychoanalysis’ (1999: 
241) but it is an argument which equally well stands in opposition to other post-
structuralist approaches to the film object.49 Post-structuralism  
 
treats the spectator’s phenomenological sense of the “real” as it relates to 
cinematic representation of any kind as essentially phantasmatic in nature and 
does not seem to allow for the structural differences that distinguish our 
engagement with cinematic images we regard as documentary representations of 
“the real” from those we regard as real representations of a “fiction”.  
      (1999: 241: Sobchack’s italics) 
 
In short, we experience what we take to be documentary in a different way to how we 
experience a fictional film and make very different judgements about that experience. It is 
a different model of ‘cinematic identification’, opening up moral and affective connotations 
that flow from ‘the charge of the real’ (1999: 242).  
 
Drawing on the work of Jean-Pierre Meunier,50 Sobchack posits three broad categories of 
filmic object: the fiction film, the documentary and the film-souvenir (or home movie in 
English parlance). All screen objects in all these categories of film are equally physically 
 
49 Sobchack is here writing in opposition to Lacanian approaches to film that date from the late 
1960s and 1970s and the tendency in post-structuralism to co-opt documentary as a form of fiction, 
and not in opposition to more recent Lacanian approaches to documentary (discussed in Chapter 
One). 
50 Sobchack credits the Belgian psychologist and film critic, Jean-Pierre Meunier, as the pioneer of 
this approach as outlined in his neglected 1969 book Les structures de l’experience filmique: 
L’identification filmique, which in turn draws on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential 
phenomenology. 
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absent and only have presence as images and recorded sound but ‘this fundamental 
absence characteristic of all cinematic representation is always modified by our personal 
and cultural knowledge of an object’s existential position as it relates to our own’ (1999: 
242; Sobchack’s italics). The fiction film exists only on the screen and we glean our 
meanings from the relation between objects on the screen. As Sobchack puts it, the 
horizon of our attention ‘is nearly isomorphic with the screen’ (1999: 245) and, I would 
add, it is a form of experience very readily susceptible to the post-structuralist approach 
that examines the play or relation of on-screen signifiers. But in our experience of 
documentary, and more so of the film-souvenir, we look both at the screen and through 
the screen; we are dependent upon the screen for knowledge but are ‘also aware of an 
excess of existence not contained by it’ (1999: 246). Sobchack illustrates this difference 
with a description of the moment when we are watching a character in a fictional film 
walking through a crowded city and suddenly wonder if the people on the street know they 
are in a movie. In this moment of wondering, the viewer has switched from looking at the 
fiction on the screen to perceiving the images as documentary in nature and so looking 
through the screen to another reality behind it (1999: 246). Michael Renov (2004: 248, 
footnote 6) makes a similar point when describing the moment in Haskell Wexler’s 1969 
fictional feature Medium Cool, where the soundman shouts ‘Look out, Haskell, it’s real!’ as 
a tear-gas canister lands amongst the film crew during the filming of a riot intended for 
inclusion in the fictional diegesis. The camera shakes and wobbles at this point as the 
historical real bursts into the feature filmmaking and we see through the screen to a world 
beyond.  
 
The nature of the intentional filmic object changes what we ask (and what we can ask) of 
the film and so changes the meanings that might emerge.51 The sort of questions we might 
ask about “Sol Nazerman”, the pawnbroker and Auschwitz survivor who is the central 
character in Sidney Lumet’s 1964 fictional feature The Pawnbroker, are very different from 
the sort of questions we can ask about Marceline (Marceline Loridan-Ivens), the 
interviewer/interviewee and Auschwitz survivor in Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin’s 1961 
 
51 Working in a different philosophic tradition (contemporary analytic aesthetics), Stacie Friend has 
recently advanced an argument about written texts that is very close to Sobchack’s argument about 
film: ‘the classification of a work as fiction or non-fiction can make a genuine difference to 
appreciation. Labelling a work in one way or the other has an effect on how we read it, primarily by 
directing our attention to different aspects of the work.’ Friend regrets that ‘there are relatively few 
studies that look at the effects on reading strategy of the fiction/non-fiction distinction specifically’ 
(Friend 2012: 200-2). 
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documentary Chronique d’un été. We can ask on-the-screen questions about Nazerman and 
through-the-screen questions about Marceline.52  
 
Christian Ferencz-Flatz and Julian Hanich (2016: 22) identify a shift in Sobchack’s focus of 
attention between 1992 (when she published The Address of the Eye) and 2004 (when she 
published Carnal Thoughts), a shift from film-as-intentional-object to film-as-experiencing-
subject, a shift that took the focus of attention from noema to noesis (in Husserlian 
terms53), from the ‘act matter’ (what is thought about) to the ‘act quality’ (the mental act 
of liking, judging or meaning by the viewer). Both these facets of Sobchack’s approach to 
film are valuable as they refuse a simple division between object and subject, with the 
object always being an experienced-object and with the subject always being an 
experiencing-subject. The 1999 essay Toward a Phenomenology of Nonfictional Film 
Experience that I refer to above, was written during the transitional phase in Sobchack’s 
thought and combines both facets of her thinking. But, for two reasons, my particular 
interest here is in what that essay says about the noematic content – the experienced-(non-
fictional)-object. First, by highlighting the object as it is experienced, Sobchack rescues the 
non-fictional film from post-structuralism’s tendency to co-opt it to fiction whilst fully 
acknowledging the subjective nature of that experience. Secondly, in her description of the 
object as experienced, Sobchack opens up a space through or behind the screen; a space 
that allows us access to aspects of the life of the on-screen protagonist beyond the screen. 
It is a theoretical position that helps to substantiate my contention that certain 
documentaries that deal with traumatic histories can give us access to diegetic meanings: 
meanings that emerge for the on-screen protagonists through the film-making process; 
meanings whose emergence might have a reparative or curative impact in the protagonists’ 
lives in and beyond the film, even though we as viewers are dependent upon the screen for 
 
52 In other areas of scholarship in the humanities, similar phenomenological distinctions are made on 
the basis of the nature of the intentional, experienced object. F. R. Leavis is meant to have joked 
that fellow literary critic, A. C. Bradley, asked illegitimate questions about fictional characters in 
literary texts, such as asking ‘How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?’ of the character in the 
Shakespeare play. But historians can perfectly legitimately ask this same question of the historical 
figure of Lady Macbeth, the wife of the eleventh century Scottish King, Mac Bethad mac Findláich, 
who Shakespeare is drawing on. With Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth we can ask only in-the-text 
questions (as the intentional object is fictional); with the wife of Mac Bethad mac Findláich we can 
ask through-or-behind-the-text questions (as the intentional object is or was “real”). The questions 
that can be asked are dependent on the object’s ontological status (existential status in Sobchack’s 
usage). Questions that are illegitimate in relation to a fictional object may well be legitimate in 
relation to a non-fictional object. The story of the jibe Leavis directed at Bradley is recounted in: 
Britton 1961.  
53 The reference here is to Husserl’s Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology of 1913. 
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knowledge. I am distinguishing these diegetic meanings (meanings whose emergence the 
viewer witnesses through consideration of the noema) from the meanings that become 
available directly to the viewer – the experiencing subject – which we might call the film’s 
extra-diegetic meanings (or noetic meanings). 
 
If this seems fanciful in the case of documentary film, it can be argued by analogy to the 
psychoanalytic case study. The analytic case study may be dismissed (or indeed celebrated) 
as a fictional text but many readers take the text (the experienced-object) as a means of 
access to aspects of the real life of the analysand; a real life that has or had its existence 
beyond or behind the text. It is this perception of the case study as experienced-object, 
that makes it available for certain sorts of counter-readings; readings that were not 
foregrounded in the original text as published but which use the material presented in the 
original text to construct or recover new meanings in the life of the diegetic protagonist. 
This is precisely what Nicolas Abraham and Mária Török (1986) do with Freud’s ‘Wolf Man’ 
case (1918); they re-imagine the Wolf Man’s (Sergei Pankejeff’s) trauma by taking the 
words used by Pankejeff in his analysis with Freud, and as reported by Freud in his text, and 
re-interpret them in the light of Pankejeff’s multi-lingual background. When Pankejeff’s 
words spoken in German to Freud are translated into his native Russian, they suggest puns 
and homophones that were not available in German and seem to give us access to 
relationships and events that were meaningful to Pankejeff but which bypassed Freud.54 If 
published analytic case studies open up a space beyond or behind the text in the life of the 
analysand (to borrow Sobchack’s terms), the documentary film offers the same opportunity 
– perhaps even a heightened opportunity – as documentary gives us access to the voice, 
the body and the affective responses of the protagonist played out in live relationships in 
the filmic present, providing us with revealing and intimate glimpses of a life lived on and 
beyond the screen.55 
 
Elizabeth Cowie writes about these glimpsed moments. If Sobchack’s account considers the 
documentary as a whole as the intentional object that gives us access to a real world 
beyond, then Elizabeth Cowie takes a more nuanced approach arguing that it is only at 
 
54 Abraham and Török are not alone in re-working the Wolf Man case by re-interpreting the 
information presented in Freud’s case study to try to unearth what was meaningful for the “real” 
Pankejeff beyond or behind the text (meanings that had evaded Freud), e.g. Jacques Lacan in his 
seminar of 1951-2. 
55 Andrew Tracey has made similar claims for the images and sounds of the ‘Essay Film’ which he 
sees as ‘part of a matrix of meaning that extends beyond the screen’ (Tracey et al 2013, 2019).  
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certain moments that we directly glimpse the real world. They are the documentary 
viewer’s ‘Look out, Haskell, it’s real!’-moments. Such a moment is 
 
never fully intended for us by controlling authors or fully interpretable, but instead, 
as “found” reality, it is always in excess of the documentary narration. 
Documentary is an organized statement, an “utterance” of the recorded 
audiovisual, but it can never fully determine […] the meaning of the utterance, for 
there is always some aspect that exceeds the intention of the filmmakers, which 
we refer to “reality”. In this lies the specificity of the documentary as nonfiction.  
         (Cowie 2011: 29) 
 
It is these moments in documentary film that allow the viewer to see through the screen to 





2.2 The fictionality of the fictional film-within 
 
If the argument that follows depends upon making some sort of distinction between fiction 
and non-fiction in documentary (to understand the role of the fictional interlude within the 
documentary frame) then it is necessary to consider the fictionality of the fictional 
interlude alongside the non-fictionality of the frame. The role of the fiction will be 
considered at length in the next chapter when I examine how psychoanalysis has deployed 
fictions in an effort to open up a traumatic history and to allow a meaningful account to 
emerge for the traumatised protagonist. But some preliminary comments are necessary 
about what is meant by fiction. Just how fictional are the fictions of documentary?  
 
Many fictional interludes borrow aesthetic forms commonly associated with fictional 
representations (animation, use of toys, theatrical re-enactment) but this is no guarantee 
of fictionality. Both Ari Folman in Waltz with Bashir (2008) and Rithy Panh in The Missing 
Picture (2013) use animation both in fictional interludes and to depict historical events 
whose veracity we are not asked to question. So, instead of looking at the form of the 
representation, it might be more helpful to look at the content. Sometimes the fictional 
interlude brings to the screen fantasies, hallucinations and internal conversations that have 
played in the mind of the traumatised protagonist. But they can also take a less fantastical 
form, such as the replaying of past events in the filmic present, with the role of the 
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traumatised protagonist taken by a substitute (a double). These are not out-and-out 
fictions but they certainly entail degrees of fictionalisation. And all these films-within are 
fictional to the extent that they diverge from anything that ever happened in the real world 
in a way that a historian would recognise.  
 
But the interludes are not fictional in the sense that anything goes. They are “real” in one 
of three ways. They are fictions in search of a non-fictional historical “truth” where the 
historical account is difficult to recover (often as a result of traumatic disruptions of 
memory) and can be seen as an attempt to re-imagine an historical event which is out of 
reach. Or secondly, they are entirely invented but may evoke powerful affective responses 
in the traumatised protagonist. This response is the measure of the truth of a fiction that 
Freud (1937b) proposes in Constructions in Analysis; a fiction with the power to have a 
positive transformatory impact on an analysand’s current experience of a real, non-fictional 
traumatic past. Those fictions without affective force are revealed as fictional fictions or 
untrue fictions, and are forgotten and fall away. Or thirdly, they reproduce real imaginings 
or fears or hallucinations that play, or have played, in the mind of the protagonist.  
 
 
2.2.1 Castoriadis and Rancière question the definition of fiction  
 
Many philosophic accounts of reality would not categorise these “events” as real even 
though these interludes seem to be attempting to reproduce a present or past psychic 
reality. This suggests that they are only unreal or fictional in a limited sense. Here I want to 
re-purpose an argument that the philosopher and psychoanalyst Cornelius Castoriadis 
deployed about the nature of being, to critique the way many philosophers have 
approached and described reality: 
 
Remember that philosophers almost always start by saying: “I want to see what 
being is, what reality is. Now, here is this table. What does this table show to me as 
characteristic of real being?” No philosopher ever starts by saying: “I want to see 
what being is, what reality is. Now, here is my memory of my dream last night.” 
       (Castoriadis 1997: 5) 
 
Following Castoriadis, I would argue for the ‘reality’ of these fictions, or describe them as 
true fictions or, better, as reproductions (re-presentations) of psychic realities. Castoriadis’s 
argument coincides with (and is likely derived from) Martin Heidegger’s (1962 [1927]) 
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distinction between the factual (the ontic or factum brutum) and the factical (or 
existential-ontological). The factual lends itself to empirical validation (or at least has that 
potential) whilst the factical has a reality in lived experience but not in the external, 
historical world. The factical, whilst not conventionally factual, is certainly not 
straightforwardly fictional. 
 
For Jacques Rancière (2006: 34), these fictions of documentary are more truthful than the 
fictions of fiction film. ‘Documentary film, film devoted to the “real”, is […] capable of 
greater fictional invention than “fiction” film, readily devoted to a certain stereotype of 
actions and characters’. The truthfulness of documentary’s fictions flows from the genre’s 
devotion to the real and Rancière’s belief that ‘[t]he real must be fictionalized in order to 
be thought’. They are fictions of the “real”. 
 
 
2.2.2 Reality fictions in Waltz with Bashir 
 
The two “fictions” or films-within at the heart of Ari Folman’s animated, autobiographical 
documentary, Waltz with Bashir (2008) – the second fiction being precipitated by the first – 
both fall into the category that Castoriadis has sought to reposition as elements of reality 
and seem to pass Rancière’s truthfulness test. The film opens at night in Tel Aviv with a 
pack of ferocious dogs running through the streets (see figure 2 in Illustrations). It is a 
frightening scene and begins without any accompanying explanation or context. It emerges 
that the scene reproduces a recurring nightmare of Ari Folman’s friend, Boaz Rein, who 
Folman had known since they both served as teenagers in the Israeli Army occupying Beirut 
during the Lebanon War of over twenty-five years before. In the scene following the 
nightmare, Rein meets Folman to ask if his description of the ferocious dogs sparks any 
memories for Folman. Rein is convinced it is connected in some way with their experiences 
in the Lebanon War and believes it to be a disguised dream-memory related to the Israeli 
army’s practice, before a nighttime attack, of killing the dogs which prowled the outskirts 
of Lebanese villages (something Rein was often asked to do). Folman tells Rein that not 
only does the description of the nightmare not spark any memories but that he is surprised 
to realise he has virtually no memories at all of his time in Lebanon and Beirut. An actual 
meeting between Rein and Folman (which is reproduced in animation in the film) is the 
event which prompted Folman to make Waltz with Bashir. The film that emerges is an 
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unfolding filmic record of Folman’s quest to recover this “lost” past, as Folman visits 
friends, former soldiers and a psychologist in his attempt to both remember and try to 
understand why he cannot remember.   
 
As the film progresses, aspects of Folman’s youthful army experiences come back to him, 
sometimes as a result of others recalling events at which Folman was present. Folman’s 
abiding recovered “recollection”, sparked by his engagement with his friend’s nightmare, is 
a not a recollection at all but a kind of recurrent waking hallucination (which Folman 
describes in voice over as a ‘flashback’)56 in which Folman sees himself and other young 
Israeli soldiers emerging naked from the sea off Beirut against a bizarrely illuminated urban 
backdrop (see figure 3 in Illustrations). Folman’s desire to understand his hallucinatory 
vision takes over as the driving force of the film’s narrative and does eventually lead 
Folman to recover a memory of his involvement as a bystander during the Christian 
Phalangist massacre of Palestinian men in the Sabra and Shatila suburbs of Beirut; the 
bizarre illumination of the scene in the hallucination perhaps recalling the flares that were 
used to illuminate the sky and assist the Phalangists in finding hiding Palestinians at night. 
It is a deeply troubling memory for Folman, especially as the child of Holocaust survivors, as 
he remembers he had stood by and allowed mass murder to occur.  
 
It is the two fictions – Rein’s nightmare and Folman’s hallucination – which open a route to 
understanding the traumatic past for Folman. Both are fictions in a strict historical sense 
but both are very real aspects of the present psychic reality of two veterans of the Lebanon 
War and fit with Castoriadis’s expanded phenomenological conception of reality which 
includes ‘Now, here is my memory of my dream last night’. Meaning emerges for Folman 
not solely in recovering a lost or repressed memory of a specific time and place but in 
constructing an account which could explain why that memory had been lost or repressed. 
Waltz with Bashir is a complex text with memory (or lack of memory) of events in Lebanon 
haunted by another “memory”: a second-generation, post-memory of the Holocaust. 
Meaning emerges for Folman when he unmasks the unconscious forces that had impelled 
him to forget the past; something about – or associated with – that past was “unthinkable”. 
 
56 In much post-structuralist trauma theory, flashbacks are veridical memories; literal, mental 
imprints of historic events (see Chapter Three). I have called this “flashback” a hallucination to avoid 
association with the notion of veridical memory. Ruth Leys (Leys and Goldman 2010: 666), Thomas 
Trezise (2013) and several other critics hostile to trauma theory, argue that memory is never 
veridical and Folman himself is clear that his “flashback” is to an event that never occurred in the 
real world.  
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It is a palimpsestic memory as Max Silverman (2018) describes: ‘a hybrid of traces’, with 
memory as an ‘act of construction in the present’ involving a ‘conjunction of different 
pasts’ (some of which might more properly be described as his parents’ pasts).57 The ontic 
fiction but factical reality of the dream and hallucination in Waltz with Bashir, are not 
meaningful in themselves but begin a process that uncovers a trauma that was itself hidden 
(the film does not offer the viewer any insight into what effect not remembering his 
youthful military experiences had on Folman in the period before the filmmaking process 
began). It is ironic that the quest for Folman began not as an attempt to understand a 
traumatic past which was troubling him; his initial amnesia seemingly acted as a successful 
defence against trauma. But once prompted by his friend’s nightmare, the desire to know, 
to understand, and to produce a meaningful account of the past, became a driving 
obsession. 
 
That the use of “fictions” in documentary seems to be driven in the main by documentary 
makers, like Folman, trying to explore traumatic pasts is perhaps a product of the nature of 
trauma itself (the subject of the next chapter). The three broad categories of fictional 
interlude that documentaries have employed (categories that can in practice overlap), 
could be summarised as psychic realities (representations of factical “events”), fictions that 
provoke strong affective responses and so hint that some “truth” is at least in play, or 
fictions that attempt to represent historic events that are lost or obscured. The label 
fictional retains value for its clarity (and for this reason, I will continue to use it in what 
follows but always with the provisos set out here). But these films-within are not fictional 
in the sense of fictitious (untrue or a lie) but closer to fictive58; they emerge from the 
imagination or perhaps the unconscious or are provocations that have the power to 
reconfigure understandings of what might be conventionally described as the “real” world. 
Perhaps better still, we could think of them as alternative frames of experience that 
interact with and modify other frames of experience which appear more straightforwardly 
non-fictional. It is in the dynamic encounter between the frames, that insights (“truths”, 
meanings) become available. This technique is deployed to great and sometimes 
bewildering effect in Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (the subject of Chapter Six) where there 
 
57 For Silverman’s use of the figure of the palimpsest to highlight the hybrid, ‘impure’ nature of 
memory, see his monograph Palimpsestic Memory (2013). Specifically re-Waltz with Bashir, see also 
Claire Launchbury’s essay “Animating Memory” in a collection edited by Silverman and Griselda 
Pollock (Launchbury 2013: 193-202). 
58 In relation to documentary, Janet Walker (2013: 20) says it was Michael Renov who was the first 
scholar to introduce the notion of the ‘fictive’ (Renov 1993: 7).  
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2.3 The non-fictionality of documentary despite its fictions 
 
So, to return to the question I asked at the beginning of this chapter about the fictionality 
of fiction and the non-fictionality of non-fiction, I am arguing that fictions of a sort can be 
introduced into documentary – inner frames of experience can be explored – without 
compromising the perception of the documentary as a whole as non-fictional. These 
documentaries remain non-fictional intentional objects despite the inclusion of interludes 
which are fictional according to many conventional accounts.  
 
Recent work by philosophers working in the analytic tradition is reaching similar 
conclusions about literary texts. Fictive utterance theorists like Gregory Currie (1990), 
writing in the 1980s and 1990s, broke texts into discrete parts labelling some parts fictional 
and some non-fictional. But recently, Stacie Friend (and others) have advocated an 
approach that looks at the text as a whole and concludes that a text can be non-fictional 
even if discrete passages within that text are fictional.  
 
[T]he reason fictive utterance theories have so much trouble accounting for the 
distinction between works of fiction and non-fiction is that they are reductionist: 
they seek to reduce fictionality to properties possessed by the parts of a work or a 
single dimension of the work. […] the right way to distinguish between fiction and 
non-fiction focuses attention, not on how the parts of a work add up to the whole, 
but instead how the whole work is embedded in a larger context, and specifically in 
certain practices of reading, writing, criticizing, and so on. 
       (Friend 2012: 187)59 
 
Amongst documentary scholars, Linda Williams was one of the first to appreciate the role 
fictions were beginning to play in documentary from the 1980s as filmmakers such as 
 
59 Friend says one cannot establish either necessary or sufficient conditions that could be used to 
delineate a work of fiction from a work of non-fiction and we should think of them instead as 
genres: that is socially-agreed-upon conventions that develop (and change) over time. Carl Plantinga 
(2005: 105) defines the non-fictionality of documentary in similar terms – not something with 
necessary or sufficient conditions but rather as a set of ‘central tendencies’.  
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Claude Lanzmann in Shoah (1985) and Errol Morris in The Thin Blue Line (1988) introduced 
“fictional” interludes into the “factual” frame of documentary and openly owned the idea 
that ‘documentary truth is […] subject to manipulation and construction’ (Williams 1993: 
12). For Williams, this positive development did not entail having to reclassify documentary 
as fictional but instead rescued documentary from being forced into one or other position 
within a false dichotomy. 
 
Instead of careening between idealistic faith in documentary truth and cynical 
recourse to fiction, we do better to define documentary not as an essence of truth 
but as a set of strategies designed to choose among the horizon of relative and 
contingent truths. The advantage, and the difficulty, of the definition is that it holds 
onto the concept of the real – indeed of a “real” at all – even in the face of 
tendencies to assimilate documentary entirely into the rules and norms of fiction. 
       (Williams 1993: 14) 
 
Like Sobchack, Williams implicitly rejects the post-structuralist claim that the quest for a 
referent (through documentary) – a truth about the real world – is ‘essentially 
phantasmatic’.60 And writing more recently, Elizabeth Cowie (2011) has argued that a 
desire for the real is perfectly congruent with the documentary project with all its 
fabrications, and that documentary can be a route to knowledge about the real world even 
if the relation between film and world is complex. 
 
For Williams, the introduction of fictions into documentary is not a roadblock on the route 
to knowledge of the real world but rather a crucial new path to that knowledge.  
 
My goal […] is to get beyond the much remarked self-reflexivity and flamboyant 
auteurism of these documentaries, which might seem Rashomon-like, to abandon 
the pursuit of truth, to what seems to me their remarkable engagement with a 
newer, more contingent, relative, postmodern truth – a truth which, far from being 
abandoned, still operates powerfully as the receding horizon of the documentary 
tradition.  
       (Williams 1993: 11) 
 
Williams not only champions the deployment of fictions within documentary as a possible 
route to understanding a real world beyond the screen, she also tries to define the nature 
of the “truth” or knowledge that can emerge from a documentary-making process that 
 
60 Sobchack (1999: 241) rejects the idea that the quest is ‘phantasmatic’, and Williams resists (like 
Fredric Jameson whom she quotes) the tendency of post-structuralism to bracket the referent and 
efface the past altogether ‘leaving us with nothing but texts’ (Jameson 1984: 64, quoted in: Williams 
1993: 14). 
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deploys these fictional elements. She calls this emergent knowledge a ‘postmodern truth’ 
and ‘relative and contingent truths’. I will return to these speculations at the end of the 
next chapter where I consider the epistemological status of the meanings (or “truths”) we 







The peculiar case of trauma and the demand for fiction 
 
 
To advance my argument further, it is necessary to explore the nature of trauma and its 
theorisations. Why is it that the film-within-the-film, the fictional interlude within the non-
fictional frame of documentary, so often appears in documentaries that explore a 
traumatic past? Is there something peculiar to trauma that demands fictions?  
 
 
3.1 Three accounts of trauma 
 
Broadly three accounts of trauma co-exist today. Each came into being in response to what 
might be described as a major cultural or societal trauma. The psychoanalytic account 
arose within late nineteenth century psychiatry in response to patients presenting a variety 
of debilitating symptoms that seemed to have their origins in the stresses and strains of 
modern urban life including (after World War One) the strains of modern industrialised 
warfare. In the wake of World War Two and, in particular of the Holocaust, a second 
account emerged within post-structuralist philosophy and cultural theory; an account 
further elaborated since the 1990s by Cathy Caruth and others in what has come to be 
known as trauma theory. The third account, that of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
emerged from American psychiatry in the 1970s in response to symptoms being presented 
by combat veterans of the Vietnam War. Despite each account arising out of a particular 
set of historical circumstances, none of them limits what might be called the precipitators 
of trauma to the events that brought the account into being. There is broad unanimity 
across the three accounts as to the sort of life experiences that are likely to precipitate 
trauma: witnessing or being subject to violence, sexual assault, accident, sudden 
bereavement, loss of a love object, etc.  
 
There is also broad unanimity as to the likely effects of trauma (its symptoms): the 
generation of disturbing thoughts, feelings or dreams which cause mental and physical 
distress; or sometimes just a debilitating feeling of blankness. All these symptoms seem to 
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entail disruptions of memory61 and the ability to represent the trauma, from the absence of 
representation (aporia) accompanied by distressing negative affect, through partial recall 
or recall that displaces or screens the traumatic events, to vivid, flashback memories that 
seem to replay the past in the present. Where psychic manifestations are absent (or in 
addition to psychic manifestations), trauma can manifest itself somatically as physical 
ailments. All three accounts also agree on the “late” registration of trauma, with symptoms 
striking retrospectively (Nachträglichkeit to use Freud’s term). 
 
But at this point the three accounts begin to diverge. Only the psychoanalytic and post-
structuralist accounts are grounded in theories of representation and reference; the PTSD 
account is practically-focused and looks to ameliorate symptoms by managing their effect. 
Both the post-structuralist and psychoanalytic accounts universalise trauma, seeing it as 
fundamental to the human condition (unlike the PTSD account which sees trauma as only 
ever affecting a portion of the population). Beyond this the psychoanalytic and post-
structuralist accounts also diverge. Psychoanalysis seeks to provide a meaningful account 
of the trauma which might help to lessen its negative psychic (and physical) symptoms; 
whilst the post-structuralist account sees trauma as both beyond representation and 
understanding, and the psychic consequences of trauma as perpetual and unshiftable. The 
experience of trauma is reconceived as a terrible, post-modern sublime, “real” and 
veridical, and unreclaimable to meaning. It is at this point of divergence that psychoanalysis 
deploys fictions: fictions which are created or found (constructed or reconstructed), giving 
representational content to the formerly unrepresented trauma and beginning a process 
that might lead to a meaningful account of the trauma. And crucially, this process takes 
place over time and in the context of an inter-personal encounter (both these contexts are 
refused in the post-structuralist account). And it is, as I hope to establish, in parallel 
circumstances that fictions are deployed in documentary in the form of fictional films-
within, as documentary makers try to find or create a meaningful account of a traumatic 
personal history.  
 
61 The role of memory was already clear in Freud’s early work with Breuer treating hysterics (where 
the hysteria was viewed as a symptom of a buried trauma) and is captured in the famous epigram of 
1893, ‘Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences’ (Freud and Breuer 1893 [1955]: 6). 
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3.2 Psychoanalysis and the many roles of fiction  
 
In psychoanalysis, trauma is everywhere and fictions are everywhere. As psychoanalysis 
developed, Freud came to see trauma not merely as an individual reaction to specific, 
unbearable events but as a universal component of normal individual and indeed group 
development. And in all these arenas, fictions played a role: fictions (in the shape of 
unconscious fantasy) could precipitate trauma, fictions (such as screen memories) could 
obscure the underlying trauma, fictions could describe and explain both individual and 
societal trauma, and fictions could play a therapeutic role in the process of “recovery” from 
trauma. 
 
Freud (in collaboration with Josef Breuer) began the work which became psychoanalysis 
with much more limited ambitions. Freud and Breuer struggled to understand the roots of 
hysteria in their largely female patients. Freud’s distinctive contribution was to trace 
hysterical symptoms (which were both psychic and physical) back to a “real” world event – 
sexual seduction. In his 1896 essay The Aetiology of Hysteria, Freud argued that ‘at the 
bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more occurrences of premature sexual 
experience’ (1896: 203; italics in the Standard Edition translation); the so-called seduction 
theory. But within two years, this exogenous (real-world) precipitator of trauma, had been 
remodeled as an endogenous precipitator through the notion of unconscious fantasy. In a 
letter of September 1897 to his colleague Wilhelm Fleiss, Freud wrote that he no longer 
believed in ‘my neurotica’ (his seduction theory) as ‘there are no indications of reality in 
the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been 
cathected with affect’ (Freud and Masson 1985: 264; italics in the Masson translation). The 
notion of fiction and its complex relation to truth, was to remain at the heart of 
psychoanalysis both in its attempts to describe trauma62 and in the therapeutic strategies it 
developed to treat trauma. A fiction which elicits a powerful affective response becomes a 
route to the truth, just as the fictional production of Hamlet’s The Murder of Gonzago – 
through the affective response it precipitates in Hamlet’s uncle Claudius – starts a process 
through which the truth is revealed.  
 
 
62 Freud frequently draws on literary fiction to describe trauma, from E.T.A. Hoffmann to 
Shakespeare.  
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As Freud’s ideas developed, trauma was not only furnished with an endogenous cause in 
unconscious fantasy, but he came to see it as a universal component of ordinary 
development; an idea he explored in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920 as he observed 
his grandson’s struggle to come to terms with the originary trauma of maternal separation 
(1920: 14-7). And, in his highly speculative work of 1939, Moses and Monotheism, trauma is 
given a further universalising twist. Not simply the individual but society (culture) itself is 
seen to have its roots in trauma. Psychological trauma, once recognised, had become all-
pervasive, whether it was a response to something outside the individual (in the form of 
violence, physical injury, sexual assault, the vicarious trauma of witnessing damage inflicted 
on others or the experience of loss) or from within (as the individual struggled to cope with 
disturbing sexual fantasies). Trauma had the power to explain both individual and group 
development, with the construction of creative fictions being of pivotal importance in both 
explaining and in gradually coming to terms with these traumas. 
 
The effect of trauma on the sufferer’s ability to represent and to understand what had 
happened to them, was complex and Freud returned to it again and again; perhaps it was 
the task of the new discipline of psychoanalysis. Early case studies often recorded the 
complete absence of any conscious representation of the trauma, and understanding could 
only come through the analyst’s attempt to trace the bodily registration of the trauma 
(psychosomatic symptoms) back to a forgotten event (seen first of all in Breuer’s work with 
‘Anna O’ (Breuer 1893 [1955]: 21-47)). Where a representation did exist, whether in dream 
or hallucination or screen memory, it often obscured (in effect, fictionalised) the historical 
cause of the trauma. Freud’s fullest attempt to explain traumatic memory was perhaps in 
The Interpretation of Dreams of 1900-01; symbolisation is disrupted by traumatic memory 
and symptom-formation is subject to complex metaphoric and metonymic displacements 
that need careful interpretation and translation if something of the originary trauma is ever 
to be recovered (Luckhurst 2008: 45-6). Trauma disrupts time, destroying or fracturing the 
narratives of our lives and interfering with our capacity to know or represent what it is that 
troubles us. Trauma is experienced on a spectrum from amnesia or aporia (where the 
trauma seems to make no registration in the conscious mind), through to searingly-vivid, 
hypermnesic, perhaps hallucinatory registration (which comes with no conscious 





3.2.1 Two accounts of a fictional construction/reconstruction of trauma:  
Constructions in Analysis and the fort-da vignette 
 
But psychoanalysis did not simply present the difficulties inherent in traumatic memory. It 
tried to restore representation and understanding in the belief that this would lessen the 
impact of the trauma through catharsis (not as Breuer conceived it in conjunction with 
hypnosis, but in its broad modern sense of release or partial release from the emotional 
pain of trauma and the grip of hysteria), or, in certain cases, simply release the sufferer 
from the grip of physical symptoms. Most of these attempts involved the restaging of the 
apparent representational, affective or emotional traces of the past in the present of the 
analytic encounter. But Freud also indicated that where a restaging was not possible – 
where the traces of the past were apparently absent – the analyst would need to mount a 
completely new production and to imagine the missing traces and to stage them for the 
analysand. Two short pieces of writing by Freud help to explicate these ideas: the late essay 
Constructions in Analysis (1937b), and the fort-da game of Freud’s grandson, described in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920: 14-7).  
 
Both these texts make it clear that the creation of an analytic play-within-the-play – a 
fictional or quasi-fictional construction or reconstruction of a traumatic history – is not 
enough on its own to act as a catalyst that might help meaning to emerge. The fiction must 
be set both within a temporal frame and in the context of an interpersonal encounter, 
where the traumatised protagonist is able to reflect upon the fiction with an other (with an 
outsider to their particular traumatic history). Of the two accounts I have chosen, 
Constructions in Analysis foregrounds the importance of another mind reflecting on the 
fiction (helping to create it), whilst in the fort-da vignette the temporal comes to the fore, 
emphasising the role of repetition (of returning again and again to the fiction) as part of the 
process through which meaning can coalesce. 
 
In Constructions in Analysis, Freud outlined a method for approaching the most 
impenetrable manifestations of trauma, where the original traumatic event appears to be 
entirely forgotten by the analysand (or never registered) leaving the analyst to 
imaginatively produce a representation – a construction – of the missing representation 
and offer it to the patient.  
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The analyst has neither experienced nor repressed any of the material under 
consideration; his task cannot be to remember anything. What then is his task? His 
task is to make out what has been forgotten from the traces which it has left 
behind or, more correctly, to construct it. 
(1937b: 258-9)  
 
Although Freud assigns authorship of the fiction to the analyst, it is clear that it arises out 
of a mutual, inter-personal space (a counter-transferential space). César and Sara Botella 
(2013: 104) take a similar tack, moving even deeper into this territory with their notion of 
regredience; a meeting of the psyches of analyst and analysand outside the normal 
representational sphere, offering the possibility of ‘approaching unrepresentable zones of 
infantile pre-history, thereby permitting the analysand to appropriate a new capacity for 
experiencing and giving shape, in the form of affects and representations, to his [sic] 
nameless and shapeless distress’ (2013: 107). In cases of adult trauma, the unrepresentable 
zone is not that of infantile pre-history but a zone that is unrepresentable because of the 
shattering impact of trauma. The fiction – the representation – is the product of an intense 
inter-personal encounter in the analysis; the mutual entanglement (and even the loss of 
boundaries) between two psyches in identification. 
 
For the Botellas, the analyst’s regredient construction, like a dream, is visual first63 and so 
suggests the creative potential of deploying dream-like sequences and visual fantasies in 
documentary. Both Freud and the Botellas place an outsider to the trauma, the analyst, in a 
pivotal creative position. But the broad implication of both Freud’s Constructions paper and 
the Botellas speculations, is that the fantasies and fictions arise out of an entangled, 
counter-transferential encounter where authorship is always mutual with the traumatised 
protagonist signalling the importance of the fiction through their affective and/or somatic 
response to it. 
 
The analyst’s task in relation to the analysand in the case of an unrepresented trauma may 
have echoes in Bill Nichols’s and Werner Herzog’s description of the new techniques that 
documentary makers have employed in recent years to bring what could not be 
 
63 For the visual nature of these dreamt or imagined fictions, see: Birksted-Breen 2016: 227.  
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represented by conventional documentary means to ‘a condition of visibility’ (Nichols 
2016: 108)64 that reveal an ‘ecstatic truth’ (Herzog 2005). For Nichols, this new  
 
form of knowing presupposes finding the means to bring to a condition of visibility 
that which has escaped notice. It sets out to identify what may attain visibility and 
yet still cannot be seen since what is seen is a trace, sign, symptom or consequence 
of that which remains beyond the net of words and the reductive aspects of 
naming. 
(2016: 108)  
 
Herzog (2005) says in a radio interview: ‘In great moments of cinema you are hit and struck 
by some sort of enlightenment, by something that illuminates you, that’s a deep form of 
truth and I call it ecstatic truth, the ecstasy of truth, and that’s what I’m after in 
documentaries and feature films’. These ecstatic moments in films register affectively and 
somatically – the viewer is ‘hit and struck’ at the moment of ecstatic revelation. Nichols 
concurs with Herzog (repeating his phrase): ‘Hit and struck. This is a form of knowledge or a 
way of seeing that is closer to a paradigm shift than an accretion of information, the 
laborious process of conventional learning, mystery solving, or the marshalling of evidence’ 
(Nichols 2016: 107).  
 
The notion of being hit and struck mirrors the language Shakespeare uses in Hamlet to 
describe the impact the fictional play-within might have on the diegetic audience: they will 
be ‘struck so to the soul’, that a hidden truth will be revealed.65 Nichols and Herzog are 
concerned with the impact on the extra-diegetic audience when the hidden attains 
visibility. For Freud, the Botellas, Shakespeare, and for my argument here, the affective 
impact of bringing something deeply traumatic to a condition of visibility, is in its impact on 
the intra-diegetic audience: the analysand in the analytic setting (or as described in the 
analytic case study); the character in the play-without watching the play-within; or the 
traumatised protagonist in the documentary responding to the film-within. This is a crucial 
difference but the mechanism through which the truth is revealed (or what I would more 
cautiously describe as the process through which meaning emerges) is the same whether it 
is revealed to the extra- or intra-diegetic audience. It is signalled in the affective and 
somatic responses of those who witness what has been made visible, what was formerly 
 
64 Nichols’s comments appear in chapter 8 (pp.99-110) of his Speaking Truths with Film where he 
endorses the thoughts Werner Herzog expressed in an NPR radio interview (Herzog 2005).  
65 Hamlet in Hamlet Act II Scene II: ‘I have heard / That guilty creatures sitting at a play / Have by the 
very cunning of the scene / Been struck so to the soul that presently / They have proclaim’d their 
malefactions’.  
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without shape or form. That this affecting representation might be fictional rather than 
historically accurate (that is not built out of the traditional materials of documentary-
making which Nichols describes as the ‘accretion of information, the laborious process of 
conventional learning, mystery solving, or the marshalling of evidence’) is not the standard 
by which it should be judged. The standard for Herzog’s ‘ecstatic truth’ is not whether it is 
reached through factual or fictional representations but in its affective impact on the 
viewer and what is revealed to the viewer in that moment.  
 
A second account that Freud offers of attempting to overcome trauma through fiction is no 
more than a vignette in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. It emphasises the importance of 
time and repetition in dealing with trauma and is less focused on the importance of the 
inter-personal encounter which is at the heart of the account in Constructions in Analysis.66 
In his description of his grandson’s game of fort-da in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud 
deals with trauma at the opposite end of the spectrum from that dealt with in 
Constructions; the quite normal and universal trauma of every human infant as he or she 
learns to bear the initially overwhelming trauma of the “loss” of the mother, and enters the 
world of representation.  
 
Freud’s grandson, Ernst (aged eighteen months), throws away and out of sight a small 
wooden reel shouting ‘fort’ (‘away’) only to immediately drag the reel back to himself by 
means of a string, shouting ‘da’ (‘there’). Ernst repeats the game again and again. The game 
can be interpreted as the child’s struggle to overcome and work through the originary, 
ontogenic trauma and discover that the mother is other and separate and may be absent. 
The absence of the mother is at first experienced as an absolute, overwhelming, 
irreparable loss (‘nameless and shapeless distress’ to borrow the Botellas’s phrase) as the 
tiny infant exists in an all-encompassing and inescapable present with no concept of time 
(or indeed space). Gradually the infant learns that the loss is not permanent but is an 
absence and that the mother will return. Ernst’s game is the working through in play of the 
deeply unpleasurable experience of the loss of the mother; he repeats the loss (‘fort’) but, 
in his retrieval of the reel (‘da’), the loss is reformulated as temporary absence. The flood of 
 
66 Although, of course, it is a description of an extended dialogue between an infant and the infant’s 
internal idea of his mother. This could be described as an intra-personal (rather than inter-personal) 
encounter; an encounter that is at the heart of self-analysis and the autobiographical film (which will 
be explored in Chapter Four); an encounter between the self and aspects of the self which are other 
to the self. 
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affect experienced by the infant when the mother disappears is gradually overcome 
through the repetition in play, in fictional make-believe, of the unpleasurable, terrifying 
loss, through the substitution of the real mother for a meaningful, symbolic representation 
of the lost object, now felt to be separate but not vanished.  
 
My reading of Ernst’s game as the child’s successful attempt to come to terms with a 
traumatic “event” through the invention and repetition of a fiction puts a particular gloss 
on Freud’s account in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920: 1-64) (a wide-ranging and 
somewhat unruly paper that deals with trauma, the pleasure principle and the life and 
death instincts67). Freud does not specifically call Ernst’s experience of maternal absence a 
trauma but he does place the fort-da vignette immediately after an extended discussion of 
various trauma-inducing events from horrific railway accidents to the traumatic neuroses 
of soldiers who had participated in ‘the terrible war that has just ended’ (1920: 12). The 
precise placement of the fort-da vignette within Beyond the Pleasure Principle as a whole, 
strongly suggests that Freud saw Ernst’s experience as traumatic. 
 
Within the fort-da vignette itself, Freud concerns himself not explicitly with trauma but 
with the pleasure principle and attempts to understand why Ernst would repeat and repeat 
in his play – in fiction – what was such a deeply unpleasant experience, and asks: ‘How then 
does his repetition of this distressing experience as a game fit in with the pleasure 
principle?’ (1920: 15). His answer is that the repetition brings with it a bonus of pleasure. 
There are two parts to this process. At first the trauma of the mother’s non-existence is 
overwhelming. It prompts an instinctual renunciation which is not a choice but a response 
to brute exigency: the mother is not there so the absence/non-existence must be accepted 
– it is simply a fact. But the game, in repeating the trauma and the renunciation, has a 
pleasurable aspect. 
 
At the outset he was in a passive situation – he was overpowered by the 
experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took 
on an active part. The efforts might be put down to an instinct for mastery that was 
acting independently of whether the memory was in itself pleasurable or not. 
(1920: 16; italics in the Standard Edition translation) 
 
 
67 The Standard Edition translation of Beyond the Pleasure Principle tends to translate both death 
drive [Trieb] and death instinct [Instinkt] as ‘instinct’. It is a serious failing but this is not the place to 
try to unpick or resolve the confusion. 
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Freud adds that the game might yield another pleasurable bonus if we think of the game as 
the child taking revenge on the mother in fictional form; throwing away the reel-mother 
who had abandoned him. With either interpretation, the child has gained the pleasure of 
agency (‘mastery’) and is no longer just the hapless, helpless victim. In fact, the child’s very 
ability to reproduce the trauma in a fictional account – to represent the trauma at all – 
might be dependent upon its yield of pleasure: 
 
[T]he child may, after all, only have been able to repeat his unpleasant experience 
in play because the repetition carried along with it a yield of pleasure of another 
sort but none the less a direct one. 
(1920: 16) 
 
The fiction of the game in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is the repetition of a hidden 
trauma but also the working through of that trauma. Something is salvaged from a terrible 
situation. In parallel, I will argue that in documentary, the construction of certain films-
within by the traumatised protagonist are a repetition of a trauma (a repetition where the 
trauma perhaps achieves representational form for the first time; where the hidden attains 
visibility) but that this unpleasurable repetition might carry with it a bonus of pleasure: 
mastery of the past; perhaps revenge; and very often (I believe) a pleasurable mastery that 
comes from understanding something of the trauma for the first time – the bonus of 
pleasure that comes from constructing a meaningful account of a terrible past, with the 
pleasure of meaning or understanding going some way to at least ameliorate the worst 
excesses of current traumatic experience. 
 
Freud’s recognition of the profound seriousness of his grandson’s play later received 
systematic elaboration in Melanie Klein’s innovative work with children where Klein 
introduced play – games with toys – into the analytic space and encouraged the child to 
stage scenarios using toys as characters in “fictional” productions (see for example: Klein 
1984 [1932]). With small children lacking the verbal dexterity required for free association 
– the talking cure – Klein’s games were designed as an alternative method of unlocking the 
structure of the unconscious mind.68 Within classical psychoanalysis the use of toys remains 
the preserve of the child analyst and so perhaps its potential to unlock the unrepresentable 
traumatic pasts of adults (unrepresentable in the sense of not available in words) has not 
been fully explored. But some recent documentary-makers have not had the same 
 
68 Donald Winnicott further developed this pioneering work of Klein’s with children: see for example 
The Piggle (1989 [1977]). 
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reluctance. In The Missing Picture (2013), Rithy Panh stages an elaborate series of 
miniature plays in which clay figurines take a variety of roles, tapping into the unrealised 
potential for adults of Klein’s work with children. Panh has indicated that it was only when 
he stumbled upon the idea of staging his past in elaborate scenarios with “toys”, that the 
making of a film about his traumatic childhood became possible.69 Similarly, in her 
autobiographical documentary The Blonds (2003), Albertina Carri creates animated 
scenarios with Playmobil figures and Playmobil sets to give representational and dramatic 
form to her childhood trauma. Both Panh and Carri stage elaborate plays, substituting their 
particular toys for Ernst’s cotton reel and piece of string. 
 
Comparisons might be drawn with Art Spiegelman’s (1992) exploration of second-
generation, post-Holocaust trauma through his use of cartoon characters which invoke 
both fictional play and the dreamlike quality of the Botellas’s regredient constructions, in 
his graphic novel Maus II. For Michael Rothberg, these playful, dreamlike fictions are 
perhaps the only way to represent the unreal or unimaginable reality of the death camps 
arguing that ‘the historical trauma of the Nazi genocide […] de-realizes human experience 
and thus creates a need for fiction’ (2000: 206; Rothberg’s italics). 
 
Beyond the central role of the child’s capacity for creative play and for producing creative 
fictions to represent the trauma, four crucial ideas are encapsulated in the short fort-da 
vignette (ideas that all re-emerge in Albertina Carri’s The Blonds).  
 
First, the originary trauma is worked through as the child moves into the world of 
representation; the representation is the comforting idea of the mother that exists (as 
what we now might call an internal object) even when the real mother is absent. This 
representation of the mother is not a simple, indexical copy of the mother (Ernst does not 
play with a photograph of his mother which he hides and then retrieves) but a complex 
metaphorical substitution, where a wooden cotton reel stands in for the absent and 
 
69 Panh has said he was working on The Missing Picture for eighteen months before he stumbled on 
the idea of recreating his memories through the use of clay figurines. ‘The first moment they start to 
sculpt, it was like a miracle. There was something very pure in the gesture – something linked to 
your childhood.’ Panh realised ‘[m]aybe I can now make this film about this story because we take 
this clay and mix it with water and dry it with sun […] and afterwards this small figurine goes back to 
dust and their only trace will be print on the film. I really liked this idea, so we start to make a film 
like that.’ Panh also revealed that he himself had made clay figurines as a child and had used them in 
his games. Panh’s comments come from a filmed interview with Deirdre Boyle (Panh and Boyle 
2015). There is a fuller discussion of The Missing Picture in Chapter Four. 
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present mother (it is a meaningful, symbolic representation where signifier and signified 
eventually, through repetition, form a unitary sign). The reel mother stands in for the real 
mother. A fictionalised account is created in play that reproduces (but also alters) the real, 
non-fictional world, and the trauma is contained.  
 
Secondly, the child’s ability to substitute a mental conception – an idea – for the real 
mother, does not happen in an instant but instead the traumatic event and the resolution 
to the trauma must be repeated again and again (‘fort’ – ‘da’, ‘fort’ – ‘da’, ‘fort’ – ‘da’) for 
the terror of the trauma to be contained.  
 
Thirdly, the child’s entry into the representational world marks the child’s entry into the 
temporal world, as the child comes to recognise absence rather than loss; this recognition 
implies an ability to think that at a future moment the mother will return and an ability to 
remember that at a past moment the mother was once present.  
 
Fourthly, this recognition marks the child’s entry into the spatial world too as it entails an 
understanding that when the mother is absent she still exists, somewhere else, not simply 
as a representation but as a physical reality in another place (the string attached to Ernst’s 
reel is the physical manifestation of this concept).  
 
Rosine Perelberg argues (following Freud) that it is in this developmental moment that ‘the 
whole of psychic reality, in its positive and negative aspects, is structured in terms of time 
and space’ (2008: 2). It happens through fictional representation and in relation to an 
emergent temporally and spatially separate “other”: ‘The constitution of the individual 
takes place in the context of the time-space created in the relationship with the mother 
(and her body)’ (2008: 21). 
 
In the fort-da vignette, Freud is (in effect) describing a “cure” for trauma, as he describes 
how his grandson (standing in for every human infant) “overcame” the originary trauma of 
maternal separation. The traumatic occurrence needs to be represented and a fiction is 
invented. That fictional representation of necessity appears where once there was no 
representation: in the infant’s case because it had not previously reached the necessary 
developmental stage, experiencing the mother not as separate from self but as fused and 
undifferentiated; in the adult’s case because the impact of the trauma has shattered 
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representational capacities, leaving only a flood of terrifying affect, blurring or erasing the 
boundaries between self and other, subject and object. The nature of the infant’s 
experience of the trauma before the ‘fort-da’ game was invented, matches the description 
of adult traumatic experience in all three of the major contemporary accounts of trauma. 
That is, an inability to represent the trauma and a consequent inability to make sense (to 
produce a meaningful account) of the trauma; the shattering of temporal capacities as the 
trauma repeats only as terrifying and present affect or in so-called veridical memory as if 
the original traumatic event is happening now, in a perpetual experiential present; and a 
loss of spatial boundaries as the traumatised adult experiences the world as if trapped at 
the site of the original traumatic occurrence.70  
 
Temporality is an essential component of non-traumatic (post-traumatic) experience; for 
the infant, a sense of time arises from the rhythm of tolerance of displeasure. The 
successful resolution of this repetition compulsion is the mastering of time and requires a 
meaningful fictional narrative (narrative is after all simply a representation played out in 
time) from the very simplest narrative – fort then da then fort then da, etc. – to the most 
complex construction in analysis. A fictional narrative becomes the “cure” or at least the 
catalyst for the “cure”. The soothing representation is a fictive, or perhaps more accurately 
in Ernst’s case, a metaphoric substitution (a wooden reel as mother). Lessening the grip of 
trauma entails a repetitive return to the traumatic event, although the repetition is more 
accurately conceptualised as a spiral, a form that apparently repeats, but which slowly 
moves one to a different “place” (a different point in time). This escape from trauma 
mirrors the process of plunging into trauma as described by Jean Laplanche, where the 
traumatised individual ‘is caught in the repetitions of a spiral of trauma that recapitulates 
the original wounding’ (Ganteau 2015: 58, paraphrasing a passage in: Laplanche 2006). For 
Laplanche, one can spiral into trauma; Freud’s description of his grandson’s repetitive 
game (his fictional play) suggests one can also spiral out of trauma given the right 
conditions. Freud does not use the term ‘spiral’ so perhaps a better way to conceptualise a 
repetitive circle/cycle that can eventually lead to change, is to think of it as a Heraclitan 
circle where one goes around the circle but can never return to the same point, as the time 
 
70 The spatial component of traumatic experience is perhaps less well-appreciated than the temporal 
component but it is recognised in the frequent use of place names as the markers of traumatic 
events: Auschwitz for the Holocaust; the references to the principal traumatised protagonists in 
Alain Resnais’s Hiroshima mon amour (1959), as ‘Nevers’ and ‘Hiroshima’, after the sites of their 
traumas.  
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dimension makes what is a return to the same point in the spatial dimensions of a circle, 
actually a progression to a different point, time having moved on. 71  
 
Laplanche’s vicious spiral into trauma is overcome through the beneficial spiral back to 
psychic health that Freud describes. This is not to give the impression that the process is 
either painless or a quick fix. Freud (1937a) was profoundly aware that an analysis of even 
neurotic symptoms can be interminable; how much more so when dealing with (arguably) 
psychotic states. Instead, the psychological damage inflicted by trauma may only be 
susceptible to amelioration in the most propitious of circumstances. There are no 
miraculous cures of the sort witnessed by viewers of The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador 
(Perret 1912) where Suzanne, on viewing a recreation (a fictionalised re-presentation) of 
the traumatic event on film, is freed instantaneously from her symptoms (her démence) 
and fully recovers the lost object, her lover d’Erquy. In the real world that Freud is trying to 
describe, cures are rarely instantaneous and never miraculous.72 Ernst’s “cure” is more 
accurately described as a coming to terms with separation through a fictive, metaphoric 
representation that constantly returns Ernst to the point of unpleasure (loss) but through 
its temporal extension, gradually diminishes the terror, turning loss into absence, 
unpleasure into pleasure.  
 
In his coming to terms, Ernst has asserted some control over the terrifying trauma, and so 
achieves what Guy Mappin (2007) failed to achieve in My Winnipeg, the recovery (or in 
Ernst’s case perhaps, the discovery) of agency. But still, the meaningful representation (the 
symbolisation) can only be a cure to the extent that it is also the marker of the loss of the 
preceding state of fusion with his mother. The fictional representation always points 
towards the lost/absent object and so is always a marker of the original trauma. The 
separation is irrevocable. Freud’s account of his grandson’s game is effectively a parable 
about human representational capacities which are only called into being in order to 
contain loss (trauma); representation is a marker of the post-traumatic nature of human 
experience beyond early infancy. In adults attempting to deal with trauma, 
representational capacities are not called into being for the first time but need to be 
recovered, having been shattered by the psychic impact of traumatic events. And a “cure”, 
 
71 My coinage Heraclitan circle is a reference to Heraclitus’s famous epigram: ‘You could not step 
twice into the same river’ (recorded by Plato in Cratylus). 
72 Although of course Freud and Breuer did point to the immediacy of abreaction in the treatment of 
hysteria in the 1890s. 
 82 
if it comes (a lessening of the psychological distress associated with the trauma), is never 
miraculous: it is a coming to terms with trauma not its eradication. 
 
In the acceptance of loss and the process of repetition required to escape the most 
debilitating effects of that traumatic loss, the fort-da vignette mirrors Freud’s description 
of mourning in Mourning and Melancholia (1917a). The “cure” for trauma has the 
temporality of mourning; the passage of time and repetition playing a vital part in the 
return to psychic health through a constant testing and then an acceptance of reality. For 
Jean Laplanche, the temporality and the repetitions of the work of mourning are ‘the very 
prototype of analytic endeavour’ (Ray 2012: 56): the analytic process itself is a process of 
mourning.73 But there is no inevitability to the “cure” as in the same essay (1917a) Freud 
describes the remarkably similar (atemporal) temporality of melancholia, which repeats 
and repeats the trauma only to retraumatise or precipitate an escape into mania. The 
fictions of analysis and documentary can only work within a dynamic temporal context; a 
context (I will argue in the next section) that is refused in the post-structuralist reading of 
trauma producing a melancholic account, with the traumatised protagonist perpetually 
trapped in an unchanging, constantly repeating traumatic present. The trauma remains an 
open wound:74 there is no possibility of mastery; there is no possibility of understanding or 
meaning; the bonus of pleasure is not available. The repetitions of the post-structuralist 
account of trauma are the melancholic repetitions of the death drive – a deathly 
compulsion to repeat – ‘repeatedly bringing the patient back into the situation of his 
accident’ (1920: 13) as Freud puts it in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in the context of the 
traumatic dreams that beset so many survivors of the First World War. This fits with 
Laplanche’s account of spiralling into trauma. What Freud’s account of Ernst’s game allows 
– and what Beyond the Pleasure Principle as a whole suggests – is that for some there may 
be no escape from the deathly repetitions of trauma but that this is not inevitable: certain 
repetitions of traumatic experience might be in the service of the life drive, allowing a 
bonus of pleasure, allowing the ‘patient’ to spiral out of trauma or at least out of its worst 
excesses.   
 
 
73 This is the same temporal rhythm required to work through an analysand’s resistances, described 
by Freud in his essay Remembering, Repeating and Working Through (1914a).  
74 As Freud wrote: ‘melancholia behaves like an open wound’ – a perpetually ‘open’ trauma (1917a: 
252-3). 
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It is clear from Freud’s two accounts of the potential routes to recovery from trauma, a 
fiction plays a central role, providing a representation that can be worked on and that may 
in time coalesce into a meaningful and perhaps curative, ameliorative, account of the 
traumatic event. Freud is describing fictional interludes that can have a profound effect on 
the very real traumatic histories in which these fictions intervene. With Ernst, Freud shows 
us the fiction; in Constructions in Analysis, he tells us how, in theory, the analyst (and 
analysand) go about creating the fiction. Both accounts suggest that a ‘bait of falsehood’ 






3.3 The post-structuralist account of trauma: a timeless truth without 
meaning 
 
In the post-structuralist reading of trauma, there is no place for the imaginative fictions 
that psychoanalysis sees as the key to unlocking or provoking a meaningful account of 
traumatic experience. Post-structuralist accounts of trauma – taking the Holocaust as the 
paradigmatic case – entail epistemological and ontological positions that are incompatible 
with a belief in the possibility of recovery from trauma. These ‘prescriptive epistemologies 
and ontologies’, as Michael Rothberg (2000: 206) calls them, refuse the “middle term”, the 
signified, where meaning – potentially curative meaning – is created or found. Instead 
traumatic experience is seen as fixed and unchanging, one either of aporia and blankness 
or of veridical flashback memory, with both conceived as non-representational 
manifestations of a terrible sublime. The place where psychoanalysis deploys its fictions – 
the place where certain recent documentaries deploy their fictions – where creative play or 
dreaming can be staged, is closed down. The space of the signified, of meaning-making, is 
lost between missing or shattered signifiers and the literal return of the referent – the 
traumatic real. 
 
In this section, I will explore the philosophical underpinnings of post-structuralist trauma 
theories in the work of Jean-François Lyotard and Cathy Caruth, to help explicate the 
contrasting philosophical framework in which psychoanalysis operates and which allows it 
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to deploy its fictions. In both Lyotard’s and Caruth’s accounts, the symptoms of trauma 
come to mould the theoretical superstructure. The insider’s experience of trauma, the 
symptoms of trauma, are universalised to become the only possible experience of the 
world, as all of experience is recast as traumatic.75 Symptomatology becomes ontology. 
This theoretical account once (or if) accepted is then perfectly consistent in refusing both 
the emergence of meaning and the possibility of any change in the traumatic condition. 
 
 
3.3.1 Lyotard and the sublime Event 
 
In a number of works written from the early 1980s,76 Jean-François Lyotard set out a vision 
of the post-Holocaust world, a world that escaped representation and refused to coalesce 
into an account that could make any sense of what had happened at Auschwitz. Lyotard re-
worked Kant’s long-neglected notion of the sublime and the epoch-changing “Event”, to 
establish Auschwitz as the terrible sublime event, beyond the reach of reason and 
understanding; an event that could only be experienced directly and unmediated as a 
shattering encounter with the referent, at once both unthinkable and ‘the most real of 
realities’ (1988 [1983]: 58). This shattering encounter came to reform ontology, turning the 
inability of the traumatised to make sense of their experience into a universal template for 
human experience of the world. His work stripped away each of the mechanisms that 
allowed the psychoanalytic account of trauma to retain at least the hope that change – 
amelioration of traumatic experience – might be possible. Lyotard stripped away the 
temporal and the inter-personal and occluded the middle term of the signified where 
meaning is found or created – a middle term that psychoanalysis seeks in its deployment of 
fictions – enshrining an implacable Denkverbot at the core of his thinking. 
 
The insider’s experience of trauma in Lyotard’s account is one of either ‘silence’, the 
inability to find any representational form for the experience, or of ‘insanity’, the inability 
to make any sense of the jumbled, terrifying representations in memory that may remain. 
But this picture of blankness or confusion, familiar from many other accounts of trauma 
 
75 This contrasts with the Freudian account which casts all of human experience (beyond very early 
childhood) as post-traumatic as we enter the world of representation and thought, having worked 
through the originary, ontogentic trauma of separation (loss). 
76 Especially The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (1988 [1983]) and also Lessons on the Analytic of the 
Sublime (1994 [1991]) where Lyotard reworks Kant’s (1951 [1790]) ideas as set out in sections 23 to 
29 of The Critique of Judgement. 
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including the psychoanalytic account, is not confined to the traumatised protagonist – the 
primary witness to the trauma – but expanded to include all outsiders to the trauma, to all 
secondary witnesses, who mirror the insider’s experience of silence in their ‘deafness’ and 
in their inability to make any sense of what has happened.  
 
[T]he “perfect crime” [which is how Lyotard describes “Auschwitz”] does not 
consist in killing the victim or the witnesses […] but rather in obtaining the silence 
of the witnesses, the deafness of the judges, and the inconsistency (insanity) of the 
testimony. You neutralize the addresser, the addressee, and the sense of the 
testimony. 
       (Lyotard 1988 [1983]: 8)77 
 
Those secondary witnesses who try to construct a temporal or historical account of the 
trauma, come in for particularly harsh criticism, with history seen as a terrorising and 
illegitimate meta-narrative. Lyotard demands that the historian 
 
must break with the monopoly over history granted to the cognitive regime of 
phrases, and he or she must venture forth by lending his or her ear to what is not 
presentable under the rules of knowledge. Every reality entails this exigency insofar 
as it entails possible unknown senses. Auschwitz is the most real of realities in this 
respect. Its name marks the confines wherein historical knowledge sees its 
competence impugned. 
        (1988 [1983]: 58) 
 
For the psychoanalyst or the documentary maker (secondary witnesses of a sort) who try 
to unravel the psychic and historical aetiology of trauma, the inconsistency and insanity of 
the testimony – even its absence (silence) – may be a starting point in a process that tries 
to recover or construct/reconstruct ‘the sense of the testimony’ and so work back to a 
meaningful account. But Lyotard sees these efforts as futile and illegitimate as the ‘rules of 
knowledge’ cannot encompass the horror of ‘Auschwitz’, with outsiders to the trauma as 
afflicted by this state of unknowing as insiders. The ‘earthquake’ of Auschwitz destroyed all 
the ‘instruments’ we thought we once had for understanding and making sense of the 
world, placing all of us in the same predicament as the traumatised survivor – unable to 
understand what has happened:  
 
77 Thomas Trezise (2013) provides a powerful theoretical and ethical critique of the notion of 
‘silence’ in Lyotard and in the later theoretical work of Cathy Caruth, Dori Laub, Berel Lang and 
Giorgio Agamben. For Trezise, Lyotard and other trauma theorists fail to listen to the countless, 
articulate survivors’ accounts, seeking instead to theorise away (to be deaf to) the content of these 
testimonies in pursuit of a preconceived notion of the unrepresentability of trauma and the 
Holocaust. Trezise describes this as ‘a pronounced listening impairment’ (2013: 3).  
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Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects but also 
the instruments used to measure earthquakes directly and indirectly. The 
impossibility of quantitatively measuring it does not prohibit, but rather inspires in 
the minds of the survivors the idea of a very great seismic force. 
        (1988 [1983]: 56) 
 
The reality of Auschwitz remains but it is not only unrepresentable but unmeasureable and 
so, quite literally, unthinkable. 
 
Lyotard reached this extreme anti-rationalist and anti-cognitivist conclusion through his 
revival and reworking of Kant’s notion of the dynamical sublime which, for Kant (1951 
[1790] The Critique of Judgment: section 23), was an overwhelming feeling that strikes the 
perceiver as a sensation of ‘boundlessness’ as we are presented with a ‘formless object’. 
The language is mirrored in Lyotard’s description of Auschwitz inspiring in ‘the minds of the 
survivors the idea of a very great presentation of the indeterminate’ and in his choice of 
the word ‘earthquake’ to describe Auschwitz, the same word Kant chose to describe the 
magnitude of the dynamical sublime, which revealed the failure of sensibility, imagination 
and understanding (Kant 1951 [1790] The Critique of Judgment: section 28).78 In his 
description of Auschwitz, Lyotard is here also referencing Kant’s ideas about the sublime, 
apocalyptic, epoch-changing event, which is so momentous it is carried outside of history 
and beyond understanding. For Kant, ‘the event’ (‘die Begebenheit’) was the French 
Revolution; for Lyotard ‘the event’ (‘l’événement’) was ‘Auschwitz’. 
 
Lyotard is more or less in agreement with Kant on how we reach the sublime. But Lyotard 
refused the key Kantian notion, ‘Judgement’ (‘Urteil’), which was crucial to drawing the 
sublime event back into the realm of ‘Understanding’ (‘Verstand’). In the Kantian scheme, 
there is no direct Understanding of the sublime (only Reason can grasp the sublime) but 
Kant offers a route from Reason to Understanding; a route that allowed the sublime to be 
drawn back into the realm of knowledge and meaning through the working of the 
spontaneous and innate, cognitive capacity of Judgement which Kant also calls the ‘faculty 
of thinking’ (Kant 1999 [2nd edition 1787]: The Critique of Pure Reason). Judgement is the 
central cognitive faculty that combines all the other cognitive capacities ‘under a single 
 
78 Romantic writers who followed Kant (although not Kant himself) also commonly described the 
French Revolution as an earthquake (Salmi, Nivala, and Sarjala 2016: 24). 
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higher-order unity of rational self-consciousness’; a complex meta-cognitive faculty 
combining conceptualisation, logic, feeling, self-consciousness, intuition, etc (Hanna 2016).  
 
So, in Kant’s account, it is Judgement that translates the sublime back from the realm 
where only Reason can operate, to the realm of Understanding. But Lyotard absolutely 
rejects the power of reason (it perished at Auschwitz). With this vital modification, Kant’s 
sublime offered Lyotard exactly the philosophical vehicle he required. Like Kant, Lyotard 
reaches the sublime by vaulting straight over understanding and meaning (the signified) to 
a much profounder but formless, unthought, registration of the world we inhabit (the 
referent). But then in Lyotard’s account, with Reason disabled, Judgement cannot act as it 
does for Kant, as a go-between linking the sublime back to Understanding. The journey to 
this new post-modern sublime becomes a one-way ticket; meaning cannot be recovered or 
constructed. Lyotard refuses the possibility of ever being able to understand the sublime 
event, leaving ‘Auschwitz’ permanently beyond understanding, incapable of being 
translated into a meaningful account and registering only as an inchoate, affective 
presentation of horror and pain.  
 
In his appropriation of Kant, Lyotard produced an account of Auschwitz – an account of 
trauma – that was carried outside history, to become a timeless, unchanging description of 
the human condition. This traumatised, anti-rationalist account, then came to reform 
ontology itself (as is clear in Geoff Bennington’s approving gloss of Lyotard’s ideas): 
 
As a sort of emblem, Auschwitz signals the limit of historical competence: but this 
limit is implied in the structure of “reality” in general.  
       (Bennington 1987: 148) 
 
Joshua Hirsch (2004: 9) has described this as post-structuralism’s tendency ‘to universalize 
trauma as inherent in history, language, or even experience itself.’ There is no outside to 
trauma: experience is traumatic and without remedy. 
 
Lyotard’s account certainly reflects the experience of many survivors, like Elie Wiesel 
(1968: 182) who described the Holocaust as ‘a mystery that exceeds and overwhelms us’; a 
terrible, sublime, unrepresentable, unthinkable event. But it is a traumatised insider’s 
account and one which has refused any outsider’s view: there is no outside to the trauma; 
we are all co-opted into Wiesel’s ‘us’. There is therefore no possibility of any interpersonal 
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encounter between the traumatised and the non-traumatised (an outside witness) capable 
of generating a dialectic that over time might produce some sort of meaningful account. In 
contemporary psychoanalytic accounts of working with trauma – like that of the Botellas – 
the process can begin where Lyotard ends. Starting with the analysand’s formless, 
contentless, unrepresented, overwhelming feelings, the analyst acts as “witness” and 
attempts to provide some form and content (a regredient dream, a construction, a fiction) 
for the formless, contentless, unrepresented trauma, beginning a process that might 
ultimately yield some understanding. There seem to be powerful parallels between the 
Botellas’s regredient technique – a particular instantiation of the broader notion of the 
free-floating attention of the analyst – and the complex meta-cognitive faculty combining, 
conceptualisation, logic, feeling, self-consciousness and intuition that Kant called 
‘Judgement’ (‘Urteil’); a form of thinking that allowed Kant to draw the formless sublime 
back to the middle term where understanding and meaning appear. It is a similar complex, 
meta-cognitive faculty that allows the analyst to draw the analyand’s formless trauma into 
some sort of representational form (into a fiction produced in the counter-transference) 
that might catalyse a meaning-generating process. For Lyotard, these techniques and 
faculties (if they ever existed) were destroyed by the ‘earthquake’ of Auschwitz. 
 
 
3.3.2 Caruth and the embodied sublime 
 
In Lyotard’s account of Auschwitz, the traumatised flesh and blood survivors of the camps 
are strangely absent. It is as if the main victim of the Holocaust was thought and 
philosophy. A more embodied, and historically-located post-structuralist account of trauma 
emerged in the United States from the late 1970s, again taking the Holocaust as its 
archetype, but placing the testimony of survivors centre stage.79  This has come to be 
known as ‘trauma theory’ and was developed by a group of Yale University literary scholars 
including Shoshana Felman and, most prominently, Cathy Caruth (in her writings from the 
early 1990s80). Caruth combined a variety of practices – poststructuralist literary theory, 
neurophysiology and a version of psychoanalysis – to articulate her account of trauma. But 
despite the different theoretical underpinnings of Caruth’s trauma theory, it comes to 
conclusions very similar to those of Lyotard. Once again, trauma is unrepresentable and 
 
79 Caruth’s colleague Dori Laub has listened to and recorded hundreds of hours of Holocaust 
survivors’ testimony.  
80 Beginning with Caruth’s essay of 1991, “Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Trauma and Culture”.  
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beyond understanding, registering as an unthinkable, timeless sublime. Lyotard’s sublime, 
unthinkable Event, that registered only as a ‘negative presentation of the indeterminate’ 
(Lyotard 1988 [1983]: 56), is replaced by a sublime, embodied, traumatised survivor of the 
work and death camps. Their terrible stories are beyond the comprehension of both 
themselves and those who witness their testimony. 
 
On understanding, Caruth is unequivocal: ‘Traumatic experience suggests a certain 
paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to 
know it’ (1996: 91-2). It is as if, according to Roger Luckhurst, ‘[t]rauma somehow is seared 
directly into the psyche, almost like a piece of shrapnel, and is not subject to the distortions 
of subjective memory’ (2008: 4). Trauma registers not as a memory (available to thought 
and reworking) but as a pristine, unchanging and veridical imprint of the traumatic event, 
sealed off from other parts of the mind. Caruth describes trauma as ‘a symptom of history’ 
and traumatised individuals ‘become themselves the symptom of a history that they 
cannot fully possess’ (1991: 4). To substantiate her conjectures, Caruth cites 
neurophysiological research – especially that of Bessel van der Kolk81 – to claim that 
traumatic memory is a ‘reality imprint’ (Van der Kolk, McFarlane, and Weisæth 1996: 52); 
or, in Roger Luckhurst’s gloss of Van der Kolk, ‘the unprocessed fragment of the thing itself’ 
(Luckhurst 2008: 13). Ruth Leys, who holds that memory is always subject to distortions 
and can never be veridical, suggests that van der Kolk and trauma theorists  
 
share the same epistemological-ontological commitments. They both think that 
traumatic flashbacks and nightmares are veridical memories of past traumatic 
events, and they both believe that those symptoms are literal replicas or 
reproductions of the trauma that as such stand outside all representation. Van der 
Kolk believes that the literal nature of the traumatic flashback or memory means 
that it belongs to a system of traumatic memory different from that of ordinary 
memory and as such is cut off or dissociated from ordinary recollection, 
symbolisation, and meaning. 
(Leys’s spoken comments in: Leys and Goldman 2010: 666) 
 
Without access to explanation and without agency, the victim of traumatic events becomes 
the embodied, sublime referent, a by-product of a traumatic history, and an unwitting 
vessel for the literal truth to which they have no access. Survivors’ accounts cease to be 
signifiers or representations of the traumatic event but fragments of the real. And when 
the trauma does not register as a veridical memory – as a piece of mental shrapnel – it is 
 
81 See for example: Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 1989: 1530-40.  
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equally lost to understanding and meaning; it is an impenetrable aporia, an “unknown” 
that is felt only as a painful, affecting absence or nothingness. Neither of these articulations 
of traumatic memory are representations: one is an embodiment of the referent; the other 
is a simple absence of representation.  
 
Caruth and other trauma theorists teaching at Yale, also drew heavily on the 
deconstructive theories of Paul de Man to reinforce the idea that trauma is 
unrepresentable or unreadable and unavailable to understanding. In a recent essay, Stef 
Craps writes: 
 
According to Caruth, conjoining a psychoanalytic view of trauma with a 
deconstructivist vigilance regarding the indeterminacies of representation in the 
analysis of texts that bear witness to traumatic histories can grant us a paradoxical 
mode of access to extreme events and experiences that defy understanding and 
representation. In this account, textual “undecidability” or “unreadability” comes 
to reflect the inaccessibility of trauma. 
(Craps 2014: 45) 
 
Craps’s perspicacious observation contradicts a common assumption that trauma theory 
addresses the real historical world and real survivor’s accounts. Trauma theory’s “real 
world” of traumatic experience is the historical world reconfigured either as unreadable 
“text” or as a remote, noumenal truth to which we have no access. The apparent return to 
history and the real world by Caruth and others, is more accurately an obliteration of 
history and the temporal. In 1991, Caruth wrote ‘a history can be grasped only in the very 
inaccessibility of its occurrence’ (1991: 7) and five years later went on to make the 
universalising claim: ‘I link the notion of trauma to the larger conception of the very 
“possibility of history”’ (1996: 7, footnote 5) – by which Caruth of course means the 
impossibility of history. And this ahistorical, atemporal traumatic world comes to describe 
all of human experience (conflating, according to Wulf Kansteiner (2004: 194), the 
traumatic with the non-traumatic and so obliterating ‘historical precision’). In “trauma 
theory”, a particular version of the inside of the traumatic experience is used to produce an 
ontology that claims all of human experience as traumatising and beyond understanding. 
For Pieter Vermeulen (2007: 460), trauma theory can be defined as a ‘program of 
understanding non-understanding’. He substantiates this by quoting Caruth: trauma is not 
about the ‘event itself’ but inheres ‘solely in the structure of its experience or reception’; an 
experience which in turn is defined as a ‘collapse of understanding’ (Vermeulen 2007: 459-
60, quoting Caruth 1995: 3-12; retaining Caruth’s italics). The theory is circular, 
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hermetically sealed, and so in its own terms, invulnerable to challenge.82 Trauma is 
everywhere, and unreadability and non-understanding are everywhere, spilling over the 
borders of traumatic history to define reality itself.  
 
My position is less hostile than that of Vermeulen and Trezise as I would concur with 
Caruth that the structure of the experience of trauma is often one of blankness and lack of 
understanding. But this is not the end point, rather it is the point where the inter-personal 
(and historicising) practice of psychoanalysis begins its work (as I will argue through the 
work of Linda Belau in section 3.4 below).  
 
 
3.3.3 Post-structuralism’s atemporality and passivation of the secondary witness 
 
It seems that trauma theory closes off all the routes that psychoanalysis pursues in trying 
to construct or recover a meaningful account of trauma. Where there is some memory of 
the trauma, even if confused and temporally fractured, the analyst as an outsider to the 
trauma tries to work with the analysand to piece together a temporal account that reaches 
behind the screen memories, the nightmares and the hallucinations. But trauma theory 
excludes both the possibility of recovering an historical account of the trauma and 
forecloses on the process of working with the insider’s account of trauma over time, 
returning to it again and again, so setting in motion a beneficial spiral (a mournful spiral) 
away from the initially traumatising account. By claiming that the registration of the 
trauma is veridical – a fragment of the real – there is no account available to work with. 
There is nothing for the psychoanalytic process to uncover as we are already in possession 
of the referent, the truth. Psychoanalysis can work with what we now call traumatic 
flashback memories but only if these are conceived of as vivid not veridical; a distinction 
that retains the notion that ‘traumatic memory is always representational, available to 
memory, and therefore open to constant revision’ (Luckhurst 2008: 13). Veridical memory 
is another facet of the trauma theory’s a-temporality; like Lyotard’s ‘Event’, it is outside 
history and not subject to change. I have no doubt that some of those suffering trauma are 
subject to powerful, terrifyingly real, flashback-“memories” that enter the mind without 
warning, but this is not proof of the flashback’s veridity, only its affective power.  
 
82 Thomas Trezise (2013: 47) recasts trauma theory’s self-defined invulnerability to challenge as 
fatally vulnerable to challenge, writing ‘the inaccessibility of traumatic experience to knowledge 
undermines the very foundation of the theory that asserts it’. 
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By conceiving the registration of trauma as veridical, non-representational and not 
available to cognition, the traumatised victim is caught in an unending repetition of the 
pain of the wounding event. This is the a-temporal temporality of melancholia rather than 
the temporal process of mourning that analysis hopes to set in motion. The temporality of 
trauma theory is not strictly an experience of time at all but the experience of a perpetual 
series of traumatic, frozen “presents” (frozen “pasts” if one prefers, constantly repeating in 
the present), which occlude the possibility of ‘working-through’.83 Without time as an agent 
of change, melancholia cannot become mourning, and mourning cannot become a process 
that can lead back to psychic health. Without an active temporal process, Freud’s 
grandson, Ernst, would have remained lost forever in ‘nameless and shapeless distress’ 
overwhelmed by the loss of his mother. Instead, through an idea of time as change, and 
the staging of the fiction with the cotton reel with its repetitions of fort-da, fort-da, Ernst is 
able to reach an accommodation with loss, recasting it as temporary absence. No longer an 
endless circle of distress but a spiral (a Heraclitan circle) out of trauma to a more ordinary 
experience of the world.  
 
And just as the action of time is excluded from Lyotard’s and Caruth’s accounts, so is the 
active intervention of the secondary witness; an intervention which (like that of the 
analyst) could generate a dialectic that might allow an understanding of the traumatic past 
to emerge. The witness (and the act of witnessing) plays a central role in trauma theory84 
but it is a passive role. All the witness can do is to passively receive the testimony, which 
the traumatised individual transmits to the witness as a kind of bodily or psychic contagion. 
Just as the primary witness – the traumatised protagonist – experiences the trauma as a 
nameless, shapeless dread, so the secondary witness plays silent witness to the trauma 
through a process of vicarious traumatisation. The secondary witness in this account, does 
not have a mind that can try to actively process the experiences that are presented or 
transmitted.85 Again, here, post-structuralist trauma theory leaves off where 
psychoanalysis begins an active process that might lead to understanding. Jean Laplanche, 
Dominique Scarfone and others (see for example: Laplanche 1999a; Scarfone 2010) write 
 
83 Referring to Freud’s essay Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (1914a). 
84 See for example: Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub. 1991. Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. 
85 The notion of ‘transmission’ is a key term in trauma theory and is used frequently by Shoshana 
Felman, Dori Laub and others. See for example their essays in: Caruth, (ed) 1995. Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory, e.g. Felman on page 56; Laub on page 68, etc. 
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about the analyst passively receiving what is transmitted by the traumatised patient, but 
the analytic mind (as both inside and outside the trauma) can then begin to actively 
process the feelings that have been transmitted (feelings that are intuited in the counter-
transference), transforming them into something new (a construction) that can then be 
offered back to the analysand. Those feelings come with no representational form but the 
analyst struggles to create that form – to create a fiction – that when offered back to the 






3.4 Psychoanalysis: working with impossibility 
 
Linda Belau (2001) succinctly characterises the difference between Cathy Caruth and 
Shoshana Felman’s deconstructive approach to trauma (and I would include Lyotard here 
too) and the approach of psychoanalysis. Deconstructive and post-structuralist accounts 
begin with the impossibility of trauma – its unrepresentability, its incomprehensibility, its 
perpetual and unchanging repetition (as veridical memory or inchoate horror), its 
passivation and vicarious traumatisation of the secondary witness – and then raise this 
experience of impossibility to the level of ‘an ideal’ (Belau 2001: paragraph 20). The 
insider’s experience of trauma – the symptomatology of trauma – is turned into a new 
ontology.  
 
Psychoanalysis takes a different approach.86 As Belau puts it (2001: footnote 32): ‘for 
deconstruction, the subject is impossible, for psychoanalysis, the subject is that very 
impossibility’. It is at this very moment of ‘impossibility’ (when post-structuralism gives up, 
turning trauma into a sublime, timeless referent) that psychoanalysis starts its work. 
Fictions are invented to take the place of lost, missing or never-existing representations. 
These fictions are generated by the secondary witness (by the analyst or, by extension, by 
 
86 And it is not just psychoanalysis that challenges a post-structuralist ontology that universalises the 
experience of the traumatised. Film theorist, Joshua Hirsch, writing about the representation of the 
Holocaust in film argues that the post-structuralist position is actually one of ethics and aesthetics 
and not ontology (symptomatology is not ontology): ‘The discourse of trauma […] transforms the 
inherent limit of the witness’s private memory into a moral limit of public memory; it transforms an 
involuntary psychological symptom into a voluntary aesthetic’ (Hirsch 2004: 20).  
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the documentary maker) out of the ‘impossibility’ – out of the transmission and passive 
reception of traumatic experience – by using their mind to work actively to give form to the 
passively received trauma (as Freud advocates in Constructions in Analysis, as the Botellas 
do through their regredient dreaming or as any analyst must do in first feeling and then 
trying to comprehend what they intuit in the counter-transference). And, in the absence of 
analyst or third-person documentary maker – in a self-analysis or in an autobiographical 
documentary – the traumatised protagonist (the primary witness) may be able to produce 
these fictions or representations intra-personally by conjuring a virtual, secondary witness 
from within the self (finding a self that is other to the self). These representations or 
fictions can then work over time within an analysis/self-analysis or a documentary, with 
time as process and change, rather than post-structuralism’s atemporal temporality of 
perpetual melancholic return to the sublime unchanging event.  
 
There is, of course, no inevitability to time as change leading to amelioration of traumatic 
experience and no utopian belief that time “heals”. For Barbara Johnson (1980: 142), 
psychoanalysis does not return to the ‘knot’ of trauma in the belief that a simple 
interpretation or insight can unknot it, but rather returns again and again to the very 
impossibility of trauma, with the clinical process being ‘an act’ or a performance: ‘an act of 
untying the knot in the structure by the repetition of the act of tying it.’87 In documentary, 
the filmic return to the knot of trauma and the repetition of the traumatic event (the act of 
tying the knot) may be the route to untying it. That process of untying through repeated 
tying may begin with a filmic return – perhaps a repeated return – to a representation of 
the trauma as it apparently happened in its apparent veridity. But by representing the tying 
of the knot in the film-within, the process of untying may be able to start to play out over 
time. 
 
The process through which psychoanalysis and documentary may be able to have an 
ameliorative influence on the structure of traumatic experience demands an ontology at 
odds with the one post-structuralism offers. But the post-structuralist account of trauma is 
 
87 Jean Laplanche also describes (at least the first part of) the analytic process as one of untying 
knots (deconstruction) or unweaving. Laplanche writes: ‘the very model of psychoanalysis [is] 
unweaving so that a new fabric can be woven, disentangling to allow the formation of new knots’ 
(1999c: 253-4; Laplanche’s italics). The etymology of analysis itself suggests unknotting: ana 
meaning back/again/anew/towards; lysis meaning to unfasten/loosen/set free/untie, etc. 
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itself at odds with what I might call the standard post-structuralist construction, which 
Fredric Jameson succinctly summarises: 
 
[T]he vast majority of structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers wage an 
implacable war on the “referent” and its supposedly ideological conception of a 
“real” reality out there (of which truth is the accurate reflection, etc). Yet in this 
process, in which the old tripartite linguistic scheme is whittled down to the simple 
opposition of signifier to signified, some of the opprobrium that hitherto attached 
to the referent now comes to contaminate the second term, the signified, which 
seems to have more or less taken its place. 
(Jameson 2015) 
 
Faced with the impossibility of trauma, post-structuralist cultural critics and philosophers 
have rediscovered the ‘referent’, the ‘real reality out there’, reinventing it in the form of 
veridical traumatic memory or the victim of trauma as the sublime, embodied referent or 
the traumatic “Event” itself as sublime and outside history. What remains in post-
structuralist trauma theory from Jameson’s description is the opprobrium that 
contaminates the second term, the signified, where meaning and understanding might 
coalesce. This contaminated middle term has taken the place once reserved for the 
referent. The referent, now rehabilitated as the post-modern or traumatic sublime, then 
refuses any mechanism that might translate the real out there back to the realm of 
meaning (as is evident in Lyotard’s refusal of the action of Judgement that Kant uses to 
work the inchoate feelings of the dynamic sublime back to Understanding).  
 
But this philosophy of impossibility seems to have been erected on a misapprehension of 
traumatic experience as sublime and “real”. What is identified in the work of Lyotard and 
Caruth seems much closer to what Jameson (1983) calls ‘material signifiers’ (schizophrenic 
signifiers) rather than the sublime referent. It is very hard to tell the difference between 
the experience of the sublime victim of trauma theory – an embodiment of the referent – 
and the experience of schizophrenia as described by Jameson. Jameson’s description of 
schizophrenic experience mirrors very precisely the description of the effects of trauma on 
those who are in its grip:88 no sense of ‘temporal continuity’, a feeling of ‘unreality’, no 
ability to make sense of the world, ‘the experience of the present becomes powerfully, 
overwhelmingly vivid and “material”’ (or ‘literal’), the schizophrenic living in a world of 
‘heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious and oppressive charge of affect, glowing with 
 
88 A description that the psychoanalytic account, trauma-theory account and PTSD account share. 
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hallucinatory energy’. And Jameson does not mistake this form of experience as an 
instance of the sublime, instead ‘schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, 
disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent 
sequence’ (1983; Jameson’s italics). The experience of the traumatised is one of shattered 
signifiers; shattered signifiers masquerading as the traumatic sublime referent.89 The 
misrecognition derives from the misrecognition of the schizophrenic or the traumatic 
signifier. The old construction of Form – Content – Unform (for signifier – signified – 
referent) of “normal” experience has become, under the shattering impact of 
schizophrenia or trauma, Unform – Content – Unform. The referent and the signifier have 
become very hard to distinguish because the unform (the shattered nature) of the signifier 
feels very like the unform of the referent.  
 
In the next section, I will turn my attention back to psychoanalysis and attempt to provide a 
theoretical account of how fictions fit into the structure of signifier-signified-referent, 
which will return us by a different route to the question of the fictionality of 
psychoanalysis’s fictions and of the fictionality of fictional films-within in documentary. 
Having argued for the place of these fictions within a non-fictional frame via 






3.5 Psychoanalysis: fictions as representations of unrepresented states 
 
In this section and the next, I will provide a fuller theoretical account of the role of fictions 
within psychoanalysis, by positioning these fictions within a broader psychoanalytic theory 
of representation, meaning and referentiality (which can be mapped on to the 
structuralist/post-structuralist trilogy of signifier-signified-referent). The previous section, 
on post-structuralism’s despairing and universalising account of traumatic experience, will 
 
89 Freud makes a parallel point in his essay on The Unconscious (1915b) where he writes that the 
schizophrenic mistakes words for things; words become concrete, real, literal. Here post-
structuralist accounts of trauma mistake fractured, broken or absent memories (signifiers) for the 
concrete, real and unchanging truth (the referent), producing what could be described as a 
traumatised account of trauma. These shattered signifiers seem to equate to André Green’s list of 
heterogeneous signifiers (as described in Chapter One). 
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serve to bring sharply into focus precisely where psychoanalysis claims to be able to “act” 
by deploying its fictions, as it takes the impossibility of trauma not as its end point but as its 
subject and starting point. 
 
 
3.5.1 Psychoanalysis as a meaning-seeking enterprise 
 
Post-stucturalism’s hostility to meaning and understanding – its scotomisation of the 
middle term, the signified – puts post-structuralist theory fundamentally at odds with the 
psychoanalytic project (despite its many borrowings from psychoanalysis). Psychoanalysis 
is at root a clinical practice with its sights set on a “cure”; a cure not conceived simply as 
the removal of the symptoms of psychic distress but rather presaged upon a belief that 
psychic pain will only diminish if a meaningful account of psychic history and psychic life 
can be found.90 As Terry Eagleton writes:  
 
the aim of the psychoanalyst […] is to restore the lost signifieds to those who have 
become stuck in a hard place, and whose discourse has consequently grown rigid 
and repetitive. To unpick the knot of a neurosis, and unravel a reified piece of 
signification […] One of the roles of psychoanalysis is to free us from a fantasy of 
compulsive repetition on which we have become impaled, converting this 
stuckness or stumbling-block at the core of one’s being into the cornerstone of a 
new form of life. 
(Eagleton 2009: 9) 
 
Psychoanalyst, Jacques-Alain Miller (1984: 622) makes a similar assertion: ‘The symptom 
can be attributed to a failure of symbolisation; the cure is an intersubjective process in the 
course of which the subject reestablishes the continuity of his [sic] life history by giving 
meaning, after the fact, to what has remained opaque in his experience’ or again as 
Jacques Lacan described the objective of psychoanalysis in a 1967 lecture: ‘To restore to 
the symptoms their meaning, to provide a place to the desires they mask’ (Lacan quoted in: 
Patsalides and Patsalides 2001: 207). The centrality of meaning to the psychoanalytic 
project is not limited to the (essentially) Lacanian thinkers quoted here. Freud wrote of the 
‘drive to know’ (the ‘Wissenstrieb’) and of an ‘epistemophilic instinct’ (see for example: 
Freud 1909: 245; Freud 1917b: 327-8) and at the heart of Wilfred Bion’s work, for example, 
 
90 For Paul Ricœur, the aim of psychoanalysis is to discover a new, meaningful, narrative identity for 
the analysand with the desire for meaning expressing itself as a desire for narrative (for exploring 
‘untold or virtual stories’). See David Wood’s Introduction to: On Paul Ricœur: Narrative and 
Interpretation (Wood 1991: 1-19; especially 11-14). 
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is the notion that human beings are meaning-seeking, driven by an epistemophilic urge to 
make sense of the world. In conditions of psychic distress, this urge (‘K’) breaks down and 
becomes minus-K (‘-K’) as the sufferer fails to link up ideas and impressions and so fails to 
create meaning: the failure of meaning is a marker of that psychic distress (Bion 1994 
[1962]; and see also 1959; 1962). 
 
 
3.5.2 Trauma and the need to create fictional representations as a route to meaning 
 
But this still begs the question of why, in the case of trauma, there is a need to create 
fictions within the meaning-seeking enterprise of psychoanalysis. In Eagleton’s example of 
neurotic patients, the process of meaning-making begins with the signified as the analytic 
pair work to unknot or unravel fixed significations or meanings that are no longer 
adequate. But in the case of profound trauma, the task cannot begin here but has to begin 
with representation, with the signifier, as representations have been lost or shattered, or 
are experienced not as memories or representations at all but as the traumatic event 
happening in the present (a re-presentation of the trauma but experienced as if it were its 
initial presentation, happening in the here and now). André Green (2005a: 134-5) has 
described the different forms that unrepresented traumatic experience can take: 
hallucination (which I take to encompass “veridical” memory), acting out, somatisation 
(including both “illness” and disturbances to bodily perception) and what he calls 
‘débordement’ or the overflow of intense negative affect, which other psychoanalytic 
theorists have called ‘fear of annihilation’ (Melanie Klein), ‘nameless anxiety’ or ‘dread’ 
(Wilfred Bion), ‘tormenting anxiety’ or ‘primitive agony’ (Donald Winnicott),91 ‘nameless, 
shapeless dread’ (the Botellas), etc. In the following chapters, when I turn my attention 
back to documentary films treating traumatic histories, all these manifestations of 
unrepresented states will be apparent: a filmic representation of a hallucination is central 
to Ari Folman’s Waltz with Bashir (2008); whilst Anwar Congo’s trauma in Joshua 
Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing (2012) struggles to find representational form, 
manifesting itself more often as acting out or as intense, debilitating somatisation. 
 
The sort of fictions that Freud advocates that the analyst constructs in Constructions in 
Analysis or the analyst must dream in the Botellas’s account, are precisely aimed at the 
 
91 The foregoing list of other theorists’ terms is taken from: Green 2005a: 134-5.  
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particularly acute problem of non-representation in profound trauma (and not Eagleton’s 
neurotic conditions). These fictions provide the representations that have gone missing or 
been fractured. With profound trauma, analysis cannot begin by reordering or 
reinterpreting existing representations, but must work at a much more fundamental level 
(what we might call a more primitive level) and create the representation – that is, produce 
a fiction that takes the place of the missing representation – a fictional representation that 
might eventually, if it has some affective traction within the psychic life of the analysand, 
become the foundation upon which a meaningful account might be built. 
 
Bion addresses this problem directly in Learning from Experience through his theorisation 
of alpha and beta elements in mental functioning. Beta elements are ‘undigested facts’ 
very different from memories. They are pieces of raw experience that have never entered 
the unconscious through repression – unmetabolised fragments of psychic or somatic or 
affective experience – which need to be given form by being converted into alpha elements 
if they are to be made available for thought and allow the construction of a meaningful 
account (Bion 1994 [1962]: 6-8). These beta elements seem to correspond to the shattered 
signifiers in Jameson’s account of schizophrenia (unsurprising perhaps as Bion’s work was 
much more focused on psychotic states than on the neurotic conditions that absorbed so 
much of Freud’s attention). For the traumatised protagonist, these beta elements are 
either experienced internally as terror (Green’s ‘débordement’) or are expelled into the 
external world (to become what Bion calls ‘bizarre objects’) and lodged in people or things 
that are then experienced as persecutory and controlling. Those objects, once expelled or 
projected into other people, allow the traumatised protagonist to act out in relation to that 
person. This acting rather than thinking can have very troubling consequences in the real 
world and can also be seen within an analysis as the analysand acts out unprocessed 
fragments of experience in the present of the analytic encounter.  
 
A generation before Bion, Sándor Ferenczi (1949 [1932]: 225-30) recognised this 
characteristic of traumatic or psychotic experience and tried to account for it within his 
clinical practice. The staging of these past traumas within the controlled environment of an 
analysis and with the help of the analyst’s insights (insights that for Ferenczi were reached 
through feeling or intuiting what he was experiencing in the counter-transference), might 
just allow the acting out to take representational form; that is to be seen by the analysand 
to be a representation of something that has gone missing rather than being a concrete 
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“fact” in the present.92 If this psychic transition can be made by analyst and analysand 
working together, then this act can become an object of thought which might begin a 
process of change. Repetitious acting out in this way, can become one of the fictions within 
the analytic encounter – a play-within-the-play – which might begin a process of psychic 
change in the life of the analysand. The repetition of the acting out within the analysis is 
perhaps an example of what Johnson (1980: 142) called ‘an act of untying the knot in the 
structure by the repetition of the act of tying it.’ 
 
The insider’s experience of these shattered, unformed fragments conforms very closely to 
the account given in post-structuralist trauma theories of traumatic experience, as a 
sublime and terrifying encounter with the “real”; with the unchanging noumenal truth. 
Bion (1994 [1962]: 6) writes that ‘[i]n contrast with the alpha-elements, the beta-elements 
are not felt as phenomena, but as things-in-themselves’. But Bion is very careful to say they 
are felt as things-in-themselves and not that they are things-in-themselves. Bion, here, 
remains firmly in the world of phenomena where beta elements can be worked with and 
given form. This symptom of trauma is not taken as an unchanging and unchangeable 
ontological fact as it is in trauma theory. Bion works with this apparent impossibility. 
 
Bion’s way of working with beta elements is to introduce the creative workings of another 
mind – an outsider or a secondary witness – who can process the beta fragments and then 
offer an account back to the traumatised protagonist in the form of alpha elements that 
are available for thought. Bion’s model for this outside mind comes from his observation of 
the interaction between mother and infant. The infant who has yet to develop a mind 
capable of thought, experiences lack or need as terrifying, without source, without any 
temporal notion that it can end, and without meaning. The mother who is attuned to her 
baby, senses the terror, imagines what the problem might be – hunger, separation, cold – 
and then offers a solution, by feeding the child or holding the child or providing bodily 
warmth. Bion calls this ability to sense and make sense of the child’s experience, maternal 
‘reverie’. It could also be characterised as the mother intuiting the child’s terror in the 
counter-transference. The mother at first passively and in tune with the child tries to feel 
what the child may be feeling – the mother tries to experience the feelings the child 
‘transmits’ – and then actively intervenes by imagining a possible solution to whatever it 
 
92 According to Green, Freud was only able to account fully for acting out after he developed the so-
called second topography, and introduced the notion of the ‘id’ which is non-representational (and 
non-linguistic) unlike the unconscious of the first topography (Green 2005a: 155-6). 
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may be that is troubling the child (this switch from passive to active secondary witnessing is 
absent from the trauma theory account). The solution is a sort of fiction as the mother 
cannot really know she is offering the “right” solution: if it is right the child will be soothed; 
if it is wrong, the first fiction will be discarded and another provided. Like Freud’s 
description of a construction in analysis, if it is productive the patient (here the baby) is 
‘touched’; if it is not, the construction will drop out of the analysis and a better one will be 
sought. The mother’s mind does the thinking that infant is not yet capable of, and through 
their inter-personal exchanges over time, the infant develops a mind capable of thinking 
for itself and able to make sense of the world for itself. It is a process through which the 
child enters the world of representation and thought. There are parallels here with Freud’s 
grandson’s fort-da game, in that the creative fiction of the game is the mechanism through 
which the child enters the world of representation and learns to contain terrors that were 
formerly uncontainable.93 And there are in turn parallels between Ernst’s struggle to enter 
the world of representation and the traumatised protagonist’s struggle to recover 
representational capacities that have been shattered by the impact of trauma. 
 
In adult trauma, these beta elements are again at play. The analyst, taking the place of the 
mother, must try to passively receive the terrifying and disturbing feelings that are being 
transmitted. Bion (1970) likened this passivity to Keat’s notion of negative capability, 
describing it as the suspension of memory and desire. The analyst then switches into an 
active mode and tries, working with the analysand, to find or create a representational 
form for the formless terror that has been “received”. The shattered fragments of the 
signifier that were received are returned to the analysand having been imaginatively 
reconstituted into something approaching “whole” signifiers or coherent representations. 
Again, this is the analyst constructing a fiction – or better, the analytic pair constructing a 
fiction – that takes the place of shattered or missing signifiers. Beta elements –
unmetabolised fragments of psychic or somatic or affective experience – are brought 
within the representational sphere in these fictional constructions. The fictional 
 
93 The profound difference between Freud’s and Bion’s account, is that Ernst is apparently author of 
his own meaning and his own “cure” whilst for Bion the intervention of another mind is critical. That 
said, it is not worth making too much of this difference, as Freud’s description of his grandson’s 
game is short and unelaborated and there is even a hint that another mind might have been 
involved in inventing the game, when Freud writes: ‘It is of course a matter of indifference from the 
point of view of judging the effective nature of the game whether the child invented it himself or 
took it over on some outside suggestion’ (1920: 15). What is certain, is that in Constructions in 
Analysis (1937b), Freud is fully aware that another mind is a necessary condition for change to 
occur.  
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constructions themselves can then be reflected on and might allow the analysand to begin 
to construct a meaningful account of their traumatic history. The fictions bring the analysis 
to the point where Eagleton began his description of an analysis that deals with neuroses. 
Having found or created signifiers to replace those lost or shattered, the analysand can 
then move on to Eagleton’s task of developing new signifieds (meanings).  
 
A recent essay by psychoanalyst Howard Levine captures this essential difference between 
the analysis of neuroses and the analysis of unrepresented trauma which requires creative 
fictions:  
 
In the presence of represented unconscious, latent content, the analytic process 
moves via free association and interpretation from conscious and preconscious 
surface to unconscious depth. In the analysis of unrepresented and weakly 
represented mental states, the elements of mind – conscious, preconscious, and 
unconscious – must first be created by a work that begins in the analyst’s psyche 
and is then offered to and inscribed in the psyche of the patient as part of an 
interactive, intersubjective relationship and process. In other words, the analyst 
may be required to provide some expressive, catalytic action in order to help 
precipitate or strengthen the patient’s representational capacities. 
(2013: 70; Levine’s italics) 
 
Levine is one of a number of analysts who have recently (re)turned to the complex issue of 
the representation of unrepresented states in profoundly traumatised or psychotic 
patients, and who look back to Freud’s Constructions essay, to Bion, and to a lesser (but 
increasing) extent to Ferenczi to find inspiration. The ‘catalytic action’ that Levine describes 
is analogous to Freud’s ‘bait of falsehood’ in the Constructions essay: the fictional account 
that takes the place of the missing representation and then acts as a catalyst for the 
emergence of meaning or in Freud’s grander articulation, acts as ‘bait’ to take the ‘carp of 
truth’. These fictions must always be judged by their impact on the analysis: that is, 
whether a fiction helps free the analysand to be able to start thinking about the trauma 
and to find meaning; or, in Bion’s terms, whether the fiction helps the analysand to convert 








3.6 Meaning as created/found fiction: between Aphrodite and Sleeping 
Beauty 
 
Levine’s recent work goes beyond the description of the clinical interventions that may be 
required in the face of trauma and its unrepresented states, and places what I am calling 
fictions, and what Freud called baits of falsehood, within a broader theory of 
representation, meaning and referentiality (an epistemological-ontological framework). 
Levine’s ideas, in common with psychoanalysis in general, fall into a broadly Kantian 
framework.94 The philosophical system depends on the idea that there are noumenal truths 
out there somewhere – truths about both the external and the internal world – but that 
these are inaccessible and unknowable in any direct way. The unknowable, noumenal truth 
is given various expressions in psychoanalysis from Lacan’s ‘Real’ to Bion’s ‘O’. Levine turns 
to Bion for his framework and describes the nature of the representation (the fiction) that 
is produced by the analyst working with a traumatised patient: 
 
The representation produced is always to some extent partial and approximate and 
never a fully complete depiction of the thing-in-itself. […] As Bion put it “(Ultimate 
Reality) O does not fall into the domain of knowledge or learning save incidentally; 
it can ‘become’, but it cannot be ‘known’. It is darkness and formlessness but it 
enters the domain K (i.e., the realm of that which can be known).” 
(2013: 70-1; Levine’s italics).95 
 
What Levine is claiming for the co-authored, “invented” representations of the analytic 
pair, is a faint echo – an indirect glimpse – of the unform of the referent. The unform of ‘O’ 
acquires form and content as a signifier in psychoanalysis’s invented, fictional 
representations. These representations can then become imbued with meaning (that is 
form a unified sign where signifier points to a signified) through further mental activity on 
 
94 In one of his rare explicit references to the Kantian framework of his thought, Freud wrote in his 
1915 essay on The Unconscious: ‘Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our 
perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is 
perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of 
consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the 
psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be.’ (1915b: 171). Here Freud seems to 
chime with Kant’s statement in The Critique of Pure Reason: ‘I […] know myself, like other 
phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am […] So far as inner intuition is concerned, we 
know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself’ (Kant 1999 [2nd edition 1787]: B152-
6). For an overview of the influence of Kant on Freud’s thought see: Brook 2003. 
95 Levine is referring to Bion’s ideas in Attention and Interpretation (1970) where he develops the 
idea of ‘O’. 
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the part of the analyst and the analytic pair (and so enter Bion’s domain of ‘K’). This is the 
process of symbolisation which emerges out of reflection on the counter-transferential 
encounter between analyst and analysand. Post-structuralist accounts of trauma recognise 
the ‘darkness and formlessness’ of traumatic reality but refuse all the mechanisms through 
which the overwhelming and terrifying experience of the traumatic sublime could be 
drawn into the representational sphere and become objects of thought. Lyotard explicitly 
rejects the workings of the complex faculty of Judgement, the mechanism that Kant 
defined as the means of drawing the formless sublime back to the realm of Understanding. 
In contrast, psychoanalysis describes a number of mechanisms which perform the function 
of Judgement from regredient dreaming, to reverie, to intuiting in the counter-
transference. All these mechanisms seek to provide representational form for the unform 
of the referent and insist that it is only through representation that we might gain ‘partial 
and approximate’ access to the referent. It is the ‘partial and approximate’ nature of these 
representations which leads us to see them as fictional. 
 
This brings me back to the nature of the “fictions” deployed in psychoanalysis when dealing 
with traumatic states. In the previous chapter, I advanced an argument from 
phenomenology that the fictions of psychoanalysis and the fictions of the film-within-the-
film in documentaries seeking to explore traumatic personal histories, might only be 
fictional to an extent. They may be representations of psychic realities (representations of 
factical events) and so, as I have said, hint that some truth is in play. And, as I have also 
argued, despite the label fictional these fictions can sit within the frame of the analysis as a 
whole or the frame of the documentary as a whole and not compromise the perception of 
the analysis or the documentary as non-fictional intentional objects (noematic objects). 
What psychoanalytic meta-theory suggests – drawing on Levine, on Bion and others – is 
that these fictions may contain fragments of the truth and this brings psychoanalytic theory 
into line with my earlier argument which was derived phenomenologically. If these 
“fictions” contain fragments of the truth, calling them fictions seems wide of the mark but 
the label remains useful as it accords with the commonsense, realist description of these 
strange, invented, representations and it is the word used (along with its synonyms) by 
analysts and filmmakers and film viewers to describe these representational forms. They 
are probably best described as alternative frames of experience that have the appearance 
of fiction.  
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But is this an entirely satisfactory theorisation? The radically unknowable nature of the 
referent or ‘O’ or the ‘Real’, means that we cannot know whether these representations 
contain a faint echo of a psychical truth or whether they really are just fictitious; that is, 
created out of nothing and so merely delusions. Of course, analysis allows for a pragmatic 
test. Freud (1937b: 262) believed a false ‘construction’ would be revealed in its lack of 
affective impact on the analysand and would ‘drop out as if it had never been made’ 
allowing a better one to be created or found (like the mother in her reverie trying various 
solutions to her infant’s terror until one seems to work). Still, perhaps we are deluding 
ourselves if we construct an ontology that posits noumenal truths that can never be known 
for certain in this phenomenal world we inhabit. 
 
Winnicott’s notion (1990 [1971]a) of the transitional object and potential space96 seem to 
offer a viable solution to this conundrum. Potential space is a play space within the analytic 
frame where ideas can be played with, tried out, discarded, altered, re-made, combined in 
different ways, as analyst and analysand can go in search of something that seems to be 
meaningful and has the potential to alter psychic perceptions. Winnicott observed that 
infants at play occupy a similar potential space, often playing with objects – apparently 
trivial and everyday objects to the adult mind – which they imbue with deep significance. 
These play objects, transitional objects, appear to help the child negotiate – to transition – 
between inner experience and the exigencies or brute realities of the external world. The 
transitional object (a doll, a teddy bear, a piece of cloth) is simultaneously both an 
imaginative creation of the child and a real object that the child finds in the external world. 
It is central to Winnicott’s account that the child’s transitional object is simultaneously both 
created and found; it is brought into being as a creative act of the child’s internal, 
imaginative world and is simultaneously an object that exists in the real external world. To 
try to separate these two apparently competing ontologies would be to destroy its function 
as a transitional object.  
 
It is the very ambiguity of the transitional object’s ontological status that allows André 
Green, in his essay on Potential Space (1986b), to use it as the basis for a theory of meaning 
(a slightly more skeptical theory of meaning than the one outlined by Levine). Green is 
trying to describe the nature of the meanings that arise in the analytic setting (meanings 
 
96 Winnicott always used the term ‘potential space’ but it is frequently referred to by commentators 
as transitional space to emphasise its link to the transitional object. 
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that are prompted into being by the catalyst of fictions akin to those in children’s play) but 
his reflections provide the basis for a more general theory of meaning with universal 
applicability: 
  
Meaning does not emerge complete as Aphrodite rising from the waves. It is for us 
to construct it. Viderman believes that, prior to the analytic situation, the meaning 
that we seek never existed; it is the analytic process which constitutes it as such for 
the first time. Meaning is not discovered, it is created. I prefer to describe it as an 
absent meaning, a virtual sense which awaits its realization through the cuttings 
and shapings offered by the analytic space (and time). It is a potential meaning. It 
would be wrong to think like Sleeping Beauty it merely waits there to be aroused. It 
is constituted in and by the analytic situation; but if the analytic situation reveals it, 
it does not create it. It brings it from absence to potentiality, and then makes it 
actual. To actualize it means to call it into existence, not out of nothing (for there is 
no spontaneous generation), but out of the meeting of two discourses, and by way 
of that object which is the analyst, in order to construct the analytic mind. 
(1986b: 293; Green’s italics)97 
 
Green’s account suggests that the meanings that are attainable in the phenomenal world 
we inhabit,98 are both created by us and found by us in a real world beyond. They are at 
once both inventions and discoveries, both subjective and objective, both fiction and truth. 
With the truth (the referent, ‘O’, the ‘Real’) posited as a priori unknowable, we cannot 
know what part of meaning is created and what part found, so the ontological status of 
meaning must forever be suspended between Aphrodite and Sleeping Beauty. Meanings 
are both a human creation and a brush with the noumenal, unknowable truth. This places 
the hard work of analysis (and the hard work of human meaning-making more generally) 
firmly back in the phenomenal world, in a world structured in time and space, in a world 
where meanings are tentative and contingent, succumbing neither to a fantasy that we can 
possess the truth nor to a despairing resignation that there is no meaning (a fantasy and a 
despair that trauma theory combines in its positing of a truth that is at once unknowable). 
Meanings emerge in a potential space that Green describes as ‘a ventilated space, a space 
which is neither that of “this is meaningless” nor that of “this means that” but one of “this 
may mean that”.’ (Green 1986c: 42).  
 
 
97 Note: Viderman, who Green mentions, is Serge Viderman (1916-91) the Romanian-born 
psychoanalyst who practised in Paris and whose work profoundly influenced César and Sara Botella. 
See: Viderman. 1970. La construction de l ’espace analytique.  
98 Meanings that are unified signs combining signifier and signified that are the outcome of what 
Alain Gibeault (2005: 1712-4) describes as the ‘process of symbolization’. 
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In the arena of cultural studies, Annette Kuhn, like Green, co-opts Winnicott’s notion of 
potential space and develops a similar theory of cultural meaning to Green’s conception of 
psychic meaning. Like Green, Kuhn recognises how creative activity in potential space 
straddles the apparently incompatible, polar opposites of invented (“fictional”) 
representation and noumenal truth: ‘Potential space can be understood as a place that 
contains fantasy and reality, “me” and “not-me”, and what in semiotic terms could be 
characterised as sign and referent’ (Kuhn 2013a: 4). I am largely in agreement with Kuhn 
but side with Green in seeing this straddling as the straddling of signifier and referent (of 
representation and noumenal truth) rather than a straddling of sign and referent, as ‘sign’ 
already contains or presupposes a fusion of signifier and signified (a fusion of 
representation with meaning). For me, and for Green, the signified (tentative meaning of 
the ‘this may mean that’ sort) is the product of the straddling and not part of the initial 
equation. Kuhn’s use of the notion of potential space has exerted an influence on film 
theory, introducing Winnicottian ideas and conceptions of meaning into the field (a subject 
I will return to in section 3.7 below).  
 
In the light of Green’s theory of meaning, the construction in analysis or the regredient 
dream or the analyst inventing solutions like Bion’s mother in her reverie or the quasi-
historical reconstruction of events – all of psychoanalysis’s fictions – are the baits of 
falsehood that tempt meanings into existence; meanings that in turn have the same 
ambiguous ontological status as Winnicott’s transitional object, suspended somewhere 
between fiction and truth.99 Likewise, the “fictional” films within the non-fictional frame of 
documentary open up a potential space within documentary: a play space where ideas 
(meanings) of ambiguous ontological status are provoked into existence. In the end, 
perhaps we should heed Adam Phillips’s observation (1988: 118), that the child is not 
concerned with what the transitional object is but what it does. It is an observation that 
validates psychoanalysis’s pragmatic test of its “fictions”: if they work keep them; if they 
don’t work let them ‘drop out’ and try others. We are left with a functional account of 
meaning. If the fictions provoke meanings that have an ameliorative or curative impact on 
the traumatised protagonist’s current psychic experience, the job is done.  
 
 
99 Green (1986b: 293) describes the transitional object as ‘constructed within the space of illusion 
never violated by the question, Was the object created or found?’. 
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In developing this functional account of meaning, I am not suggesting that it is only 
applicable to psychic meanings: I am not advocating a lower threshold for the achievement 
meaning in relation to the psychic, quite the contrary. The notion of meaning that I derive 
from Green is universally applicable across all of human meaning-making activity whether 
in relation to psychic phenomena or those of natural science. Like psychoanalysis, natural 
science has its meaningful fictions – that is, its tested and as yet unfalsified hypotheses 
often backed up with empirical data – that function to advance further scientific 
discoveries. But it would be a mistake to think of these theories as the noumenal truth: 
they are functional theories of which we can at least say ‘this may mean that’ and contain 
elements of both the created and the found. Whilst these theories continue to “function” 
science will keep them; when they fail (as aspects of Newtonian physics did in the face 
Einstein’s speculations of 1905), they will drop out of the frame. 
 
Of more immediate impact on the conduct of an analysis or on the making of a 
documentary are the creative possibilities that are opened up by the notion of potential 
space. The idea of potential space grants the analyst or filmmaker permission to bring the 
freedoms and unbounded imaginative potential of children’s play into the serious business 
of analysis or filmmaking. This freedom is particularly needed in the case of traumatic 
histories where representations must be conjured up to take the place of those that have 
been fractured, have gone missing or have never achieved representational form. Green 
pays Winnicott the highest compliment for placing the notion of play at the heart of 
analysis. He rejects Freud’s suggestion that the analytic situation can be compared to a 
game of chess with its fixed and rigid rules, preferring Winnicott’s games:  
 
If Winnicott is the master player of psychoanalysis, it is surely not chess that he 
plays with his patient. It is a game with a cotton reel, with a piece of string, with 
the doll or a teddy bear. 
(Green 1986b: 293) 
 
The essence of an analysis is to provide a setting which enables the patient to play these 
games:  
 
Analytic technique is directed toward bringing about the capacity for play with 
transitional objects. The essential feature is no longer interpreting, but enabling  
the subject to live out creative experiences of a new category of objects. 
(1986b: 285; Green’s italics) 
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Games ‘with a cotton reel, with a piece of string, with the doll or a teddy bear’ perhaps 
best captures the spirit of the imaginative strategies deployed in the fictional films-within 
in the documentaries that form the core of this study. The films-within are transitional 
objects that sit within the potential space of the documentary, just as the games Winnicott 
encourages sit within the potential space of the analysis. For Green ‘Winnicott has […] 
described not so much an object as a space lending itself to the creation of objects’; a 
‘playground of transitional phenomena’ (Green 1986b: 285). It is the frame of the 
documentary and the frame of the analysis that define the potential space where meaning 
might emerge through the playing of games (through the exploration of fictions).  
 
And although articulated in a very different idiom, Green’s speculations about the nature of 
the meanings that become available through the analytic process seem to be very similar 
to the sort of “truths” that Linda Williams sees as becoming available through a 
documentary-making process that deploys fictions. Williams argues that ‘documentary can 
and should use all the strategies of fictional construction to get at truths’ (1993: 20); truths 
which she describes as ‘postmodern’ truths; relative and contingent truths (or the 
fragmented and ‘receding horizon’ of the truth if we figure the truth as absolute) (1993: 
11). These post-modern truths (like Green’s meanings) are never stable and are subject to 
change – ‘never absolute and never fixed’ but always ‘under construction’ as Williams 
describes them – so ‘the truth figured by documentary cannot be a simple unmasking or 





3.7 The Winnicottian viewer watching the Winnicottian viewer: 
the emergence of meaning for both extra- and intra-diegetic audience 
 
Over the last twenty years or so, a few cultural critics have applied Winnicott’s idea of 
potential space to the space of the fictional feature film. Ira Konigsberg (1996: 887) 
describes the ‘transitional’ filmic space of fictional cinema, as a ‘world of shadows half-way 
[…] between signifier and reality’. Phyllis Creme in her 1994 PhD thesis,100 invented the idea 
 
100 Ideas she reprises in: Creme 2013.  
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of a Winnicottian viewer, a viewer who enters the film on the screen and plays an active 
role.  
 
Film and spectator interact in a mutual, overlapping potential space as the 
apparently uncrossable offscreen/onscreen barrier appears to be crossed. As I 
engage with it, the film that is given me out there on screen becomes my own 
creation, like a found object. 
        (Creme 2013: 41) 
 
For Creme (2013: 48), we (as viewers) ‘both “find” and “create” this film as it unfolds 
before us, with us as willing participants’, whilst Konigsberg (1996: 885) sees the on-screen 
characters as transitional objects, part oneself (as viewer) part other. And for Creme, this 
playful, creative activity (like the play Winnicott observed in his child patients) is a 
meaning-making and a therapeutic activity: ‘For Winnicott, play is everyone’s birthright. It 
is a mark of psychic health and the major aim of therapy – not just to cure “illness” but as a 
way of experiencing a sense of meaning and of self in life’ (2013: 39). Play takes place in the 
potential space of the film just as it did in the potential space of the therapeutic setting of 
Winnicott’s consulting room. 
 
The entanglement between the viewer and the viewed – between spectator and film – that 
Konigsberg and Creme describe through Winnicott, seems to fit very closely with the 
entanglement between spectator and film that Sobchack (1999) describes through 
phenomenology, where viewer and film are not a separate subject and object but mutually 
implicated as an experiencing-subject perceives an experienced-object. 
 
And just as Sobchack took the insights of a film phenomenology developed to interpret 
fictional films and then applied them to non-fiction films (documentary), so I want to take 
Konigsberg’s and Creme’s psychoanalytic insights about fictional film and apply them to 
documentary. I also want to shift the frame of reference to allow me to sustain my 
contention that the film-within can make meanings available to the traumatised 
protagonist who exists within the documentary. The frame of reference used by Creme and 
Konigsberg is that of the cinema goer (their Winnicottian viewer) entering the potential 
space of the film on the cinema screen, who both finds and creates meaning through their 
active, playful spectatorship. In the documentaries that concern me, the films-within are 
viewed (sometimes repeatedly) by the traumatised protagonist within the documentary. 
This traumatised diegetic spectator becomes my primary Winnicottian viewer. Creme’s and 
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Konigsberg’s extra-diegetic Winnicottian viewer (you or I watching the documentary) 
therefore witnesses another Winnicottian viewer (an inner Winnicottian viewer) within the 
diegesis who, like us, reacts to and enters into the film that they are watching. We watch 
the documentary, and within that documentary we see this inner Winnicottian viewer 
watching the film within the documentary. It is the meanings (intra-diegetic meanings) that 
may become available to this inner Winnicottian viewer, that are my primary focus. 
 
Even these two frames of reference cannot capture the complexities of some 
documentaries (Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003) has frames within frames within 
frames) or the complexity of the analytic encounter as described by André Green. Taking 
the theatre rather than cinema as his model (a common metaphor in “French” 
psychoanalysis), Green (1979: 3-4) builds a picture of frames of reference nesting one 
within the other like Matryoshka (“Russian”) dolls. There is the outside world that contains 
the theatre (a theatre that I take to be the analysis sitting within the frame of the everyday 
life of the analysand); inside the theatre there is the auditorium and the stage (which marks 
the divide between the analysand’s outer and inner selves); and then there is the stage 
itself, where the analysand might try to put on a performance of their inner life. But this 
on-stage space contains another frame, a hidden frame – off-stage space – which remains 
forever off limits. In Green’s metaphor, off-stage is the unconscious, the unseen part of the 
stage where the truth hides.101 Linking this notion of frames back to ideas put forward in 
the previous section, the stage is the place where Terry Eagleton’s neurotic patient puts on 
a performance of existing representations of their inner life as they search for new 
signifieds (new meanings) which it is hoped will be in close proximity to the truth that sits 
just out of reach, off-stage. It is also the place where the analyst (as theatre director) might 
have to stage a fiction (a construction) for a traumatised analysand as the traumatised 
patient may have no play of their own to stage, trauma having fractured or obliterated 
those representations which might have formed a play.  
 
In the next chapter, I will turn my attention away from psychoanalytic meta-theory and 
towards documentary film, and ask if parallels can be drawn between psychoanalytic 
practice and documentary practice where fictions are deployed in pursuit of a traumatic 
personal history. 
 
101 And that off-stage unconscious is not restricted to the represented but hidden, repressed 
unconscious of the neurotic but includes the idea of the psychotic and traumatised, unstructured, 








In Chapter Two, I briefly surveyed the gradually expanding boundaries of documentary as 
audiences and filmmakers came to accept a more permissive attitude towards such 
practices as the deployment of fictions in documentary and the adoption of more 
subjective modes of address, especially the autobiographical.  
 
In this chapter, in pursuing my argument that documentary is capable of producing 
meaning in the wake of trauma, I want first to make a case for cinéma vérité – and 
specifically Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin’s 1961 documentary Chronique d’un été – as 
having pioneered many of the practices that are central to contemporary documentaries 
that use fictions to explore traumatic histories.102 Rouch and Morin theorised their 
filmmaking and its ability to produce “truths” in both phenomenological and 
psychoanalytic terms; and they did this thirty years before film scholars began to apply the 
insights of these bodies of theory to the interpretation of documentary film (see discussion 
in Chapter One).  
 
But one practice that cinéma vérité and Chronique did not pioneer but which is common in 
documentaries today treating traumatic histories, is the autobiographical mode of address. 
And so, in the second part of this chapter, I want to look more closely at how 
autobiographical documentaries produce meaning when the key, meaning-generating, 
interpersonal relationship of conventional documentary – between the director and the 




102 Joshua Oppenheimer, for example, explicitly acknowledges his debt to Rouch, declaring ‘I’m 
absolutely standing on his shoulders’ (interview with Oppenheimer in: Spiessens 2014: 69). This is 
just one of many instances of Oppenheimer expressing his debt to Rouch and cinéma vérité. That 
said, associations between Chronique and current practice are not offered in the spirit of a 
genealogy – a continuous teleological progression from then to now – but more to indicate points of 
connection.  
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4.1 Cinéma vérité 
 
4.1.1 Chronique d’un été: documentary as ‘filmo-therapy’ 
 
Chronique d’un été was conceived as an anthropological study of contemporary Parisian 
life, which both Rouch and Morin treated as an experiment in phenomenological 
filmmaking; truths would be revealed in the intensity of the encounters between ordinary 
Parisians in the filmmaking present. Chronique was made at the high point of Bazinian 
phenomenological realism and, more generally, whilst French intellectual life was still 
heavily influenced by Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential phenomenology. Rouch and Morin, like 
Sartre, sought an immediate, authentic engagement with the world. Truth was to be – 
could only be – grasped through direct experience of the world and was to be found in the 
impressions of the individual. Truth was revealed in the encounter with the world not in 
withdrawn contemplation and this encounter could be captured on film and sound tape. 
For Sam Di Iorio (2007: 30), ‘Rouch and Morin shared a Bazinian faith in cinema’s power to 
uncover fundamental truths: in showing appearances (things as they seem) they hoped to 
reveal essences (things as they are)’. 
 
And those essences were understood by Rouch and Morin to conform to a psychoanalytic 
model of the production of meaning or “truth”. Rouch described the cinéma-vérité 
approach to filmmaking pioneered in Chronique d’un été as ‘filmo-therapy’ (said on film in: 
Dauman 2011)103 and believed that the documentary camera actively creates and records 
something new and transformative in the filmic present. 
 
Yes, the camera deforms, but not from the moment that it becomes an accomplice. 
At that point it has the possibility of doing something I couldn’t do if the camera 
wasn’t there: it becomes a kind of psychoanalytic stimulant which lets people do 
things they wouldn’t otherwise do. 
(Rouch quoted in: Renov 2004: 197) 
 
 
103 Rouch says this in a piece of footage from 1960-1 that did not make the final cut of Chronique but 
which is included in Florence Dauman’s 2011 documentary Un été +50 (in which Chronique’s original 
participants, fifty years after its release, reflect on their experience of making the film). I should 
make it clear that Rouch did not see this ‘filmo-therapy’ as necessarily positive in its impact on 
protagonists. In Rouch’s view, several participants in Chronique ended the filmmaking process more 
unhappy than when they began it. Edgar Morin (responding to Rouch’s comments in this Chronique 
out-take) agrees but feels the process brought participants from a ‘semi-conscious state’ to a much 
deeper understanding of themselves, even if this understanding might produce a ‘deeper sadness’. 
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Morin (2003 [1960]: 232) made a parallel point when he described the encounters to be 
filmed in Chronique as a ‘sociodrama’ or a ‘game [that] has the value of psychoanalytic 
truth, that is to say, precisely that which is hidden or repressed comes to the surface in 
these roles’. The truth is seen as emerging from an examination of the structure of 
experience in the present just as it is in the analytic encounter. 
 
Edgar Morin’s two interviews with ‘Mary Lou’104 (a young Italian woman who had recently 
moved to Paris) are examples of the revelatory and creative power of the camera in 
Chronique. The combination of Morin’s searching and highly-personal questions about 
Mary Lou’s personal happiness and the close camera work focusing on Mary Lou’s face, 
capture her troubled state. She is agitated and close to tears, her speech is hesitant and 
broken. However we might interpret Mary Lou’s state of mind during the interviews, it is 
clear that the conversation in the presence of the camera was very exposing. Morin and 
Mary Lou generated an encounter that had not been seen in documentary before; a 
moment, perhaps, of highly-charged “reality”. Towards the end of Chronique, Mary Lou is 
filmed commenting on her experience of being interviewed, and confirms the intensity of 
the filmic encounter: 
 
I feel that to obtain even the tiniest grain of truth, the subject has to be alone and 
on the verge of hysteria – that is if it is to talk of anything intimate. 
 
The tiny grains of truth are not revealed simply in the intensity of the moment of filming, 
they emerge from the interpersonal relationship between filmmaker and protagonist 
(despite Mary Lou’s feeling of being ‘alone’). It is encounters like that between Morin and 
Mary-Lou which prompted Emanuel Berman many years later to describe documentary 
contributors becoming ‘invested in their relationship with the filmmaker in a way that 
evokes what goes on in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy’ (Berman’s comments reproduced 
in: Chanan 2007: 216). And the revolutionary interviewing techniques and the open group 
discussions pioneered in Chronique transformed subsequent documentary practice to such 




104 Credited as ‘Mary Lou’ in the film but in life, Marilù Parolini. 
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It may be a truism to liken the interviewing process to that of psychoanalysis, but in 
my experience that is very much the case. People will say things to you in front of 
the camera and a film crew that they might not have said ever before. 
(Macdonald in: Cousins and Macdonald 2006: 392)  
 
The mechanics of the filmmaking process and the interpersonal relationships that the 
process entails, are fully visible in Chronique. It is a Brechtian mode of filmmaking, where 
the director, film crew and filming equipment are not hidden; it is a mode Allan Casebier 
(1991: 157-8) describes as ‘reflexive’ as it unmasks the mechanics of the filmmaking 
process in documenting a subject. The camera is not seen as a transparent window on the 
world – rather the filmmaking process actively creates what it then records.  
 
And the cinéma-vérité mode of filmmaking was not simply reflexive but self-reflexive, 
allowing protagonists to reflect back on their own performances and perhaps to find 
something meaningful in what they witness. Morin certainly knew that self-reflexivity was a 
necessary part of the process of revealing the truth, as he wrote about it before the filming 
of Chronique had even started: 
 
We will show them [the participants] what has been filmed so far (at a stage in the 
editing that has not yet been determined) and in doing so attempt the ultimate 
psychodrama, the ultimate explication. 
(Morin 2003 [1960]: 233) 
 
This psychodrama was played out towards the end of the filmmaking process, in a scene 
where a partly edited version of the film (a rough cut of sections of the film) is shown in a 
small movie theatre to all the protagonists, with Rouch and Morin present. The 
protagonists are encouraged to comment on their own performance and on the 
performances of others. This scene in the movie theatre was filmed and the sometimes 
heated exchanges that ensued were then cut into the final version of Chronique to create 
the film that was released to the world. Casebier (1991: 157-8) describes this self-reflexive 
process as the process of mediation involved in the reception of the documentary playing 
out within the documentary itself. It is a highly self-conscious mode of filmmaking, where 
the documentary itself becomes a subject of the documentary. It allows for an examination 
of the processes through which the truth is produced – and a questioning of the validity of 




In making the documentary itself a subject of the documentary, Chronique suggested an 
approach to filmmaking where isolated moments of insight or revelation in the filmic 
present can become an evolving series of successive “presents” that play out over the 
screen time of the film. It is not unlike analyst and analysand in later sessions, revisiting 
interpretations and constructions from earlier sessions which are then re-considered, re-
made, abandoned, seen in a different light, as perhaps profounder insights become 
available. In structural terms, it provides the space within documentary where the fictional 
film-within-the-film finds it place. It is here that the outer Winnicottian viewer (us as extra-
diegetic audience) watch an inner Winnicottian viewer (an intra-diegetic audience 
member) being acted on and affected by and perhaps changed by the film and the 
filmmaking process and by their own performance within the film.  
 
 
4.1.2 Chronique d’un été and the fictional film-within: ‘walking through’ trauma 
 
One scene in particular opened up these possibilities, moving documentary beyond the 
talking-head encounter towards the performative, offering the potential to harness the 
creative power of the fictional film within the frame of documentary. It was a scene that 
shifted the focus of Chronique from the present of life in Paris to the past and to the 
traumatic past. 
 
Rouch had experimented with fictions before making Chronique, placing his documentary 
protagonists into entirely made-up scenarios and having them improvise in front of the 
camera. Whether these scenarios were devised by Rouch or by the protagonists 
themselves, Rouch believed that these fictions would reveal a deeper truth that was not 
otherwise available.105 In La pyramide humaine (1959), Rouch brought together black pupils 
and white pupils from a high school in Abidjan on the Ivory Coast who usually kept apart 
from each other and had fairly-distant, even hostile, relations. He arbitrarily assigned the 
students character traits (racist, non-racist) and had the pupils play out everyday scenarios 
(meeting at the beach, falling in love). The fictional scenarios dramatised often previously 
 
105 In Moi, un noir (1958), Rouch employed this tactic by having his economic-migrant protagonists 
portray themselves as the Hollywood stars they most admired: it was a way to unearth the hopes 
and fears and disappointments in the lives of migrant workers in a foreign country. There are 
powerful echoes of Moi, un noir in The Act of Killing (2012) where director Joshua Oppenheimer 
provides a stage for his protagonists to act out scenes from their murderous past in the style of the 
Hollywood movies they loved.  
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unspoken racial tensions and prompted the students to reflect on their attitudes which had 
formerly been concealed (perhaps even from themselves). Rouch was putting into practice 
his belief that ‘fiction is the only way to penetrate reality’ (Rouch 2003: 6). At the close of 
the film we see a friendship has developed between a white and black pupil, leading Rouch 
to tell the audience: ‘This small film accomplished in its daily improvisations what years of 
being in the same classroom could not.’ Although some critics have questioned Rouch’s 
claim that the film really shifted entrenched racist attitudes (see for example: Margulies 
2007: 125-33), if we take Rouch’s optimistic summation at face value, the improvisations, 
the fictional interlude within the documentary frame, had a transformatory impact on the 
real lives of the participants. A ‘truth’, to use Rouch’s term, a social truth about the here-
and-now, had emerged from the filmmaking process: a truth that facilitated the 
transformation. 
 
When making Chronique, Rouch again experimented with a fiction. Keen to test the 
potential of the new light-weight cameras and synchronised recording equipment that 
were just becoming available in France in 1960, Rouch and Morin designed a scene in 
which one of the film’s researchers, Marceline,106 would walk through La place de la 
Concorde and Les Halles whilst delivering a monologue. The light-weight camera allowed 
her to be filmed at a distance whilst on the move, with her words picked up on the 
portable sound-recording equipment. Marceline, who was an Auschwitz-Birkenau survivor, 
talked about her wartime experiences.  
 
Marceline performed a “dialogue” (or more accurately a monologue) between herself and 
her father who died in Auschwitz. On her lonely walk, Marceline refers to her father as 
‘you’, as if he were there alongside her. We hear Marceline saying: ‘Here I am now in the 
Place de la Concorde. I came back, you stayed.’ She tells her “father”: ‘I was almost happy 
to be deported, I loved you so much’ (her father having been deported to Auschwitz six 
months before her own deportation). Late in the scene Marceline says: ‘Papa, papa, I wish 
you were here now’. Her last word is: ‘Papa’, followed by a heavy sigh. The experience is 
laden with affect for Marceline. The scene could be described as fictional as it involves a 
protagonist engaging in dialogue with someone who is dead. This is not to suggest a 
temporal confusion; Marceline uses the past tense and knows very well that the father she 
 
106 Marceline Loridan (later Loridan-Ivens) who was born Marceline Rozenberg of Polish Jewish 
parents living in France. 
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addresses is dead. But the scene has an intensity that comes from the performance 
happening in the present and, in an emotional sense, Marceline is accompanied by her 
father on her long, lonely walk across La place de la Concorde. 
 
What resulted was a sequence in which the film’s phenomenological method (the 
spontaneous expression by protagonists of feelings and thoughts about their current 
predicament) was applied to the past. The past was evoked through memory and not by 
recourse to an account that made any claim to historical objectivity. Marceline’s words 
remained an examination of the structure of present experience but the structure of a 
present experience of a remembered and reimagined past. The past is not out there 
somewhere, to be looked at as an object: it only exists in the embodied form in which it is 
being recounted; it only appears as perceived by a consciousness (as an indivisible subject-
object phenomenon). This opens up a space in documentary for fantasy, imagination and 
fictionalisation.  
 
It was a very different approach to documentary to the contemporaneous North-American 
practice of direct cinema (with which cinéma vérité is frequently equated). Direct cinema 
purports to capture truths about the world out there as if the camera and crew did not 
exist; the camera is a transparent window on reality. Joshua Oppenheimer, who sees 
himself working in the cinéma-vérité tradition pioneered by Rouch, draws a stark 
distinction between the two filmmaking practices: 
 
It’s a great pity that in the Anglophone world we conflate cinéma vérité and Direct 
Cinema. Cinéma vérité was all about giving people the space to perform on camera, 
to imagine, to stage themselves as a way of documenting how they see themselves 
and make sense of their world. It’s trying to do something fundamentally more 
profound. Direct Cinema tries to be insightful by looking at reality in a very close 
way, while in fact much more is staged than we like to think. In cinéma vérité it’s 
about trying to make something visible – the role of fantasy and imagination in 
everyday life. 
(Oppenheimer quoted in: Bradshaw 2013: 38) 
 
Rouch was not trying to capture an objective reality directly on film but using the 
interfering presence of the camera to create a space for fantasy and imagination as this, he 
believed, was the route to a deeper truth (a deeper reality). Alisa Lebow (2006: 235) makes 
a similar point when she notes ‘documentary realism can be said to disavow its fantasy, 
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and […] it is precisely fantasy that is necessary to achieve a glimpse of the Real.’107 And 
Peter Loizos (1993: 46; 50), writing about Rouch’s ethnofictions more generally (not 
specifically Chronique), sees Rouch’s ‘use of improvisation and fantasy as projective 
methods in the exploration of people’s lives’ which ‘convey something fundamental about 
real lives’. 
 
Rouch’s phenomenological-historical method, pioneered in Marceline’s scene in Chronique, 
was an approach uniquely suited to trauma as trauma exists only in the present and is 
manifest in a variety of disruptions of memory and physical symptoms. It is an approach to 
the traumatic past that Claude Lanzmann deployed to devastating effect in his 1985 
documentary, Shoah; a film made in the “present” through memory and without the usual 
paraphernalia of old photographs and film footage, authoritative voice-over narration, 
linear historical chronology or extra-diegetic sound or music. Shoshana Felman (1991: 51), 
writing about Shoah, has called it ‘the story of the past in the present of the telling’. For 
Felman, this ‘telling’ includes what is not said and unconscious enactments of aspects of 
the past that evade memory.  
 
What is not available in words, what is denied, what cannot and what will not be 
remembered or articulated, nonetheless gets realized. What takes place in the film, 
what materially and unexpectedly occurs and what returns like a ghost is reference 
itself, the very object – and the very content – of historical erasure. 
(Felman 1991: 68) 
 
Felman’s words capture the potential of documentaries like Shoah to bring to light things 
that were hidden (erased), but I question the idea that what returns is reference in the 
strong sense of the veridical, the truth, the thing-in-itself, and instead take what is 
articulated to be an embodied representation (a signifier) of a missing traumatic past which 
might allow understanding, meaning to emerge.  
 
For this phenomenological-historical method of documentary making, Joshua Hirsch (2004: 
69) coined the term historical vérité, making explicit its debt to the cinéma vérité of Rouch 
and Morin and Marceline’s famous scene. Through Marceline, because of her personal 
history, Chronique d’un été had opened up the possibility of using a traumatised individual 
to represent a trauma with deep historical roots directly to the viewer and also to 
 
107 Lebow is referencing Slavoj Žižek’s ideas on fantasy and the “Real”.  
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themselves.108 Rouch and Morin’s innovation was to give us not just the words of the 
traumatised protagonist but also their body, allowing us to hear and see the past 
performed in the present through memory (and its distortions and aporias) and to witness 
that memory performed in the body of the protagonist. Joshua Oppenheimer 
acknowledges his debt to Lanzmann and Shoah and the potential of historical vérité to 
reveal meanings about the traumatic past.  
 
The now of the film is the time that it’s made and that becomes the present. I think 
what that also does is that it somehow makes the film fundamentally about that 
now. It’s about how that traumatic past is alive in the present. For me it becomes 
about how these real time moments of people remembering and working through 
layers of resistance to their memory has become for me how people struggle to 
make meaning of the unimaginable in the present and how the present is 
traumatized by the past. People are literally becoming coherent in the face of such 
a traumatic history. 
(Oppenheimer interviewed in: Oppenheimer and Hoberman 2015)109 
 
Beyond offering documentary makers a way to explore trauma through the memories, 
bodies, silences, and identifications of protagonists, Chronique opened up the possibility of 
the documentary-making process itself intervening in the life of the protagonist (the life as 
it is seen within the diegesis). Through its self-reflexive structure, Chronique allowed 
Marceline to review her performed, embodied monologue when she watched it back and 
reacted to it in the movie theatre alongside the other protagonists. At first, she doubted its 
veracity. She felt her performance had been forced and unnatural. She worried that she 
had been ‘acting’ whilst being filmed; acting here being a synonym for untruthful 
(fictitious). But she also said: 
 
They were very personal, intimate memories. Maybe when I was saying the words, 
I was reliving the past, feeling it. 
 
 
108 I should note that Shoah lacks the self-reflexive element of Chronique, where the traumatised 
protagonist within the diegesis represents the traumatic past not just to the audience but also to 
themselves through the medium of the film-within-the-film (as they watch back their own 
performance).  
109 In Oppenheimer’s appropriation of Lanzmann’s historical-vérité method, he makes claims for its 
meaning-generating potential which Lanzmann explicitly rejected. In conformity with the trauma-
theory paradigm, Lanzmann utterly rejected the idea that we can reach a meaningful account of 
trauma (a meaningful account of the insider’s experience of the Holocaust): ‘There is indeed an 
absolute obscenity in the project of understanding. Not to understand was my ironclad rule during 
all the years Shoah was in the making’ (Lanzmann in: Liebman 2007: 51-2). Oppenheimer rejects 
Lanzmann’s view very directly in an interview with Irene Lusztig: ‘Lanzmann famously said that it’s 
obscene to ask that question “why”. I utterly disagree.’ (Lusztig 2013: 52). 
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In Chronique, Rouch and Morin gave documentary its first, traumatised inner Winnicottian 
viewer in the character of Marceline. Marceline walked and talked through her traumatic 
past and was later able to watch back and comment on her own performance and so, 
potentially, reach a new understanding of that past. But Marceline’s scene remains a 
largely unexplored potential in Chronique as it was neither a film about Marceline nor 
about her traumatic past and the scene in which she reflects on her performance is short, 
with no subsequent or evolving elaboration of her responses to her performance. But the 
scene is suggestive of a number of possibilities for documentary.  
 
Marceline’s walk moved Chronique beyond talk towards an enacted, embodied and 
fictionalised dramatisation of the traumatic past. Stella Bruzzi, in writing about re-
enactment in much more recent documentaries, emphasises the ‘emotive’ power of these 
fantasised, dramatised, constructions/reconstructions: 
 
[T]he permanent now of the documentary re-enactment […] remains an emotive 
form of revisiting history, especially because it muddies the documentary waters by 
incorporating drama, fantasy and personalization. In this sense, it becomes a logical 
extension of the psychotherapeutic ‘talking cure’. Enacting – or walking through, 
not merely talking through – pain or trauma, renders it even more immediate and 
palpable, as the audience is invited to identify and empathize with the re-evoked 
past event, to become engrossed with it. 
(2015a: 94; Bruzzi’s italics) 
 
Bruzzi’s observation recognises not just the emotive or affective forces to which 
documentary re-enactment gives us access but, in giving us access to the bodies of the 
protagonists, it can offer clues (somatic clues) to the protagonist’s psychic state that are 
not necessarily captured in the web of words of a psychotherapy narrowly conceived as a 
talking cure. And as viewers, we may ourselves experience the re-enacted trauma at a 
bodily level before we can translate that experience into words: it is ‘an overtly visceral, 
physical viewing experience that conveys the trauma of the events being re-enacted in a 
literal way, a transference that makes our bodies feel the impact of the emotional impact 
[sic] of the film’ (2015a: 95; Bruzzi’s italics).  
 
Bruzzi’s account adopts the viewpoint of those who watch the documentary (the extra-
diegetic audience member). But in documentaries that fully exploit the self-reflexive 
potential suggested by Chronique, the protagonist within the diegesis also becomes an 
audience member (an intra-diegetic audience member) watching back their own 
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performance, responding somatically and affectively, forming identifications and 
empathetic attachments within the diegesis. In watching their own walking through of 
their own traumatic past, the protagonist is actively caught up in a series of intra-diegetic 
identifications that play out within the frame of the documentary film. Marceline’s short 
walk and talk revealed an intense transferential encounter between Marceline and a 
fictional object (her dead father). The scene is an embodied performance or dramatisation 
of Marceline’s encounter with one of her own internal objects and the identifications that 
this encounter entails, as she works through (bodily walks through) her traumatic past.110 
Joshua Hirsch (2004: x-xi) places Marceline within a broader group of film protagonists, all 
with traumatic memories of the Nazi concentration and death camps, who he describes as 
‘characters who cannot stop moving’. Sometimes this movement is in the form of a journey 
(Hirsch cites the constant movement of trains in Shoah) but in some films it is specifically 
the bodily movement of a protagonist; it defines a form of ‘post-traumatic cinema’ that 
‘not only represents traumatic historical events but also attempts to embody and 
reproduce the trauma for the spectator’ (Hirsch 2004: x-xi).111  
 
 
4.1.3 Rithy Panh’s S21: the embodied past in the historical-vérité tradition 
 
Rithy Panh’s S21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine (2003), is just such an attempt to 
explore the embodied nature of trauma in documentary. Two of the survivors of the Khmer 
Rouge’s notorious Tuol Sleng prison (known as S21) – Van Nath and Chum Mey – return to 
the prison where they were tortured and beaten and are brought back together with the 
perpetrators of the murder, violence and cruelty that took place there in the 1970s. Rithy 
Panh’s film presents both victims and perpetrators as traumatised by their past experience. 
In S21’s now empty cells, former prison guards are asked to re-create their daily routines 
and interactions with the prisoners, but with no-one playing the part of the prisoners. They 
shackle and unshackle, beat and verbally abuse these unseen, re-imagined victims and 
seem to readily fall back into the rhythm of their daily routines of more than twenty-five 
years earlier. The manner in which the actions are performed suggests that memories of 
 
110 These encounters with a protagonist’s internal objects will be pursued at greater length later in 
this chapter where I write about Rithy Panh’s autobiographical documentary, The Missing Picture 
(2013). 
111 Marceline is the only non-fictional (that is documentary) character that Hirsch cites; the others 
are characters in fictional features such as Holocaust-survivor Sol Nazerman who paces the streets 
of New York in Sidney Lumet’s The Pawnbroker (1964). 
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the 1970s are as much body memories as they are the product of conscious recall. For 
Jacques Rancière (2011: 101), the scene ‘reactivates the machine’ (the impersonal killing 
machine of the film’s title) with the re-enactors in a trance-like or ‘hallucinatory’ state, a 
contention confirmed by Panh himself when he described how he directed this scene: ‘I […] 
simply said “so show me your work, show me how you worked.” And that’s what opened 
up the bodily memory’ (Panh quoted in: Oppenheimer 2012: 245). The imagined prisoners 
seem to be very real to the guards in their re-enactments and the performance of this 
fictional scenario makes the prisoners very real for us as viewers of the film; the story of 
the past returning in the present of its embodied re-enactment.  
 
In self-reflexive mode, the film stages confrontations between the guard-reenactors and 
“victim” Vann Nath, and between one of the guards, Houy Him, and his parents. Houy Him 
revisits the experience of the re-enactment in these interpersonal encounters. In Van 
Nath’s meeting with the guards, he makes it clear what he hopes for from the experience: 
 
I don’t really want to come to these meetings, because we’re not here to tell 
pleasant stories. We only talk about this unbearable past, which we can’t escape. I 
can’t anyway. I’m trying to understand what happened, to make sense out of it. I 
want to understand it. 
 
But the potential of this self-reflexive process to bring understanding seems to be 
unavailable to Houy Him. He is unable to engage in any meaningful way with the fictional 
re-creations of the past. When talking to Van Nath, he hides behind the justification that he 
was following orders and so he is not responsible. And with his parents, he attempts to 
stop them talking about his role at S21, exclaiming: ‘Stop it. I have a headache. I’m sick all 
day long. I can’t eat a thing’ and so rather than the embodied traumatic past becoming 
available for a meaningful reworking, it re-emerges only in a different bodily form; in its 
return as a psychosomatic symptom. The traumatic past may become available for the 
viewer to work with and develop a deeper understanding (through a reflection on the re-
presentation of the past in the hallucinatory, dramatic re-enactments) but it is not available 
to Houy Him. The extent to which historical verité’s embodied, self-reflexive approach to 
filmmaking can reveal new meanings to the protagonist, is always limited by the 
protagonist’s psychic capacity to confront these meanings.112  
 
112 Similarly, in Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing (2012), some of what Anwar Congo witnesses in his 
own films-within proves too difficult for Congo to comprehend and what results is not 
understanding but somatisation (see Chapter Five).  
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4.1.4 Cinéma vérité as a partial model for contemporary “trauma” documentaries 
 
The cinéma vérité of Rouch and Morin – in its self-consciously reflexive and self-reflexive 
form, in its phenomenological approach to meaning making (producing something new and 
transformative in the filmmaking present), in its belief that documentary gives access to 
embodied meanings, and in its deployment of fictions as a means of getting at 
psychological “truths” on a psychoanalytic model – can be viewed as a precursor of recent 
documentaries that try to coax out a meaningful account of a traumatic past through the 
deployment of a fictional-film-within-the-documentary.  
 
But this statement needs some qualification. Several contemporary films that explore 
trauma through fictions do not present the body of the traumatised protagonist directly to 
the audience. In animated documentary, for example, the body is represented graphically 
and we are reliant on the voice of the traumatised protagonist to tell us (to talk us through) 
how they responded physically and affectively to the unfolding filmmaking process and to 
the fictional interludes within the documentary (for example in Rithy Panh’s The Missing 
Picture (2013) or Ari Folman’s Waltz with Bashir (2008)).113 And sometimes, the body of the 
traumatised protagonist is not available as it is substituted by the body of a double who 
takes the protagonist’s place (for example in Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003)). But 
cinéma vérité – and cinéma vérité in its evolution into historical vérité – delineated a range 
of filmmaking practices and techniques that were capable of engaging with the 
complexities of psychological trauma, even if not all the contemporary documentaries 
conform precisely to the cinéma/historical-vérité model.  
 
But perhaps the most marked difference between contemporary films exploring trauma 
and vérité, is that the autobiographical mode address has become so common in recent 
films. Rouch may appear in a number of his films, but none could be described as 
autobiographical. In the second section of this chapter, I turn my attention to 
autobiographical explorations of trauma to tease out the mechanisms through which 
meaning emerges in the absence of the key inter-personal relationship between director 
and protagonist: the very inter-personal relationship that has led several documentary 
 
113 In The Missing Picture, Panh’s clay manikins are expressionless and so the filmmaker’s voice over 
is an essential adjunct to the scenes. Waltz with Bashir is more of a half-way house, as its animated 
interviews (and a few other scenes) were achieved through a frame-by-frame animated 
reproduction (using manual rotoscoping) of scenes originally shot on videotape and so something of 
the initial human encounter on film is retained in the animation.  
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theorists (from Berman to Piotrowska) to make an equation between the documentary 





4.2 Autobiographical documentary-making as self-analytic process 
 
Michael Renov credits the emergence of the autobiographical mode of address with 
reinventing the very idea of documentary (2008: 41). The films at the core of this study – 
documentaries that deploy fictions as part of a process of working through a “real” 
traumatic history – are frequently autobiographical: Carri’s The Blonds (2003); Maddin’s My 
Winnipeg (2007); Folman’s Waltz with Bashir (2008); Panh’s The Missing Picture (2013). 
And even when in third-person mode, like Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing (2012), there is 
a strong autobiographical element, as it was the traumatised, principal protagonist who 
conceived, scripted and directed the film’s fictional interludes (the films-within-the-film).  
 
In Chapter Three, I likened the fictions that are deployed in documentary to the fictions the 
analyst constructs (Freud) or dreams (the Botellas) when attempting to represent 
otherwise unrepresented traumas. But in documentaries where it is the traumatised 
protagonist who constructs or dreams the fictions, and where the director and principal 
protagonist are one and the same, it might be better to think of these films as exercises in 
self-analysis rather than in terms of a conventional, two-person, analyst-analysand model. 
This raises the question of whether self-analysis is even possible and if it is, who performs 
the critical role of the secondary witness in a self-analysis and by extension in an 
autobiographical film?  
 
 
4.2.1 Freud’s self-analysis 
 
Didier Anzieu’s detailed account, Freud’s Self-Analysis, establishes beyond question that 
not only is self-analysis possible but that ‘the basic corpus of psychoanalytic notions’ 
emerged from Freud’s self-analysis rather than from the analysis of his patients (Anzieu 
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1986 [1959 & 1975]: 232).114 James Barron (1993: xix) echoes this view arguing that 
‘psychoanalytic theory and practice are the intellectual children of Freud’s self-analytic 
efforts.’ In the subsequent history of psychoanalysis, Freud’s reliance on his own 
unconscious and his own dreams as objects of research has been under-acknowledged. 
Freud himself rarely mentioned his self-analysis in his public presentations of 
psychoanalysis, perhaps out of fear that the practice would be seen as lacking the 
objectivity required of a “science” (Mitchell 1993: xiv).  
 
But the psychoanalytic model that is most familiar is that of analysis taking place in the 
dynamic, inter-personal encounter between analyst and analysand: the “other” of the 
analyst is a crucial (perhaps the crucial) element in a transactional process from which 
meaning may emerge. How can autobiographical documentaries on the one hand, or the 
isolated practice of examining one’s own psychic mechanisms, hope to unearth 
psychological meanings or insights without that creative – sometimes traumatic – 
encounter between a “self” and an “other”? In his foreword to a collection of essays on 
self-analysis by practising psychoanalysts, Stephen A. Mitchell acknowledges the problem:  
 
Self-analysis, as it turns out, is very hard to do […] [T]here is an omnipresent danger 
of self-absorption, self-indulgence, self-deception. 
(Mitchell 1993: xvii)  
 
Documentary theorist Alisa Lebow (2012: 1) points to similar dangers confronting 
documentary practice when she notes the widespread perception of autobiographical or 
first-person documentaries as ‘self-absorbed, myopic, ego-driven films that only a mother 
could love’.115 
 
Away from the public stage in Freud’s private correspondence, a picture of self-analysis 
emerges that belies the assumption that self-analysis is a solitary and solipsistic endeavour. 
Freud’s self-analytic practice was dependent on others; both “real”, external others and 




114 Anzieu is not alone in seeing Freud’s self-analysis as central to the development of 
psychoanalysis. See for example: Gay 1988.  
115 This is not Lebow’s view but her recognition of a widespread perception.  
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My self-analysis remains interrupted. I have realized why I can analyze myself only 
with the help of self-knowledge obtained objectively (like an outsider). True self-
analysis is impossible; otherwise there would be no [neurotic] illness. 
(Freud and Masson 1985: letter dated 24 November 1897)  
 
In this highly-ambivalent statement, Freud at first describes the condition that makes a 
self-analysis possible and then seems to retreat, and to doubt the very possibility of true 
self-analysis.116 But to focus on the positive part of the statement, the other in self-analysis 
must be conjured from within the observing self; a part of the self that can observe another 
part of the self, ‘like an outsider’.117 Freud’s internal other was joined by external others; 
trusted colleagues and family members who Freud used as sounding boards for ideas and 
insights that emerged from his self-analysis. So important were these external others to 
Freud’s self-analysis that Anzieu (1986 [1959 & 1975]: 569) claims ‘[t]here can be no proper 
self-analysis unless it is communicated to someone else.’118 
 
 
4.2.2 Self-analysis in documentary 
 
In documentary, a number of others are generated by the very mechanics of the 
filmmaking process itself. The director even of an autobiographical film is never alone. The 
film is made with the participation of others: camera and sound crew, producer, editor, 
who act as external others. In reflexive films that unmask the mechanics of the filmmaking 
process, these external others are not simply assumed to exist by the film’s viewers but 
appear in the diegesis and can be seen to perform their role of other to the director. In 
Albertina Carri’s autobiographical documentary The Blonds (2003), Carri appears to reach a 
profounder understanding of her traumatic past in part through her continual dialogue 
with her film crew.  
 
116 Doubts as to the objectivity of self-analysis dogged Freud throughout his life. In the late essay The 
Subtleties of a Faulty Action (1935: 234) he wrote: ‘in self-analysis the danger of incompleteness is 
particularly great. One is too soon satisfied with a part explanation, behind which resistance may 
easily be keeping back something that is more important perhaps’. 
117 From the perspective of the subsequent genesis of psychoanalysis, this tentative statement about 
how self-analysis might work, is perhaps the first glimmering of an idea that would develop into 
object relations, with different parts of the self in communication with each other. The ambivalence 
of Freud’s comment in his letter to Fliess, perhaps reflects Freud’s lack of an internal objects model 
at that time. It was only with the publication of On Narcissism (1914b) and Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917a) that Freud developed a theoretical construct capable of explaining how one 
could take oneself as an object (a self-observing self). 
118 Freud’s principal external others, were (according to Anzieu) first Wilhelm Fliess, then sister-in-
law Minna Bernays and finally daughter Anna Freud.  
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The nature of the filmmaking process also produces a very present and tangible internal 
other in the images and words of the autobiographical director captured on film. In the 
editing process especially, the director of an autobiographical film is confronted by an alien 
self – a filmic Doppelgänger in sound and vision – who it is hard to hear and view in any 
other way than ‘like an outsider’. This Doppelgänger-effect is given more play in self-
reflexive documentaries as the encounter between the director and his or her 
Doppelgänger is brought within the diegesis, as the encounter is filmed and then this new 
material is cut into the final version of the film (the film-within-the-film is witnessed within 
the diegesis).119 In being confronted by a filmic other in the midst of making the film, the 
direction the final film will take is almost certainly altered. Meanings are likely to emerge 
for the director/protagonist from this confrontation with their other self.  
 
Finally, there is the prospect of a future external other that constantly plays in the 
imagination of the director throughout the making of a film; the film’s eventual audience. 
At the end of Rithy Panh’s The Missing Picture (2013), he says he is handing over his film to 
his audience so he can be rid of it and so rid, he hopes, of the painful recollections it 
contains. This fictional transaction with a fictional (that is imagined) audience, provides 
Panh with a profoundly important external witness to his self-analytic efforts. The audience 
is, even though only in prospect, that ‘someone else’ that Anzieu says is essential to any 
‘proper self-analysis’. The filmmaker’s prospective audience acts on the filmmaker in much 
the same way as the prospect of an eventual reader acted on psychoanalyst, Rivka 
Eifermann, in her self-analytic writing: ‘My audience, fantasized and real, took form and 
gradually became a constant presence. Indeed, unanticipated discoveries concerning the 
unconscious role the audience played, or served, in the course of writing, turned out again 
and again to be integral to the subject of the paper I was writing’ (Eifermann 1993: 173). 
The same ‘unanticipated discoveries’ are available in autobiographical film. 
 
Both Alisa Lebow (2012) and Michael Renov (2008) have written about the emergence of 
the autobiographical documentary120 and its transformatory impact on our perception of 
 
119 The archetype for the self-reflexive documentary is Chronique d’un été, where protagonists are 
filmed watching and critiquing their own performances.  
120 Lebow prefers the term ‘first-person documentary’ (to the more common ‘autobiographical 
documentary’ used by Renov and others) as films can be highly personal and subjective without 
being strictly autobiographical (Lebow 2012: 1-2). 
 129 
the nature of documentary. Both see the autobiographical form as carrying within it its 
own others; others which are inevitably in dialogue with the autobiographical filmmaker. In 
The Cinema of Me, Lebow takes Jean Luc Nancy’s formulation of the singular plural, where 
the “I” is always ontologically a “we”, and argues that in documentary articulations of the 
self, others are always inferred, indeed are constitutive of the self (Lebow 2012: 2; 
referencing Nancy 2000). There is no Cartesian singular-self – the self as an island – but 
instead a social “I” whose language and culture both precede the “I” and form the “I”. She 
extends this singular plural (the “I” that contains the other of “we”) through Emmanuel 
Levinas’s formulation of subjectivity as created in and through our subjection to the other, 
and Judith Butler’s formulation of the subject as always in a social relation, in dialogue, 
with the norms defined by a wider community (Lebow 2012; referencing Levinas 1998, and 
Butler 2005). I am entirely sympathetic to this notion of a culturally and linguistically 
constituted “I” and would even expand the domain of the “we” in the “I” that Lebow 
defines, to memory and the unconscious both of which are central to my way of 
approaching autobiographical and non-autobiographical documentaries that deal with 
trauma. I am thinking here of Maurice Halbwachs’s notion of ‘la mémoire collective’ 
(Halbwachs 1992) and Jean Laplanche’s formulation of the unconscious as a receptacle for 
untranslatable remnants of other people’s unconscious (Laplanche 1999a). 
 
For Lebow (2012: 3), ‘the speaking, and in this case filming, subject is neither solipsistic nor 
monologic, but always already in dialogue or as Nancy would have it, always already 
“speaking with”.’ Michael Renov (2004 [1989]: 112) makes a similar argument. The 
structure of autobiographical documentary, with its dual focus on the self and the self in 
relation to a real outside world, inevitably produces the outside perspective of an other 
through ‘a practice of inscription in which the domain of the subject and the enveloping 
world are mutually constitutive: self and other/self through other’.  
 
The presence of others in the filmmaking process, the threat or the promise of an eventual 
audience and the ‘dialogic splitting of subjectivity’ (Lebow 2012: 3) entailed in the act of 
autobiographical filmmaking, are all instances of others entering the process. But for those 
filmmakers trying to explore their traumatic past something more seems to be required, 
often involving the deployment of elaborate fictions which the filmmaker invents 
(constructs or dreams) and in which internal others and alternative versions of the self are 
brought to life in animation, in clay models, in the bodies of actors, etc. Fictions are 
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required as the primary internal other that is sought in these self-analytic films is the 
unconscious, which by definition is unrepresented and can only be known through its 
derivatives. By fictionalising the self and being able to view this fictionalised self in relation 
to others, a picture of unconscious structures may emerge. It puts on the filmic stage, 
structures of identification and object relating that might otherwise remain obscure. The 
task is further complicated as this internal other is one we are ‘not constitutionally inclined’ 
to look for (as Freud put it in his paper The Unconscious (Freud 1915b: 169)). And in filmic 
explorations, as in life, when we do seek the unconscious, it is not “simply” a case of trying 
to find ways of lifting repressions that block our access to painful and difficult memories 
that have undergone repression by the dynamic unconscious. In the wake of trauma these 
memories might survive only as vestiges without representation, as a blank ‘that has no 
history and is incapable of taking the form of represented memories’ (Botella and Botella 
2013: 108). Albertina Carri faced precisely this problem in her autobiographical 
documentary The Blonds (2003) where the traumatic loss of her parents was not 
remembered but felt as an aching absence. By fictionalising herself in the body of an actor, 
she was able to represent (reconstruct) the emotional form of her connection to her 
parents even if the content remained blank.  
 
The fictions and fictionalisations of the self in autobiographical documentary are attempts 
to both represent the self and gain the necessary critical distance to view the self like an 
outsider; to gain the distance that Freud and Anzieu see as crucial to a successful self-
analysis. Jordana Blejmar describes these documentaries with their elaborate fictions as 
‘docu-fantasy’121 and points to what she calls an ‘autofictional turn’ in documentary 
(Blejmar 2016).122 Blejmar is borrowing a term coined by Serge Doubrovsky to describe his 
form of literary autobiography that saw fictions and fictionalisations of the self as the route 
to forms of self-knowledge (or ‘truth’ in Doubrovsky’s language). For Doubrovsky (1989), 
these fictions were ‘fiction[s] of strictly real events or facts’; fictions that are a route to the 
‘truth’ not to its downfall. The fictionalised self becomes an object for the author of the 
autofiction that can be viewed as if from the outside. It is a self that autofiction writer, 
Camille Laurens (quoted in: Cusset 2012) describes as decentred, at once ‘I, it’s not me’; an 
 
121 A similar term, ‘docu-fantasia’, is used by Guy Maddin to describe his autobiographical 
documentary My Winnipeg (2007), which deploys fictions, and a fictionalised version of himself 
played by actor Darcy Fehr, to explore his traumatic past. See: Ebiri 2008.  
122 Blejmar’s 2016 book, Playful Memories: The Autofictional Turn in Post-Dictatorship Argentina, 
cites Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003) as an early and important exemplar of this ‘turn’.  
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exteriorised and fictionalised self that can be viewed like an outsider, so that the truth of 
past emotion can emerge.123  
 
 
4.2.3 Rithy Panh’s The Missing Picture: an exercise in self-analysis 
 
Fictional and fantasised internal and external others play a crucial role in Rithy Panh’s 
autobiographical documentary The Missing Picture (2013). We do not have access to the 
body and the somatic responses of the traumatised protagonist on screen in the way that a 
film made in the vérité mode would allow; Panh “appears” in the film represented by a clay 
manikin. Instead, the affective and subjective voice of the director (Panh’s words voiced by 
actor Randal Douc),124 guide the viewer through the evolving process that was the making 
of The Missing Picture. Rithy Panh had spent four years of his childhood as a slave labourer 
in Khmer Rouge camps where most members of his immediate and extended family met 
their deaths. In his subsequent career as a filmmaker, Panh explored the history and 
traumatic aftermath of the Khmer Rouge’s period in power in Cambodia in documentary 
and docudrama, in feature film, and through film biography. With the project that became 
The Missing Picture (2013), Panh tells us that the past finally caught up with him, 
compelling him to confront his personal trauma directly through autobiography, and to try 
to lay it to rest.  
 
I seek my childhood like a lost picture 
or rather it seeks me. 
Is it because I am fifty? 
Because I’ve seen troubled times 
When fear alternates with hope? 
The memory is there [pause] now 
Pounding at my temples. 
I’d like to be rid of it.125 
 
The film describes Panh’s attempts to find the lost or missing picture: some way to 
represent his traumatic past to himself that might bring him some peace. As the film 
 
123 The quarry for Laurens is ‘past emotion’ but the construction of a fictionalised self is equally 
valuable when the quarry is traumatic experience. Note: In this paragraph (for references to 
Doubrovsky and Laurens) I am indebted to a conference paper delivered by autofiction writer 
Catherine Cusset (2012).  
124 Strictly speaking, the narration was co-written by Panh and novelist Christophe Bataille (printed 
version available in: Panh and Bataille 2013a). 
125 This is the film’s opening voice over. 
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progresses, Panh’s understanding of the nature of that missing picture gradually shifts. In 
the film’s trailer, Panh tells us that he began the filmmaking process thinking that the key 
to his past, to the trauma, would be found in the artefacts and objects that are the focus of 
the historian and the realist documentary maker. He sets out to find the picture, the 
photograph, that will somehow reveal the truth; the indexical object that will be the truth. 
 
For many years I have been looking for a missing picture. A photograph taken 
between 1975 and 1979 by the Khmer Rouge. […] I searched vainly for it in 
archives, in old papers, in country villages across Cambodia. Today I know this 
image must be missing – I was not really looking for it – would it not be obscene 
and insignificant? So I created it.126 
 
What Panh creates is a film that he calls The Missing Picture. It is a realisation that the key 
to the past lies inside himself – in his memory and fantasies – and not in some external 
piece of documentary evidence. Panh recreates his memories and the factical (fantasy) 
world that played in his head as child, in clay scenes populated with clay figurines.  
 
As the film progresses, the fictions that Panh deploys with his clay models are increasingly 
not fictionalised recreations of past events or even the representation in clay of childhood 
fantasies but entirely fictional present encounters between people; inter-subjective 
encounters of the sort that psychoanalysis brings into play in the transference and the 
counter-transference and that self-analysis brings into play as the self confronts alien 
selves. The dialogues happen internally, inside Panh, between the middle-aged Panh and a 
variety of internal others – his dead parents, his lost childhood self – in an intra-personal 
dialogue between Panh and his own internal objects. Panh gives voice to both “himself” 
and these other aspects of himself in the voice-over narration. He both speaks and 
ventriloquises.  
 
Panh’s main internal interlocutor is his former self, the boy Rithy Panh. As Panh tells us late 
in the film, ‘Now, it is the boy who seeks me out’. It is a dramatisation with clay models of 
Joyce McDougall’s evocative description of what happens in analysis: ‘Whether we will it or 
not, our inner characters are constantly seeking a stage on which to play out their tragedies 
and comedies’ (McDougall 1986: 3); a stage she saw, following Winnicott, as a potential 
space ‘that lies between fantasy and reality’ where we can try out or stage productions 
 
126 The trailer is included on the DVD of the film issued by New Wave Films (2013). 
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(1986: 10). Like a character in Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author (1995 
[1921]), the boy marches into the theatre and demands to put on his show for the director.  
 
If we were in any doubt that The Missing Picture is an exercise in self-analysis (an exercise 
that plays out with internal others in a variety of fictional encounters) these doubts are 
dispelled in a wonderfully comic and moving scene late in the film. A clay manikin of the 
middle-aged Panh lies on a model couch beneath a huge portrait of Sigmund Freud. A clay-
manikin analyst sits by Panh. It is soon apparent that the “analyst” is also the middle-aged 
Rithy Panh.127 The two Panhs, analyst and analysand, sit and lie under the stern gaze of 
Freud (see figure 4 in Illustrations). The voice over begins with the words: ‘Sometimes I 
picture a child. Let’s say it’s me’, and the clay analysand on the couch morphs into the child 
Rithy Panh in a mix lasting a couple of seconds. Now the adult analyst-Panh is analysing the 
child analysand-Panh. As the scene progresses, the model set of the analytic consulting 
room fills up with more and more characters from Panh’s past (parents, siblings, friends), 
who surround the little analysand on the couch (see figure 5 in Illustrations). Panh, as his 
own analyst, has produced a facilitating set or stage that might cast light on his traumatic 
past, as Joyce McDougall (1986: 10) describes: ‘The analyst might be likened to the stage 
manager of Luigi Pirandello’s celebrated Six Characters in Search of an Author, in that he or 
she seeks to maintain a space that is ready to welcome all the internal inhabitants of each 
analysand’s secret theater’. 
 
But the self-analysis appears to result in failure. Panh tells us that the boy ‘wants to speak 
to me. But words are hard to find.’ And Panh admits that he does not really want to hear 
what the boy has to say anyway: ‘I want to leave it all, leave my language, my country in 
vain and my childhood returns’. Panh seems to be struggling to avoid that other we are not 
constitutionally inclined to ‘hear’; our own unconscious. There is a missing picture locked 
up inside the fifty-year-old Panh and it seems the picture is destined to remain missing as 
he cannot bear to look for it.  
 
 
127 Jennifer Cazenave (2018: 44-5) writes about this scene as an analysis not a self-analysis, 
apparently not equating the middle-aged analyst with Panh. I am unable to argue definitively that 
the middle-aged analyst is in fact Panh as clay manikins closely resemble each other (even though 
the two manikins that represent the middle-aged analyst and the middle-aged analysand look 
identical and are dressed identically). Nevertheless, even if this scene is of a conventional two-
person analysis (where only the analysand is Panh), the film as a whole remains an autobiographical 
exercise in psychic self-examination (and so is, in effect, an exercise in self-analysis).  
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Panh explains towards the end of the film that he is trapped in perpetual melancholia 
unable to mourn, identified with the dead (‘Their flesh is my flesh’), and himself perhaps 
already psychically killed by his past (‘It is me they will kill. Or maybe they already have’). 
Mourning has failed. Panh is caught in an unending repetition of his painful past (both 
within this film and in all the other films he has directed about his and Cambodia’s past 
(Boyle 2014b: 32)128): attached to the unmourned, lost object of dead parents, siblings, 
family and friends and to the lost object of his former self whose childhood was murdered 
by the Khmer Rouge; full of self-reproach for his failure to “do” enough (feeling ‘guilty for 
not having helped the destitute’); and unable to understand or to make sense of what has 
happened to him.129 
 
Panh’s sense of loss is felt at a bodily level (‘I want to touch them. Their voice is missing, so 
I won’t tell’). It is a sense of bodily disconnection and loss that precedes representation and 
cannot be represented. It is the overwhelming sense of loss and separation that we assume 
Freud’s grandson Ernst felt before he was able to find a soothing fiction – a missing picture 
– and to bridge the gap of loss with his fort-da game. For Panh, the sense of bodily 
disconnection is presented as an insuperable melancholic fact and for all the inventive 
fictions he deploys, for all the pictures he conjures up in the film to try to find 
representational form for his traumatic experience, he cannot bridge the gap. After a 
second visit to the analytic consulting room with its portrait of Freud on the wall, Panh 
concludes: ‘Of course, I haven’t found the missing picture. I looked for it, in vain.’130 
 
But in the film’s trailer, made after the film was completed, Panh reaches a different 
conclusion. The missing picture is actually hiding in plain sight. It is the film Panh creates 
and calls The Missing Picture. He is only able to see it when the film is finished. It is in the 
trailer, that Panh tells us of his giving up on the search for the unique, missing photograph 




128 Deirdre Boyle quotes Panh as saying he has been making ‘one film’ throughout his adult life even 
though, in 2014 when he made the statement, he had actually made thirteen documentaries and 
five fiction films. Since 2014, Panh has made four more films, and again all of them are about his or 
Cambodia’s troubled past.  
129 These are all aspects of failed mourning (melancholia) as described by Freud in Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917a).  
130 All quotations in this paragraph and the preceding two are taken from Panh’s voice over. 
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Today I know this image must be missing – I was not really looking for it – would it 
not be obscene and insignificant? 
 
But he immediately goes on to say: 
 
So I created it. What I give you today is neither the picture nor the search for a 
unique picture, but the picture of a quest, a quest that cinema allows.  
 
Panh’s words suggest that it is the autobiographical documentary-making process itself 
that allows the possibility of reaching an understanding of a traumatic past. It is the 
filmmaking process conceived as Rouch conceived it, not as a transparent window on 
reality, but as an active intervention in the world, a provocation and a catalyst for the 
emergence of truth or meaning that would not otherwise be available. This active process 
plays out in intra-personal encounters with internal others or alien selves. The fictions that 
Panh stages – the films-within-the-film of The Missing Picture – are attempts to give 
representational form to the contents of his own posttraumatic consciousness as it 
manifests itself in memory and fantasy, and in imagined encounters and identifications 
with internal objects. These fictional representations in themselves do not bring 
understanding. The process involves self-conscious reflection; a questioning of the 
adequacy of the representations that have been produced. It is perhaps ironic that in a film 
that contains a fictional representation of a failed self-analysis that the documentary-
making process can be seen to echo most closely the strategies and the possibilities made 
available by the analytic process as it attempts to find meaning in a traumatic past. But the 
irony is perhaps explained in Barbara Johnson’s perception of the analytic process. The 
knot of trauma is not untied in a sudden revelatory interpretation or insight. If the knot can 
be untied or at least loosened, it is through a temporally-evolving process that involves 
constant failure and constant painful repetitions (re-knottings) of the “unresolvable” 
trauma until in the end the knot might be untied through the very repetition of failure: ‘an 
act of untying the knot in the structure by the repetition of the act of tying it’ (Johnson 
1980: 142).131 If understanding can be reached in analysis, it is reached through a process 
and in The Missing Picture, Panh provides himself and us with a picture of a quest, a picture 
 
131 The apparent paradox of untying through tying is the paradox of mourning: constant painful 
repetition and failure over time being the route back to psychic health (the untying of the knot). As 
Jean Laplanche asserts, the process of mourning (knotting and unknotting) is ‘the very prototype of 
analytic endeavor’ (see: Ray 2012: 56).  
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of a process; an unfolding process of self-examination, made possible through film (‘a quest 
that cinema allows’). 
 
The filmmaking process can open up a space – a Winnicottian play space – where trauma 
can be explored experimentally in all its manifestations including those we might 
conventionally call fictions. The analytic space is a space for fantasy, memory, dreams 
(even hallucinations), free associations, acting out, transference, counter-transference. The 
filmic space in documentary, in the hands a director such as Panh, is a similar space. The 
film-within-the-film in documentary is a way of importing fictional representations – 
psychically real fictions, fantasies, imagined intra-personal encounters – into the arguably 
factual frame of documentary. There is then a secondary part of the process – both in 
analysis and documentary – which was encapsulated by Jean Laplanche when he described 
Freud’s analytic method as having a patient go step by step from one representation to 
another and ‘reminding him of those steps’ (quoted in: Fletcher and Stanton 1992: 87-8). 
The being reminded of the steps is made possible in self-reflexive documentaries where the 
protagonist views and reviews their own fictional creations as an intra-diegetic audience 
member (an inner Winnicottian viewer) watching their own fictions. The self-reflexivity of 
both certain documentaries and analysis, is what turns the process into a truly dynamic 
process; a process that might be able to loosen the knot of trauma. Panh said in interview 
(IDFA 2013): ‘Personally I don’t know where I am going […] if you know before, it is not 
documentary film’132 confirming Stella Bruzzi’s contention about performative 
documentary that ‘documentary is an unpredictable act’ (Bruzzi 2006: 214). Panh reminds 
us of that unpredictability by telling us about the failures of the process; telling us and 
reminding himself of the steps that have been taken. 
 
But for all its representational ingenuity and its deployment of fictions within the frame of 
the documentary, did the process bring any greater understanding for Panh? Was the 
process cathartic? Panh’s final piece of voice over suggests that it is the transaction with us 
– the external other of the imagined audience – that has cathartic potential.  
 
Of course I haven’t found the missing picture. I looked for it, in vain. […] 
 
132 Panh made these comments just after completing The Missing Picture. In the same interview, he 
also re-emphasised the theme of unpredicability, saying: ‘You can’t order reality to go to your script’ 
(IDFA 2013).  
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And so I make this picture. I look at it. I cherish it. I hold it in my hand like a belovèd 
face. This missing picture I now hand over to you, so that it never cease [sic] to 
seek us out. 
 
This is an ambiguous statement. Is the handing over of the film to the secondary witness – 
us as audience who have witnessed the filmic representations of Panh’s traumatic past – a 
perpetuation of the trauma which is now transmitted to us and seeks us out and haunts us 
too, or is there some relief for Panh in the inter-personal exchange with this imagined 
other of the audience? My feeling is that if we read this closing statement both in 
conjunction with the upbeat images and music that accompany and follow the closing 
credits and in conjunction with Panh’s statement that opens the film, there might be at 
least a glimmer of optimism to be found. Panh opens the film explaining why he must make 
the film:  
 
The memory is there [pause] now 
Pounding at my temples. 
I’d like to be rid of it. 
 
And he ends the film handing over the picture he has created out of his memories, 
fantasies and encounters with his own internal objects. He is rid of something to the extent 
that he hands over this picture of a process of psychic self-exploration. As in the analytic 
process, there is a hope of catharsis in the handing over or the sharing of the traumatic 
past with a secondary witness.133 And if there is some sort of catharsis – some sort of 
therapeutic benefit – through filmmaking or analysis it emerges from the process as a 
whole, not in an isolated moment of epiphany or in a single interpretation. It is a process or 
a quest; a quest that Panh tells us ‘cinema allows’; the process of making a film.  
 
If this is Panh’s own verdict on his making of an autobiographical film, then it seems to 
echo Ari Folman’s experience of the autobiographical, self-exploratory process of making 
Waltz with Bashir, which he described, in retrospect, as ‘four years of therapy’ (Folman in 
interview quoted in: Schäuble 2011: 210). And it was not just in retrospect that Folman 
pointed to the therapeutic potential (the self-analytic potential) of autobiographical 
filmmaking. He explores it within the diegesis of Waltz with Bashir. At the start of the film – 
 
133 The process we see in The Missing Picture (Panh’s creation of fictions where he encounters 
internal and external others) seems to closely mirror the analytic process as described by André 
Green (1986b: 296): ‘the essence of analytic action concerns the representation of intrasubjective 
and intersubjective psychic processes’.  
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when Folman’s friend Boaz Rein recounts his nightmare vision of ferocious dogs rampaging 
through Tel Aviv – Folman asks Rein why he has not tried ‘therapy, psychiatry, shiatsu, 
anything…’ but has instead contacted Folman about his nightmares. ‘I’m just a filmmaker’, 
opines Folman. Rein replies ‘Can’t films be therapeutic?’. Both Waltz with Bashir and The 






Chapter Five: Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing (2012) 
 
 
‘the play’s the thing’: 






‘… I have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaim’d their malefactions; 
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak 
With most miraculous organ. I’ll have these players 
Play something like the murder of my father 
Before mine uncle: I’ll observe his looks; 
I’ll tent him to the quick: if he blench, 
I know my course. The spirit I have seen  
May be the devil: and the devil hath power 
To assume a pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps 
Out of my weakness and my melancholy, 
As he is very potent with such spirits, 
Abuses me to damn me: I’ll have grounds 
More relative than this: the play’s the thing 
Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king.’ 
 
Hamlet in Act II, Scene II of William Shakespeare’s  





5.1 The Act of Killing: its structure and central conceit 
 
5.1.1 The final scene: the rooftop re-enactment and how to read it 
 
In the extraordinary closing scene of Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2012 documentary The Act of 
Killing,134 Anwar Congo returns to the rooftop above what is now a handbag shop in Medan 
in North Sumatra where half a century before he had murdered scores, perhaps hundreds 
of people. As he tries to re-enact the methods he used to kill his victims for Oppenheimer’s 
camera, he is convulsed, he retches, he doubles up, he sits and breathes deeply, he leaks 
tears and nasal mucus, he emits strange, guttural noises. Gradually Congo recovers his 
composure and carries on with his re-enactment only for his body to rebel again. It seems 
Anwar Congo, the thinking, conscious “I”, has been completely upstaged by his body; a 
body that although it ‘speaks no known language’ has forced its way centre stage and 
provided ‘a framework for communicating the psychic scenes of the internal theatre’ 
(McDougall 1986: 53) through a series of extreme, observable bodily blenches. Congo 
struggles on to the end of his re-enactment after several attempts, and then quietly leaves 
the rooftop stage and heads off into the city night. The film ends.  
 
What are we to make of this bizarre, climactic scene? I felt I was witnessing something 
terrible, something agonising, something primitive.135 It made deeply disturbing viewing; a 
disturbance I struggled to understand. What was going on inside Congo that made this 
attempt to re-play a memory of a traumatic past so difficult? Could Congo make sense of it 
and did that sense bring any relief from the pain of traumatic memory?136 
 
The reading of The Act of Killing and the character Anwar Congo that I am offering in this 
chapter, emerges from my experience of disturbance and the struggle to understand what 
unfolds on screen. The theoretical justification for this reading begins with Vivian 
 
134 The film is conventionally catalogued as directed by Oppenheimer alone but was co-directed by 
Oppenheimer, Christine Cyn and an anonymous Indonesian director (whose name was withheld to 
protect him/her from reprisals in Indonesia). What follows draws largely on the 115-minute 
theatrical release of the film although I will refer to some scenes that only appear in the longer 159-
minute director’s cut. 
135 I mean ‘primitive’ in a psychic not an anthropological sense: psychic distress that only seems to 
register somatically. 
136 I am aware of Stef Craps’s (2013; 2014) powerful critique of the application of Western trauma 
categories to non-Western subjects and acknowledge that Congo himself describes his experience in 
categories drawn from Indonesian culture (possession, haunting, being cursed) but these seem to 
map very closely onto the categories of trauma theory and other Western constructions of trauma.  
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Sobchack’s thoughts about the act matter (the noematic content of film) and the nature of 
the phenomenological experience of a viewer watching a film that is perceived to be non-
fictional and concerns non-fictional characters. It returns to documentary the referentiality 
it claims in its self-declaration as non-fictional. For Sobchack, the non-fictional filmic object 
opens up a space through or behind the screen that allows the viewer to speculate about 
the life – and that must include the psychic life – of an on-screen protagonist. But Sobchack 
also describes the act quality (the noesis); the viewer’s act of perceiving and speculating 
about the life of the onscreen protagonist. The act matter cannot be separated out from 
the act quality and so my speculations about the internal psychic life of Anwar Congo 
cannot be separated off from my own subjective, unconscious and embodied responses to 
the film that unfolds before me. Phyllis Creme, in a different idiom, construes this 
entanglement through Winnicott’s transitional object and the impossibility of separating 
the found (the referential) from the created (the invention of the perceiving subject). 
Rather than treating this inseparability as invalidating the attempt to understand the 
psychic life of an onscreen character,137 I conceive of it as the route to that understanding 
through the notion of a counter-transferential reading, where meaning (symbolisation) 
emerges in a ‘system of intra- and intersubjective exchanges’ (Gibeault 2005: 1712-4) 
between viewing subject and viewed subject. The disturbance I felt on first encountering 
Anwar Congo might be taken to be a bodily and affective contagion, an entanglement, a 
psychic identification with Congo who – although I only encounter him as a filmic avatar – I 
know to have a real life beyond the screen. My feeling of disturbance, if it can become an 
object of reflection, might offer me a glimpse into the internal psychic life of Congo but it 
begins with my subjective, non-cognitive, unconscious, affective responses to what I see 
and hear on screen.  
 
 
5.1.2 The fictional film-within-the-documentary-frame 
 
To begin to understand this closing scene, which graphically enacts both the impossibility 
and the possibility of representing trauma, we need to spool back to the start of the film. 
Over the opening shots of Medan city, we are provided with a series of “cards” (on-screen 
 
137 For Winnicott (1953), separating out the created and found elements of the transitional object is 
not some impossible ideal, in fact quite the opposite: the power of the transitional object resides in 
not questioning the paradox of it being both created and found. 
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texts) which situate us in the context of Indonesian politics and history, asserting the film’s 
“facticity” and describing the film’s central conceit: 
 
In 1965, the Indonesian government was overthrown by the military. 
 
Anybody opposed to the military dictatorship could be accused of being a 
communist: union members, landless farmers, intellectuals, and the ethnic 
Chinese. 
 
In less than a year, and with the direct aid of western governments, over one 
million “communists” were murdered. 
 
The army used paramilitaries and gangsters to carry out the killings. 
 
These men have been in power – and have persecuted their opponents – ever 
since. 
 
When we met the killers, they proudly told us stories about what they did. 
 
To understand why, we asked them to create scenes about the killings in whatever 
ways they wished. 
 
This film follows that process, and documents its consequences. 
 
 
With Indonesia’s troubling history and the film’s central conceit explained in a few 
words,138 the viewer enters the main body of the documentary which takes place in a 
dynamic and evolving present driven in part by the scenes the killers create; scenes that 
were shot to produce what the killers thought would be a feature film about the events of 
1965 and which appear as short interstitial scenes (short films within the Oppenheimer 
documentary). These scenes take many forms from historical re-enactments of events from 
the killing years of the mid-1960s, through fictionalised re-enactments often in the style of 
the Hollywood movies so loved by the killers, to fantasy sequences that bear no relation to 
anything that ever happened. These films-within sit within the frame of Oppenheimer’s 
documentary which follows the killers over several years: he films them talking to each 
other; he films them answering questions that he poses from behind his camera; he films 
them talking to survivors of the 1965-66 massacres and to the children of victims of those 
massacres; he films them making their feature film; he films them reflecting on what they 
 
138 Oppenheimer (2016) argues that non-fiction films require the maker only to give the audience 
the facts they need to understand the core story. It is not necessary to tell all the facts.  
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have shot as they watch their rushes – and rough and fine cuts of their film – on a monitor. 
This last technique gives the film a self-reflexive quality like Chronique d’un été but 
Oppenheimer deploys the technique much more extensively, in a cycle of ‘shooting-
screening, shooting-screening, shooting-screening’ (Oppenheimer 2016).139 We are not 
simply presented with the final version of the killers’ film (in fact we never see their film in 
its entirety nor was it ever finished) but we hear the killers reflecting on the process of 
making the film, reflecting on scenes they have shot, as their initial intentions are modified 
and re-cast in the light of their own production, experienced as an external object. The 
killers form an intra-diegetic audience for their own film. We as documentary viewers (as 
extra-diegetic audience) see the film-within, see the intra-diegetic audience watching and 
responding to scenes from the film-within and see the documentary frame in which 
Oppenheimer places this material. Just as in Hamlet, we as extra-diegetic audience watch 
an intra-diegetic audience (the ‘guilty creatures sitting at a play’) but with the added twist 
that the ‘cunning’ scenes we watch are of the killers’ own devising and they take roles in 
their own “play”. We witness the consequences of this process: the process and the 
consequences of this process as seen within the diegesis are the subject of this chapter. 
 
Errol Morris, who became Joshua Oppenheimer’s executive producer on The Act of Killing 
after the film had been shot and editing had begun, identified a parallel between 
Oppenheimer’s film with its films-within and Hamlet with its plays-within, calling his 2013 
essay on The Act of Killing – The Murders of Gonzago. Morris describes the film’s 
disquieting nature and its deployment of fictional scenes and quasi-fictional re-enactments 
to unearth hidden truths: 
 
The Act of Killing is truly unlike any other documentary film. A good thing in my 
opinion. One of the extraordinary things about documentary is that you get to 
continually reinvent the form, reinvent what it means to make a documentary – 
and Oppenheimer did just that. He identified several of the killers from 1965 and 
convinced them to make a movie about the killings. But the film is even weirder 
than that. Oppenheimer convinced these killers to act in a movie about the making 
of a movie about the killings. There would be re-enactments of the murders by the 
actual perpetrators. There would be singing, and there would be dancing. A 
perverted hall of mirrors. 
But there is method to Oppenheimer’s madness – the idea that by re-
enacting the murders, he, the viewers of the movie, and the various perpetrators 
recruited to participate could become reconnected to a history that had nearly 
 
139 Oppenheimer (2016) also described The Act of Killing as a document of a dynamic process and 
not simply a single snap-shot of a particular moment in time. 
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vanished into a crepuscular past. Oppenheimer has the optimistic thought that the 
past is inside us and can be brought back to life. 
        (Morris 2013; my italics) 
 
Morris claims ‘The Act of Killing is truly unlike any other documentary film’. It is. But The 
Act of Killing is also heir to all the possibilities for documentary opened up by the work of 
Rouch and Morin, later pursued by Ari Folman, Guy Maddin and others:140 the use of 
fictions, the re-enactment of the past in a dynamic present, the exploration of trauma 
through fantasy and hallucination, the implication and complicity of the director in the 
filmmaking process, the director acting as an active secondary witness, the inclusion of the 
film’s protagonists in a potentially meaning-making exercise through their exposure to a 
film-within which they respond to and are affected by in an evolving temporal process.  
 
I want to ask whether the complex structure of the documentary with its film-within-the 
film (‘a movie about the making of a movie about the killings’) can generate the possibility 
of meaning emerging (what Morris calls becoming ‘reconnected to a history’) in all the 
frames Morris describes: for the director who exists within the diegesis (the director as he 
appears in the film); 141 for the ‘various perpetrators’ who exist within the diegesis; and for 
us as ‘viewers of the movie’ (the film’s extra-diegetic audience)? Of these three frames, it is 
the frame of the perpetrator-protagonist which is my central concern: the protagonist I call 
in Chapter Three the inner Winnicottian viewer who can be witnessed by us (the audience 
or outer Winnicottian viewer) creating and responding to their own or the director’s filmic 
fictions. Can the creation of and the reflection on fictional constructions – here filmed 
fictional scenes – help to bring understanding of a real, non-fictional traumatic past and 
can that understanding have a material impact on the psychic life of the traumatised 
protagonist? Behind this question lies a second question: are there parallels between the 
filmmaking process and the analytic process where fictions are deployed to represent 
traumatic histories that have all but ‘vanished into a crepuscular past’?  
 
The Act of Killing is not a historical film; it is, in Oppenheimer’s words (2016), about ‘now’. 
It is firmly in the vérité tradition of Rouch and its evolution into the phenomenological-
historical (historical vérité) tradition of Lanzmann. We do not see the world as it was in 
 
140 Rouch is the most direct influence on Oppenheimer, as Oppenheimer attests in numerous 
interviews. See for example: Feldman 2013. 
141 Oppenheimer does not appear in shot in The Act of Killing but is a powerful presence throughout, 
intervening as a disembodied voice from behind the camera. 
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1965-66. This is a re-articulation of the traumatic past as it is experienced, re-enacted, 
acted-out, lied about and fantasised about, in the present.142 For Milo Sweedler (2014): 
‘Oppenheimer’s strikingly original approach to filmmaking dilates the category of 
testimonial documentary to include what the filmmaker evocatively calls “documentary of 
the imagination,” in which truth emerges in and as a fiction’. Through fictions – and 
responses to these present (here-and-now), imaginative fictions – Oppenheimer explores 
both the political and the psychological ramifications of the past in present-day Indonesia. I 
am concerned here particularly with the psychological or psychic ramifications for those 
filmic protagonists who had been perpetrators of violence in 1965-66.  
 
But if the film is not historical, it has its own temporality. Major scenes are edited together 
in more or less the chronological order in which they were shot and so the viewer is 
confronted by a series of successive experiential “presents” that reveal changes in the 
protagonists’ relation to the past as the documentary’s chronological structure plays out. 
The viewer is able to gauge changes in the protagonists that have occurred over the 
production period of the film and so we can speculate as to whether the filmmaking 
process itself has altered perceptions of, and psychic responses to, a traumatic history as 
those present perceptions of the past change over filmic time. Can it bring about changes 
in the traumatised protagonists’ relation to the traumatic past as psychoanalysis claims to 
be able to do? Is it possible to use film and the filmmaking process to reach a less painful 
accommodation with a traumatic past as Guy Maddin hoped to do when he began to make 
My Winnipeg (2007) and expressed the desire to ‘film my way out of here’; that is, to film 
his way out of trauma. 
 
At the heart of the film is an evolving relationship between the director and Anwar Congo, 
one of the killers (or gangsters) of 1965-66 and the one who appears the most troubled by 
his past. He emerges as the film’s central character. The relationship between 
Oppenheimer and Congo develops over filmic time with the chronological construction of 
the documentary leading the viewer to assume that the development of this filmic 
 
142 A persistent criticism, from a sizeable minority of scholars, is that the film fails to adequately 
explore the events of 1965-66. The demand seems to be for a more conventional historical 
documentary despite the film never pretending to be about 1965-66 and explicitly stating that its 
concern is with the present-day consequences of those events (it is a film about the here-and-now). 
Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003) has been subject to similar (misplaced) criticism (see Chapter 
Six). For these critics of The Act of Killing, see: Fraser 2013 & 2014; Rayns 2013; Tyson 2014: Beckett 
2014; Godmilow 2014; Wandita 2014; Meneghetti 2016. 
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relationship mirrors the development over time of the “real” relationship between 
Oppenheimer and Congo.143 The temporal component of this documentary allows the 
viewer to witness Congo’s increasing reliance on Oppenheimer and his powerful need to 
gain something from Oppenheimer (his support, his sympathy, his approbation, his 
absolution perhaps) as Congo apparently spirals deeper into trauma rather than out of 
trauma. The film’s linear, chronological structure is also circular as the film is bookended 
with two re-enactments by Congo of his killing methods on the roof of the handbag shop in 
Medan city. The final bizarre and climatic scene where Congo seems to lose control of his 
body, repeats a visit to that same roof and repeats a re-enactment by Congo of the same 
killing methods, shot early on in the filmmaking process. The contrast between these two 
visits, affords us a yardstick by which to measure changes in Congo’s psychic state and his 
relation to his traumatic past; changes which we can perhaps attribute (at least in part) to 
Congo’s engagement in the filmmaking process playing out over time.144 
 
 
5.1.3 An early scene: the initial rooftop re-enactment 
 
On Anwar Congo’s first visit to the rooftop site of his murders he is accompanied by a 
neighbour who plays the part of a murder victim. Congo places a garrote around the 
neighbour’s neck and explains how he developed this method of killing in order to dispatch 
his victims without spilling too much blood. Garroting was efficient and clean. Through 
most of the scene Congo is calm and matter-of-fact and apparently untroubled by the past 
and the horrors he is describing. But there are some signs of a more troubled relation to his 
past. There are physical gestures which suggest disquiet – frequent massaging of his 
forehead as he recounts the story of his murders – and his admission that ‘[t]here’s so 
many ghosts here; because many people were killed here.’ And towards the end of the 
scene Congo confesses: ‘I’ve tried to forget all this with good music…Dancing…Feeling 
happy…A little alcohol…A little marijuana…a little…Ecstasy…Once I’d get drunk, I’d fly and 
feel happy.’ The scene ends with Congo demonstrating his dancing and his neighbour 
opining, in a spectacular act of misrecognition, ‘He’s a happy man’.  
 
143 An assumption confirmed by Oppenheimer in several interviews (see for example: Cohn 2012).  
144 In an interview with Amy Goodman (2013), Oppenheimer revealed that the first visit to the roof 
happened on the very first day Oppenheimer met Congo and the second visit (which was one of the 




The Congo who we meet at the start of the film appears at his happiest when discussing 
the film project that Oppenheimer has facilitated; the making of the film about his 
murderous past. ‘Whether this ends up on the big screen – or only on TV, it doesn’t matter’ 
a broadly smiling Congo tells his friend and fellow gangster Herman Koto, ‘we have to 
show, that this is the history. This is who we are.’ The making of the film seems to provide a 
substitute for alcohol and drugs as Congo’s chosen route to ‘feeling happy’. Somehow, the 
making of the film will bring him absolution and justify what he did. But the ‘consequences’ 
of making a film about that traumatic past that for years Congo had been trying so 
desperately to obliterate with alcohol and drugs, are not those Congo expects or hopes for. 
They lead him back to the same rooftop to once again demonstrate his killing method, and 





5.2 The play-within-the-play: the truth uncovered or ‘miching malicho’? 
 
5.2.1 Scenes from the film-within: The Apotheosis of Anwar Congo  
 
The sort of film Anwar Congo is imagining, we see as an edited actuality near the end of 
The Act of Killing. In a scene Congo has designed and scripted we see him, arms aloft, 
standing in a sunlit landscape, surrounded by women in long white skirts and elaborate 
headdresses, dancing slowly, a vast waterfall tumbling behind them; it is Congo’s vision of 
heaven, and elicits something close to joy in Congo as he watches it back on a monitor in 
his living room. He tells an off-screen Oppenheimer: ‘This is great Joshua. This is very good. 
I never imagined I could make something so great. One thing that makes me so proud is 
how the waterfall expresses such deep feelings’. In flowing gown, he is approached by 
actors playing the “communists” he murdered in 1965-66, the wire garrotes Congo had 
used to kill them still around their necks. One by one, they thank Congo for killing them and 
present him with a gold medal – which they hang around his neck – whilst Congo 
“graciously” bows.  
 
Murdered “communist”: For executing me and sending me to heaven 
    I thank you a thousand times, for everything. 
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This utterly bizarre scene, perhaps the strangest and most perverse I have ever watched in 
a documentary – a dark and unintended parody of the post-modern sublime perhaps – is 
played out to a music track of a version of Matt Monro’s upbeat, popular, 1960s song, Born 
Free. But this scene of the beatific Congo, coming so close to the end of The Act of Killing, 
rings hollow. By this stage, we have already witnessed Anwar Congo’s progressive 
traumatisation and psychological collapse. He may know that he was born free, but his past 
actions leave him haunted, suffering a traumatic reaction which cannot be expunged by a 
piece of cinematic fiction however ‘great’ the depiction of his apotheosis may be. This 
quasi-religious, fictional attempt to be forgiven his sins by the victims of his murderous 
violence, echoes a scene that only appears in the longer, director’s cut of the documentary. 
Here Congo – who is suffering with recurrent, nightmare dream-visions of his victims – 
confides that when he was little and had bad dreams, his mother would tell him he had the 
dreams because he had not washed his feet before he went to bed. Although not stated 
explicitly, Congo, the elderly, haunted killer, seems desperate to find a way to wash his 
feet; to wash away his sins. To try to achieve it he constructs an elaborate filmic fantasy. 
The scene of the apotheosis of Anwar Congo appears to be a conscious attempt by Congo 
to produce a self-protective screen memory or screen fantasy. In interview, Oppenheimer 
described Congo in this scene as ‘trying to run away from his pain, to build up a cinematic 
psychic scar tissue around his trauma’ (Oppenheimer quoted in: Barnes 2013). Is this fiction 
as shield against the “truth” rather than a route to it? 
 
So how should we think about the film-within-the-film in The Act of Killing? Is it a vehicle 
for hiding unpalatable truths, where former killers indulge in elaborate fantasies that seek 
to hide guilt and wash away sins145 or is it a more dangerous and unpredictable vehicle that 





145 This is Slavoj Žižek’s (2013) reading of The Act of Killing (which I explore below in conjunction with 
Thomas Wartenberg’s reading of the re-enactments of the film-within-the-film). 
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5.2.2 Claudius and Congo compared: The Murder of Gonzago and the films within 
The Act of Killing 
 
In its presentation of quasi-historical reconstructions (for example, the two rooftop scenes) 
and out-and-out fictions (for example, the apotheosis scene), The Act of Killing seems to be 
deploying the techniques of both reconstruction and construction that Freud proposed in 
his attempts to find or create representations of a traumatic past, and the two models that 
Hamlet offers of the fictional play-within-the-play (a form of re-enactment and a forgery) 
with both acting as catalysts to provoke the emergence of the “truth”. But given the 
persistent criticism that in The Act of Killing the killers use their fictional films to justify their 
past actions, to evade guilt and to imply that the murders were necessary, even ethical, it is 
important to explore the counter-argument that the fictions might obscure the truth.  
 
Hamlet is aware of the possibility that the story he reproduces in The Murder of Gonzago 
might have been suggested to him by a malevolent spirt that ‘Abuses me to damn me’ 
(Hamlet: Act II Scene II). And on two other occasions, Hamlet suggests that his plays might 
be ‘false’ in the sense of malicious, obscuring or misleading. First, on seeing the dumb 
show, Ophelia enquires of Hamlet: ‘What means this, my lord?’ and Hamlet replies: ‘Marry, 
this is miching malicho. It means mischief.’ (Hamlet: Act III Scene II). Secondly, later, in the 
middle of the staging of The Murder of Gonzago – as the King rises from his seat ready to 
storm out of the production – Hamlet comments: ‘What, frighted with false fire?’ (Hamlet: 
Act III Scene II). Is the entire project of staging a fictional production, the ‘false fire’, or is it 
only false in Polonius’s much more limited sense; a falsity but a falsity with the power to 
provoke the emergence of truth? 
 
Hamlet, and Freud in Constructions in Analysis (1937b), both suggest that there is a lurking 
danger that the play or construction might be merely false and misleading. But both also 
suggest the potential to provoke the truth. For both Hamlet and Freud, the play’s or the 
construction’s truth-provoking credentials are established in the reactions elicited and in 
how those reactions come to be understood by the diegetic play-goer or by the analysand. 
Freud (1937b: 260-1) argues that a valid or productive construction will touch the patient 
and that a false construction will leave the analysand ‘untouched’ and fade out of the 
analysis. Hamlet describes his parallel strategy in a speech in Act II Scene II (reproduced at 
the front of this chapter), where he defines both what he hopes the theatrical production 
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might reveal and the manner in which that revelation will become apparent. The play-
within-the-play, if it is a cunningly constructed conceit, has the power to force the guilty to 
feel their guilt (‘the play’s the thing / Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king’) and 
they will publicly proclaim ‘their malefactions’; that is, confess to their crimes. This 
confession – this public proclamation – will take a particular form. The malefactors will be 
‘struck […] to the soul’, a condition that reveals itself to the eye (‘I’ll observe his looks’) with 
the visual evidence of the guilt apparent in a bodily response (a ‘blench’). It is in this bodily 
response that the crime will speak (it will ‘speak / With most miraculous organ’), as actual 
speech – a verbal confession – is not the expected response (the malefaction – ‘murder’ – 
has ‘no tongue’). In staging his play, Hamlet seeks a bodily reaction that cannot be 
suppressed and will reveal something hitherto unseen; specifically, evidence of the 
Queen’s, and especially the King’s, as-yet-unseen guilt for the murder of Hamlet’s father, 
old King Hamlet. The new king, Claudius, Hamlet hopes will be soul struck, precipitating an 
affective, involuntary, bodily response. That this response is to be seen rather than 
confessed in words, is amplified in Hamlet’s instruction to his accomplice Horatio in Act III 
Scene II, to keep his gaze fixed on Claudius as the play is staged. Hamlet tells Horatio to 
‘Observe mine uncle’ and undertakes to do the same himself (‘I mine eyes will rivet to his 
face’) hoping to observe his uncle’s ‘occulted guilt’ which will ‘unkennel’ itself. And when 
the plays are staged before King Claudius, his reaction is indeed bodily and observable; he 
rushes from the scene in anger, shouting, ‘Give me some light: away!’ (Act III Scene II). 
 
But final confirmation of the King’s guilt only comes later, in the period immediately after 
he has watched the play (in Act III Scene III). In an act of personal reflection on what he has 
just seen and heard in the play, Claudius confesses his guilt in a soliloquy that is overheard 
by Hamlet.  
 
O, my offence is rank, it smells to heaven;  
It hath the primal eldest curse upon’t –  
A brother’s murder. 
 
Only then is Claudius able to symbolise into words what had been a purely bodily response 
(an acting out) when he watched the theatrical production. And it is only at this point that 
it becomes more certain that Hamlet’s play is not a mere devilish trick, or miching malicho, 
or false fire. I have followed the same approach in judging the fictional films within The Act 
of Killing: looking for involuntary, visible, physical blenches from Anwar Congo as he 
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witnesses his various filmic fictions and then waiting to see if these somatic and affective 
responses can be reflected on by Congo and can coalesce into words; into an account that 
is meaningful to Congo.  
 
There are striking similarities between Claudius and Congo. Both are murderers 
traumatised by their past actions, neither seems able to confess their guilt before being 
precipitated into doing so by watching a play-/ film-within, and both are desperate to wash 
away the stain of their crimes. Congo (as we have seen) is troubled by his inability to wash 
his feet, to wash away his sins as his mother had advised; whilst Claudius, in his soliloquy, 
reveals a similar desire to be cleansed: 
 
What if this cursed hand 
Were thicker than itself with brother’s blood, 
Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens 
To wash it white as snow?146 
 
And both men are still in possession of the fruits of their crimes which neither wishes to 
give up. Congo enjoys being a hero and minor celebrity in his home town, fêted as one of 
the men who rid the country of the “communist menace” in the 1960s; whilst Claudius 
revels in the power his crime has brought him (and is unwilling to relinquish it): 
 
O, what form of prayer 
Can serve my turn? “Forgive me my foul murder?” 
That cannot be, since I am still possess’d 
Of those effects for which I did murder –  
My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen. 
(Hamlet: Act III Scene III)  
 
Where The Act of Killing does part company from Hamlet is in the casting of the 
malefactors as the players. It is as if Hamlet had cast King Claudius and Queen Gertrude in 
his play and asked them to re-enact their own malefactions ‘in whatever ways they 
wished’.147 This is, perhaps, Oppenheimer’s unique bit of mischief – his bit of miching 
malicho. But, and once again in conformity with Hamlet, the Oppenheimer we hear within 
the diegesis plays a role similar to that of the character Hamlet. He appears as a character 
 
146 Compare another guilty, traumatised protagonist, Lady Macbeth in Macbeth: ‘Out, damn’d spot! 
out, I say!’  
147 As Oppenheimer allows the Indonesian killers to do (quotation from The Act of Killing’s opening 
on-screen texts). 
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(as a voice and an off-screen presence) in the play-without, talking to the killers whilst they 
make or watch-back the film-within and, like Hamlet, he keeps a close eye – a focused 
camera lens – trained on them to see how they will react to witnessing the fictional 
production to see if they will blench.  
 
 
5.2.3 Scenes from the film-within: The Kampung Kolam massacre  
 
In a major scene in The Act of Killing, Anwar Congo directs his friends and local extras – 
many of them children – in re-enacting the destruction of Kampung Kolam (a so-called 
“communist” village in the 1960s) and the rape and massacre of its inhabitants. Like 
Hamlet’s staging of a play that is ‘something like the murder of my father’, this scene is 
Congo’s attempt to recreate an historical event for the camera. Congo himself (like Hamlet) 
does not take an acting role but observes as the action is filmed. He is an intra-diegetic 
audience member watching the live performance of his own “play”.  
 
During the filming of the scene, Congo speaks to Oppenheimer’s documentary camera. 
 
Congo:  What I regret … [long pause and cannot finish his sentence] … Honestly, I  
  never expected it would look this awful. 
 
Congo then tries to gather his thoughts, looking troubled: 
 
Congo:  Imagine those children’s future. They’ve been tortured. Now their houses  
  will be burned down. What future do they have? They will curse us for the  
  rest of their lives. This was so, very, very, very … [Congo tails off into  
  silence].  
 
Congo seems to be taken by surprise by his emotional and affective response to witnessing 
his own reconstruction even though it re-enacts an event he clearly remembers. His 
response is largely affective and has ‘no tongue’; he is scarcely able to articulate – to 
represent in words – what is so ‘awful’. But what does struggle into words is his fear of 
being cursed (a fear Claudius also voices in his soliloquy in Act III Scene III of Hamlet) and a 
confusion of past and present in his use of the future tense for something that happened 
long ago (their houses will be burned down and they will curse us). The film-within – 
despite it being of Congo’s own ‘cunning’ design – has unexpectedly revivified the past in 
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the present, blurring the distinction between them and exposing a temporal confusion: the 
past bursting into the present or past and present overlaid, inter-mixed and inseparable, 
revealing in Congo a facet of traumatic experience that is recognised in all the major 
accounts of trauma.  
 
What also emerges, again apparently unexpectedly for Congo, is that he is brought into an 
empathetic encounter with the victims of his violence (‘Imagine those children’s future’). 
The intermingling of self and other implied by the notion of empathy is only one of a 
number of interminglings or identifications that psychoanalysis recognises, including 
imitation, sympathy, mental contagion, introjection, projection, etc., which will be explored 
later in this chapter. Part of the mischievous force of the play- or film-within is to activate 
these identifications and reveal their workings in the traumatised diegetic protagonist as 
they witness the re-creations and forgeries of the play or film. For André Green, bringing 
identifications into representational form (making the analysand aware of their own 
identifications) is at the heart of the analytic process: ‘[T]he essence of analytic action 
concerns the representation of intrasubjective and intersubjective psychic processes’ 
(Green quoted in: Delourmel 2013: 133). Congo’s filmic representation of a massacre has 
opened him up to these processes. Meaning or understanding of the past might become 
available to Congo if these identifications can be understood rather than simply being 
experienced as troubling, largely inarticulate, affect.  
 
 
5.2.4 Scenes from the film-within: Congo as “communist” victim  
 
As I have suggested, the film-within in The Act of Killing has a radical twist that makes it 
more mischievous than Hamlet’s The Murder of Gonzago. The malefactors do not merely 
watch re-enactments of their “pasts” played by actors, they are also the players. Often they 
play their own past selves but they also engage in role reversal when they choose to play 
their own past victims. This role reversal is a second, radical, mischievous twist on the play-
within-the-play model provided by Hamlet. This device – despite being of the killers’ own 
choosing – is highly revealing, generating the possibility of meanings emerging that might 
otherwise have remained hidden both from the killers themselves and from the cinema 
audience. The device forces the perpetrators to embody and perform – to imaginatively 
enter – the experience of the victim. Those perpetrator-actors who are open to this 
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process, find themselves forced into an empathetic engagement with their victims’ 
experience at the very moment of their torture and imminent death. This is perhaps the 
most devious and mischievous of all the ‘indirections’ in The Act of Killing by which ‘we find 
directions out’.148 Congo again and again places himself in the most difficult and potentially 
revealing circumstances. It is as if Congo understands and deliberately adopts the methods 
of psychodrama for uncovering hidden truths about a traumatic past, rather than 
proceeding evasively like a guilty man trying to cover his tracks. The lack of a social 
imperative for him to examine his past actions (Congo, like the other killers, is still 
celebrated as a hero by many in Indonesia) suggests that Congo is driven by psychic 
imperatives. One suspects he is driven by a powerful desire to confess or perhaps by an 
epistemophilic urge to understand his past in the hope that this will be cathartic.  
 
A scene in the film-within has Anwar Congo reversing roles and playing a “communist” who 
has been brought in for interrogation. We do not find out why Congo chose to play a victim 
but it clearly has physical and psychological consequences for him. 
 
Congo is seated at a table, bloodied and bowed, being interrogated by three men; the 
principal interrogator role being taken by Congo’s friend, Herman Koto. After playing this 
scene for a little while, there is a call of ‘cut’ from someone off-camera but the camera 
keeps running, focused on Congo who looks troubled. He takes deep breaths and blows the 
air out slowly, apparently trying to calm himself. He drinks water from a plastic bottle with 
his eyes closed. Koto crouches next to him, looking concerned, his arm on the small of 
Congo’s back as if to comfort him. Eventually Congo manages to say, breathily and quietly, 
‘OK, let’s do it’. Congo is blindfolded and Koto winds a wire around his neck ready to 
garrote him, saying ‘I place this medal around your neck’ in a perverse reference to the 
apotheosis scene in which the murdered “communist” places a medal around Congo’s 
neck. Congo is strangely still during all this activity. Koto then tightens the wire and Congo 
twitches, making a strange, gurgling, snorting noise; a noise Congo has already 
demonstrated in the documentary both as the sound he remembers being made by 
someone who is being garroted and as the sound that was made by the severed neck of a 
man Congo had murdered by decapitation. It is a sound that Congo has told us haunts him 
in his dreams. As I watched Congo apparently close to bodily collapse, I was struck by the 
 
148 I am referencing Polonius’s method for flushing out the truth, which he describes in Hamlet Act II 
Scene I: ‘Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth; / And thus do we of wisdom and of reach, / 
With windlasses and with assays of bias, / By indirections find directions out’. 
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raw, bodily nature of the scene; guttural noises issued from somewhere apparently deep 
inside Congo. 
 
Congo begins to make small, agitated gestures with his right hand. It appears Congo is 
trying, wordlessly, to stop proceedings. Koto stares at the stricken Congo and then looks 
anxiously in the direction of the camera, seemingly asking someone off-camera 
(Oppenheimer perhaps) – what’s happening? – what’s wrong with Anwar? 
 
Congo is now utterly still again. Eventually he manages to pull off the blindfold. Koto asks, 
‘Are you alright?’ and Congo replies, ‘I can’t do that again.’ The camera again keeps 
running, although now of course the camera is recording the reactions of the “players” to 
having played a scene and is no longer recording a scene from the film-within itself. This is 
a seamless switch of frames from the film-within to the frame of the documentary-without. 
Congo remains seated: head bowed, eyes closed, arms limp. After a while Koto says, ‘Get 
him some water’ but Congo cannot grasp the water bottle placed in his hand and so Koto 
pours water into his mouth, before Congo pushes the bottle away and returns to sitting 
limply, breathing deeply, lost in some inexpressible, inner awfulness. 
 
In the director’s cut we are shown a different take of this same scene. Congo is, if anything, 
even more physically afflicted, Koto having to lift Congo’s “lifeless” arms from where they 
dangle by his side and place them on his knees. After a while Congo says, ‘I feel like I was 
dead for a moment’. Koto stares at Congo and then responds, ‘Don’t get so into it … Don’t 
think too much about it’, aware, as the cinema audience is aware, that playing the part has 
physically overwhelmed Congo. The playing of a part – a role reversal – in the film-within 
has had a profound impact on Congo; an impact that registers bodily and scarcely registers 
in words beyond ‘I can’t do that again’ or ‘I feel like I was dead for a moment’.  
 
How these physical and affective reactions – these blenches – might be read is fraught with 
uncertainty. Interpreting affective and somatic responses is a hugely challenging task. As 
André Green wrote of affect: ‘Affect constitutes a challenge to thought’ as it ‘is difficult to 
speak of something which is, in essence, only partially communicable as affects often are’ 
(Green 1977: 129). Any interpretation is liable to misrecognitions, as affects can easily 
become attached to the “wrong” ‘ideational representative’ in the mind of the person who 
is affected, let alone in the minds of others (outsiders) who witness the affected body 
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(Green 2005a; especially chapter 9: 125-64). But what is clear is that wherever the film-
within-the-film sits in a spectrum running from historical re-enactment to elaborate 
fantasies set in no time (like the apotheosis scene), it has the power to precipitate 
powerful, affective, bodily responses. That the killers had total control over what was 
represented and how it was to be represented, brought no concomitant power to control 
their affective responses to playing a role or to watching back their own fictions. One 
imagines that Congo did not anticipate his own almost-total collapse and his inability to 
carry on playing the part when he designed the scene in which he reversed roles with one 
of his victims. The power of the film-within in documentary is in its potential to generate 
unexpected and unanticipated responses; this is its miching malicho. Like so many 
sorcerer’s apprentices, the killers of 1965-66 produced a film-within that made them the 
unwitting playthings of their own creation; a creation which acted back upon them in ways 
they did not anticipate.149  
 
 
5.2.5 Scenes from the film-without: Congo watches himself playing the victim  
 
Some time after the shooting of the scene in which Congo plays a victim of interrogation, 
torture and garroting – how long we are not told – we meet Congo again.150 In a deft piece 
of structural editing, Oppenheimer places this scene immediately after the scene in which 
we see his apotheosis. We move from Congo’s bizarre fantasy of absolution to his much 
more troubled reaction to inhabiting the body of a victim. The cinema audience sees most 
of the apotheosis scene unframed but towards its end, we cut to a wide-shot and see that 
Congo is watching the scene on a monitor in his house (again a seamless move from film-
within to film-without, and a seamless move from the filmic present of the apotheosis 
scene to the later filmic present of reviewing that scene). Having pronounced the 
apotheosis scene to be ‘great’, Congo asks an unseen Oppenheimer to put the 
interrogation scene on the monitor. That Congo moves directly from the apotheosis scene 
to the interrogation scene may suggest that he is not convinced by the self-protective 
 
149 Congo is not the first documentary protagonist to be surprised by the destabilising intensity of 
the experience of reenacting. In Werner Herzog’s film Little Dieter Needs to Fly (1997), principal 
protagonist Dieter Dengler returns to Laos to recreate his capture by the Pathet Lao. As his arms are 
tied, Dieter is terrified and says ‘Uh, oh, this feels a little bit too close to home.’  
150 In screen time, Congo returns four minutes after the torture scene. In the real time of the 
production schedule, we are not sure whether days or months have elapsed.  
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fantasy of being forgiven by his victims and that something more meaningful might be 
available in reviewing the other scene.  
 
In what I interpret as an attempt to insulate or distance himself from what he is about to 
see, Congo calls for his grandsons – aged about six and eight – to watch the scene with him. 
 
Congo:   Yan [the older grandson], watch the scene where grandpa is  
   tortured and killed. 
 
Oppenheimer  
(out of shot):  But this is too violent, Anwar. Are you sure? 
 
Congo:   Yes, it’s fine. 
 
When the scene is at its most violent, Congo tries to reassure his grandsons. 
 
Congo:   This is only a film… 
 Grandpa looks so sad, doesn’t he, Yan?… 
That’s grandpa being beaten up by the fat guy [Herman Koto].  
Grandpa’s head is smashed. 
 
The grandsons watch for a while: the younger one looking amused; the older one, Yan, 
blank and impenetrable (at least to my enquiring gaze). They then leave and Congo 
watches on. The smile that was on his face as he watched with his grandsons, disappears. 
He now looks troubled by what he sees of himself in the reconstruction. He stares intently, 
frowns, blinks repeatedly. Congo’s comments take on a darker, more introspective hue 
when he is no longer protected by the presence of his grandsons. 
 
Congo:   Did the people I tortured feel the way I do here? 
   I can feel what the people I tortured felt. 
Because here my dignity has been destroyed and then fear comes,  
right there and then. 
All the terror suddenly possessed my body. 
It surrounded me, and possessed me. 
 
It seems that Congo is now able to articulate – to represent in words – his affective, 
traumatised responses to playing a part in the film-within. He describes how he felt, 
providing a meaningful account of his bodily, tongueless, reactions on set. In the gap of 
time between the shooting of the scene and the “present” of recording his reflections in his 
house, Congo has found a way to represent his experience. This later present in his house is 
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also a dynamic present like the present when he was on set in character. His reflective 
comments at home come not as recollections in memory alone but through a new affective 
confrontation with the past as represented by the images and sounds of himself on the 
monitor; a confrontation generated by a self-reflexive engagement in a film-making 
process playing out over real (and filmic) time. In front of the monitor, Congo is no longer 
the actor or the “player” but a member of the intra-diegetic audience.  
 
But the glimmerings of understanding, and Congo’s first tentative attempts to face his past 
when watching this replaying of fictionalised recreations of the past on the screen, soon 
dissipate. The experience of watching himself rendered still and almost lifeless in the film-
within, seems to re-traumatise Congo. By the end of the scene in front of the monitor, 
Congo the-intra-diegetic-audience-member, closely mirrors Congo the-player-of-a-victim-
of-interrogation in the film-within. Oppenheimer’s intercutting between film-within and 
film-without reveals both “Congos” to be absolutely still, silent and seemingly ‘struck […] to 
the soul’. The twitching hand of the player-Congo is replaced by the twitching jaw muscles 
of the viewer-Congo. In both frames, Congo blenches. In both frames he is physically 
overwhelmed by the playing/witnessing of traumatic events. As a member of the extra-
diegetic audience, I am able to ‘observe his looks’ and to see him ‘blench’.  
 
If Congo’s own attempt to interpret his blenches is brief and soon dissolves back into 
overwhelming affect and bodily ticks, are we as members of the extra-diegetic audience 
able to read these blenches? Let us accept Congo’s own account in words, his own 
signification, of what he experienced: ‘I can feel what the people I tortured felt. […] All the 
terror suddenly possessed my body.’ Congo is overwhelmed bodily, undone to the point of 
near lifelessness. Congo is telling us that he is experiencing what his victims experienced. 
This is not a conscious, cognitive recognition of how he thinks they might have felt but a far 
more “primitive”, body-to-body encounter that comes entirely unbidden. In fact, 
encounter is too distancing a word, implying a separation between Congo and his victims. 
He is the victim at the moment the terror arrives or, to use Congo’s own word, he is 
‘possessed’. And ‘possessed’ has far more affective resonance in Indonesian culture than in 
the West. For some social groups within Indonesian society – predominantly the 
uneducated like Congo – possession is a live, real and terrifying notion and not a term of 
purely historic interest (Lusztig 2013: 53). 
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Thomas Wartenberg, writing recently about the role-reversing interrogation scene from a 
philosophical and ethical perspective, reaches conclusions similar to my psychological 
reading of this same scene (and indeed of the later scene with Congo watching his 
interrogation at home in front of the monitor). Playing the part of one of his own victims 
precipitates what Wartenberg (2017) calls an ontological collapse in Congo; a collapse of 
the gap between self and other with profound consequences.  
 
Two dichotomies are necessary to characterise this ontological situation: that of an 
actor playing a role, thereby creating a distinction between reality and fiction, and 
another within the reenactment between the roles of perpetrator and victim. So, 
Congo is a real perpetrator acting in the fictional role of one of his own victims. 
What transpires is an ontological collapse of this structure, for the actor playing a 
character actually becomes that character, at least briefly in his own imagination, 
and a perpetrator of torture and murder becomes his own victim albeit only 
imaginatively. As a result of this double collapse of roles and reality – in which the 
actor becomes the character he is supposed to simply be playing, experiencing 
himself as a victim of his own crimes – Congo is no longer able to repress an ethical 
assessment of his own actions. 
(2017; Wartenberg’s italics) 
 
The ontological collapse that Wartenberg describes precipitates a profound ethical crisis 
for Congo. My reading of this double collapse is cognisant of its ethical dimension (it is 
ethical to the extent that in reviewing himself playing this part, Congo acknowledges his 
own guilt)151 but I am more interested in the psychological dimension of the collapse(s). 
The difference between my reading and Wartenberg’s is that Wartenberg is asking ethical 
questions framed within the grander question: can documentaries do philosophy? I am 
asking psychological questions framed within the grander question: can documentaries do 
psychoanalysis? Wartenberg answers his own grand question with a yes: ‘My discussion of 
The Act of Killing presents the film as an important example of cinematic philosophy 
because it provides better support for Arendt’s banality of evil thesis than Arendt was able 
to by means of her own account of Eichmann.’ (Wartenberg 2017, with reference to: 
Arendt 2006 [1963]). I also hope (in what follows) to be able to answer my grand question 
with a yes – even if tentatively. 
 
My reading of this scene is that playing the part undermines Congo’s ego ideal; his heavily 
defended sense of himself that he has for so long sought to bolster (for example in the 
 
151 Congo’s admission of guilt (which he calls sin) is dealt with later in this chapter when I return to 
this scene.  
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apotheosis scene). In the heightened, phenomenological present instant of the playing, 
distinctions between reality and fiction, between self and other, collapse, precipitating a 
psychological crisis (and perhaps creating the conditions for a meaningful or “truthful” 
account to emerge).  
 
Slavoj Žižek reaches a very different conclusion about this scene. He argues that despite 
Congo showing the glimmerings of guilt and remorse, this does not lead on to an ethical or 
psychological collapse. As Žižek puts it, it 
 
does not lead to a deeper crisis of conscience – [as] his heroic pride immediately 
takes over again. The protective screen that prevented a deeper moral crisis was 
the cinematic screen: as in their real killings and torture, the men experienced their 




What Wartenberg and I see as the catalyst for the collapse (the playing of a part in a fiction 
in the style of a Hollywood movie), Žižek sees as Congo’s defence against collapse, 
protecting him from having to face his traumatic past and his culpability. And Žižek goes 
further. Not only do Congo and the other killers not experience their re-enactments in The 
Act of Killing as real, but they did not experience the actual killings in 1965-66 as real 
because (as Congo has told us) at that time, they imagined themselves to be film stars 
acting in violent Hollywood movies. For Žižek, filmic fictions are a screen against truth and 
reality – both in 1965-66 and now – and not a bait of falsehood capable of taking the carp 
of truth. 
 
Whilst wanting to acknowledge Žižek’s powerful reading, I do not share it. My reading of 
the scene is that playing the victim prompts a powerful identification that precipitates a 
collapse. For Wartenberg (2017) this identification is empathy: ‘The reenactment process 
employed by The Act of Killing forces empathy upon Congo by making his own experience 
of victimisation the bridge to his understanding of what his victims experienced.’ In the rest 
of this chapter, I will consider empathy alongside other forms of identification as the 






5.3 Congo ‘possessed’: empathy, affect, identification and meaning in the 
counter-transference  
 
5.3.1 The nature of Congo’s possession 
 
Congo describes his collapse as possession. But what is the nature of this possession? The 
word certainly implies that Congo believes something alien to himself, something other to 
himself, has entered him and changed him: he has been taken over by an alien “being”. But 
what is it, and crucially, does Congo understand what it is? 
 
For Wartenberg (2017) the possession is empathy which, extrapolating from his text, is a 
sharing, real or imagined, of the psychic or emotional state of another human being that 
also has a cognitive component (‘understanding’). This entails a theory of mind, a 
conscious, cognitive ability to place oneself in “someone else’s shoes”: what Shannon 
Spaulding (2017: 13) calls ‘the capacity to understand another person’s state of mind from 
her perspective’ which (in Karsten Stueber’s words (2017: 138)) ‘presupposes an awareness 
of the difference between self and other’. Wartenberg may be right, but there is no stable 
definition of empathy and the balance between its “felt” and its cognitive components. It is 
a much-contested term that has attracted a vast and expanding literature in recent years. 
Dan Zahavi, writing recently in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy 
(Maibom, ed 2017), surveys current conceptions of empathy and finds a range of 
definitions from ‘contagion’ – a sharing of mental states that comes with no understanding 
(‘empathy does not involve knowledge’) – through ‘both sharing and knowing’ – an account 
which ‘requires some cognitive grasp and some self-other differentiation’ – to ‘knowing’ – 
an account by ‘those who emphasize the cognitive dimension and argue that empathy 
doesn’t require sharing, but that it simply refers to any process by means of which one 
comes to know the other’s mental state’ (Zahavi 2017: 33-43). Elsewhere in this same 
Routledge volume, editor Heidi Maibom suggests that the categories Zahavi defines 
represent not competing definitions of empathy but delineate different forms of empathy: 
broadly (in the order Zahavi describes them), emotional contagion/personal distress, 
‘affective empathy’ and ‘cognitive empathy’ (Maibom 2017: 1-10; 22-32). But there is no 




Psychoanalysis is equally unable to provide a stable definition of the term. The first of 
Freud’s many references to empathy (‘Einfühlung’ in German) was in his essay on Jokes and 
their Relation to the Unconscious (1905b: 186; 195; etc). Analyst, George W. Pigman, has 
argued that throughout his career, Freud deployed it most frequently in the context of 
understanding (a meaning-making activity akin to Maibom’s category of ‘cognitive 
empathy’): ‘Perhaps the most striking aspect of Freud’s conception of empathy is his 
emphasis on its intellectual features and his relative neglect, even suspicion, of its affective 
ones’ (Pigman 1995: 251-2). But there is little consensus within psychoanalysis and Freud 
never attempted a formal definition. If I were to venture a consensus view, empathy (in 
both philosophy and psychoanalysis) is a form of sharing of mental states that has both 
affective and cognitive components: what Zahavi calls ‘both sharing and knowing’; a 
definition that accords with Wartenberg’s deployment of the term. 
 
But empathy – conceived as an appreciation of the other’s predicament that operates with 
understanding – seems inadequate as an explanatory tool when attempting to interpret 
Congo’s blenches in the scene where he plays the “communist” interrogation victim. 
Whatever Congo is experiencing, it expresses itself as a bodily reaction. What we witness is 
in part mental anguish but also clearly bodily anguish that apparently bypasses his 
cognitive faculties and manifests itself as a temporary paralysis.  
 
Perhaps, instead of a collapse induced by empathy, we could think of Congo as being 
overwhelmed by an intense surge of negative affect that comes without understanding. 
Unrepresented trauma may in fact be best described as registering as overwhelming affect 
as Freud implies his grandson experienced before he found/created his fictive narrative of 
the cotton reel and the piece of string or Bion’s generic infant experienced before the 
intervention of the mother in her reverie interpreting the child’s distress. Congo’s near 
paralysis may imply a hysterical conversion of some of that negative affect into a purely 
bodily symptom. And, if Congo is experiencing an intense surge of negative affect, this is 
not to suggest the absence of an inter-personal (or perhaps inter-subjective, inter-psychic, 
inter-corporeal) encounter with someone or something that is other to himself. Affect can 
be experienced by a body alone (“autochthonic” affect) but many accounts of affect 
highlight its transmission, its capacity to move from one body to another: a characteristic  
often described as resonance or contagion. Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (2010a: 
2) describe affect as ‘swells of intensities that pass between “bodies”’ and Félix Guattari 
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(1996: 158) writes about the ‘transitivist character of affect’ where there is a confusion or 
an intermixing of self and other, with one body apparently mimicking the affect expressed 
in another body.152 
 
As with empathy, affect has generated a vast and expanding literature in recent years153 
and little consensus as to a definition. But within the multitude of different constructions of 
affect it is clear, at least, that a cognitive component is far less prevalent than in definitions 
of empathy and many commentators specifically exclude cognition. In my use of affect I 
concur with this exclusion as without it there is a blurring and overlapping of terms such as 
affect and empathy which then lose precision. In philosophy, cultural/critical theory and 
psychoanalysis, affect is generally considered as a bodily phenomenon, as transmittable 
between bodies and as non-cognitive, non-representational and unsymbolised. André 
Green (1977: 129), for example, writes that ‘[a]ffect constitutes a challenge to thought’ and 
Lawrence Grossberg (lamenting the imprecision with which the term is currently used) 
confirms that, at the very least, it is ‘non-representational’ and ‘non-semantic’ (interview 
with Grossberg in: Gregg and Seigworth 2010b: 316).  
 
Post-structuralist “affect theory” has often stressed the embodied, non-representational, 
pre-/non-cognitive, pre-/non-personal nature of affect and so offers a way of thinking 
about Congo that stands in stark contrast to empathy, certainly as it is conceptualised by 
Wartenberg with a cognitive component.154 Congo seems to display the symptoms of what 
Eric Shouse (2005)155 calls a body overwhelmed by ‘a non-conscious experience of 
intensity’ (2005: paragraph 5) as ‘affect is transmitted between bodies’ (2005: paragraph 
12) breaking down the barriers between inside and outside, between self and what’s 
 
152 Guattari does also recognise “autochthonic” affect when he cites Daniel Stern’s work on 
‘shareable’ (i.e. transitivist) and ‘non-shareable’ (i.e. autochthonic) affects. 
153 I am referring in particular here to post-structuralist “affect theory” and the so-called affective 
turn in the humanities in the mid-1990s, conventionally traced back to the publication of an essay by 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995b) called “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading 
Silvan Tomkins” but prefigured in earlier work by Lawrence Grossberg, Vivian Sobchack, Linda 
Williams and Steven Shaviro in the fields of music and film, and also deeply influenced by Deleuze 
and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1988 [1980]) and Brian Massumi’s gloss of their work for an 
anglophone readership. 
154 It also stands in contrast to Heidi Maibom’s (2017: 24) version of affective empathy which entails 
an emotion which has ‘“an object” or “representational content”. It is about something.’ Affect or 
affective states are generally considered both to lack this content and (by some including myself) to 
also lack any readily identifiable object. André Green has stressed the profound difficulty in 
interpreting affect precisely because of its lack of a readily identifiable object (Green 2005a; 
especially chapter 9: 125-64). 
155 Shouse draws on the work of Massumi, Deleuze and Guattari in this essay. 
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beyond the self. For Shouse, the ‘transmission of affect is about the way that bodies affect 
one another’ and occurs ‘[w]hen your body infolds a context and another body (real or 
virtual) is expressing intensity in that context, one intensity is infolded into another’ (2005: 
paragraph 14). Shouse distinguishes the impact of empathy (when ‘one person’s feelings 
become another’s’ consciously or not (2005: paragraph 14)) from affect, and gives a gloss 
that is key to my appropriation of this theoretical construction, in making it clear that 
‘another’ body can be ‘real or virtual’. In Congo’s case that body is both ‘virtual’, as he is 
inhabiting a long-dead body suffering torture, and ‘real’, as Congo is the torture victim in 
the affective, phenomenological present of the film-within. The idea of a ‘real or virtual’ 
body is key to my understanding of how the viewer of documentary constructs meaning 
through a process that often begins with the non-cognitive, affective force of the filmic 
object and the filmic characters on the viewer (before the viewer attempts to interpret 
what that experienced affect might mean). Here, the other body which affects the viewer is 
necessarily ‘virtual’ as the film and its protagonists exist only on screen. 
 
But the overarching theoretical construction I want to propose to describe Congo’s physical 
collapse as he plays victim is the notion of identification: an umbrella term denoting the 
various ways in which bodies and especially psyches affect each other and become like 
each other – or, more accurately, the same as each other – encompassing the notion of 
empathy (when the feelings of one are shared or exchanged and become another’s and are 
understood to a greater or lesser extent by another) and the transmission of affect (when 
the bodily state of one becomes another’s). Identification includes these ideas but is 
broader, taking in the exchange of unconscious material and even of material that has 
never properly entered the dynamic unconscious. All identifications entail – to a greater or 
lesser extent – the collapse of the gap between self and other (a collapse Wartenberg sees 
happening to Congo in his re-enactments and describes as empathy). Jean Laplanche and 
Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1988 [1967]: 205-8), borrowing the words of André Lalande, 
describe identification both as the notion of one idea being substitutable by another (as in 
dream-work) and as an ‘act whereby an individual becomes identical with another or two 
beings become identical with each other (whether in thought or in fact, completely or 
secundum quid.)’. It is this second articulation I want to pursue. It contains, in Laplanche 
and Pontalis’s words, ‘a whole group of psychological concepts – e.g. imitation, Einfühlung 
(empathy), sympathy, mental contagion, projection, etc.’ 
 
 165 
In what follows, I explore various identifications including projection and projective 
identifications but also (and in particular) projection’s counterpart, introjection and 
introjective identifications. The formal omission of introjection from Laplanche and 
Pontalis’s list (its ghostly presence marked by the ‘etc’) is symptomatic of introjection’s lack 
of prominence (until recently) in much psychoanalytic writing about clinical practice, where 
along with projection it is a facet of the transference/counter-transference. Outside of the 
clinical context, though, introjection has played a key role in meta-psychological theory 
(and continues to do so)156 and it is central to Bion’s theory of infantile development.  
 
Projection and introjection both describe interactions between the inner and outer worlds. 
In projection, an aspect of one’s inner world is projected – excreted – into an external 
object (often a person), who is then experienced as the incarnation or embodiment of the 
expelled psychic material but with no sense, no understanding, that what is then 
experienced originated in the self. Often the expelled material (in the language of object 
relations), is a bad object that the projecting psyche wishes to be rid of. By contrast, 
introjection rests on the unconscious fantasy of ingestion – an oral fantasy – where the 
characteristics of an external object (often a person) are taken into the self which then 
acquires those characteristics (and again with no sense or understanding that this psychic 
transaction has taken place). Often the introjected object is a good object that acts, say, as 
a defence mechanism in the case of introjecting the attributes of strength in another to 
help bolster a self that is felt to be weak and vulnerable. But Karl Abraham’s and Sándor 
Ferenczi’s work suggests that the logic of projecting bad objects and introjecting good 
ones, is not always the case. In 1924, Karl Abraham (1927 [1924]: 418-79) wrote about the 
projection outside the self of good objects, impoverishing the ego with psychotic 
consequences. And in 1932, Sándor Ferenczi (1949 [1932]: 228) explored the notion of the 
introjection of bad objects, and specifically the child’s ‘introjection of the guilt feelings of 
the adult’ in the case of a child that has been maltreated or sexually abused by an adult.157  
 
Returning now to Congo, the notions of introjection and projection seem to offer ways to 
read Congo’s blenches. In the scene from the film-within where Congo plays the victim of 
 
156 For example, in Freud’s essay on Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921). 
Introjection is the central concept in the work of Abraham and Török which will be explored later in 
this chapter. 
157 The child who is sexually-abused by a parent will often desperately try to hold on to the parent as 
a good object and will introject the bad object – the guilt of the parent – feeling guilty themselves 
for somehow having asked for or provoked the unprovoked parental assault.  
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the sort of torture that Congo himself in “real” life meted out to countless victims, he is a 
very complex object to observe. Is he victim? Is he perpetrator? It also makes any 
conjectures about projection and introjection very difficult to distinguish. We are 
presented with a single body that is both perpetrator and victim and projections and 
introjections are taking place, not between separate bodies, but within this already-
complex body. Nevertheless, I am going to attempt a reading that suggests a toxic 
introjection – an introjective identification – that leaves Congo physically (and psychically) 
undone.  
 
That he is physically undone seems incontrovertible. Congo says of playing the part of a 
victim: ‘I can’t do that again’ and ‘I feel like I was dead for a moment’, and he ends the 
scene utterly immobile as if in (or in) a state of paralysis. His very stillness suggests that 
something very bad is happening inside Congo. My only direct evidence of introjection, of 
taking in something from outside – taking something in “orally” – is the negative evidence 
of Congo pushing away the water bottle proffered to him by his concerned friend, Herman 
Koto. It is as if he can take nothing else inside. The enormous effort of rousing himself from 
near torpor to push the bottle away suggests the power of his urge either not to ingest 
anything more or perhaps to refuse something being forced into him from outside. 
 
 
5.3.2 Scenes from the film-within: the cannibal forces Congo to cannibalise himself  
 
Another scene from The Act of Killing’s film-within invites this specifically introjective 
interpretation. Congo and Herman Koto appear in a jungle setting, with Koto in extravagant 
drag playing the part of Aminah, a female, communist activist. He (she) sits next to a 
decapitated Congo. Again, Congo is playing a victim of murder and torture, but this time (in 
another of the bewildering twists of the film-within) he is playing himself, a perpetrator, 
who has fallen victim to a cruel communist woman, so turning the objective historical 
record on its head. It is a paranoid, persecutory fantasy in which the killers have re-
invented themselves as victims of the communists.  
 
In reading Congo in this scene, we must bear in mind that this inversion is not simply a 
private fantasy (delusion) but is supported in wider Indonesian society. The scene is 
explicitly making reference to the docudrama feature film, Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI [The 
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Treachery of the 30th September Movement of the Communist Party of Indonesia] (Noer 
1984), made with Indonesian government sponsorship, which purports to retell the events 
of 1965 and the rise to power of General Suharto. It was a piece of propaganda that shifted 
the blame for the bloodbath of 1965 from Suharto and his supporters to the communists, 
who are falsely portrayed as the violent aggressors in an attempt to justify the 
government-sponsored mass killings that followed. The film particularly demonises women 
of the leftist Gerwani Movement – an activist women’s organisation with links to the 
Communist Party of Indonesia – who in Pengkhianatan kidnap and murder loyal army 
generals. The reference to Pengkhianatan would be clear to an Indonesian audience as the 
film was, for more than twenty years, compulsory viewing in Indonesian schools and was 
shown annually on national television. Herman Koto’s character Aminah would be 
immediately identifiable as one of these merciless, violent Gerwani women.158 But what is 
so striking about Congo’s re-articulation of this myth is his decision to portray Aminah as a 
cannibal. Aminah does not simply kill and mutilate her victim, she eats him and forces him 
to eat himself. 
 
Congo-the-victim has already been decapitated in an earlier scene shot in studio (see 
figures 6 and 7 in Illustrations). Congo’s headless body (a ghoulish manikin that has been 
made by the props department) lies on the jungle floor. Congo’s apparently decapitated 
head (his real head) rests upright on a fake rock, the illusion of decapitation sustained 
through the concealment of his real body behind the rock so only his head is visible to us 
(see figure 8 in Illustrations). Congo’s decapitated head speaks to Koto. We are still in the 
framing documentary at this point, as Oppenheimer’s camera captures Congo’s 
preparations for the shooting of the Aminah scene for his film-within. Congo is giving Koto 
some last-minute directorial instructions. 
 
Congo:   You should be furious, but also sad. 
   You should be angry, sad. Sadistic.159 
 
 
158 The Indonesian scholar and novelist Intan Paramaditha (2013: 44) places the scene in context for 
the non-Indonesian viewer: ‘Aminah, a scantily clad, liver-eating woman whose sexual monstrosity is 
overemphasized through Herman’s unruly body, reminds us of the merciless Gerwani woman who 
slashes a general’s forehead with a razorblade in Pengkhianatan.’  
159 This opening part of the sequence is in the director’s cut only but the essentials of the scene are 
the same in both cuts of The Act of Killing.  
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Filming the film-within now begins. Koto (playing Aminah) speaks to Congo’s decapitated 
head:  
 
Koto [Aminah]:   Look at your blood. 
 
Koto smears blood over Congo’s face, and laughs manically. 
 
Koto [Aminah]:  Look what I found in your stomach. 
Look at this! Your liver. 
 
Koto picks up a huge piece of raw offal – probably a cow’s liver – and puts it in his own 
mouth. 
 
Koto [Aminah]:  Look, I’m eating you. 
 
Then Koto dangles the raw liver near Congo’s mouth and Congo gags. Koto tries to make 
Congo eat the offal. Congo gags again, coughs, retches (a more violent reaction this time). 
One expects him to throw-up but the retching produces nothing. Congo cannot resist what 
is being done to him as his body is concealed (trapped) by the fake rock and so his arms are 
not free to push the offal away (see figure 9 in Illustrations). 
 
Koto [Aminah]:  It’s rotten!  
 
Koto spits out some of the liver that is in his mouth. Congo continues to gag and retch, on 
the verge of vomiting. 
 
Koto [Aminah]:  Look at this. Look, your penis! I’ll stuff it in your mouth. 
 
Koto holds up a bloody, penis-shaped piece of offal, and rubs it over Congo’s face. Congo’s 
physical discomfort increases. 
 
As Koto attempts to force-feed Congo, the actor Congo seems to be genuinely disturbed. 
As a spectator, I read Congo’s responses not as those of an actor skillfully playing a part but 
as signs of viscerally-real disgust and horror. As Koto pushes the raw liver into Congo’s face 
and mouth, Congo’s reactions appear to be involuntary and unrehearsed. There could 
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hardly be a more literal depiction of the taking-in (or here the attempt to refuse the taking-
in) of something bad from outside.  
 
That Congo chose to stage this encounter as an act of cannibalism resonates with 
psychoanalytic accounts of introjection. In psychoanalytic theory and metapsychology, the 
taking in of both bad and good objects from outside the self is invariably an oral and 
ingestive act but frequently also, in metaphor and sometimes literally, a cannibalistic act. 
Metapsychology might offer some clues as to what is happening in this scene – it might 
help us to read Congo’s blenches – even if we don’t know what impelled him to give a 
cannibalistic twist to the popular myth of the violent Gerwani women.  
 
The metaphor of cannibalism is mentioned by Freud as early as his Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality, where it is linked specifically to the ‘aggressive element of the sexual 
instinct’ (1905a: 159) and to early oral, pre-genital sexual organisation (1905a: 198). There 
are echoes of this in Karl Abraham’s (1927 [1924]: 418-79) description of what he called the 
second or oral stage of child development – the ‘oral-sadistic phase’ – as one of biting or 
sadistic ‘cannibalism’ in which the infant incorporates objects in order to destroy them. 
Abraham referred to this as the ‘cannibalistic stage’. Freud returns to cannibalism in 1913 
in Totem and Taboo. Here cannibalism is pursued not as a metaphor but as a historical-
anthropological speculation about early human societies where the act of eating another 
(who is ritually sacrificed and consumed in the ‘totem meal’) is an attempt to gain their 
powers: ‘By incorporating parts of a person’s body through the act of eating, one at the 
same time acquires the qualities possessed by him.’ (1913: 82). 
 
Whatever credence we place on Freud’s historical-anthropological speculations, he is 
describing the fantasy that I become you by eating you. In section seven of Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) on “Identification”, Freud pursues this same 
theme of (what we now call) introjective identification: 
 
the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way 
annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has remained at this standpoint; he 
has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of whom he is 
fond. 
(1921: 105)  
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Freud is clear that we should not mistake the cannibal’s ‘devouring affection’ simply as an 
act of loving identification; it also involves destructive theft and the desire to annihilate the 
other: 
 
Identification, in fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an 
expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone's removal. 
(1921: 105) 
 
The ambivalent nature of ‘devouring affection’ brings both love and hate into play (a theme 
Freud had already pursued in Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915a)). Freud again makes 
reference to cannibalism in Mourning and Melancholia (1917a) where in both the 
successful process of mourning and in the failure of this process in melancholia, the dead 
love object is taken in psychically by the bereaved in an incorporative act he equates to 
cannibalism:  
 
The ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the 
oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development in which it is, it wants to do so 
by devouring it. 
(1917a: 248-9) 
 
But in Mourning and Melancholia the process of mourning is seen not simply to restructure 
the ego but also the super-ego, which is described in this essay as ‘the critical activity of the 
ego’ (1917a: 249).160 By 1923 in The Ego and the Id, under the aegis of the new tripartite 
division of the psyche, a fully-formed theory of the structuring of the super-ego through 
incorporations from outside the self has emerged: 
 
this ego ideal or super-ego [is] the representative of our relation to our parents. 
When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and 
feared them; and later we took them into ourselves. 
(1923: 36) 
 
In thinking about Congo and his cannibalistic film-within, which of these articulations of 
cannibalistic incorporation in psychoanalytic theory might offer a key? Incorporation to 
gain qualities from beyond the self or to annihilate those qualities (in sadistic 
incorporation) or in incorporation as an aspect of mourning (or melancholia)? And where 
 
160 Freud’s comments in Mourning and Melancholia anticipate his articulation of the tripartite 
division of the psyche in 1923, where he formally introduces the idea of the super-ego (and indeed 
the id).  
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might the effects be felt: in the ego, or in the super-ego as punishing guilt? My reading of 
Congo’s blenches in both the cannibalism film and in his other performances in The Act of 
Killing will encompass all these elements.  
 
 
5.3.3 Guilt unkennelled or the introjection of failed projections: 
first incorporative/introjective reading 
 
I have described Congo watching the interrogation scene on the monitor at his home up to 
the point where he says: 
 
Congo:   Did the people I tortured feel the way I do here? 
   I can feel what the people I tortured felt. 
Because here my dignity has been destroyed and then fear comes,  
right there and then. 
All the terror suddenly possessed my body. 
It surrounded me, and possessed me. 
 
But the scene continues with an intervention from Oppenheimer (a disembodied voice 
from off-screen): 
 
Oppenheimer:  Actually, the people you tortured felt far worse  
because you know it’s only a film.  
They knew they were being killed. 
 
Congo looks surprised at Oppenheimer’s comment and he replies: 
 
Congo:   But I can feel it, Josh. Really, I feel it. 
   Or have I sinned?  
 
Congo’s eyes well-up, he bites his lip, and then he continues with his voice cracking. 
 
Congo:   I did this to so many people, Josh. 
 
Now Congo is in tears. 
 
Congo:   Is it all coming back to me?  
   I really hope it won’t. I don’t want it to, Josh. 
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Congo puts his hand over his face as the crying increases, he shakes his head, and seems to 
search for more words but none are forthcoming. The camera stays on his face.  
 
Here Congo in the film-without (as a member of the intra-diegetic audience watching his 
own performance and his own bodily blenches in the film-within), offers two 
interpretations of the effect on him of performing a role reversal with one of his victims. At 
first, he describes a bodily and affective identification felt as terror and possession. But in 
his intervention, Oppenheimer confronts Congo with his own responsibility as the source of 
this terror161 and this elicits his second interpretation – ‘Or have I sinned?’ – which he 
immediately seems to confirm in the next sentence: ‘I did this to so many people, Josh’. 
Congo’s empathetic and affective encounter with his victims has, with Oppenheimer’s 
prompting, unleashed something perhaps even more terrifying for Congo; a confrontation 
with his own guilt. Hamlet hoped that showing Claudius his own murderous acts in the 
form of a performed fiction, a play, would ‘unkennel’ his uncle’s ‘occulted guilt’.162 It did. 
Congo seems to have suffered the same fate. Congo’s encounter with his victims in a 
performed fiction, a film, seems to have unkennelled his super-ego to punish him. 
 
But we can also read this moment of crippling confrontation with guilt as a return of guilt 
that Congo had been projecting out. In the apotheosis scene, the guilt was projected and 
then magically abolished in the fantasy of his victims forgiving him and even thanking him. 
In the cannibalism scene, Congo projects his guilt into Aminah and she is recast as the 
monstrous one. Aminah, like Ferenczi’s abused child, must carry the guilt that properly 
belongs to the abuser. It is a psychic projection that is supported and exploited by 
Indonesian state propaganda (as exemplified in the film Pengkhianatan) where the 
“communist” victims of murder and torture are re-cast as the perpetrators. As Congo says 
to Oppenheimer in an earlier scene: ‘For me, that film [Pengkhianatan] is the one thing 
that makes me feel not guilty’. But in the cannibalistic exchange that takes place in the film-
within between Congo and Aminah, that projection is reversed or rather returned. In 
forcing Congo’s own internal organs into his face and mouth, Aminah enacts in the most 
graphic and concrete way, Congo’s forced introjection of the toxic bad object (the guilt) 
 
161 One could characterise this moment in this scene as another role reversal in which Oppenheimer 
takes the place of Koto as Congo’s interrogator, mirroring in the play-without the earlier 
interrogation scene from the play-within. 
162 Hamlet in Hamlet: Act III Scene II: ‘If his occulted guilt / Do not itself unkennel in one speech, / It 
is a damnèd ghost that we have seen, / And my imaginations are as foul / As Vulcan’s stithy.’ 
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that had been projected out and into the other (into Aminah). Congo experiences crippling 
guilt as his projections begin to fail and so return. There is even a hint that Congo has an 
intuitive understanding of the process of introjecting failed projections in his exchange with 
Oppenheimer in front of the monitor, where a desperate Congo says ‘Is it all coming back 
to me? I really hope it won’t. I don’t want it to, Josh.’ The projection has returned; it has all 
come back. It is an argument that runs in parallel with Freud’s metapsychological 
speculations, where the things the infant “self” ingests from the outside, play a vital role in 
structuring the super-ego. The affective present moment of the role-reversal interrogation 
scene in the film-within – a moment repeated and re-experienced as it is watched on a 
monitor in the film-without – precipitates the collapse of projections and the introjection 
of failed projections into the super-ego (the ‘critical activity’ of the self),163 radically 
challenging the self-image to which Congo had desperately clung for fifty years. This 
reading brings the ontological collapse that Wartenberg (2017) sees as empathetic and 
ethical into conformity with my reading that sees it as introjective and psychological. The 
two readings are not in competition but are facets of the same ontological collapse.  
 
In this psychological reading, unconscious processes taking place within Congo seem, 
rather miraculously, to have been able to find expression in the fictional vehicle of the film-
within. But perhaps it is no more miraculous than Winnicott’s child patients revealing 
unconscious processes in their drawings and games. Meaning – certainly for the patient – 
emerges not directly in the game itself but when the game is reflected on by the mind of 
the analyst in dialogue with the patient. Congo’s game – his film-within – seems to yield 
some meaning (albeit a very uncomfortable and dangerous meaning) in the reflective space 
of the dialogue between Oppenheimer and Congo. 
 
In a recent conference paper, Julian Koch (2019) has pointed to the crucial role 
Oppenheimer plays within the diegesis (never in shot but appearing as a voice or as 
someone out-of-shot who the protagonists address). Oppenheimer’s presence acts as the 
guarantor of the non-fictionality of what we see in The Act of Killing; as the guarantor of 
the “truth” or reality of the documentary. Koch says ‘Oppenheimer pursues two metaleptic 
strategies in his film, the first of which deliberately merges fact and fiction, yet the second 
 
163 Here (following Freud (1917a)) my argument is about the super-ego. I will amend this a little 
when I look at Abraham and Török’s work on the ‘crypt’, where it is the ego that does the taking-in 
and the focus is on shame rather than guilt. 
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enables the viewer to tell them apart.’164 It is only this first metaleptic strategy that most of 
Oppenheimer’s critics see, where Oppenheimer “allows” the perpetrators to play fast and 
loose with fact and fiction in the making of their films.165 But ‘[t]he second metalepsis 
[Oppenheimer’s intra-diegetic interventions] creates a distance to the first, betraying the 
fictionalised history, and asserts the film’s own factual stance’ (Koch 2019). It is in these 
inter-personal encounters of the second metalepsis that what might be called “truth” – 
what Koch calls the ‘factual’ and what I call meaning – is able to emerge. 
 
 
5.3.4 Shame unkennelled or the breaking open of the crypt: 
second incorporative/introjective reading 
 
I want to suggest a second introjective reading of Congo’s blenches. It emerges from 
beneath the first reading in the final, climactic scene on the rooftop above the handbag 
shop (Congo’s second visit to the rooftop to demonstrate his killing methods). From the 
very start of this final scene, Congo looks deeply troubled. The faux-jollity that has 
characterised so many of Congo’s appearances in the film-without has gone; its only trace 
is perhaps the loud, bright-yellow, double-breasted suit that he is wearing. He begins to 
speak quietly. 
 
Congo:   This is where we tortured and killed the people we captured. 
   I know it was wrong but I had to do it. 
 
Out-of-the-blue, and with no signs or warnings the viewer can see, Congo begins to gag 
very loudly. Each time, it convulses his body. He paces slowly around the rooftop, hands in 
pockets. The gagging increases in ferocity and the noises that emanate from Congo 
increase in volume. It is the sound we have already heard Congo making in the 
interrogation scene where he reproduces the sound his victims made as they were 
garroted or decapitated. It is also a noise Congo has told us he hears in his nightmares 
when the ghosts of his victims haunt his dreams.166 He eventually walks to the railings that 
run around the edge of the rooftop and he doubles-up, resting his hands on a low 
 
164 Koch is using metalepsis in Gérard Genette’s sense of ‘any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator 
or narratee into the diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.) or 
the inverse’ (Genette 1980: 234-5). 
165 These critics include: Fraser 2013; Crichlow 2013; Tyson 2014; Meneghetti 2016. 
166 In an earlier scene from the film-within, Congo has dramatised this recurrent nightmare. 
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perimeter wall beneath the safety railings. The noises coming from Congo are now very 
loud. He retches several times, then spits, coughs, still bending forward, supporting himself 
with both hands on the wall. Even as the ferocity of the retching increases, nothing is 
thrown up; he is dry-heaving. Eventually he stands straight again, snorts loudly, trying to 
clear the phlegm obstructing his nose and throat. The camera stays on him for quite a while 
in a medium-wide shot and then there is a cut.  
 
We next see Congo (evidently very shortly after the last shot ended) sitting on the wall, 
quietly trying to compose himself. He glances to his left, and seeing a length of wire, he 
picks it up.  
 
Congo:   This is… 
 
Congo pauses and breathes deeply, puffing out air. 
 
This is one of the easiest ways to take a human life. 
And this … 
 
He holds up a hemp sack.  
 
This was used to take away…  
 
His voice cracks at this point. He is struggling to speak. 
 
…the human beings… 
 
He can now barely speak.  
 
…we killed… 
because without this maybe people would know. 
 
Congo throws the sack down, sits quietly for two or three seconds, and then begins to dry 
retch again. The noises Congo makes are deep and guttural, and now even louder. The 
convulsions come closer and closer together. Eventually, Congo sits stock still, breathing 
deeply, not looking at the camera but off into some private, middle-distance.  
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The camera cuts to Congo leaving the rooftop by the stairs, supporting himself on the 
bannister, and descending the steps very unsteadily. The next shot (the film’s finale167) is a 
wide shot of the back view of Congo leaving the shop through the open door and out into 
the night. The shot of the open door, with the night-time city and traffic visible beyond, is 
held still for a long time (twenty-eight seconds), Congo having departed. The film then cuts 
to black. The credits roll. The manner in which the film closes – its metaphoric message – 
strongly suggests that the filmmaker can see little hope for Congo and that whatever 
demons he has confronted on that rooftop, will continue to haunt him. 
 
Before embarking on my detailed reading of this scene it is necessary to confront an issue 
that has divided critics. Is Congo acting (in the sense of dissembling) in order, perhaps, to 
gain sympathy or to try to convince himself or an audience that he is a “decent” man, or 
are his actions involuntary and out of his conscious control as he remembers and relives his 
past? I take Congo’s bodily contortions and the guttural noises that emanate from him in 
this scene (and in other scenes in the film) to be involuntary and “genuine” – blenches in 
Hamlet’s sense – and not a performance that he puts on for the camera. This is a 
judgement about authenticity which I accept is highly subjective. Those critics (for example 
Nick Fraser (2013)) who have profound moral objections to the film, see Congo’s bodily 
actions as being manipulative, dissembling and disingenuous and consider those of us who 
think his actions are “genuine” to be credulous. But neither of these positions can be 
substantiated as neither Fraser nor I can really know. So instead, having made my personal 
position clear, I will proceed from the more skeptical position set out by Janet Walker 
(2013: 16-8). Walker cites an exchange between Errol Morris (the film’s executive producer 
and a powerful advocate of the film) and Oppenheimer over Congo’s retching in this final 
scene (an exchange reproduced in Morris’s The Murders of Gonzago (2013: 24)).  
 
Morris:   Yes. The vomiting – whether the vomiting is one more  
performance for himself and for us, or if it is the result of 
something real. Can we ever know?  
 
At first, Oppenheimer is taken aback by Morris’s skepticism, calling it ‘a very, very scary 
thought’. But, on reflection, Oppenheimer manages a more measured reply:  
 
Oppenheimer:  It’s both – in the same sense that an actor can tap into a real  
 
167 In the theatrical cut of the film (not the director’s cut). 
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emotion through acting or we can make ourselves sad by choosing 
to remember something and talking about it in a way that makes 
us sad. It’s definitely both. He’s performing for my camera. He’s 
certainly aware of the camera and he’s thinking about that. At the 
same time, he’s performing in such a way that he allows the past 
to hit him with an unexpected force in that moment. 
 
Walker (following Oppenheimer’s recalibration of his views in the wake of Morris’s 
skepticism) writes: ‘I would resist the opposition between “performance” and “something 
real” and concur with Oppenheimer that it’s both at once.’ Walker’s point is that whether 
Congo is acting or not, his performances nevertheless make meaning. The therapeutic 
practice of psychodrama proceeds on this same basis as does my reading of this scene that 
follows. 
 
If one tracks the sequence of events in the final rooftop scene very closely, the precise 
trigger for each of Congo’s most violent bodily blenches is something Congo says about 
guilt, responsibility, or culpability for his past actions. The first retching seems to come out 
of the blue, after he utters the words: ‘This is where we tortured and killed the people we 
captured. I know it was wrong but I had to do it.’ And, to be very precise, the trigger is ‘I 
had to do it’. It is something in that lie – in that self-deception – that precipitates the 
violent reaction in Congo’s body. It is a self-deception that Congo has maintained ever since 
1965-66; a self-deception supported in wider Indonesian culture by the power of state 
propaganda. His only alternative over the years has been the oblivion of alcohol and drugs. 
In the director’s cut, which provides a slightly extended version of the scene, there is a 
further clue. A little before the second bout of retching, as Congo sits on the low wall at the 
roof edge, he says:  
 
Congo:   Why did I have to kill them? 
I had to kill…[pause] 
My conscience told me they had to be killed.  
 
This response to his own question seems more perverse. Although Congo attempts to link 
‘conscience’ to the imperative to murder, it is a piece of self-deceiving psychic-gymnastics 
too far. Each of Congo’s conscious, verbal attempts to disown and project out his guilt 
seem increasingly desperate, precipitating violent bodily reactions. These reactions appear 
to be signs of what Raya Morag (in the context of perpetrator guilt in Israeli documentary) 
calls the ‘somatic conditions of guilt’ (2012: 98). Or, as Janet Walker puts it, Congo’s ‘body 
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testifies’ (2013: 16)168 even as his words dissemble. Or, again, as Elizabeth Cowie writes of 
documentary moments that are like this one on the rooftop: 
 
In documentary film, sights as well as sounds of reality are seen and heard that are 
a record of their occurrence in time and space independently of specific 
statements by the film-makers, or interviewees. For we make sense of the 
uncontrolled, the polysemic, in documentary as well as the organized and narrated. 
(Cowie 2011: 28)  
 
One bout of spasms comes in response to a slightly different trigger. When Congo shows us 
the sort of hemp sack used to dispose of the bodies of his victims, he says the sack was 
necessary, ‘because without this maybe people would know’. This is not the moral 
language of guilt and conscience but a statement about shame. Of course, the desire to 
prevent people from knowing what was happening on the rooftop in Medan might have 
been out of fear of being caught but as the murders were state-sanctioned and there were 
no legal consequences, this seems unlikely. One of Congo’s fellow killers, Adi Zulkadry, 
made it very clear earlier in the film that he, Congo and the others, killed openly and with 
impunity.169 So if this is a statement about shame – and shame that precipitates as violent a 
bodily response in Congo as his statements about conscience and guilt – what is Congo’s 
shameful secret? We seem to have moved from super-ego disturbance – self-punishing 
guilt – to ego disturbance, or at least from guilt to the narcissistic wound of shame which 
threatens the ego ideal.170  
 
Having looked at the words that trigger Congo’s most violent and uncontrollable bodily 
responses as he plays a role in the film-within, what of the responses themselves? In the 
cannibalism scene, Congo’s blenches come in response to something being forced into him, 
something of his own which is toxic. In psychic terms this could be read as Congo’s 
desperate attempts to refuse the return of something from the outside; the return of his 
 
168 Congo’s body is ‘performing the drama of stupefaction’ (Walker 2013: 16). 
169 In an early scene in the film, Zulkadry accuses a journalist (Saoduon Siregar) of dissembling and 
pretending he saw nothing during the murders of 1965-66 even though his office was next to a room 
in which scores of killings took place. Zulkadry says to Oppenheimer: ‘I’m not calling him a liar, 
Joshua. But this man, a journalist, distancing himself from these things … That’s predictable. But 
logically something we didn’t hide, how could he not know? Even the neighbours knew! Hundreds 
were killed. It was an open secret.’ 
170 Here, I am distinguishing between super-ego and ego ideal, or between what Otto Fenichel and 
Sándor Radó describe as two facets of the super-ego, i.e. between its self-punishing aspect (guilt), 
and its self-protective aspect (shame), which if threatened inflicts a narcissistic wound (Fenichel 
1928: 47-70; Radó 1928: 420-38; Fenichel 1946: 399).  
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own projections of toxic guilt. But on the rooftop, Congo seems to be trying to expel 
something. His body tries again and again to throw something up that is already inside him, 
but to no avail. If Congo’s body is acting out some sort of unconscious struggle, what has he 
taken in that he is now desperate to expel but is failing to expel? Introjective theories in 
psychoanalysis often treat the introjected good or bad object as either being annihilated or 
fully assimilated into the introjecting psyche, restructuring the ego or the super-ego, and 
becoming an integral part of the psyche. The psyche is altered through the act of 
introjection becoming a “new” psyche. But Congo’s bodily struggles on the rooftop suggest 
that there is something inside him which is not integrated, something which is separate 
from him and alien to him,171 which could be (or at least feels as if it could be) expelled.  
 
The work of Nicolas Abraham and Mária Török offers a way to read these struggles. In a 
series of essays published from the 1950s to the 1980s, Abraham and Török took up the 
notion of introjection and, in a radical move, placed it at the heart of psychoanalysis: 
introjection is made ‘the driving force of psychic life in its entirety’ (Rand 1994: 8). At the 
core of Abraham and Török’s reworking of introjection was a critical distinction between 
introjection and incorporation;172 manifestations of two sorts of psychic taking-in. In their 
1972 essay, “Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation” (1994 [1972]: 
125), they propose a crucial distinction between the two. ‘Incorporation denotes fantasy, 
introjection a process’ and ‘[i]n our conception fantasy is essentially narcissistic; it tends to 
transform the world rather than inflict injury on the subject.’ Introjection, by contrast, 
changes the subject (the psyche), which adjusts to reality through a slow, painful process of 
transformation, until the introjection is fully integrated. It is in the notion of incorporation, 
the notion that something is taken in that remains undigested as an alien within the 
psyche, which offers a way to read Congo’s blenches – his dry-retching – in the climatic 
final scene.  
 
In an essay on mourning as illness, Török (1994 [1968]) uses the distinction to differentiate 
between a successful and a failed process of mourning. In successful mourning, the lost 
love object is gradually, slowly and painfully over a period of time taken into the self and 
 
171 As if he is “possessed”. 
172 Abraham and Török were highly critical of the confusing and imprecise way in which the term 
introjection had been deployed by Freud, Klein and others (and the random interchanging of the 
terms introjection and incorporation), leading Török to exclaim: ‘the term “introjection” has 
undergone so many variations in meaning that its mere mention is enough to arouse in me the 
suspicion of a confused idea, not to say verbiage’ (Török 1994 [1968]: 110).  
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eventually the introjecting psyche comes to a less painful accommodation with the loss. In 
failed mourning, on the other hand, the traumatic loss is not worked through. It happens 
instantaneously and magically. The lost love object is taken into the incorporating psyche 
as if it still existed. Incorporation can have a number of troubling consequences including 
hallucination (as the reality of the loss is denied) and the erotic charge of possessing the 
love object which secretly still exists and is available, creating a kind of sentimental sickness 
(melancholy). The love object is locked away as a troubling, shameful secret. Abraham and 
Török developed this concept of failed mourning – of incorporation – to describe recurring 
and unresolved trauma both in the life of the individual and in the transmission of trauma 
between the generations.  
 
In transgenerational trauma, the unworked through trauma of one generation passes 
unconsciously to the next (and is most comprehensively explored in Török’s essay (1994 
[1975]) “Story of Fear: The Symptoms of Phobia - the Return of the Repressed or the 
Return of the Phantom?”):  
 
[T]he “phantom” is a formation in the dynamic unconscious that is found there not 
because of the subject's own repression but on account of a direct empathy with 
the unconscious or the repressed psychic matter of a parental object. 
(1994 [1975]: 181; Török’s italics)  
 
The disturbance remains hidden away like a ghost or a phantom in the psyche capable of 
bursting out and overwhelming the subject, like the eruption of an alien being from within. 
In individual life, the unresolved trauma is locked away inside the individual in a crypt 
where it is hermetically sealed off from the rest of the psyche but with the ever-present 
danger that it might escape its vault and overwhelm the subject. Both phantom and cryptic 
behaviour can manifest themselves in bizarre ways (such as verbal and non-verbal para-
speech)173 as if the subject was possessed and controlled and spoken-through by the 
repressed material experienced as an alien being. 
 
The parallel seems irresistible between Török’s conception of the crypt, as a hermetically 
sealed off part of the psyche, and Besel van der Kolk’s construction of traumatic memory as 
sealed off from ordinary subjective memory (a conception that Cathy Caruth borrows and 
subsumes into “trauma theory”). Both Török and van der Kolk seem to be pointing to 
 
173 This aspect of Abraham and Török’s work has been developed by others (for example: Cyrulnik 
2009).  
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unintegrated elements within the psyche/memory produced by traumatic experience. But 
where van der Kolk and Caruth conceive of traumatic memory as a ‘reality imprint’ (van der 
Kolk et al 1996: 52) or as an ‘unprocessed fragment of the thing itself’ (Luckhurst 2008: 13), 
Török takes cryptic behavior to be a hallucinatory mis-recognition of reality prompted by a 
melancholic failure to mourn.  For Török (and for me), cryptic behavior is symptomatic, not 
a trace of the unvarnished, noumenal truth and so, at least in theory, subject to the 
possibility of change through a process of mourning. 
 
Returning to Congo on the rooftop, the body of Congo the re-enactor behaves in bizarre 
ways suggestive of cryptic behaviour. The very suddenness of the onset of extreme bodily 
blenches is striking. He moves from a relatively calm narration from memory of his 
activities of fifty years ago, to extreme bodily convulsions as if suddenly possessed. And the 
dry heaving that ensues graphically suggests that something powerful and toxic has been 
ingested and needs to be expelled. But nothing will come up despite the convulsions, the 
retching and the muscular contortions. If we read this as a bad object that has been taken-
in, it has not been annihilated or fully assimilated as we might expect from Karl Abraham’s 
or Freud’s accounts of identification through ingestion. The bad object is inside Congo but 
is still distinct and alien.  
 
But if the toxic object locked in the crypt cannot be expelled, what is the nature of that 
object? In their 1975 essay “The Lost Object”, Abraham and Török describe it as  
 
a memory […] buried without legal burial place. The memory is of an idyll, 
experienced with a valued object and yet for some reason unspeakable. It is a 
memory entombed in a fast and secure place, awaiting resurrection. 
(Abraham and Török 1994 [1975]: 141; authors’ italics)  
 
Carrying over Abraham and Török’s insight to what we observe of Congo as a character in 
the film, the memory is unspeakable as it is a memory of his murderous acts, which if fully 
confronted would unleash overwhelming guilt or shame. In his confrontations with his past 
in the film-within (and in his reflections on the film-within in the film-without) some of this 
guilt or shame has begun to be unkennelled.  
 
But the psychic structure is able to endure as it is not only a memory of horror but also the 
treasured memory ‘of an idyll, experienced with a valued object’. The failure to confront 
the past can be read as a failure to confront the loss of the dead love object. The memory 
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of his unmourned victims is potent as it carries an erotic charge, expressed in the evident 
joy Congo takes in recalling his sadism: he boasts that he killed ‘happily’; he boasts that he 
and his friends were more sadistic than the Nazi killers they watched in Hollywood films in 
the 1960s; his final instruction to Koto before he plays his part in the cannibalism scene is 
to say, ‘You should be angry, sad. Sadistic’. Congo’s victims seem constantly available, 
unmourned, undead, and the source of libidinal (sadistic) pleasure. Even in the role reversal 
scenes where Congo plays the “communist” victim (a scene that starts to unravel the idyll 
by bringing Congo into an empathetic encounter with his victims), the perverse structure of 
the idyll is simultaneously maintained. Congo is alone amongst the killers in choosing to 
play the victim and we might ask why. Perhaps he is seeking to understand the past. But we 
might also read this choice as simply choosing to invert the perverse, erotically-charged 
structure, exchanging the sadistic thrill of the perpetrator for the erotically-charged 
masochistic thrill of being persecuted. Just as a direct ‘empathy with the unconscious or 
the repressed psychic matter of a parental object’ does not undo but rather maintains the 
phantom of inter-generational trauma, so Congo’s direct empathetic encounter with his 
victims might not start a process of mourning and working through but instead strengthen 
the structure of the crypt. 
 
In her essay on The Act of Killing, Homay King (2013) compares Congo and the various roles 
he plays, to the child in Freud’s essay A Child is Being Beaten (1919a). In the fantasy of the 
films-within, Congo (like the child) successively occupies ‘all three of the classic positions in 
Freud’s beating fantasy: aggressor, onlooker, and finally victim’ (King 2013: 33). King argues 
that ‘fantasy […] is an incredibly malleable instrument, one that allows its subjects to 
imagine themselves occupying a range of mutually exclusive positions’ (2013: 32), and that 
these fantasised alternative perspectives have a protean potential in documentary to 
reveal things that would otherwise remain hidden. She concludes that ‘fantasy can 
paradoxically be the route back to reality, performing the difficult work of opening doors to 
the past that were previously locked shut’ (2013: 35). King’s argument supports the idea 
that the deployment of fictions or fantasies in documentary, may be a route to meaning for 
the protagonist and a way to understand and work through a traumatic past; or, in the 
words of Shakespeare (and Freud), they are a ‘bait of falsehood’ that might, paradoxically, 
be able to take the ‘carp of truth’. Different fantasised perspectives might provoke 
identifications (empathy for example) which loosen or challenge rigid psychic structures. 
But this does not seem to be the case with the Congo we see in The Act of Killing. Central to 
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Freud’s essay is the sado-masochism of the child (something that King is not particularly 
interested in in her essay). And central to my reading of the filmic Congo through Abraham 
and Török’s notion of the crypt, is the sado-masochistic (libidinal) nature of Congo’s 
attachment to his victims. It is the sado-masochistic charge he seems to derive from the 
memory of his victims and his crimes that may prevent him from escaping from the 
repetitions of his trauma, as the repetitions are horrifying yet simultaneously deeply 
pleasurable. He is trapped in an ‘unspeakable’ idyll (in Abraham and Török’s terms), 
possessed by the ghosts of the dead. It is a psychic structure that even a panoply of 
perspectival fantasies seems powerless to loosen.174 
 
In this my second incorporative/introjective reading of Congo, his victims are alive inside 
him, locked away in an unspeakable crypt. The Hungarian-born French psychoanalyst Judith 
Dupont (2000) wrote in a gloss of Abraham and Török’s work, that when grief cannot be 
recognised, then the trauma and all the emotions it provokes are locked away in a vault as 
a shameful secret, shared only with the lost object of love. If the idea of a shameful, live, 
secret, sado-masochistic love shared with his victims seems far-fetched or even morally 
repugnant, one can look to Freud’s work on cannibalism to find some justification: ‘The 
cannibal […] has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of whom he 
is fond’ (1921: 105). But Abraham and Török perhaps best capture the strangeness of what 
we witness on the rooftop; their words reading like a description of the scene that unfolds 
before the viewer: 
 
Sometimes […] when libidinal fulfilments have their way, the ghost of the crypt 
comes back to haunt the cemetery guard, giving him strange and incomprehensible 
signals, making him perform bizarre acts, or subjecting him to unexpected 
sensations. 
(1994 [1972]: 130) 
 
The ‘bizarre acts’ Congo performs for Oppenheimer’s camera on the rooftop suggest a 
moment when the crypt opens ever so slightly to reveal its toxic contents. The ‘memory 
entombed in a fast and secure place, awaiting resurrection’ is for a few brief seconds 
resurrected. The resurrection of Congo’s buried love – the breaking open of the crypt 
within him – is accompanied by the non-verbal para-speech characteristic of cryptic 
 
174 It is a psychoanalytic commonplace that perverse psychic structures (such as sado-masochistic 
structures) are notoriously persistent and impervious to attempts to shift them.  
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behavior. In an interview, Oppenheimer describes the moment on the rooftop when Congo 
begins to retch.  
 
He had his back toward me, and I, at first, didn’t realize that he was choking […] To 
clarify this word choke: the sounds Anwar makes in this scene imitate the sounds 
his victims made as he killed them, expressing in phantom ways how it might have 
felt to have your neck garroted with a wire and pulled tight until it cuts into your 
windpipe. The choking that Anwar experiences is exactly that, and it is a terrible 
sound, indeed. 
(Oppenheimer in interview with: Cohn 2012; Cohn’s italics) 
 
The sounds that emanate from Anwar Congo are the sounds of his victims – his shameful 
love objects – for so long buried in their crypt. The lid of their tomb has opened far enough 
for us to hear their groans from beyond the grave or, if one prefers, Congo has become an 
unwitting ventriloquist “speaking” with the voice of his victims. Congo is indeed ‘expressing 
in phantom ways’ his terrible secret; he is proclaiming his malefactions in para-speech: ‘For 
murder, though it have no tongue, will speak with most miraculous organ’ (Hamlet in: 
Hamlet: Act II Scene II).  
 
For Congo, there may be no redemption. The crypt within him momentarily opens in his 
dynamic encounter with his past in the film-within, and we both hear groans from within 
the crypt and see his body contorted in its struggle to eject the toxic object he has 
incorporated. In Oppenheimer’s words, ‘he starts to retch and it’s as though, I think, he’s 
trying to vomit up the ghosts that haunt him’ (Oppenheimer in interview with: Goodman 
2013). But Congo cannot eject that object: he cannot vomit; nothing will come up. We 
could take this as merely a filmic metaphor for his predicament but to me it feels more 
than that. Bodies do speak in miraculous ways and the deeper and more profound the 
psychological disturbance, the more likely perhaps that the disturbance can only express 
itself somatically.  
 
In an interview with Pamela Cohn, Oppenheimer expressed a similar view of Congo and his 
chances of redemption. On the rooftop, on hearing the ‘miraculous organ’ speak, 
Oppenheimer knew he was in the presence of something dreadful and deathly. 
 
That space that Anwar was occupying belonged to the dead. It’s filled with ghosts. I 
could not walk in that space with him […] That space of the dead is his space, he is 
of that space, because he’s also died somehow. It’s a terrible thing to witness that 
in someone you’ve come to care about. It’s a very difficult scene for me to watch, 
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as well. The final statement is the understanding that he’s in a total limbo. And 
that’s where he’ll probably stay for the rest of his life. 
(Cohn 2012) 
 
What seems to have been unkennelled in Congo through the vehicle of the film-within is 
perhaps his ‘occulted guilt’ but, for me, a more complex and a more troubling 
interpretation is that it is his occulted shame that has been unkennelled. What is briefly 
revealed at the end of The Act of Killing is the shameful secret Congo shares with his 
unmourned victims – his eroticised love-objects locked away inside him for fifty years – 
who cry out from the tomb, whilst Congo in jaunty, yellow suit paces the suburban rooftop 
in downtown Medan. And what is unmourned probably cannot be escaped; it will continue 
to haunt him in a perpetual, “timeless”, melancholic circle of repetition. 
 
 
5.3.5 A clinical vignette: Congo’s teeth 
 
As a brief afterword, I want to mention Congo’s teeth.      
 
A visual metaphor that snakes its way through The Act of Killing is Congo’s obsession with 
his teeth and his dentures. The first time I watched The Act of Killing, I was struck by the 
number of shots of Congo “playing” with his teeth: putting in and taking out the line of 
three dentures that fill a gap between his natural teeth; making sure his teeth look good in 
any available mirror; making a trip to the dentist;175 and one almost unwatchable occasion 
when Congo (alone in his room) takes a pair of woodworking pliers and pulls out a broken 
section of one of his natural teeth without anaesthetic. Initially, I read these recurring 
scenes as an astute piece of observational filmmaking. Most of the sequences demonstrate 
Congo’s vanity and narcissism. But the scene with the pliers suggests another facet of 
Congo; that for all the vanity and conceit, Congo is a man who is disintegrating. 
 
Although these sequences made a powerful impression on me as filmic metaphors, I was 
not going to write about them here until I re-read Török’s essay, “The Illness of Mourning 
and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse”. In a clinical vignette, Török describes a patient 
called Thérèse whom Török presents as a classic case of blocked, incorporative mourning. 
 
175 This appears only in the director’s cut of the film. 
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Unable to mourn her father in the ten years since his death, Thérèse sought an analysis. 
Török writes:  
 
In the course of her analysis Thérèse brought a dream triptych that I also found in 
other patients of mourning: marriage with an inaccessible man, an indictment for 
having eaten a corpse, a dentist predicting the exposure of her receding gumline, 
followed by the total loss of her teeth. 
(Török 1994 [1968]: 122) 
 
In her analysis with Török, Thérèse also described in highly-disguised form, the ‘much 
desired though deeply repressed union in love with her father’ which was ‘consummated 
hallucinatorily during the last rites’. Török goes on to make it clear that, far from this case 
being bizarre or unique, Thérèse’s dreams are typical of patients with blocked 
(incorporative) mourning: dreams about eating and burying a corpse and dreams about 
teeth, especially their growth or loss, or about receding gumlines (Török 1994 [1968]: 123). 
I mention Török’s clinical observations here because of the uncanny echoes with the Congo 
we see in The Act of Killing: the consumption of a corpse, the disintegrating teeth and the 
highly-disguised but plainly erotic desire for a lost, unmourned love object. If one takes 
seriously Sobchack’s conjecture that documentary gives us access to the real life of the 
protagonist beyond or behind the screen, then the behaviors Congo displays within the 
diegesis are suggestive of someone suffering from the clinical symptoms of blocked 





5.4 The emergence of meaning: documentary film as analytic process 
 
There are a number of implicit questions in this chapter. Can the creation of (and the 
reflection on) filmed fictional constructions within the non-fictional frame of a 
documentary help to bring understanding of a real, non-fictional traumatic past? Or, in the 
terms in which Freud framed it in Constructions in Analysis (1937b), can a ‘bait of 
falsehood’ – a play-within-the-play, a forgery – take the ‘carp of truth’? If understanding 
does emerge, for whom does it emerge: for the traumatised protagonist, for the director, 
for “us” the viewers who constitute the extra-diegetic audience, or perhaps for all three as 
Errol Morris suggests (2013: 2) in his essay on the The Act of Killing? If some sort of 
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meaning does become available to the traumatised protagonist, does it have a curative 
function – does it lessen the psychic pain attendant on the trauma? And, finally, can 
parallels be drawn between the filmmaking process and an analytic process where fictions 
are deployed to represent traumatic histories and begin a process that might over time 
create or find a meaningful account of a trauma that has all but ‘vanished into a 
crepuscular past’ (Morris 2013: 2)? 
 
 
5.4.1 Anwar Congo: the traumatised protagonist 
 
Measured by the yardstick of Congo’s two re-enactments of his killing methods on the 
rooftop in Medan – one shot at the beginning of the filmmaking process and one at the end 
– it would be impossible to claim that Congo’s involvement in making a film about his past 
had been “curative”. A man troubled by his past at the start of the film, ends it on the brink 
of physical and psychic collapse. If Congo had hoped to ‘film my way out of here’176 by 
making a film about the events that troubled him, that is not how it turned out. Rather, 
Congo appears to have spiralled further into the trauma he sought to escape. But this is not 
to suggest that the creation of fictional films about his past – representations of his 
memories and fantasies – did not bring a greater understanding of that past. In making, 
and especially in watching back these films on a screen after the event, Congo is forced to 
confront his past and to recognise his past actions for what they were. Playing a role in the 
film-within brought Congo into an empathetic encounter in his imagination with the victims 
of his violence; a deeply disturbing encounter that at first could only express itself in bodily 
form as blenches but blenches that were witnessed and then interpreted by Congo as he 
watched back his own performance on a screen. It is Congo as a member of the intra-
diegetic audience (as an inner Winnicottian viewer), watching himself perform in the film-
within that finally allows him to speak his guilt and ask Oppenheimer, ‘Have I sinned?’. Like 
Claudius watching Hamlet’s production of The Murder of Gonzago, Congo blenches; his 




176 Guy Maddin’s words from his autobiographical documentary My Winnipeg (2007) as discussed in 
the Prelude, above.  
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In interview, Oppenheimer described this process and the central, catalytic role played by 
the film-within, stressing the essential non-fictionality of the film-within’s fictions (non-
fictional in the sense that they reveal something that is “true”):  
 
The thought was to look not only at the characters, but the whole regime, through 
a prism where we see the stories and are also able to create the second- and third-
hand stories in which they imagine themselves – and fail to know themselves. We 
see the way they construct themselves. But I think everything we see is nonfiction. 
Everything is true. Something true is revealed through this process. However 
desperate Anwar’s fantasy, his visions of the victim, his rewards in heaven, all have 
a truth – through artifacts, through emotional and poetic force, through his 
personal process. The village massacre scene was something really problematic to 
shoot. It’s a misbegotten icon of this terrible time of genocide when genocide 
shouldn’t really have an icon. But that’s why it’s deconstructed – not only by me, 
but also by the participants. 
(Oppenheimer in interview with: Cohn 2012) 
 
What Oppenheimer describes as the participants’ deconstruction of their own productions 
is the reflective process where meaning emerges. A process that begins for Congo in an 
identificatory encounter with his imagined victims. Bill Nichols recognises how radical The 
Act of Killing is in affording the protagonists an interpretive role.  
 
Normally, reenactments represent an interpretive gesture by the filmmaker, but 
that is one of many documentary conventions this remarkable film flouts. In this 
case, the filmmaker enables his subjects to offer their interpretation of past events. 
(Nichols 2013: 25) 
 
But there are limits to what Congo is able to understand of his traumatic past. Whatever 
horror Congo is experiencing on the rooftop at the end of the film, it is only able to find 
somatic expression. There is no sense that he understands why he can scarcely complete 
his re-enactment as his body contorts and retches; he offers no interpretation of these 
blenches. As the analyst-theorist Joyce McDougall writes: ‘[t]he body speaks no known 
language, yet it serves, time and again, as a framework for communicating the psychic 
scenes of the internal theatre’ (1986: 53). Congo seems to be performing a part in 
McDougall’s ‘psychosomatic theatre’ where ‘actors tend to draw attention to themselves 
by means of gestures or abrupt physical displacements’ (1986: 12). Congo is finding a way 
to communicate the nature of his trauma even if there is no sense that he knows the 




5.4.2 Anwar Congo and Joshua Oppenheimer: the protagonist in inter-personal relation 
 
But if these bodily contortions are a communication, who is the recipient of these 
communications? The moments of revelation for Congo and his bodily performances occur 
in the context of his relationship with the director Joshua Oppenheimer. It is through 
Oppenheimer’s prompting – as Congo watches himself on a monitor close to wordless 
paralysis in the interrogation scene – that Congo finally comes to speak his guilt. And it is 
for Oppenheimer and his camera that Congo’s body puts on its bizarre performance on the 
rooftop. Oppenheimer acts not just as an ear and an eye – as a passive witness to Congo’s 
trauma – but as an active secondary witness, as another mind, that helps Congo to process 
what emerges from his engagement in his various films-within.  
 
Oppenheimer fulfils a role not dissimilar to that of the analyst in the analytic encounter. In 
the question and answer session at the end of a masterclass Oppenheimer gave in London 
in May 2016, an audience member said, ‘Anwar’s scenes are like therapy’ and asked 
Oppenheimer to comment. Oppenheimer rejected the idea, saying it could only be therapy 
if his primary responsibility was to Anwar Congo rather than to the human-rights agenda 
which he states was his primary goal (Oppenheimer 2016). The Act of Killing is indeed a film 
with a primarily political, human-rights agenda but this does not prevent the relationship at 
the heart of the film – the relationship between Congo and Oppenheimer – taking the form 
of, and perhaps performing some of the functions of, the analytic encounter. Congo, at 
least, seems to have entered into this joint-filmmaking project with the hopes and 
expectations of an analysand entering therapy, as Oppenheimer confirmed in interview: 
‘He was working out his own pain, and I was trying to expose a regime of impunity for 
Indonesians themselves’ (Oppenheimer in interview with: Fortune 2013). And as the 
project continued, these hopes and expectations became more pronounced: 
 
After Anwar decided to explore through the filmmaking his own brokenness, his 
own trauma, his own pain, he stopped asking when the film would be ready. This 
happened midway through the production, when he started to suggest we go 
deeper into his bad dreams. 
(Oppenheimer quoted in: Cooper 2013) 
 
So, despite Oppenheimer’s reservations, the Oppenheimer-Congo relationship could even 
be described as an ideal analytic relationship, where critical distance is maintained by the 
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director/analyst whilst retaining the capacity to think empathetically177 about the 
protagonist/analysand within a relationship of mutual love.178  
 
The close and empathetic relationship between Oppenheimer and Congo is clearly legible 
to the extra-diegetic audience and it also clearly facilitates the complex communications 
that take place between the two, including the emergence of a more meaningful (if 
traumatising) account of the past that comes from Congo’s engagement with his own film-
within, and he asks ‘have I sinned?’ That said, much of the complexity of this relationship is 
not available to us on screen, even in this highly self-reflexive film.  
 
To more fully understand the relationship, one has to have recourse to a more extensive 
paratext (especially to comments made about the film in interview subsequent to its 
release). The analyst/analysand relationship of Oppenheimer/Congo is perhaps exemplified 
in Congo’s increasing dependence on Oppenheimer and in Oppenheimer’s predicament in 
hearing troubling material and being subject to disturbance in the counter-transference 
(the mutual-implication of the Freudian pair in the messy middle). Reflecting on witnessing 
Congo’s ‘real descent into hell’ (Cohn 2012) in playing the victim in the interrogation scene, 
Oppenheimer said in interview that he found himself deeply embroiled in Congo’s 
traumatic world: 
 
I felt so implicated because suddenly we were re-living something, and it felt very, 
very real. And it felt like the flimsiest cover that it was being played as a gangster 
scene. I had nightmares and was experiencing intense feelings of guilt. To go really 
deep into that kind of pain just made me feel dirty, really awful. So much of what 
eventually constituted the story of the film didn’t exist yet. It was a really hard 
time. I couldn’t sleep throughout that period which lasted about six months. 
(Oppenheimer in interview with: Cohn 2012) 
 
At this same period, in a separate interview, Oppenheimer (Barnes 2013) described the 
nightmares he had of a ‘family reunion transforming gradually into a scene where 
somebody I loved was being tortured or killed’. As a member of a family that had lost many 
close relatives in the Holocaust, Oppenheimer was deeply troubled by making a film with 
 
177 Oppenheimer has said he did not sympathise with Congo (by which he implied that to feel 
sympathy would be to condone Congo’s past actions) but he did empathise with Congo 
(Oppenheimer 2016). 
178 Oppenheimer has spoken about the troubling nature of this relationship in several interviews but 
is unblinkingly honest about ‘love’ being at its centre. In a Guardian interview (one of several 
examples) Oppenheimer said: ‘I care about him. It's hard to call our relationship a friendship […] I 
may not exactly like him, but I have love for him as another human being’ (Barnes 2013). 
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men who had committed genocide but who continued to be celebrated as heroes in 
Indonesia: ‘It dawned on me that I had walked into Germany 40 years after the Holocaust, 
and found the Nazis still in power’ (Oppenheimer quoted in: Barnes 2013). At least in the 
counter-transference, Congo is the aging Nazi torturer and murderer of Oppenheimer’s 
own family179 and we might speculate that Oppenheimer was drawn to this project in the 
first place as a way of working through his traumatic family history. Like so many filmic 
trauma texts, The Act of Killing has echoes well beyond the apparent geographical and 
chronological boundaries of its ostensible subject, demonstrating the palimpsestic and/or 
multidirectional nature of traumatic memory.180 Making the film may have been, in the 
language of Abraham and Török, Oppenheimer’s way of wrestling with his own inter-
generational phantoms. 
 
But the precise details of the transference/counter-transference that Oppenheimer 
experienced are not available to the viewer in the film as cut and edited. As Agnieszka 
Piotrowska (2014) has argued, this key relationship that drives and shapes so much of 
documentary filmmaking – the director-protagonist relationship with its unconscious 
desires and complex identifications – often leaves few concrete traces in the final film.181  
This relationship, that I argue has certain parallels to the relationship of analyst and 
analysand in the consulting room, ‘is a ghostly presence, that the spectator may be 




179 Nick Fraser (2013: 21-4), who argues that the re-enacted scenes in The Act of Killing are 
trivialising, deeply ethically flawed and in very bad taste, believes Oppenheimer has only been able 
to escape moral censure because ‘such goings-on in Indonesia are acceptable merely because the 
place is so far away, and so little known or talked about, that the implications of such an act can pass 
unnoticed.’ To try to persuade his readers that this film should be shunned, he goes on to say, 
imagine a director ‘rounding up a bunch of aging Nazis and getting them to make a film entitled “We 
Love Killing Jews.” That is what the film is about…!’ Fraser’s provocative rhetorical gesture backfires 
if we take into account what Oppenheimer has said about his film: it seems Oppenheimer did not 
intend the implications of his filmmaking act to pass unnoticed – quite the contrary. It is indeed 
what the film is about. Oppenheimer is, quite deliberately, drawing a parallel between Indonesia 
and a re-imagined and victorious Nazi Germany both to make a political point and, we might 
assume, to work through his own troubled family history. Our judgement as to whether this puts the 
film beyond the ethical pale, will depend upon the individual viewer’s attitude to the representation 
of traumatic events and their judgement as to the ethical intent of the director.  
180 See: Silverman 2013; and, Rothberg 2009.  
181 Piotrowska (2014: 9) is talking specifically about the ‘type of documentary […] in which a verbal 
testimony of the other is at the heart of the work’ mostly involving ‘a trauma and a profound loss of 
some kind’. 
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If the precise details of this key relationship are hidden, its effects are palpable. It is with 
Oppenheimer that Congo is able to find representational forms for his trauma and when on 
occasions he is only able to respond with bodily blenches (non-representational 
symptomatology) to witnessing his own representations, it is Oppenheimer who is able to 
steer Congo towards an understanding of his performance. The intense counter-
transferential relationship between Oppenheimer and Congo allows Oppenheimer to both 
grasp the nature and horror of the trauma (the inside of traumatic experience) as he has 
felt it himself in the counter-transference, whilst also remaining outside the trauma as a 
mind able to process Congo’s nameless anxiety and bodily distress.182  
 
 
5.4.3 The structure of The Act of Killing and the structure of the analytic encounter 
 
If the counter-transferential encounter between Oppenheimer and Congo mirrors 
something of the encounter between analyst and analysand but remains semi-
submerged,183 then much more clearly visible are the structural elements of The Act of 
Killing that mirror structural aspects of the analytic encounter. 
 
Oppenheimer as director/analyst did not try to determine or propose what narratives 
Congo or the other killers should present, or to modify them. The narratives they came up 
with mirror the sort of narratives that the analysand might present in analysis: attempts to 
recount personal history from memory (a conventional history that starts gradually to 
unravel, to unknot, revealing deeper meanings); descriptions of dreams or nightmares; 
fantasies in which the analysand desperately tries to evade troubling aspects of their past; 
the gradual emergence of unconscious fantasies into representational form; the patient 
beginning to hear what it is that they are saying, etc. The self-reflexive structure of The Act 
of Killing – the protagonist and Oppenheimer watching back on a monitor, scenes that have 
already been shot – mirrors the analytic encounter where stories told in earlier sessions are 
picked up, reflected on, and reformulated in the light of later examination. 
 
We could view the film-within in documentary as a kind of play space, akin to Donald 
Winnicott’s idea (1990 [1971]a) of the analytic space as a play space (mirroring the 
 
182 In terms of Bion’s theory of infant development, Oppenheimer acts as the mother in her 
maternal reverie. 
183 Of course, it also remains semi-submerged in the analytic encounter. 
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transitional or potential space that exists between mother and child). The film-within-the-
film is a play space in documentary, where many plays (many narratives) can be performed: 
plays of psychic and metaphorical significance that may reveal otherwise hidden “truths”; 
or, as I would prefer to argue, plays that in the witnessing may allow the construction of 
otherwise unavailable meanings. These meanings would not have become available 
without the freedom to fantasise and to lie and to remember and to play with the 
traumatic past without restriction.  
 
More broadly, and to turn my analogy on its head, the clinical encounter between analyst 
and analysand and what emerges between them in successive sessions, can be read as a 
particular form of the play-within-the-play. The representations and interpretations that 
emerge within analysis, are all fictional forms that emerge out of the “factual” frame of a 
life-lived (or perhaps more accurately, emerge between the two lives-lived of analysand 
and analyst): dreams; free associations; constructions in analysis; the recounting of 
personal history through memory in a dynamic present; screen memories; reflections on 
the transference and counter-transference; and all the various enactments and projections 
and introjections that take place in the analytic space. The narratives that emerge in 
analysis are not judged either by their conformity to historical objectivity (an external 
measure of their truth-value) or by their conformity to a normative moral code but are 
valued for their capacity to reveal or generate psychological meanings or insights.  
 
The meaning-generative, amoral, a-factual space of the analytic encounter is mirrored in 
the amoral, a-factual space opened up in documentary through the film-within. Sometimes 
the stories told might conform to something like the notion of objective historical “truth”, 
as Hamlet hopes the retelling of his father’s murder in fictional form (in The Murder of 
Gonzago) will be.184 But elsewhere in the play Hamlet, it is clear that baits of falsehood 
might equally well take the carp of truth and that it is by these very indirections we find 
directions out. The film-within introduces some miching malicho into documentary, not for 
the sake of mischievousness in and of itself, but to uncover meanings or allow the 
construction of meanings that are not otherwise available. 
 
Sometimes in analysis and in life, the fictional narratives that are created or found might 
have a curative function. In Freud’s story of his grandson’s game with cotton reel and 
 
184 But, of course, these narratives are never “true” in a strict historical sense.  
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string, the fictive, enacted narrative repeated over time both brings the trauma of maternal 
separation (loss) into representational form and is simultaneously a representation of the 
process of working through that trauma. The terror of the loss of the love object is bridged 
by a fiction; the fiction that the mother is always available now as an introjected good 
object (the internalisation of the idea or representation of the mother) which is securely 
held even when the “real” mother is absent. The outcome for Congo, though, looks much 
more bleak, as for all his fictive narratives, the object he seems to have introjected 
(incorporated in Török’s terms) is a very bad “good object”: a fantastical, unmourned, 
undead version of the actually dead love object. The fictive, enacted narrative that Congo 
performs on the rooftop both brings the trauma of his murderous past into 
representational form and is simultaneously a representation of his failure to work through 
that trauma. For Congo, a meaningful and possibly curative process would involve the 
recognition that the love object is really dead; killed by him. This would entail a 
renunciation of the erotic, sadistic charge he draws from his “undead” victims and a much 
fuller appreciation of his own shame. The incorporated love object carries within it the very 
trauma he seeks to escape; an object he cannot dislodge; an object that contains his 
undead victims who cry out for revenge. Congo’s fictive narratives seem to carry him only 
so far in constructing a meaningful, “truthful” account of his trauma before the narratives 
themselves become traumatising and his capacity to symbolise breaks down.  
 
 
5.4.4 “Us” – the extra-diegetic audience  
 
In considering the film-within-the-film and its function in catalysing or provoking the 
emergence of meaning for Congo,185 I have offered readings which emerge from within the 
diegesis. They are readings that explore the potential for a reflexive and self-reflexive 
filmmaking process to act like the analytic process, as a meaning-making process that might 
be able to lessen the psychic pain of trauma. 
 
But the ultimate locus for meaning-making is the viewer, “us” as the extra-diegetic 
audience. And, as it is hard to find a theoretical justification to aggregate viewers together 
as a collective “we”, the ultimate locus for meaning-making is each individual viewer of The 
Act of Killing. In the personal reading offered by this particular viewer, the meanings I have 
 
185 Or, more precisely, for Congo as a facet of the dynamic analytic pair of Congo-Oppenheimer. 
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assigned to Congo and the unconscious processes he seems to reveal as he re-enacts 
scenes from the traumatic past, must be owned by me as my personal projections onto the 
filmic object.  
 
I offered a theoretical justification for this approach arguing from both the film 
phenomenology of Vivian Sobchack (Chapter Two) and through an elaboration of Phyllis 
Creme’s notion of the Winnicottian viewer (Chapter Three). Sobchack argues that the 
viewer of documentary perceives the filmic object very differently from the viewer of a 
fiction film and although the documentary viewer is dependent upon the screen for 
knowledge, he or she also looks through or behind the screen to gain access to aspects of 
the life of the on-screen protagonist beyond the screen. Phyllis Creme’s notion of the 
Winnicottian viewer performs a similar theoretical function by positing a viewer who does 
not just passively receive the film but actively enters the potential space of the film on (or 
through) the cinema screen and so both finds and creates the film and its meanings 
through their active, playful spectatorship. With the complex structure of The Act of Killing 
there is a doubling of this filmic potential space. As an outer Winnicottian viewer actively 
finding/creating meanings in my engagement with The Act of Killing and imagining (or 
directly experiencing through forms of identification) the unconscious processes going on 
inside the “virtual”, filmic Congo, I also see another Winnicottian viewer – Anwar Congo 
within the diegesis – who (like me) reacts to and enters into the film that he is watching. I 
watch the documentary, and within that documentary I see Congo, the inner Winnicottian 
viewer, watching his own films, imagining what his victims were feeling (or directly 
experiencing what his victims were experiencing in non-conscious, non-cognitive bodily 
identification), and actively creating or finding meanings.  
 
In engaging with his own film, Congo as inner Winnicottian viewer, seems to create or find 
a meaningful account of his own past to the extent that he begins to speak his own guilt. 
But this same inner Winnicottian viewer appears unable to find/create a meaningful 
account of what he experiences in the cannibalism scene or in his near physical collapse on 
the rooftop at the end of The Act of Killing. Of course, in The Act of Killing there is no 
opportunity for Congo to reflect back on the final rooftop scene with Oppenheimer (as the 
filmmaking process ends) and so unlike Winnicott’s child patients, there is no opportunity 
for a dialogue and a process of reflection to take place between “analyst” and “patient”. 
But this notwithstanding, I find it hard not to concur with Oppenheimer’s own assessment 
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of Congo’s chances of reaching a meaningful account; namely, a very slim chance. The 
meaning I have assigned to the final scene – Congo’s incorporation of an unmourned, 
undead love object – is a reading that I, as outer Winnicottian viewer, have created or 
found through my active engagement with the film object as a whole. Or, in Sobchack’s 
terms, I have looked through the screen to speculate about the real psychic life of the on-
screen protagonist.  
 
Ultimately, my reading of The Act of Killing emerges out of my own transference/counter-
transference onto the filmic object. Watching the film was a disturbing, vertiginous, 
disorientating experience as I found myself drawn into an empathetic encounter with 
Congo (and the other killers). I am not alone in experiencing the film in this way. For Bill 
Nichols (2013: 25), ‘the killers’ vision of reality creates a deep disturbance in the viewer. 
Oppenheimer intensifies a sense of what it feels like to enter a world without a moral 
compass’. Whilst Oppenheimer himself offers an even more unsettling reason for our (my) 
feelings of disturbance, suggesting that those viewers with the courage to do so, will ‘see a 
small part of themselves in Anwar […] and thereby see themselves as much closer to 
perpetrators than we would normally wish to see ourselves’ (Oppenheimer quoted in: 
Crichlow 2013: 42; footnote 6).186 These are troubling identifications, as even in feeling 
empathy I simultaneously felt as if I should be condemning the killers absolutely and out-
of-hand. I was left feeling both tainted by my engagement with the film and guilty for 
identifying so closely with a mass killer. It is out of this counter-transference onto the filmic 
object that my reading of Congo emerges as, working backwards from my initial feelings to 
my later detailed interpretations, my interpretations of what is going on inside Congo 
replicate my own initial feelings of awfulness and guilt or shame.187 Whether I have simply 
projected my feelings on to Congo as filmic object or have felt something of what Congo 
was feeling whilst making The Act of Killing, is an open question. For my part, I assume that 
 
186 The film draws us into a world of moral degradation and makes us, through identification, 
through our counter-transference, inhabit the world of the killer. I think it is this aspect of The Act of 
Killing that has led a (sizeable) minority of critics to condemn the film in the most extreme language 
(e.g. Fraser 2013). Jonathan Dollimore in Radical Tragedy (2010) makes a very similar observation 
about The Revenger’s Tragedy (Thomas Middleton 2018 [1607]), which has been condemned in the 
most violent terms by many critics. Dollimore’s explanation for all this critical bile is that the play 
implicates its audience in its deceptions and horrors – it makes the audience morally complicit – and 
some critics will not countenance being disturbed and challenged in this way. 
187 Counter-transferential “feelings” that echo those described by Oppenheimer when making the 
film (as quoted above): ‘intense feelings of guilt […] that kind of pain just made me feel dirty, really 
awful’ (Cooper 2013). 
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these countervailing currents cannot be untangled and I cannot know if I have found or 
created the meanings I have gleaned.  
 
 
5.4.5 Meaning in all the frames of The Act of Killing 
 
In all the frames of The Act of Killing, the meanings that emerge – for Congo, for 
Oppenheimer, for me as extra-diegetic viewer – all emerge in the space between two 
subjects (in an inter- or intra-personal space playing out over time) whether those subjects 
are real, imagined, the virtual creations of role play and role reversal, or simply filmic 
avatars. They are all essentially meanings gleaned from reflection on the 
transference/counter-transference between two subjects. But the meanings that emerge 
are all set in motion by the mischievous device, the ‘false-fire’, of the film-within; a fictional 
play-space where trauma is explored in any way and without limit. The device of the 
fictional film-within-the-film generates powerful affective and somatic responses in all the 
frames of the complex structure of this documentary: in the players in the film-within; in 
the intra-diegetic audience (as Congo in the film-without watches himself performing in the 
film-within on a monitor); in the director as a character in the diegesis and as an extra-
diegetic witness after the completion of his film; and in the extra-diegetic audience. The 
fictional representation of the trauma – the bait of falsehood – is not meaningful in itself 
but, if it has some purchase, it will precipitate new representations or somatic and affective 
responses (often bizarre and obscure non-representational symptomatology)188 which are 
forms of communication that are open to interpretation (symbolisation). As Freud 
maintained in Constructions in Analysis (1937b), the value of the fiction – its worth – is to 
be gauged by whether it touches the patient, a touch that then requires interpretation. Or 
in the words of Hamlet, we must rivet our eyes on Congo to see ‘if he blench’ and then use 





188 As Janet Walker (2013: 14) puts it in her essay on The Act of Killing: ‘Body language, gestures, 
vocal inflection, and the “microphysiognomy” of the face are all crucial.’ 
189 Hamlet says to Horatio that they must both rivet their eyes on Claudius to see if he blenches, 
‘And after we will both our judgments join / In censure of his seeming’.  
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Chapter Six: Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003) 
 
 
‘(like an outsider)’:  





‘I can analyze myself only with the help of self-knowledge 
obtained objectively (like an outsider).’ 
 
Sigmund Freud in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, 24 November 1897 




The analyst’s ‘task cannot be to remember anything.  
What then is his task? His task is to make out what has been forgotten 
from the traces which it has left behind or, more correctly, to construct it.’  
 




Albertina Carri’s 2003 documentary Los Rubios (called The Blonds in the English-speaking 
world) is an autobiographical exploration of the psychic ramifications for the director of the 
abduction and murder of her parents in the mid-1970s when she was three-years old. Like 
The Act of Killing, The Blonds approaches historical trauma through fictions and 
fictionalisations which the traumatised protagonist creates and witnesses within the 
diegesis. Again, I ask whether the filmmaking process – like the analytic process – can 
ameliorate the pain of traumatic experience, with evidence for this change gleaned from 
what can be witnessed within the evolving diegesis. 
 
However, The Blonds differs profoundly from The Act of Killing in that the traumatic events 
in question are beyond the reach of the protagonist’s memory and so have to be given 
both form and content – some representational expression even if that expression is only 
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to define an absence – before they can become objects of reflection. The problem that 
confronted Carri in making her film is similar to the problem Freud explored in 
Constructions in Analysis (1937b) where a fiction must be created to take the place of the 
missing memory, or the problem the Botellas (2013: 96-8) pursue though their notion of 
dreaming the missing content of the analysand’s traumatic experience in the counter-
transference.  
 
Both these approaches are predicated on the complex interactions between the 
traumatised protagonist and an outsider, the analyst, who dreams or constructs the 
fictions for the analysand. Carri, by contrast, must construct or dream her own fictions as 
her documentary is autobiographical: she is both director and protagonist and (by analogy) 
both analyst and analysand. In The Blonds, Carri adopts practices similar to the self-analytic 
practices that Anzieu (1986 [1959 & 1975]) and others describe: finding external others and 
generating internal others. Carri finds external others (in the absence of a physically and 
psychically separate director) in members of her film crew and in an audience she imagines 
for her finished film. And she generates internal others – self-observing aspects of the self – 
in an attempt to view herself ‘like an outsider’ (to borrow Freud’s phrase). Perhaps the 
closest model for Carri’s radical approach in generating internal others is to be found in the 
literary practice of autofiction, where the author creates fictionalised versions of the self 
that can be viewed with at least some of the objectivity that Freud sees as a requirement of 
a self-analysis.190  
 
In The Blonds, Carri deploys two sorts of fiction, two representational forms for her films-
within: animated segments that reproduce the content of childhood memories or 
nightmares that occurred some time after the original traumatic events; and a film about 
the making of a documentary about Carri’s past in which Carri is played by an actress, 
Analía Couceyro.191 It is through this fictionalisation of herself that Carri attempts to gain 
the distance necessary to view herself ‘like an outsider’, borrowing one of the key 
performative techniques of psychodrama: having one’s role taken by another to make 
oneself visible to oneself. In what follows, I will try to describe the complex role Carri’s 
 
190 As Jordana Blejmar and Natalia Fortuny (2013: 3) point out, Carri’s approach was new to 
documentary: this ‘blending of autobiography with fiction […] was not common in films, literature 
and testimonies of the 1980s and 1990s’ in Latin America about the ‘dictatorial past’. 
191 I refer to Analía Couceyro as actress rather than actor, following the form, actriz, used by Carri in 
the film. 
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fictionalised self plays in The Blonds: helping to define her traumatic past; allowing her to 
slough off constructions of herself and her traumatic history that have been foisted upon 
her by others; and implicitly providing a critique of the conventional practices of realist 
documentary. The Blonds is not merely a self-reflexive search for a meaningful and less 
painful accommodation with the past through the deployment of fictional films-within-the-
documentary but is simultaneously a filmic argument for a new form of documentary that 





6.1 Throwing away the rule book: kamikaze filmmaking192 
 
In 1977, Albertina Carri’s parents Ana María Caruso and Roberto Carri were abducted and 
murdered. They were victims of Argentina’s so-called “dirty war” of 1976-1983, prosecuted 
by Argentina’s right-wing military junta (after the death of Juan Perón in 1974) against left-
wing guerrillas, political dissidents and anyone associated with socialist ideas or 
organisations. Carri’s parents were targeted as vocal, revolutionary, Peronist intellectuals: 
her father was a well-known academic sociologist; her mother a professor of literature. 
Their deaths left three orphaned daughters: Albertina aged four (three at the time of the 
abduction) and her elder sisters, Andrea aged thirteen and Paula aged twelve. Following 
their parents’ deaths, the girls moved from the city to a farm in the country to be raised by 
an aunt and uncle. Between 9,000 and 30,000 people were murdered in Argentina’s dirty 
war, often after torture; many victims (Carri’s parents included) were taken in secret 
abductions and so the victims came to be known as los desaparecidos (the disappeared). 
 
Many of the initial reviews of The Blonds criticised the film for failing to adequately explain 
these events. It was deemed to have failed as an historical or investigative documentary of 




192 ‘Kamikaze’ is how the characters in John Waters’s Cecil B. Demented (2000) describe their 
filmmaking. 
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It is frustrating in its inability to ever really confront the material it purports to 
explore—the political murder of its filmmaker Albertina Carri’s leftist parents by 
the Argentine secret police in 1977. 
(Singleton 2004) 
 
But the film never claims to be an exploration of political murder. The demand that the film 
should be something that it actually did not purport to be (leading to misreadings of the 
film as a failed attempt to provide an adequate historical and political account) is a 
common criticism of recent documentaries that try to explore the psychological impact of 
traumatic events; to explore the experiential “inside” of a traumatic event.193 It is perhaps 
because this form of documentary does not fit long-established preconceptions of what a 
documentary is or indeed should be. But that The Blonds is criticised on these grounds is 
perplexing, as Carri deals with these normative demands directly within the film itself. 
 
About a third of the way into the film, there is a scene in which Carri shoots herself and her 
film crew discussing a letter they had received from the state body, The National Film and 
Audiovisual Arts Institute; a body Carri hoped would fund the continuation of work on the 
film. Actress, Analía Couceyro, reads extracts from the letter to the others. The film is 
deemed to be ‘worthy’ but in need of ‘revision’ in ‘a more rigorous documentary fashion’, 
and continues: 
 
The story as it is shown, fictionalizes life experiences when pain can fog the 
interpretation of harmful facts. The main character’s claim for her parents’ absence 
conforms [sic] the spine of the story but it requires a more accurate search for 
“proper documents”, like the participation of your parents’ comrades, in 
agreement or not. Roberto Carri and Ana María Caruso were two committed 
intellectuals in the 1970s. This project deserves to be made.  
 
 
But Carri is adamant that the film the film institute wants and expects is not her project: 
‘They need it. I understand that. It’s not my place to do it or I don’t want to.’194 
 
So, what is Carri’s project? Very broadly, it is an exploration of the impact on Albertina 
Carri of the murder of her parents. It is only about the murders themselves to the extent 
 
193 Nick Fraser and several other scholars make a similar (invalid) criticism of Joshua Oppenheimer’s 
The Act of Killing: ‘Instead of an investigation, based on such humdrum aspects of the killings as to 
why and how they occurred […] we have ended somewhere else’ (Fraser 2013: 22). 
194 Carri says this on screen in response to hearing the letter. 
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that those events have affected her. The National Film and Audiovisual Arts Institute 
suggests that Carri’s pain has fogged her ability to interpret the historical facts. But Carri’s 
subject is the pain and is the fog, and not the historical facts per se. Fictionalising life 
experiences is Carri’s route to try to understand the pain and fog. Carri said in a “Director’s 
Statement” that accompanied the film’s release, my aim  
 
was not understood by any fund or producer that read my project. History, for 
them, lies in my parents’ “disappearance” and not in my constitution as a person 
starting from an absence. 
(Women Make Movies Release 2004: 7)195  
 
Carri’s statement captures the film’s vastly ambitious quest: to find out how Carri has come 
to be who she is in the wake, not of two political murders, but in the shadow of an 
absence; an absence that The Blonds attempts to define. The film is an exploration of the 
inside of a traumatic event as that event has echoed through the filmmaker’s life. As Kerry 
Bystrom argues (2009: 35), The Blonds is an attempt to ‘wrest politicized narratives from 
the public sphere and locate them within the private one’. Politicised narratives are 
disrupted by this private perspective, challenging long-cherished views such as the left-
liberal vision of Carri’s parents’ generation as heroes. From Carri’s private perspective, she 
was abandoned by her parents for a political cause, and this generates anger as much as 
admiration.196 The film is Carri’s attempt to describe to herself and to an audience what it is 
to be Albertina Carri, the daughter of “disappeared” parents; an ontological quest for what 
constitutes her as a person.  
 
In pursuit of this nebulous quarry, the overall structure of The Blonds is both reflexive and 
self-reflexive. We see protagonists in the documentary viewing on screen other 
protagonists who have been recorded at an earlier point in the production and we see Carri 
herself as a character in the film, not as a documentary interviewee but directing the crew 
making the documentary. Throughout the film, the crew including Carri are shot on one 
camera – often in black and white – whilst a second camera – often shooting in colour – 
 
195 Carri is not alone amongst her generation of orphans of the “disappearances” either in her sense 
of a formative constitutional absence at her core or in her resort to documentary film to explore that 
absence. Lisa Renee DiGiovanni (2013: 65) writes that in the decade since The Blonds was made (c. 
2003-13), the documentary genre has provided a platform for the children of the disappeared to 
contemplate the legacies of loss; what Gabriela Nouzeilles (2005: 265) calls ‘the complex sense of 
identity that they carried with them as a result of the foundational absence that defines their lives’.  
196 I would modify Bystrom’s statement slightly by saying the private perspective is private but it 
does have political ramifications. 
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records the more standard documentary material (but with the twist that the principal 
documentary protagonist has been replaced by an actress). This reflexivity led Diego Papic 
and Jorge Bernárdez to describe the film as ‘un meta-documental’ (quoted in: Page 2009: 
168) and Gabriella Nouzeilles (2005: 269) to describe it as ‘a self-referential documentary 
about a “failed” documentary, in which the trace of the real corresponds to the process of 
making and assembling the film’. For the director, the filmmaking process is a dynamic, 
meaning-seeking process unfolding over time; a process that viewers of the film can 
witness in the film as edited. 
 
Within this unconventional structure, fictions or fictionalisations are key. There are two 
fictional plays-within: one “spoken”, the other “dumb”, in an intentional or unintentional 
echo of the two plays staged by the players under Hamlet’s direction. The dumb play is 
broken into several, discontinuous scenes scattered throughout the film, and uses 
Playmobil figures, buildings and accessories197 to produce stop-motion animated scenes 
from Carri’s childhood: some historically “real”; some of childhood fantasies. The scenes 
are without dialogue but use sound effects and music. The spoken play-within constitutes 
much of the screen time of The Blonds. Rather than film herself investigating her own past, 
Carri casts actress Analía Couceyro to play Albertina Carri making a documentary about her 
traumatic past. As Couceyro announces near the start of the film: ‘My name is Analía 
Couceyro. I’m an actress and in this film. I play the part of Albertina Carri.’ Couceyro is seen 
reviewing taped interviews before editing, setting up film shoots, interviewing old 
comrades of Roberto Carri and Ana María Caruso, etc. Analía Couceyro is not a 
conventional autobiographical double – a character who might re-enact scenes from the 
director’s past – rather she plays the director in the present making the very documentary 
Carri herself is making. With the exception of one scene (where Carri conducts an interview 
in a suburb of Buenos Aires where her parents last lived) Albertina Carri only appears in the 
film as the director of The Blonds (itself of course a documentary) whilst Couceyro plays the 
part of “Albertina Carri” making a documentary about Albertina Carri’s traumatic past. The 
scenes with Couceyro making the documentary could even be viewed as a play-within-the-
play-within-the-play. The film as a whole is structured like a nest of Matryoshka dolls. 
 
 
197 Playmobil is a line of plastic toys produced, since the 1970s, by the Brandstätter Group in 
Germany, consisting of c.75mm high human figures with a variety of costumes as well as accessories 
such as buildings, vehicles and animals. They are distributed worldwide and were popular in 
Argentina by the time Carri’s parents disappeared in 1977.  
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A. O. Scott, in a New York Times review, captures this complexity: 
 
It is not so much a documentary as a fictional film about the making of a 
documentary, or perhaps a documentary about the making of a fictional film about 
the making of a documentary. 
(Scott 2004) 
 
Although one struggles to describe the complex structure of the film, it is certainly a film 
where the director has gone to enormous lengths to conduct a self-exploration and a self-
analysis which has the perspective of the ‘outsider’: to produce a self that can look at the 
self; to have the self embodied in a double who mirrors and fails to mirror the self. There is 
the unseen, non-celluloid Albertina Carri whom we know to be the director of The Blonds 
who was responsible for the final cut of the film and its promotion, there is the Albertina 
Carri we see in the film playing “Albertina Carri” the character in The Blonds who directs 
the framing film and the films-within, and there is Analía Couceyro whom we see in the 
spoken film-within, playing the character “Albertina Carri” who is directing a documentary 
about Albertina Carri. Hamlet’s own account (Act III Scene II) of the plays he “directed” 
seems pertinent here: ‘Marry, this is miching malicho. It means mischief.’  
 
The mischief runs throughout the film, not just in its formal structure. It is, in Joanna Page’s 
words (2009: 167), ‘an experimental and often ludic reflection on the loss of the director’s 
parents’. The film is peppered with tiny visual clues (half-hidden signifiers) and embedded 
inter-textual references – easy to miss on a first viewing – that serve as comments on the 
film’s structure and style, or on Carri’s psychological state or ambitions in making the film. 
One of these is a film poster for John Waters’s cult movie, Cecil B. Demented (2000), seen 
fleetingly and unremarked (but frequently) in the background of shots of Analía Couceyro 
playing Carri in her production office and makeshift editing suite for The Blonds (see figure 
10 in Illustrations). The poster is never featured – there is no cut away – and only sections 
of the poster can be seen in any one shot. But in its persistent inclusion, Carri is signalling 
her intention to throw away the documentary rulebook, just as the anarchic, self-styled 
movie-makers the ‘SprocketHoles’ and their unstable leader, Cecil B. Demented (aka 
Sinclair), do with the Hollywood rulebook in Waters’s film. Janis Breckenridge, in an article 
on the performance of memory and identity in The Blonds, makes much of the parallel with 
Cecil B Demented, arguing that Carri takes similar liberties to those taken by Waters with 
her chosen genre, overthrowing the ‘almost suffocating tradition of high seriousness’ 
typical of “trauma” documentaries. But there is a deep seriousness behind the levity: 
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As the film advances, it seemingly runs adrift with what might at first appear to be 
poor filming techniques, random juxtapositions or disjunctures and unwarranted 
fragmentations; however, the cumulative effect of these cinematic strategies 
proves these ruptures to be both intentional and revealing. 
(Breckenridge 2008: 13) 
 
Carri’s ambitions perhaps match those of the fictional director Sinclair (Cecil B. Demented) 
in Waters’s film, who declares: ‘I’ve had a vision. And that vision is called ultimate reality.’ 
For Carri, that ‘ultimate reality’ is the psychic reality of trauma. Carri and her documentary 
crew (whom we see and hear many times in the film) are a tight-knit and committed group 
of friends and collaborators who, like the SprocketHoles, work with and for a strong-willed 





6.2 The Blonds as vacuum: the limitations of memory and conventional 
documentary technique 
 
For much of the film, Carri uses her double to define what belongs to Carri or what is 
meaningful to Carri and what is not. Conventional documentary techniques and practices –  
of the sort demanded by The National Film and Audiovisual Arts Institute – are not 
excluded from The Blonds but are often set up and presented in such a way as to 
demonstrate their failure. Their failure to move the Albertina Carri we see in the diegesis 
closer to her nebulous quarry (to comprehending her trauma) through their failure to have 
any meaningful or affective impact on her double. The double expresses to us (as viewers 
of The Blonds), and more crucially to Carri as a character within the diegesis (as an inner 
Winnicottian viewer), the failure of these conventional devices. 
 
In two scenes – shot in the back of a taxi and in the production office – Analía Couceyro 
examines old photographs of the Carri family. Couceyro flicks through the pages of a photo 
album in the cab or shuffles individual prints on her desk in a desultory fashion, as if 
 
198 My description of Carri as ‘a strong-willed and determined director’ is not intended as a 
description of the “real” Albertina Carri but of the character “Albertina Carri” as played by Albertina 
Carri, whom we see in The Blonds. 
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looking for something that is not there. Often, in more conventional documentaries about 
traumatic pasts, family photographs are used to create poignant and affecting moments, as 
viewers are invited to see – and to feel – the loss that the protagonist has suffered: 
moments when the photograph of those once alive is able to suspend us, according to 
Roland Barthes (1984: 79), between life and death; or to allow us to identify with the 
protagonist (after all we all have family photos) across national, ethnic and other barriers 
of difference, as Marianne Hirsch claims (1997: 252). In these two scenes in The Blonds, 
there is no attempt to elicit any affective connection or response in the audience, and 
Couceyro under Carri’s direction as Carri’s double, remains impassive, so defamiliarising 
these conventional archive objects, distancing the audience from what they are seeing.  
 
Conventional documentary interviews are treated in an even more alienated, arm’s-length 
fashion. The earnest words and reminiscences of old friends and comrades of Carri’s 
parents are shown without introduction and without naming the interviewee. The 
interviews do not even appear full-screen but are presented as elements of scenes in which 
Couceyro is dispassionately reviewing VHS tapes of “her” rushes on a poor-quality monitor 
in the production office; sometimes she is not even looking at the screen or finds what the 
interviewees are saying mildly amusing. When Couceyro does interview an old colleague of 
Carri’s parents on one occasion, she shows little interest. Kerry Bystrom (2009: 43) sees this 
as an attempt to ‘downplay […] testimony’s usual claim to unmediated truth’. I think 
Bystrom is right but these scenes are also a demonstration of the lack of connection Carri 
feels to other people’s memories, alien memories, and she expresses this through her 
double. However significant these memories are for the interviewee, they are not Carri’s 
memories. And through the double’s lack of interest in the heroic stories of her parents’ 
“comrades in arms”, Carri is beginning to be able to act out (by proxy) her anger with her 
parents for deserting her in the name of a political cause. It is an anger that Carri does not 
(or is not able to) express “as herself”, torn between loving her parents and feeling 
deserted by them. In the early scenes of the film, this anger is expressed obliquely through 
the double’s cool, lack of interest in conventionally affecting encounters and objects. Later, 
Carri finds ways to use Couceyro to express – to enact – her anger more explicitly.  
 
Perhaps the strangest of these affectless interactions with the past through conventional – 
and what should, by convention, be affecting – documentary material, is enacted near the 
beginning of the film. Analía Couceyro sits and reads aloud from a book whose title we can 
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just make out on the cover as Isidro Velázquez. It is read in a monotone. The text is a piece 
of utopian, revolutionary prose. In Couceyro’s rendition of the text, and in its placement in 
the structure of the film without context or provenance, it is reduced to gobbledygook. It is 
a perplexing and alienating experience for the viewer: we have no idea why we are hearing 
these words; we have no idea who Isidro Velázquez is or was; and we cannot see from the 
cover of the book who the author of this biography might be.199 Much later in the film, this 
same book appears in a shot of Couceyro’s production office but again the author of the 
text is not legible. A little research reveals that the book was written by Carri’s father, 
Roberto.200 Our genre expectations when presented with a work by a much-loved, 
murdered father would be, at the very least, for a poignant moment of connection, 
communicated through the reactions of the reader or perhaps through music or other 
filmic technique. Carri eschews these conventions, all but burying the significance of the 
book and its author.  A.O. Scott felt it is in moments like this one, where Carri’s film fails: 
 
The film's open-ended, recursive structure is central to Ms. Carri’s intellectual 
agenda, which is to emphasize the deceptive, indeterminate nature of the truth. It 
is sometimes hard to tell, though, whether she wants to explore the ways that 
individual and collective psychology contrive to blur and distort painful or shameful 
aspects of the political past, or whether her concern is with the grander, more 
abstract and ultimately more banal tendency of any representation to falsify what 
it tries to depict. Too much of the film is in a mood of chin-scratching detachment, 
and this creates a vacuum in which its powerful, confrontational moments lose 
their force, the trauma of the past pushed nearly out of reach. 
(Scott 2004)201  
 
On first watching The Blonds, my reaction was similar to Scott’s. I found the film frustrating, 
even irritating, like an overly-ambitious student production. In subsequent viewings, I 
questioned my transference/counter-transference onto the filmic object, as my initial 
feelings of frustration and irritation intensified into an almost unbearable sense of 
desperation; an excruciating sense of trying to reach something that keeps receding as it is 
 
199 It is conceivable that a well-read Argentinian viewer might know something of the book and 
therefore might have a different take from a non-Argentinian viewer (from this viewer). But it is my 
reading of the scene, that it was set up to deliberately produce the response I have described in all 
its viewers. 
200 Nouzeilles (2005: 271) points out that the passage Couceyro reads was actually written by 
historian Juan Díaz del Moral in 1923, and Roberto Carri is simply quoting here. But she continues to 
say, Albertina Carri’s ‘father is not the author of the passage but this is irrelevant. It stands for a 
political position and a political view Roberto Carri fully endorsed.’  
201 Scott’s view fits Stella Bruzzi’s description (2006: 185) of the use of performance within a non-
fiction (documentary) context, as drawing ‘attention to the impossibilities of authentic documentary 
representation’ and acting as ‘an alienating, distancing device’.  
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approached. Catharsis is withheld. Reflecting on my counter-transference, I now think that 
Scott’s description of the film is acute but I no longer share his negative gloss. That ‘the 
trauma of the past’ is ‘pushed nearly out of reach’ seems to reflect Carri’s experience of her 
trauma. Through her fictionalised double, Carri provides the viewer with a representation 
of how she experiences her traumatic past. And Carri herself – the Carri we see in the film 
(Albertina Carri playing “Albertina Carri”) – does not behave as we expect victims of trauma 
to behave in documentary film: either emotionally broken-down or breaking down under 
the gaze of the camera and the act of representing the trauma in words. The irony, the 
humour, the intellectual distance that are evident in The Blonds, are indeed markers of the 
distance Carri feels from the traumatic event in her life; for her to pretend otherwise would 
be dishonest and so at times she finds it difficult to take her own plight seriously. But the 
vacuum that Scott identifies – a vacuum that undermines ‘powerful, confrontational 
moments’ – is not a vacuum of failed filmic-representation and failure to establish affective 
connections but rather Carri’s filmic representation of the ontological vacuum that she has 
described as her ‘constitution as a person starting from an absence.’ This filmic 
representation is created in the performance of her double, Couceyro, in the fictional 
documentary-within-the-documentary and is available both to us as the extra-diegetic 
audience and to Carri herself within the diegesis. In her attempt to view herself ‘like an 
outsider’ – as Freud advocated for the successful practice of self-analysis – Carri seems to 
view herself like Camus’s outsider, Meursault: alienated from her own experience.202 But 
unlike the psychopathic Meursault, the alienation Carri feels and her double enacts, is 
deeply painful, frustrating, even excruciating and is available in the intensely similar 
feelings the film generates in the viewer (or in this viewer). 
 
The sense of alienation and disconnection that pervades much of the documentary is 
hinted at in the very name of the film, The Blonds. The title refers to an outsider’s memory 
of the Carri family; not merely an alien memory with which Albertina Carri cannot engage 
but a demonstrably false memory. Whilst filming in the neighbourhood where Albertina, 
her sisters and her parents lived before the parents’ abduction, an interview is conducted 
with the Carris’s old neighbour, an elderly woman with jet-black hair. She says she 
remembers the family well and that they all were blond: ‘The girls were blondes. The father 
was blond, the mother was blonde. All blonds.’203 Photographs we see of the family, the 
 
202 Albert Camus The Outsider (1983 [1942]).  
203 The neighbour repeats the idea the family were blond several times, and always with complete 
certainty. 
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physical presence in the film of Albertina and the testimony of Albertina’s aunt Andrea, all 
confirm the inaccuracy of the neighbour’s memory; the Carris had dark hair. Naming the 
film The Blonds is a powerful indication that the film as a whole has been conceived as an 
exploration of the fickleness, the falsity and the impossibility of memory.  
 
There is a political dimension to this misremembering. It suggests that the family were 
viewed as middle-class interlopers in the working-class barrio of La Matanza in Buenos 
Aires where they lived in the mid-1970s. At that time, middle-class Argentinians were 
frequently blond whilst their poorer compatriots were frequently dark-haired. The 
neighbour’s inaccurate memory is an accurate recollection that the Carris were viewed 
with suspicion and as outsiders by others in the barrio. Much can be made of the politics of 
this misremembering204 but here I am more interested in the psychic dimension for Carri 
and how she treats the misremembering in the film-within. In a later scene in The Blonds, 
Couceyro is taken by Albertina Carri to buy a blonde wig which the director has Couveyro 
wear in almost all the subsequent scenes in the film. The wig becomes an icon of the 
impossibility of memory, of the trap of being defined by other’s memories. In forcing her 
double to wear the wig, Couceyro becomes the not-Carri double (alongside her role as the 
Carri double or mirror). The not-Carri double is a receptacle for – or an embodiment of – 
the false or alien memories of others, carrying off elements that are not “Carri” so she can 
find what really belongs to her. 
 
The double in film, literature or in psychoanalytic theory has played many roles. Which of 
these does Couceyro most resemble? She is never the traumatising, frightening double we 
know from literature or from the film The Student of Prague (Wegener and Rye, German 
Empire, 1913) that Otto Rank writes about in Der Doppelgänger (1971 [1914]): in fact she is 
neither of the doubles Rank articulated over his career – neither a narcissistic, morbid 
manifestation of self-love nor a harbinger of death. She is not the uncanny, disturbing 
double of Freud’s essay Das Unheimliche (The Uncanny) (1919b), nor the herald of madness 
and breakdown that marked the appearance of the clerk’s Doppelgänger in Dostoevsky’s 
The Double (2005), nor the traumatising double that Anwar Congo devises and encounters 
in the form of his own headless corpse in The Act of Killing. And for most of the film, 
Couceyro is not the double of psychodrama who takes the original participant’s place and 
 
204 The neighbour’s “recollection” could be viewed as a parapraxis performed by the political 
unconscious or as an ideologically prompted mis-remembering. 
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attempts to make conscious, under-expressed material in an earlier performance by the 
original participant (although she does perform this role late on in The Blonds). Couceyro is 
so closely directed and coached that she is closer to being the “mirror” of psychodrama, 
who re-enacts the scene the original participant has just devised. 
 
In wearing the wig, Couceyro most closely resembles Honey Whitlock, whose giant image 
dominates the poster for John Waters’s film Cecil B Demented that we catch so many 
fleeting glimpses of on the production office wall in The Blonds. In this image, we see 
Honey Whitlock (played by Melanie Griffith) bound to a chair and gagged, with the director 
character, Cecil B Demented (played by Stephen Dorff) holding a gun to her head. In 
Waters’s film, Whitlock is a Hollywood star who has been kidnapped by Demented and the 
SprocketHoles, and is coerced into playing the lead in their ‘kamikaze’ movie. Couceyro 
plays a very similar role in The Blonds in as much as she is very closely and minutely 
directed and allowed very little agency. To underscore the idea that Analía Couceyro is 
Honey Whitlock, Carri provides the viewer with a brief but wonderfully comic moment in 
the production office when Couceyro passes the Cecil B Demented poster and comes 
between the camera and the poster. From the camera’s point of view, Couceyro’s head and 
body completely mask the poster image of Honey Whitlock’s head and body, leaving us 
with the indelible image of the director, Cecil B. Demented, holding a gun to Couceyro’s 
head (see figures 11 and 12 in Illustrations).  
 
Crucial to the parallel Carri is drawing between Waters’s film and The Blonds, is that the 
Honey Whitlock we see on the poster is red-headed and is depicted just before the 
moment in Waters’s film when she is forcibly “peroxided” by the SprocketHoles; for the 
rest of the film Whitlock is blonde, one could say very blonde. Couceyro suffers the same 
fate in Carri’s film; forced to wear a blonde wig as a sign of her subjugation to the will of 
others. Of course, as with all doubles, they are both mirror and inverse, and highly unstable 
– which is the “original”, which is the double? – and so Honey Whitlock is both Analía 
Couceyro and Albertina Carri. Whitlock is the creature and creation of others, forced to 
play a role that is not really “her”.205 That is Couceyro’s relation to Carri but it also mirrors 
 
205 The intertextual echo (or, in Bakhtin’s terms, the dialogic reach of The Blonds) does not end with 
the figure of Honey Whitlock, kidnapped and bent to the will of others. Waters memorably found 
room in Cecil B Demented for a cameo role for Patty Hearst – arguably the most famous kidnap 
victim of the twentieth century – who still generates controversy as to whether she was forced by, 
or conspired with, her kidnappers to commit criminal acts. So, in this dialogic reading of The Blonds, 
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Carri’s predicament; kidnapped by her past and then forced to play a role that others 
define. The recollections of others seem to conspire to tell her what her past is: The 
National Film and Audiovisual Arts Institute wants to foist on to her other people’s 
memories of her parents and their place in an heroic struggle that the Institute defines; old 
neighbours insist she and her sisters and her parents were blond. This same violence is 
replicated in some of the academic work on The Blonds, where Carri is conscripted to 
agendas that are not hers – kidnapped by other people’s agendas – a subject I will deal 
with later. At this juncture in my argument, Carri has at least managed to foist the not-Carri 
blondness onto her double, Analía Couceyro, who plays the forcibly peroxided Honey 
Whitlock whilst Carri plays the role of Cecil B Demented. It is part of the process of trying to 
slough off the adiaphora, so Carri can find the core of her very personal trauma. Kerry 
Bystrom (2009: 42) argues that The Blonds focuses on ‘the appearance of the subject’ and 
‘the power that narratives framed by others have to shape the self’. But this is not 
something Carri meekly accepts, rather she tenaciously resists these powerful narratives. 
Through the fictional device of a double, Carri is able to observe herself as she is in the 
narratives other people have constructed for her. She is able to watch these “fictions” play 
out within the diegesis and respond to them. 
 
A harsh reading of Carri’s deployment of her double might suggest an element of the 
narcissism that Otto Rank detected. Carri will not release her double to confront and 
disturb her – to be fully “other” and to face her ‘like an outsider’ – and so defuses the 
potential power of the double; a manifestation of the more general danger of solipsism 
that always haunts the self-analysis or autobiographical documentary. An alternative 
reading is that Carri uses the double to try to define what Albertina Carri is and what 
Albertina Carri isn’t, in an attempt to fill in – or rather to define the edges and borders of – 
the constitutional absence at her core. In a scene late in The Blonds, Carri uses her double 
to be “Carri” rather than to be the not-Carri who wears the blond wig. Couceyro (without 
the wig for this scene) is very closely coached and directed, Carri telling Couceyro between 
takes in minute detail how she should play the part and deliver the lines. I found the scene 
low key and touching, as the things that Carri knows to be Carri’s are so slight, particular 
and inconsequential: ‘I hate ladybugs, shooting stars, train tracks, going under bridges, 
flocks of birds, I hate the way your eyelashes fall out…’. This list seems to go to the heart of 
 
Carri/Couceyro is also Patty Hearst who is in turn either an innocent victim or a manipulative 
deceiver.  
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Carri’s existential problem: an aching sense of loss and very little of her own to fill the void. 
It could be argued that all of Carri’s “hates” are items or events which conventionally 
permit one to make a wish. This modifies my reading: less a case of owning very little and 
more a case of hating any mechanism that allows a wish, as to wish is to hope and Carri 
knows these hopes will be dashed. Either reading exposes an aching desire that cannot be 
met. Even this list of things that Carri either knows to be hers or permit her to make futile, 
painful wishes, is thrown into question by the words the sound recordist utters before the 
first take (as she “marks” the DAT sound tape with a verbal reference point for the edit): 
‘Fiction… We are shooting a fiction. Today is […] July seventh 2002’. And as Couceyro’s 
recital of this short list of Carri’s “hates” moves on, we are soon drawn back towards the 
core of the trauma:  
 
and especially I hate candles […] having to make a wish at your birthday, blowing 
the candles, because I spent many birthdays wishing the same wish: that my mom 
would come back, that my dad would come back, that they’d come back soon. And 
it still happens to me, I blow out birthday candles and I can’t help wishing my mom 
and my dad would come back soon. Actually, it was just one wish but I make it into 
three wishes, so my wish becomes stronger.  
 
As Couceyro finishes, Carri – who we have seen in shot throughout this scene smiling gently 
as she looks through the camera’s viewfinder and silently mouthing the words Couceyro is 
speaking – says in a very quiet voice ‘Very good…Cut.’ This scene seems to touch Carri more 
than many others in the film. Here in the spoken play-within with Couceyro as her double, 
Carri’s trauma seems to gain some affective content; her desperate desire to be 
reconnected with her parents.206  
 
Carri has used her double to filter out the false and alien memories of others, but what of 
her own memories of her parents and of their disappearance? It seems she remembers 
very little. The list of hates is an attempt to define something that is definitively hers. When 
she does reach back to the few memories she has of her parents, she is not sure if they 




206 Here I agree with Shohini Chaudhuri (2014: 110): ‘The scene is repeated in a series of takes, 
which serves not, as Joanna Page claims, to “detract from [the] emotive value of what is recounted 
onscreen” but to insist on it’ (here Chaudhuri quotes and disagrees with: Page 2009: 172). 
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This was our last house. I lived here with my parents and my sisters […] I was three 
so I don’t remember much. […] I don’t know if some of my memories are real or 
they’re my sisters’.  
 
The central problem remains. Carri is unsure whether she really remembers anything at all 
of her parents. As the fiction writer Carlos Gamerro observes in his essay “Remembering 
without Memories” (2013: 113), Carri’s investigation ‘achieves nothing more than making 
absence present’.207 And this absence – this void of memory – is a profound existential 
problem for Carri and a problem for the film (as Carri tells us through Couceyro): 
 
I have to think of something. Something that will be a movie. All I have are vague 
memories contaminated by so many versions. Whatever I do to get to the truth, 
will probably take me further away. 
 
It is in this context that one needs to view the avant garde devices and kamikaze 
techniques that Carri deploys in The Blonds. They are not superficial, tricksy, stylistic 
choices but baits of falsehood: traps that Carri sets in a desperate effort to take a carp of 
truth, to try to find something meaningful in the absence at the centre of her life (and, by 





6.3 Glimmerings of meaning: circling the vacuum 
 
It is one of these avant garde devices that begins to reveal the first glimmerings of 
memories that Carri seems to securely own. Carri employs stop-motion animation of 
Playmobil figures – in what I am describing as the “dumb” play-within – to try to recreate 
the world of her childhood both in fact (“real” memories of events) and in fantasy.208 The 
memories and fantasies that we see in the animated film-within are not her memories of 
her parents or of their disappearance but memories of how in childhood Carri tried to deal 
with their absence.   
 
207 Gamerro’s observation is not intended as a criticism of the film. 
208 Jane Pilling (2012: 2) has written about the creative possibilities of wordless animation: it 
transcends the ‘boundaries of language’ and in so doing ‘give[s] voice to that which is hard to 
articulate’ namely ‘unconscious feelings’. In similar vein, Paul Wells (1998: 184) notes that 




The importance of this device is established at once, as it is a scene from the dumb play 
that opens the film. We see a Playmobil house lit from within and beyond the house, and 
dimly lit, a garden, cows (with mooing on the soundtrack), horses and farm equipment. As 
the camera pans from the garden towards the house, we hear a voice (a voice that we will 
learn is Carri’s as the film progresses) calling out: ‘Make sure I’m not in frame’, with this 
directorial intervention layered over the artificially created sounds of a farm at night (the 
sounds have been laid on in post-production but give the impression of diegetic sound 
recorded on this farm at night). Over these pictures and soundtrack, we then hear an 
intimate, close exchange between two female voices in which one instructs the other (a 
young woman or a girl?) in the art of riding a horse: ‘She’s a good horse. Do you want to 
mount her?’, etc. This exchange would suggest that the dumb-play is not so dumb. But in 
the very last scene of the film – live-action footage shot on the farm where Albertina Carri 
grew up – we realise that this verbal exchange takes place between Carri and Couceyro as 
Carri teaches Couceyro how to ride. It is an exchange from the filmic present of the end of 
the film and not the reproduction of spoken dialogue from a filmic “past”.  
 
What is established in this opening scene are three ideas which will run throughout the film 
(and they are established with great economy).209 This is not a conventional documentary 
(it employs stop-motion animation). The farm of Carri’s aunt and uncle where she spent 
her childhood is a happy and loving place. The film will be highly self-conscious, as Carri’s 
directorial instruction (‘Make sure I’m not in frame’) breaks the fourth wall of documentary 
practice, revealing the constructedness of the film in an act of Brechtian estrangement (the 
Verfremdungseffekt).  
 
As the film progresses, we see several more Playmobil scenes set on the farm where Carri 
grew up: most are happy family scenes, with people partying and having fun. My initial 
reaction to these scenes was one of confusion, as it confounded my expectation of how 
Albertina Carri should feel after the loss of her parents. How could these scenes of idyllic 
family life come in the wake of their disappearances? The scenes feel pre- not post-
lapsarian. Later in the film, over live-action shots of the farm, Couceyro provides the 
explanation. The family remained in the city for some time after the disappearance of Ana 
María Caruso and Roberto Carri and the children continued to receive occasional letters 
 
209 The scene runs for only 46 seconds. 
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from their parents. When the letters stopped, Albertina and her sisters, Andrea and Paula, 
moved to their aunt and uncle’s farm in the country. Couceyro tells us in voice-over:  
 
Andrea was fourteen. Paula thirteen. It was a huge cultural and social shock for 
them. I was five and I fell in love with the horses, the cows, with my uncle Federico 
and with getting up early […] My sisters were very depressed when we moved here 
but I enjoyed being a spoiled child. 
 
Carri’s age at the time of the “disappearances” emerges as a key factor in her experience of 
the loss. Her elder sisters had no difficulty in remembering their parents. They were old 
enough to have secure and indelible memories, and their reaction to the disappearances 
was the essentially adult response of depression. Albertina Carri was so young at the time 
her parents disappeared forever – too young to have securely laid down memories – that 
by the time she was five and living on the farm, her parents had receded almost entirely 
from conscious memory.  
 
In the scene that follows directly after the one in which we hear of the sisters’ depression 
and Albertina’s happiness on the farm, we see Couceyro in the production office – her desk 
covered in family photos and Playmobil figures – and are told in voice-over: 
 
The farm was a land of fantasy, where all my memories begin. 
I would see my parents arriving by car, by bus, on horseback. 
 
The edge or the border of the constitutional absence at the core of Carri’s adult life is 
beginning to gain some definition. A shape is being defined but a shape without any 
representational or narrative content. What content the loss appears to have is supplied by 
others – as Carri hears other people’s recollections of her absent parents – and these 
recollections were then reshaped by the little girl Albertina in her world of fantasy and 
play. The dumb play is the vehicle Carri devises to unpick this complicated world of fantasy 
and “memory”. The Playmobil figures – whether the young Albertina Carri actually played 
with these particular toys or not – connect her and her audience back to Carri’s childhood 
world; “childish” vehicles for recollections of childhood. In a literal sense, Carri has adopted 
a technique that both Klein and Winnicott used in their analysis of children. It is an attempt 
to unearth something of a trauma that has evaded representation but that might emerge in 
games with dolls, and teddy bears and pieces of string. More broadly, these scenes are 
Carri’s Winnicottian potential space or play space where fragments of childhood memory 
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and fantasy can be given form and become objects of contemplation for Carri as an 
‘outsider’. The scenes from the Playmobil play-within are at once both memory and 
fantasy, history and fiction. Carri’s memory reaches its limits in her recollections of her 
childhood on the farm long after her parents disappeared. To replace the “missing” 
memories of her early childhood and her “real” parents, fantasy took over. But the fantasy 
is of course also a version of the historical “real”; her later childhood fantasies about her 
parents are not memories of the once real and later murdered parents, but they are the 
“real” of Carri’s childhood world where she constructed fantasies about her “forgotten” 
parents: real memories of childhood fantasies; historically real fictions constructed in 
childhood to take the place of what was missing. They have the status of what Heidegger 
called the ‘factical’ (1962 [1927]) and are a version of reality that Castoriadis was pursuing 
when he wrote: ‘I want to see what being is, what reality is. Now, here is my memory of my 
dream last night’ (1997: 5). 
 
This recollected fantasy world – developed amidst her ostensibly happy childhood life on 
the farm – was a confusing and perplexing one. Couceyro tells us in voice-over:  
 
First they told me they were working in another country. At that age I thought 
“working” meant being a doctor or a lawyer. But they told me my mother had a 
degree in literature and my father was a sociologist and journalist, which seemed 
suspicious. When I was twelve they tried to tell me about good guys and bad guys, 
the Peronists, the workers, the Army, the Montoneros. I didn’t understand a word 
of what they said. What I remember, is I started thinking about guns, shoot outs 
and heroes. 
 
The scene encapsulates the “problem” of memory – the void – that Carri faces. The child 
Carri filled the void with representational, narrative memories that were other people’s 
memories she had picked up second-hand and in a garbled form, and then re-worked in 
fantasy and play. Her parents cease to be academics and writers (that seemed ‘suspicious’) 
but are re-worked as the eponymous hero of her father’s book Isidro Velázquez: Robin-
Hood figures and outlaws, shooting it out with the police.210 But the void of memory is not, 
I think, the void that is familiar from much writing on trauma – the absence of memory as a 
consequence of the trauma – rather it is a developmental issue: at only three-years old 
 
210 Although we are not told this in The Blonds, Roberto Carri’s life ended with uncanny parallels to 
that of Isidro Velázquez (whose biography Roberto wrote and which Couceyro reads in an early 
scene in The Blonds). Both tried to help the poor and dispossessed of Argentina and both ended up 
being murdered by the state. 
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when her parents disappeared, Carri retains no narrative, representational memories of 
her parents. It is an example of what Freud describes as infantile amnesia that begins at the 
end of the Oedipal stage. By the time Carri arrived on the farm, tangible memories of her 
parents are likely to have succumbed to this amnesia. As Freud put it: ‘The majority of 
experiences and mental impulses before the start of the latency period now fall victim to 
infantile amnesia – the forgetting […] which veils our earliest youth from us and makes us 
strangers to it’ (1917b: 326). Carri, herself, confirms this when she tells us ‘all my memories 
begin’ with the family’s arrival on the farm when she is five. By then it was almost half her 
lifetime ago since her parents disappeared. 
 
The developmental issue comes sharply into focus in the only sinister fantasy of the dumb 
play. In reaching back to her childhood construction of her parents’ abduction, Carri creates 
a Playmobil scene in which a spaceship hovers over an isolated country road and captures 
one figure and then another (her parents we assume) and takes them into the ship. The 
ship then flies off into the night sky. A little later, three female Playmobil figures are seen 
on the same isolated road (Albertina and her sisters we assume) as if searching, but the 
two abducted figures are nowhere to be seen; they are gone forever. This Playmobil scene 
seems to be a recreation of Carri’s childhood attempts to represent and understand the 
loss of her parents. For me, it has the feel of a traumatic reworking of the fort-da game that 
Freud’s grandson played (throwing away a cotton reel and then retrieving it by pulling on a 
string) as he negotiated the transition from unsymbolised maternal non-existence to 
symbolised maternal absence and entered the temporal, spatial and representational 
world: the world of memory; the world of “self” and “other”.  
 
Aged three at the time of her parents’ abduction, Albertina Carri was much older than 
Freud’s infant grandson when Freud observed his game, and so would doubtless already 
have negotiated this transition in her own way. This is not a speculation on my part about 
Carri’s actual childhood: I have no knowledge of Carri’s childhood beyond what I see and 
hear on screen in The Blonds. Instead, it is a generic comment about a developmental stage 
that Carri must have passed through before the age of three if we accept that Freud’s 
account of his grandson’s game is a particular instance of a universal phenomenon. In 
whatever way the infant Carri had negotiated the transition, the negotiation would have 
been broken or traumatically undone by the disappearance of her parents. Rather than 
being able to hold on to an old, comforting symbolisation of temporary absence 
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constructed in infancy, the three-year-old Carri was brutally (re-)confronted with endless, 
permanent absence (loss).211 When the little Albertina shouted ‘da’ and pulled on the 
string, there would be no reel on the other end, the string limp and without agency. We 
can surmise from The Blonds that Carri tried to symbolise this absence later in childhood by 
playing with ideas of alien abductions but these abductions were in themselves 
traumatising as they were one-way only (in her scenario the “reel” has flown away into 
outer space and however many times she shouts ‘da’ or makes birthday wishes whilst 
blowing out candles, her parents did not come back). The adult Carri tells us she is 
predicated on, constituted by, an absence. And that absence for Carri, given her age at the 
time of the abductions, had no secure representational content; it was destined to become 
a gaping, formless hole. The alien abduction scene feels like an ex post facto symbolisation 
of an inescapable traumatic loss and so is quite unlike Ernst’s symbolisation which helped 
him to gradually spiral out of and away from the originary trauma. Carri’s symbolisation 
fixed the absence as a permanent reality, as she spiralled back into the originary trauma. 
 
If the Playmobil “dumb” play-within allows Carri to move closer in time to the traumatic 
loss of her parents by allowing her to represent her childhood responses to the loss, it is 
through the spoken play-within that the unrepresented trauma is able to find affective 
expression. Late on in the film, there is a scene shot on the farm near a wood, in which 
Couceyro screams, unrestrained and in anguish, whilst the camera either focuses on 
Couceyro or spins round and round in the wood, dizzying the viewer. In voice over, 
Couceyro as Carri tells us:  
 
It’s hard for me to understand my mother’s decision. I’ve often asked myself why 
she never left the country. Sometimes I wonder why she left me here in the world 
of the living. And when I ask myself, I feel enraged. 
 
Gonzalo Aguilar (2008; 2011), in his book on new Argentinian cinema, locates Carri’s anger 
within a larger and recent tendency in Argentinian film- and documentary-making, to 
question the formerly unquestioned acceptance of the political rightness of the 
revolutionary left of the 1970s and 1980s. As Aguilar says of Carri’s parents’ generation: ‘By 
 
211 The Playmobil scenes suggest that this traumatic undoing may have taken place gradually. Carri’s 
early fantasy of her parents returning to the farm ‘by car, by bus, on horseback’ might at first have 
“worked” for Carri but over time it gave way to the traumatising fantasy/nightmare of alien 
abduction. 
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committing the whole of their lives to political militancy, they dragged along their children, 
who were neither in a position to choose nor to understand that commitment’ (2011: 187).  
 
But having expressed her rage, Couceyro’s voice over becomes more reflective (but still 
heard over the image of the screaming, anguished figure of Carri’s double): ‘Are the souls 
of the dead in those who follow? In those who try to remember them? And how much of 
that memory is preservation, how much whim?’. So, despite the rage expressed towards 
her internal mother, the scene ends back at Carri’s fundamental problem; the internal 
mother has no shape or form other than whim, and beyond that is yawning absence. It is 
perhaps Carri’s most affectively powerful use of her double in the whole film as Couceyro 
seems to embody the anguish, the pain and indeed the rage that Carri feels but, in the 
screen personae of “Albertina Carri” that Carri plays, is too restrained and contained to 
convey. Couceyro here, as very much the Carri rather than the not-Carri double, enacts the 
anguish, the affect, that Carri cannot express. Here we see the doubling technique of 
psychodrama, where the double makes conscious and manifest, the unspoken, repressed 
or under-expressed material in the principal protagonist’s own performance, giving voice to 
latent material. Perhaps the film’s emotional eloquence is achieved through its 
combination of moments when anger breaks through only for these moments to be 
undercut by ironic distance which, far from dissipating the agony, makes it more acute. The 
Albertina Carri we see in the film may ruthlessly control her double and her crew but she 
reserves her most ruthless treatment for herself, never allowing herself for long to own her 
own pain or her own memories, cruelly undoing them through her forensic questioning of 
everything. Couceyro’s unrestrained screaming at the top of her voice is perhaps the only 







6.4 The nature of the vacuum: bodily connection/disconnection 
 
6.4.1 Attempting to represent an ‘event-affect complex without 
representational content’ 
 
For all the experimental, avant-garde filmic devices that Carri deploys – doubles, Playmobil 
toys, plays-within, the comradery of a committed film crew pursuing a goal in defiance of 
potential funding bodies and documentary conventions, the breaking of the “wall” that 
usually separates the documentary crew from their filmic subjects – the core or navel of 
Carri’s trauma as elaborated in The Blonds is to be found in the most basic of human 
connections: that of one body to another. Or, rather, it is to be found in bodily dis-
connection. The foundational trauma of Carri’s life is the unwished for, forcible 
disconnection from the parental body; a body torn away from her, never to return. It is 
where the playful, ludic,212 iconoclastic methods of The Blonds and the ‘chin-scratching 
detachment’ (Scott 2004) reach their limits and strike something very real: the missing 
bodies of Carri’s parents. It is also the point where Carri’s fictionalisations reach their limit 
and fictionalisation is refused. 
 
In this section I will seek to establish that it is this missing parental body – and not her 
missing memories of her parents – that is the absence that haunted Carri’s childhood and 
haunts her adult life. The founding absence – ‘my constitution as a person starting from an 
absence’ (Women Make Movies Release 2004: 7) – that Carri pursues and tries to make 
sense of, is the missing, irrevocably-lost parental body; a body that finds expression in the 
film as hair, as blood, as DNA. And it is through the fictional provocations of the spoken 
play-within that this connection-disconnection is unearthed, witnessed by Carri (the 
director within the diegesis), and given expression as the theatre of the body takes over the 
stage of the play-within. 
 
If the heart of Carri’s trauma is a bodily sense of absence and disconnection, it will 
inevitably struggle to find representational form. The “sense” I am invoking is what is 
sometimes referred to colloquially as a “body memory”;213 an unarticulated and never-
 
212 What Jordana Blejmar (2013; 2016) calls ‘playful memory’. 
213 By using the term “body memory”, I am not invoking Paul Connerton’s (1989) concept of 
‘embodied memory’ (memory carried in bodily gestures and habits). The unconscious connection 
between Carri and her parents has not even been able to struggle into the forms of bodily 
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articulated sense or feeling that persists and is best understood under Freud’s descriptive 
model of the unconscious: that is not a repressed memory (a memory that once had a 
definite form but underwent repression by the dynamic unconscious) but a feeling which 
carries with it no narrative structure and so is profoundly difficult to translate into a 
representable form.  
 
In a case study dealing with the difficulty of approaching traumatic events in the life of a 
tiny child, César and Sara Botella write: 
 
The limits of traditional therapeutic intervention came from two sides: word-
presentations could no longer fulfil their role of communication; on the other side, 
there was the impossibility of connecting the pain to the recollection of the past, 
because the past was simply blank. Properly speaking, in such cases the notion of a 
transference of the forgotten past onto the analyst does not meet the actual 
clinical fact. It is, rather, the actualisation of an “event-affect complex without 
representational content” that has no history and is incapable of taking the form of 
represented memories. 
(Botella and Botella 2013: 108) 
 
The Botellas’s case, of course, differs in two important ways from Carri in search of her 
trauma. First, the Botellas’s patient was still a small child when they undertook the analysis 
and so the child’s lack of word-presentations is not something that hampers the very 
articulate Carri. That said, the child patient’s inability to put its pain into words may well 
hold true for Carri because adult articulacy is unlikely to gain much traction on an 
“inarticulate” childhood trauma. The trauma can only be re-felt or re-experienced and 
then, by accepting that this feeling is the memory of the historical event, some 
understanding might struggle into words, which may help to ameliorate the pain of the 
experience. Secondly, Carri’s filmic analysis is a self-analysis and so she is attempting to pull 
off the trick of actualising the ‘event-affect complex’ without having a truly “other” other (a 
truly alien other) with whom to interact.  
 
With adult patients in mind, Howard Levine has also dealt with the huge difficulties 
entailed in traumas of this sort.  
 
In the presence of the represented unconscious [i.e. Freud’s dynamic unconscious] 
[…] the analytic process moves via free association and interpretation from 
 
representation (bodily mirroring) that concern Connerton, as Carri was too young at the time of 
their disappearance. 
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conscious and preconscious surface to unconscious depth. In the analysis of 
unrepresented and weakly represented mental states, the elements of mind – 
conscious, preconscious, and unconscious – must first be created by a work that 
begins in the analyst’s psyche and is then offered to and inscribed in the psyche of 
the patient as part of an interactive, intersubjective relationship and process. 
(2013: 70; Levine’s italics)  
 
Levine, like the Botellas, highlights the importance of a creative or empathetic “other” in 
bringing certain traumas – which must include the traumas of early childhood – into some 
sort of representational form. In search of her largely wordless, weakly-represented or un-
represented trauma, Carri has the difficulty of not having access to ‘an interactive, 
intersubjective relationship and process’, and so she must try to create those 
intersubjective relationships within the structure of a self-analytic filmic process by creating 
a self that can view the self as an outsider. Of course, the external others of film crew and 
imagined audience are still available to Carri but, if we follow Anzieu’s (1986) account of 
Freud’s self-analysis, an internal other is also required alongside the external others. 
 
 
6.4.2 The missing parental body: ‘trying to rip my parents’ absence 
(as if it were a corpse)’ 
 
I will try to substantiate my argument that the core of Carri’s trauma is an unrepresented 
bodily connection/disconnection to her parents from two statements Carri made about her 
film after its completion (the paratext) and from several clues within the film itself (the 
text). In interview, Carri was asked: ‘Why did you decide to have yourself played by an 
actress at certain points in the film?’:  
 
I thought about this a thousand times. At one point, I thought about fictionalizing 
everything, but I could not have actors taking the parts of my mother and father. 
So I decided instead to fictionalize my present. To me it seemed important that the 
viewer be left with the feeling that it is impossible to reconstruct the memory. And 
that the memory is more a state of mind than anything else. 
(Ministerio de Educación, Argentina (Bibliteca y Materiales Didácticos) 2010)214  
 
 
214 Interviewer: ‘¿Por qué decidiste que por momentos se interpretara una actriz?’  
Carri: ‘Pasé por mil instancias. En algún momento pensé en ficcionalizar todo, pero no podía llamar a  
actores para que hagan de mi madre y de mi padre. Entonces decidí ficcionalizar mi presente. Me  
pareció importante que el espectador se quede con esa sensación de que es imposible reconstruir la  
memoria. Y que el recuerdo es más un estado de ánimo que otra cosa.’  
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A key part of this reply is the refusal to trespass on the bodies of her parents; Carri could 
simply ‘not have’ actors playing her parents. The refusal to fictionalise her parents is not a 
refusal of their fictionalisation in the representational sphere. Again and again in the film, 
people describe, remember and reminisce about Carri’s parents. None of these depictions, 
these fictionalisations, seem to make much impression on Carri (as played by Couceyro); 
they remain alien descriptions of unknown people with whom “Carri” seems to feel no 
connection. Carri treats these depictions with ironic distance or bafflement but does not 
refuse them a place in her film; there is no effort to ‘not have’ these depictions. In 
presenting these fictionalisations, these representations, the double once again has a 
double function. First, to allow Carri through Couceyro to express her disconnection from 
other people’s “versions” of her parents; and secondly, and conversely, to allow Carri to 
view her parents dispassionately as the Couceyro double is not emotionally vulnerable to 
what she is hearing (as Carri herself, doubtless would be). The double is the mirror that 
allows Carri to see the reflection of the “Medusa” rather than confronting the Medusa 
directly. But what Carri absolutely refuses is the corporeal impersonation of her parents – a 
bodily substitution – in the body of an actor. It is this that generates a red line that cannot 
be crossed.215 
 
Carri’s refusal to have the bodies of her parents impersonated, seems in stark contrast to 
the approach taken by a group of six Argentinian actors in Lola Arias’s seminal 2009 play, 
Mi vida después [My Life After], where the actors – all children of parents who were caught 
up in the state terror of 1976-83 – take the parts of their parents and re-enact on stage 
what they know of what happened to their parents: ‘As if they were their parents’ stunt 
doubles, they put on their clothes and try to represent their lives’ (quotation from Lola 
Arias’s note in the original theatre programme for Mi vida después quoted by: Perez 2013: 
6). This contrast with Carri’s approach, though, may be more superficial than it at first 
appears. These actors are not any actors; each had a direct bodily connection – through 
blood and through the nurturing they received from their parents – to those they depict. It 
seems the actors could only express their feelings about their parents by literally 
embodying them, and in so doing both try to feel as their parents felt and try to express 
their feelings towards their parents.  
 
 
215 It reminds me of the absolute refusal of the traumatised characters in Luigi Pirandello’s Six 
Characters in Search of an Author (1995 [1921]) to have themselves substituted bodily by the actors. 
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In her essay on Mi vida después, Mariana Eva Perez (2013) looks at the experience of those 
amongst the actors who, like Carri, lost their parents when they were very young. She 
invokes the work of Christopher Bollas216 on traumatic memory laid down whilst a child is 
still an infant and has not yet acquired language and entered the representational world. 
Bollas argues that the trauma is registered (inscribed) but not fully lived in a conscious 
remembered way, with the children experiencing ‘in their own bodies […] traumatic events 
for which they had no language or memory’ (Perez 2013: 10). This is exactly the sort of 
affective, bodily memory that I want to argue emerges from Carri’s exploration of her past 
in The Blonds. The actors in Mi vida después perhaps choose a different route to Carri but 
they seem to be pursuing the same object: a bodily connection to, and a bodily memory of, 
the absent parent; an embodiment of the absence.  
 
The director’s statement that accompanied the exhibition of The Blonds at various 
international film festivals, gives a little more insight into the centrality of the parental 
body to Carri. At the Pesaro Film Festival in Italy in the summer of 2006, audiences were 
provided with this statement of Carri’s: 
 
In 1999, I began doing research on the fiction of memory – objective facts placed 
before fantasies, fragmented stories placed before the impossibility of 
remembering certain elements and forgetting certain details. I immersed myself in 
this tunnel, and my erratic, ambitious and desperate search became the first half 
hour of Los Rubios. Later, trying to break up the absence of my parents (like a 
body), I was able to unite the past and present. Connecting my present as a 
director with my past, which was marked by this absence, seemed to me like an 
ambitious job, as well as impertinent and provocative. 
(Fondazione Pesaro Nuovo Cinema Onlus, 2006: 42) 
 
Carri’s statement was issued in a different translation by the organisation ‘Women Make 
Movies’ for a US showing of The Blonds in 2004. It is worth reproducing in part for its 
rendering of the key phrase about the parents’ bodies: 
 
While I was trying to rip my parents’ absence (as if it were a corpse), I managed to 
put the past together with the present.  
(Women Make Movies Release, 2004: 7) 
 
Carri’s connection to her past is through the bodies of her parents. The difficulty both 
translators appear to have had in clearly rendering the key sentence – ripping or breaking 
 
216 Perez is referencing (in particular) Bollas’s The Shadow of the Object (1987). 
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up the body or corpse of the parents – seems to me less evidence of poor translation skills 
and more revealing of the difficulty in trying to represent in words, an essentially wordless, 
bodily connection. One may assume that the translators have merely carried over into their 
translations the opacity of Carri’s original words in Spanish and her struggle to represent in 
words her “unrepresentable” feelings.217 Or, as the Botellas put it, the difficulty in 
actualising an ‘event-affect complex without representational content’. 
 
The search for the parental body in the film – Carri’s attempt to articulate and make sense 
of her feelings and the connection between her present and her past – is the search for an 
‘absence’ (as Carri has called it) at the core of her adult life. Carri describes this absence as 
a black hole: ‘My feeling is that no-one [in other accounts of the “disappeared”] has 
reached deep into that black hole that is the absence’218 (quoted in: García 2003) and goes 
on to say the black hole was the starting point of her quest that became The Blonds. Like a 
black hole in the physical universe, we know it is there because we can detect nothing of it; 
we have to conjecture its presence from its absolute “absence”. Its presence is presumed 
from the odd effects that occur around it.219  
 
 
6.4.3 Confronting the parental body: the limits of fictionalisation  
 
These effects are apparent in The Blonds in a scene shot at the Center for Forensic 
Anthropology. This non-government organisation (Equipo Argentino de Antropología 
Forense or EAAF) has been investigating the plight of the “disappeared” since the mid-
1980s: collecting written and oral accounts of victims, and attempting to locate and identify 
corpses at various mass burial sites through the matching of DNA taken from the bodies of 
the disappeared to that of surviving relatives.  
 
217 I have not managed to find a copy of Carri’s original statement in Spanish on which these two 
translations must be based (despite contacting Carri herself through Cinemargentino – she no longer 
has a copy of her own statement). The “missing” original Spanish text, seems to have replicated in 
my research, the predicament Carri found herself in. I find myself with plenty of other people’s 
translations floating around the edges of the missing core text, just as Carri had plenty of other 
people’s memories (translations) floating around the edges of the missing core that was her parents. 
Perhaps this doesn’t matter, as it is clear, even from translations, that Carri was only able to put her 
past together with her present when she came to focus on her parents’ absent bodies/corpses. 
218 ‘Mi sensación es que nadie ha metido la mano en ese agujero negro que es la ausencia.’  
219 Carri is not alone in reaching for an astronomical metaphor when trying to describe her 
experience of a “disappearance”. The filmmaker and some of the interviewees in Patricio Guzmán’s 
2010 documentary exploration of the Chilean disappearances, Nostalgia for the Light, also look to 
the stars to find ways to represent and describe the experience. 
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Very soon after we enter the offices of the EAAF, the soundtrack becomes a dull roar – a 
kind of white noise – and all external sounds are not just muffled but obliterated. The 
strange soundtrack starts as soon as the camera begins to pick out photographs on the 
office walls of human skulls (presumably excavated from mass graves of the disappeared). 
The soundtrack continues as we see the EAAF representative talking to “Carri” (Analía 
Couceyro). His lips move in speech and he presses the end of a retractable ballpoint pen 
but we hear no click when the button on the top of the pen is pressed and we hear no 
recording of what the representative is saying, just the roaring sound. It is akin to that 
sound of the rushing of our own blood in our ears. I think we must assume it is a recreation 
of the roaring sound inside the head of Carri as she films and observes the scene – an 
internal diegetic sound – not an extra-diegetic sound effect (although technically, of 
course, it is the latter). The absence of synchronised sound brings an uncanny, disquieting 
feel to this scene. We, as viewers, are plunged into deafness and trapped inside our own 
heads. The moving footage we are watching recedes as if it were a disturbing dream. Our 
eyes tell us we are present but our ears make us feel a long way away. There is the 
sensation of an out-of-body experience or, perhaps, an absolutely locked into our own body 
experience.220 This scene is the first in the film in which Carri comes close to the bodies, the 
corpses, of her parents. The corpses on the walls of the Center are a far cry from the verbal 
descriptions, the photographic images from life or the academic texts that have so far 
represented her parents. And although the Carri we see in this scene remains calm as ever, 
the soundtrack tells a different story and has been designed, we must assume, to convey to 
the viewer the terror or disturbance Carri felt during filming.  
 
There is then an abrupt cut back to synchronised sound as the EAAF representative 
prepares to take a blood sample from Couceyro: he assembles the necessary equipment; 
dons latex gloves; lays a circular piece of filter paper on his desk ready to absorb the blood. 
The blood sample is taken and Couceyro signs the required paperwork. At this point, 
Albertina Carri breaks in and says: ‘Aren’t you going to stick me?’ (meaning Aren’t you 
going to take my blood sample?). The whole procedure is undertaken again using the blood 
from the real Albertina Carri’s finger and her samples are bagged up to go to the lab. 
 
220 Similar sound techniques were used to disturbing effect in the diving-bell scenes in the film The 
Diving Bell and the Butterfly (2007), as director Julian Schnabel attempted to make the viewer feel 
the terror of the film’s hero Jean-Dominique Bauby, who is left with “locked-in syndrome” after a 
stroke. 
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Although, again, Carri remains calm during these exchanges and procedures, what is 
striking is that Carri has broken a rule of her own notoriously rule-breaking film. Carri’s 
interventions elsewhere in the film are all essentially acts of Brechtian estrangement that 
unmask the constructed, artificial nature of the documentary-making process and serve to 
distance the viewer from the narrative. Without exception, Carri’s other interventions in 
The Blonds – her continual breaking of documentary’s fourth wall – are the interventions of 
a director as she makes a film: Carri’s voice saying ‘Make sure I’m not in frame’ heard over 
the first Playmobil scene; Carri instructing Couceyro in how to recite her list of “hates”; etc. 
Here for the first and only time, Carri breaks into the scene being shot and insists that she 
has to replace her double. She is saying my double isn’t the real thing; only I am the real 
thing, or, to put it another way, everything can be fictionalised including myself in the body 
of Analía Couceyro but not the blood that ran in the veins of Ana María Caruso and Roberto 
Carri. Carri’s unbreakable bond to her parents – a bond of blood, of DNA – crashes through 
the fourth wall of Carri’s film not in an act of distancing disconnection but as a revelation of 
an unbreakable bodily connection between parents and daughter. I cannot decide from 
watching the scene whether Carri’s intervention was a spontaneous act that occurred, 
unrehearsed in the filmic present or whether Carri had planned her intervention. I actually 
do not think this really matters as either way it reveals, through presentation or re-
presentation, the power of the visceral, bodily connection. 
 
There is then a cut back to Analía Couceyro playing “Albertina Carri”. She is looking at a 
drawing on the wall of the Center; it is a diagram with crudely-drawn human figures spread 
out in various positions across two sheets of paper. It is hard to know what it depicts but it 
appears to be a map of the positions of bodies within a geographical space, and I assume it 
is a map of a mass burial site the EAAF has excavated. The soundtrack changes once more 
over these pictures. Again, it is disconcerting although no longer the roaring sound heard 
earlier but distorted, high-pitched, screeching sounds reminiscent of distant screams.  
 
The sound track was probably created by running sound tape of human speech in fast 
forward and/or rewind through a tape recorder with the volume turned on. This hypothesis 
gains veracity when we become aware of the mechanical “clunks” that punctuate the 
recordings; “clunks” that sound like the stop button being pressed on the recorder/player 
and then the fast-forward or rewind button being pressed again to allow the resumption of 
the high-pitched screeching sound. If these disturbing sounds, these screams, were created 
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by tampering with audio tapes of speech (as I suspect) then they could be construed as 
another comment on documentary testimony. The voices of interviewees have been 
reduced to meaningless screeches, but screeches filled with affect and pain when 
juxtaposed against the images of the dead on the walls of EAAF Center. For all the 
recordings of people’s memories of Carri’s parents – accurate memories, false memories, 
other people’s memories – Carri is no nearer to a coherent, meaningful picture. When we 
approach the bodies of the disappeared in the Center – the bones and blood of the dead – 
all these representations in words disintegrate into an inarticulate wail of pain; the screams 
of the dead or the screams of the living who have been left behind. 
 
Two other scenes later in the film also make this bodily connection; and in both, as in the 
scene at the EAAF offices, it is in part through the sound edit that Carri signals their 
importance. In the first of these, Couceyro visits the police station and the cells where 
Carri’s parents were detained and tortured. As Couceyro approaches the cells, a much 
more muted version of the “roaring” sound effect that we heard over the opening scene at 
the EAAF, is used again. Although more muted and layered over synchronised sound, it is 
nevertheless fully audible and is reprised in this scene where again Couceyro/Carri comes 
close to the bodies of her parents. Here the bodily proximity is a geographical proximity, as 
she visits the very site and the very room in which her parents were imprisoned and 
tortured.  
 
The other “scene” is really a quite complex series of scenes in which the bodies of cows 
being beaten, prodded and herded into pens come to represent – to stand in for – the 
tortured bodies of Carri’s parents (and remind the viewer that political prisoners of the 
1970s were routinely tortured with electric cattle prods). The concluding scene of the 
series with the cattle is set up earlier when Couceyro (in her role as Albertina Carri) 
recounts an uncanny story. She says that she and a friend were in a picture-framing shop 
when by chance she came across some incredible photographs of cows in a 
slaughterhouse. The photos really moved both Carri and her friend. Couceyro (playing 
Carri) recalls: 
 
My friend said: “The person who made these has been tortured.”  
And I thought: “The photos are great, my friend’s nuts.”  
The photographer’s name was Paula. Just Paula. 
[…] 
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My sister called me weeks later, crying, and told me that she had met the only 
survivor from the detention center where they’d held my parents. The survivor was 
the same photographer. 
 
After a short break, the story continues: 
 
She [Paula, the photographer] doesn’t want us to film her. She refuses to talk. She 
said: “I never talked when they tortured me […] I’m not talking on camera.” I 
wonder how does a camera resemble electric torture? […] How does a camera 
resemble a hatchet for killing cows? 
 
Shortly after this scene, Couceyro is back at the farm where Carri grew up, helping the 
gauchos to herd cattle into a pen. The gauchos use force to beat the bullocks into line so 
they can be injected (presumably with antibiotics). The bullocks show signs of pain and 
distress as they are “sticked” (injected). In the middle of the scene, the strange, disturbing 
sound effects – similar to those heard at the EAAF offices – begin again. The pictures we 
see of the cattle also become stranger at this moment; they are slowed down and jumpy (a 
number of frames have been removed from the original footage to achieve this effect). As 
a viewer, we are back in the same, disturbing territory we inhabited at the EAAF office. We 
are in no doubt that the sweating, terrified bodies of the bullocks on the farm are the same 
terrified bodies of cattle depicted in Paula’s photographs (which we never see) and they in 
turn are the bodies of Carri’s parents at the detention centre as they were tortured. As 
Couceyro/Carri comes close to these bodies on the farm, we as viewers experience Carri’s 
terror or disturbance through the careful manipulation of the sound and the pictures we 
hear and see on screen.  
 
Each time Carri comes close to the bodies of her parents – at the EAAF, in the police cells, 
with the cattle on the farm – strange and disturbing effects occur. It is on these occasions 
when the film is furthest from A.O. Scott’s (2004) description of it as ‘a vacuum in which its 
powerful, confrontational moments lose their force, the trauma of the past pushed nearly 
out of reach.’ These are the powerful moments, when the viewer is made to feel the 
disturbance and to know they are in the presence of trauma. But the thing itself, the core, 
is indeed a vacuum or, better, a black hole whose presence we can detect only from the 
odd effects that occur around it. And these effects are not spontaneous occurrences caught 
on camera or sound tape in the filmic present (as is the case in The Act of Killing). They are 
filmic effects, engineered in the edit or signalled by the breaking of a convention that had 
been established elsewhere in the film. They are mediated, constructed, conscious 
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attempts to represent the “unrepresentable” core of Carri’s constitutional absence; 
attempts to convey the intense feeling of absence, of connection to and disconnection 
from the parental body, that Carri feels. If one is open to these moments, they have a live 





6.5 Taking stock: suspended between fictions at the mid-point 
of the self-analytic process 
 
The intensity of Albertina Carri’s affective response to the proximity of the parental body, I 
want to argue, is the key to understanding the film and also the key to understanding the 
film as a self-analytic, meaning-seeking process that unfolds over time. But at this juncture 
in the film, meaning has yet to emerge for the Carri we see in the diegesis. The deployment 
of fictional films-within has revealed the black hole of absence in all its starkness: the 
fictions stripping away both false and alien memories (other people’s memories) and 
childhood attempts to understand the loss of her parents, leaving (for Carri I think, and this 
viewer certainly) an intense, aching sense of absence. This is the black hole that opened up 
when the parental bodies were wrenched away from the infant Carri. But it is these 
parental bodies that offer a way to understand the trauma, as whatever Carri loses and 
discards in representational content over the course of the film, she recovers (or reveals to 
the viewer and herself) as affective content through her intense bodily connection to her 
lost parents.  
 
At this point in my film analysis – a point that coincides with a certain juncture in the film 
as I have yet to analyse the last few scenes in the last fifteen minutes of The Blonds – we 
have moved closer and closer to the essence of Carri’s constitutional absence, but still it 
evades us and her. It is a point in the film that corresponds to the moment in Freud’s 
Constructions in Analysis (1937b) when the analyst has offered a fiction, a bait of 
falsehood, and the analysand has been touched or the moment in Hamlet when Claudius is 
watching the play-within and he blenches. The protagonist’s powerful affective, somatic 
response to the fictional play or fictional construction suggests that we are approaching 
something of importance – a ‘carp of truth’ as Polonius calls it – but what that might be 
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remains to be interpreted and understood. It corresponds to those moments in The Act of 
Killing when Anwar Congo confronts one of his own filmic fictions – whether in playing a 
role or in witnessing himself playing a role – and this elicits a powerful affective or somatic 
response. At these moments, Anwar Congo has yet to understand what these bodily 
blenches might mean (and apparently, even after reflection, he is only able to do so to a 
limited extent with much remaining as symptomatology). It is a point that we might see as 
suspended between fictions. Fictions have brought the unrepresented core of the trauma 
into view. For Carri, that core seems to be the unshakeable connection to the missing 
parental body that cannot be trespassed upon and cannot and must not be fictionalised. If 
Carri can understand what this means for her – if she can interpret her own affective 
responses – she may be able to find a less painful accommodation with her past. But this 
accommodation itself might require the creation of new fictions, soothing fictions, 
symbolisations, like the one Ernst constructed out of a cotton reel and a piece of string as 





6.6 The picture and the frame 
 
6.6.1 Finding a secure psychic frame or how to theorise a black hole 
 
But before considering whether Carri is able to construct a meaningful account of her 
traumatic past, I want to offer an interpretive structure for thinking about the parental 
body. It draws on the work of André Green and Donald Winnicott, and provides a way to 
conceptualise the black hole, the void, of parental absence.221 It begins with André Green’s 
ideas on ‘the work of the negative’ and more specifically on what he calls ‘the framing 
structure’. In this work on the psychic development of the child, Green argues that whilst 
the mother’s representation may be replaced by substitutes, the crucial thing is the 
introjection of a secure bodily sense of the mother which acts as an empty frame, holding 
psychic space, and providing the foundation for all later secure psychic development.  
 
 
221 My comments on Green and Winnicott in this section are indebted to an unpublished conference 
paper by Rachel Chaplin (2016). 
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When we think of the early mother-child relationship in Winnicottian terms, we 
realise the importance of holding. When a separation occurs, the baby is left alone. 
The mother’s representation may be suspended and replaced by many substitutes. 
What is of the greatest importance is the introjected construction of a framing 
structure [structure encadrante] analogous to the mother’s arms in the holding. 
This framing structure can tolerate the absence of representation because it holds 
the psychic space, like Bion’s container. As long as the framing structure holds the 
mind, the negative hallucination can be replaced by hallucinatory wish-fulfilment 
or fantasy. 
(2000: 102-3; Green’s italics) 
 
Taking Green’s theoretical speculations and placing them alongside the screen character, 
Albertina Carri, we see a principal protagonist who has an intense sense of connection to 
her parents. Is this an indication that the framing structure has held? Could the powerful 
sense of bodily connection felt by Carri to her parents be taken to be a bodily sense 
(although it is of course psychic) of a mother’s arms holding and containing her?;222 a sense 
that can, not without difficulties and pain, ‘tolerate the absence of representation’ and 
hold ‘the psychic space’? The black hole that Carri has said is at her core (and is revealed 
more starkly over the course of the film as she strips away and discards the representations 
of others) is the absence of representation. We might take this for the negative 
hallucination as described by Green but we have also witnessed Carri’s ability to bear the 
process of stripping the past back to the negative and this could be construed as a sign of 
psychic strength (an ability to tolerate the negative). An increasingly blank canvas is 
revealed but one that may sit within a secure psychic frame. In Winnicottian terms, does 
Carri have enough good-enough mothering inside her to tolerate the negative? But the film 
tells us nothing about the parenting Carri received as an infant (and the adult Carri is 
without memory of this time). What we do discover in the film is that Carri’s aunt and uncle 
were able to provide a happy home for Carri on the farm after her parents’ deaths (and we 
see this environment reproduced in the early Playmobil scenes in The Blonds). Is this the 
firm ground and the base on which she might be able to build? Is this a solid frame into 
which Carri might, eventually, be able to place a picture (a ‘substitute’ representation)?  
 
Green, though, reminds us of what can go wrong (and this quotation follows on directly 
from the one above): 
 
 
222 I am following Green’s and Winnicott’s usage of mother/maternal here, but this does not exclude 
paternal holding or even extra-parental holding, and really designates the crucial early bonding of 
the baby with whoever is the care-giver. 
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But when the baby is confronted by the death experience, the frame becomes 
unable to create substitute representations – it holds only the void. This means the 
non-existence of the object or of any substitute object. The negative hallucination 
of the object cannot be overcome; the negative does not lead to an alternative 
positive substitution. Even the badness of the object and fantasised 
destructiveness will not do. It is the mind, that is, mental activity giving birth to 
representations, which is under threat of being destroyed, in the frame. At other 
times it is the framing structure itself that is damaged; here we have disintegration. 
(Green 2000: 103) 
 
In Carri’s ruthless stripping away and questioning of representations that once stood in for 
her parents – discarding all the not-Carri representations – there feels a very real danger 
that she will be left with nothing but the void, with a traumatising, unshiftable negative 
hallucination. Carri does rail at ‘the badness of the object’ in the scene where Couceyro 
enacts Carri’s rage at the mother who deserted her (Couceyro spinning and screaming) but 
as the rage subsides, Carri’s mother (parents) returns to intangibility, to absence, with Carri 
describing her parents as a ‘whim’: a void of unfulfilled desire; a wish as impotent as her 
birthday wishes. Perhaps the danger for Carri (which Green outlines in a further gloss of 
Winnicott’s speculations) is that ‘non-existence, will become, the only thing that is real’ and 
that it will take ‘possession of the mind, erasing representations of the object that  
preceded its absence. This is an irreversible step, at least until treatment.’ (Green 2000: 
104). Is this Carri’s fate and predicament? Is there only a black hole – a negative 
hallucination – that has become ‘the only thing that is real’? 
 
My reading of The Blonds suggests otherwise. To ground this argument, I will need to take 
a detour back through the work of Freud and Winnicott. As so often with Freud, he had 
already stumbled across the notion of the negative hallucination long before Green seized 
upon it, but consigned it, unelaborated, to a footnote in an essay that was driving in a 
different direction. In A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams he writes: 
‘I may add by way of supplement that any attempt to explain hallucination would have to 
start out from negative rather than positive hallucination.’ (1917 [1915]: 232; footnote 3; 
italics in Standard Edition). More directly relevant to my purposes here is Freud’s 
observation of his two-year-old grandson’s fort-da game, where the traumatising absence 
of the mother – experienced as non-existence – precipitates representation and 
symbolisation: absence (non-existence) precedes representation; representation is a 
response to traumatic absence; and a representation has the potential to catalyse the 
emergence of a meaningful account (a symbolisation of the trauma). Winnicott takes a step 
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back from Freud’s chronological point of observation and asks how the child is able to 
develop a mind that can use a cotton reel and two words (fort/da) in this way? He takes a 
perhaps surprising direction, insisting that the infant needs a comforting illusion (a fiction) 
and that illusion is a normal, non-pathological phenomenon (Chaplin 2016: 2). He even 
suggests that it is the mother’s task to support the infant in the illusion that what the infant 
creates, really exists. This sounds like folie à deux and indeed ‘[t]here is madness here 
which is permissible’ (Olive Stevenson quoted in: Winnicott 2017: Volume 4: 298). The 
symbolising ego grows through or out of illusion, temporarily sanctioned and protected. 
Illusion provides  
 
an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both 
contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim is made on its 
behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the individual engaged in the 
perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate and yet 
interrelated. 
(1990 [1971]b: 3; Winnicott’s italics)  
 
Winnicott then takes this theorisation one step further. If illusion is necessary for 
symbolisation, so is gradual disillusion arrived at through failure. As the mother 
progressively fails to adapt to the infant, the infant butts into external reality, the 
otherness of the mother, the world outside its omnipotence. This is another “impossible” 
parenting task, to fail the infant at the right speed. Too fast a disillusionment and the infant 
is traumatised; too slow and the folie à deux persists (Chaplin 2016: 3).  
 
The Blonds could be read as Carri’s third attempt to negotiate maternal (parental) absence. 
The first attempt, as I have said, is a conjecture on my part that the infant Carri – like every 
other infant – must have negotiated this traumatising absence in her own way with her 
own illusions. The second attempted negotiation was precipitated by the sudden 
disappearance of Carri’s parents when she was three; an event that must have undone any 
soothing illusions the little Carri had developed to cope with absence (and the thoughts 
that had gradually superseded those initial, soothing illusions) re-exposing the negative 
hallucination beneath it. This second, terrifying encounter with “non-existence” was a 
confrontation with what Green calls ‘the death experience’, which begs the question of 
whether the little Albertina Carri would be left with the void, where the ‘negative 
hallucination of the object cannot be overcome’ and where ‘the negative does not lead to 
an alternative positive substitution.’ This second negotiation is represented in the film in 
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various scenes from the dumb play (the Playmobil play-within), as Carri stages the struggle 
of her younger self to find a soothing illusion or a positive substitution to fill the void. We 
see a pair of Playmobil figures arriving at the farm whilst Couceyro tells us in voice over: 
‘The farm was a land of fantasy, where all my memories begin. I would see my parents 
arriving by car, by bus, on horseback.’ This fantasy is echoed in Carri’s recurrent birthday 
wish for her parents return as she blows out her birthday candles (which Carri presents in 
the spoken play-within through her double Couceyro). But this attempt at a positive 
substitution fails as it crashes into the brute facts of outer reality – her parents never return 
– and it gives way to the Playmobil scene of alien abduction. The fantasy has now adapted 
itself to outer reality but in so doing, it has fixed the traumatic absence as permanent and 
irreversible. For the child Carri growing up on the farm, the illusion of alien abduction could 
never have been soothing but seems instead to be a representation of her too fast a 
disillusionment as her mother (parents) literally “disappeared”, leaving her trapped in a 
perpetual, melancholic repetition of the moment of the traumatising disappearance. The 
little Albertina Carri did manage to fill the void but the substitution she achieved was a 
traumatising substitution. And as an adult, Carri puts other traumatising pictures into this 
empty frame: Paula’s photographs of cattle in an abattoir representing the bodies of the 
tortured “disappeared”; and the tortured bodies of the bullocks on her uncle’s farm. The 
adult Albertina Carri who decided to make the film that came to be The Blonds, presents 
herself as caught in a trap of perpetually repeating (and re-traumatising) substitute 
representations of the parental disappearance.  
 
This brings us to what theoretically we might imagine to be Carri’s third attempt to 
negotiate maternal (parental) loss, which we witness in great detail; that negotiation is the 
film The Blonds itself. The film as a whole is a search for a representation, a positive 
substitution which can replace the failed and traumatising substitutions of childhood. But 
for most of the film, Carri rejects all substitutions: the failed historic and psychic residues of 
her childhood substitutions are ruthlessly stripped away along with the substitute 
representations and alien memories of others, as she pares her past back to the bare bones 
of what she really knows or what she really feels. It is as if Carri is aware that she has to 
start again from the negative hallucination, a psychic ground zero, as arguably she had 
done twice before. For me as a viewer, Carri’s ruthlessness, lack of sentimentality and use 
of ironic distance in achieving this ground zero seemed fraught with dangers. I feared that 
she would be left only with the void, reconfronting the death experience and unable to 
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replace the negative hallucination with a positive substitution. It is an interpretation that 
developed out of my initial counter-transference onto the filmic object; an agonising sense 
of frustration where nothing felt tangible or certain, where there seemed to be nothing but 
a void. It is a fear of this “nothingness” that Carri herself expresses in the film when she 
says ‘I have to think of something. Something that will be a movie’. She is desperate to find 
a substitute representation to put in the frame that is her documentary project. 
 
But by the end of the film, this feeling has dissipated and it finishes on a guardedly 
optimistic note.223 Carri, the director, does not leave us with a picture of the character 
“Albertina Carri” experiencing ‘disintegration’ or confronting a ‘negative hallucination of 
the object [that] cannot be overcome’ (the psychic dangers that Green describes). I 
reached this conclusion both by contemplating the filmic object itself (The Blonds viewed 
from the outside as a single coherent text) and from the specific content of the film, and 
especially from the scenes in the film’s concluding fifteen minutes. The filmic object as a 
whole is a picture of a mind representing itself in the act of representing; a mind 
representing and failing to represent a psychic predicament. But the failing to represent is 
itself represented in the film; it is not the void of non-representation. From this 
perspective, the secure frame is not a psychic capacity we search for in the filmic character 
“Albertina Carri” but the frame of the documentary which is a container for all these 
representations including the failed representations. The frame seems to have held.  
 
And turning away from the film object as a whole to the specific narrative content of 
scenes within the film (the pictures Carri places in the frame), by the end of the film we do 
not witness the protagonist’s disintegration but a protagonist working through and coming 
to terms with the past.  
 
 
6.6.2 Putting a picture in the frame (or bridging the void)  
 
In the last few scenes in the closing fifteen minutes of the film, we see what appear to be 
positive substitutions – non-traumatising pictures are placed within the frame of the 
documentary – which suggest there is a possibility of escaping the traumatising void: that it 
 
223 Several critics point to this feeling of optimism at the end of the film, for example Nouzeilles 
(2005), Bystrom (2009), Page (2009), Sosa (2013). 
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might be possible to find or create a soothing (meaningful) account to lay over the 
traumatic past and fill the void. The film’s closing sequence of scenes begin with Carri and 
her crew back at her aunt and uncle’s farm, standing outside in the depths of the night, 
with a single, dim light throwing long shadows of their bodies onto the ground. It is, in a 
literal sense, the darkest point of the film. But the sound track moves in a slightly different 
direction; it is of cicadas and other night-time country sounds, and recalls, through sound, 
the film’s relatively positive opening scene of the Playmobil farm at night. At this point, a 
series of cryptic texts float across the screen: 
 
If all the world could be like that 
like memories 
I would love all mankind 
and happily die for it 
 
It seems that Carri craves memories (positive memories) and so seems to be searching for 
something positive to fill the void; something like the happy childhood memories she 
formed on the farm where ‘I fell in love with the horses, the cows, with my uncle Federico 
and with getting up early.’ In the next scene, night time has given way to the first 
glimmerings of dawn; the red glow of the morning sun still below the horizon. There is a 
cut to the crew waking up in an out-building on the farm with the early dawn still visible 
through the windows. They prepare coffee. All of them now possess blond wigs, which they 
brush, before heading out into the new day with their film equipment. The crew chat 
happily to each other, laughing (although we cannot make out the words). A male voice 
then begins to sing a ballad, which continues throughout the remaining scenes shot at 
dawn on the farm, throughout the closing credits and on through a final (“post-end”) scene 
that comes in the middle of the closing credits. The song’s lyrics act as a commentary on 
what we are seeing at the end of the film and, to some extent, on the film as a whole. 
Although this is not announced to the viewer, the song is called Influencia by the hugely 
popular Argentinian singer and rock star, Charly García (a fact that would not be lost on an 
Argentinian audience).224 
 
As the song continues, the pre-credits closing scene begins with Analía Couceyro, in blonde 
wig, walking away from the camera into the distance down a long, muddy, farm track. We 
 
224 Influencia was originally a Todd Rundgren song, Influenza (1982). In the 1970s, García was a 
member of the band La Máquina de Hacer Pájaros whose 1977 album Películas (‘Movies’) contained 
several political songs directed against the military junta responsible for the disappearances.  
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then cut back to Albertina Carri saying to the crew: ‘It’s better. The film ends with Analía 
alone. It’s more beautiful.’ But what we actually see immediately after this is the whole 
crew of five, including Albertina and Analía, all wearing blond wigs in the dawn sun, walking 
away from the camera into the distance. The scene has the strangely optimistic feel of a 
band of friends (an alternative family) walking together towards a new future. The feeling 
of a positive future and new beginnings is generated in part by the use of that common 
literary and filmic trope of a new dawn signifying a new beginning, in part by a sense that in 
dressing up and wearing wigs the crew have become like children happy in their creative 
play, and in part by the lyrics and the tempo of the song. Is this Carri’s positive substitution, 
her comforting illusion that can fill the void and rescue her from the danger Green sees 
when ‘non-existence, will become, the only thing that is real’? 
 
In thinking about this question, the temporal dimension is crucial. The dawn scene is not a 
flight from the past and a rush towards a rose-tinted vision of the future – such a solution 
would be fragile and liable to collapse back into trauma when the past caught up with Carri 
– it is rather a scene that links Carri and her crew to the past as well as the future. The five-
person crew mirrors or “doubles” Albertina Carri’s nuclear family with its five members: 
the parents, Ana María Caruso and Roberto Carri, and the three daughters, Andrea, Paula 
and Albertina. The connection is made explicit in that the crew all wear blond wigs, echoing 
the old neighbour’s comment: ‘The girls were blondes. The father was blond, the mother 
was blonde. All blonds.’ Carri seems to be making a link between (trying to integrate) her 
traumatic past and an optimistic vision of the future; a future with friends and with 
possibilities. It is perhaps the moment when Carri recovers what Eric Brenman (1980: 53-
60; and 2006) calls ‘the lost good object’. 
 
In Chapter Three, I argued that Ernst’s fort-da game was not merely a soothing illusion that 
could fill the void of maternal absence and rescue little Ernst from the nameless, shapeless 
agony of his mother’s “non-existence”. To be able to create a soothing illusion, Ernst had to 
enter the spatial and temporal world: to understand that if his mother was not here she 
still existed somewhere else; and to understand that if his mother was not present now, 
she had been present in the past and would be again in the future. In Rosine Perelberg’s 
gloss of the developmental moment Freud observed in his grandson, she argues it is in this 
moment that ‘the whole of psychic reality, in its positive and negative aspects, is structured 
in terms of time and space.’ (2008: 2). If, as I have argued, the film The Blonds is Carri’s 
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third attempt to deal with maternal absence, then the temporal integration of past, 
present and future must form part of this third attempt if it is to be successful.  
 
Carri herself was fully aware of the importance of the temporal dimension in the directorial 
statement that accompanied the release of the film. 
 
Later, trying to break up the absence of my parents (like a body), I was able to unite 
the past and present. Connecting my present as a director with my past, which was 
marked by this absence, seemed to me like an ambitious job, as well as impertinent 
and provocative. 
(Fondazione Pesaro Nuovo Cinema Onlus, 2006) 
 
and in the alternative translation: 
 
While I was trying to rip my parents’ absence (as if it were a corpse), I managed to 
put the past together with the present. 
(Women Make Movies Release, 2004: 7) 
 
Carri does say ‘past and present’ in this statement rather than past and future, but I think 
Carri’s statement entails a notion of the future. It is the crew’s happy “togetherness” in the 
present that allows the optimistic vision of the future; a vision that is not yet achieved. The 
optimism for the future arises out of the putting together – the re-integration – of past and 
present. The resulting vision of the future is both Winnicott’s soothing illusion and Green’s 
positive hallucination; illusion and hallucination, that is, not in the sense of false and 
deluded but in the sense of unrealised and possible.  
 
Carri’s directorial statement also reminds us that she was only able to achieve this 
temporal integration by going through the bodies (the corpses) of her parents. In the 
closing sequence with the crew, Albertina Carri walks alongside her mother and her father 
(the past), their roles taken by her friends who simultaneously represent a positive vision of 
the future. The scene is a very concrete and externalised representation of Green’s 
‘introjected construction of a framing structure analogous to the mother’s arms in the 
holding’ (2000: 102-3; Green’s italics); her parents are there with her, holding her, as she 
walks on the farm. The scene suggests that the framing structure has been able to hold 
Carri’s mind and so allow the negative hallucination to be ‘replaced by hallucinatory wish-
fulfilment or fantasy’ (2000: 102-3). Or, in Winnicott’s terms, the final scene sees Carri’s 
mother, alongside her, fulfilling the mother’s task of supporting the infant (but now adult 
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Carri) in the illusion that what the infant creates, really exists.225 The introjected, bodily 
sense of a loving and protective mother has allowed Carri to gain some control over her 
traumatic past and to create the fantasy, or illusion, or hallucinatory wish for a less 
troubled future. As Perelberg goes on to say in her gloss of the fort-da story: ‘The 
constitution of the individual takes place in the context of the time-space created in the 
relationship with the mother (and her body).’ (2008: 21). By integrating the trauma of the 
past into a dynamic, temporal frame including the present and the future, Carri seems 
finally to have begun to come to terms with what she calls ‘my constitution as a person 
starting from an absence’ (Women Make Movies Release, 2004: 7). That absence, as it 
turns out, contained, or rather was contained by, an unbreakable, positive, psychic sense of 
her mother, expressed in terms of the maternal body.  
 
That everything changes in the last few minutes of the film, is evident in Carri’s changed 
attitude to blondness. For most of the film, Carri was fiercely protective of what was hers, 
forcing the false memory of blondness onto her not-Carri double, Analía Couceyro (herself, 
in turn, a double for the kidnapped and forcibly peroxided Honey Whitlock in the film Cecil 
B Demented). Carri has also spent most of the film refusing to have her parents’ bodies 
fictionalised in any way. This was an absolute red line for Carri. But in the closing, dawn 
sequence Carri herself wears a blonde wig and her parents’ bodies are fictionalised, their 
places taken by members of the crew, who not only impersonate (embody) them but wear 
blond wigs. It seems that having stripped everything in her past back to what is truly hers, 
leaving herself with no representations (a void) but with a burning sense of bodily 
connection to her lost parents, Carri was then able to fantasise again. Having found the 
outlines of the black hole at the core of her being – having returned to the negative 
hallucination – she was then able to find ‘an alternative positive substitution’ (Green 2000: 
103). In finding that substitution, it is as if Carri has been released from the prison of her 
ever-repeating traumatic past, and in finding that freedom she is also free from the 
strictures she placed upon herself and the anathemas she issued to protect the corporeal 
integrity of her parents. I am not suggesting that her intense sense of bodily connection to 
her parents no longer matters – it does profoundly – but it no longer needs to be policed so 
fiercely as she knows it is secure within her. Her parents can now be impersonated (their 
bodies replaced with those of “actors”) and fictionalised in the wearing of blond wigs.  
 
225 Winnicott’s developmental speculations also describe the nature of film where there is the 
illusion that what the director creates, really exists. 
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My reading of the last few scenes of the film is supported by a narrative commentary 
provided by the words of the song Influencia. But just before considering the song’s lyrics, 
it is worth noticing that the mere fact that Carri allows the words of a popular song to 
provide a commentary on her life and her predicament is deeply surprising (like her 
surprising decisions to allow the impersonation of her parents and the wearing of blond 
wigs). The fierce desire to pare everything down to precisely what she knows to be hers 
and the refusal to borrow the memories of others, seems to have gone. I cannot imagine 
Carri being willing to borrow the generic words of a popular song earlier in the film. It is 
only possible in the context of her transformation at the end of the film. The song’s lyrics 
can be read as Carri’s commentary on The Blonds and her attempt to find a meaningful 
account of her traumatic past. 
 
I can see and say, 
I can see and say and feel: 
Something changed 
It’s not strange for me 
I’m not gonna run 
I’m not gonna run or hide from my destiny 
I don’t think about danger 
If it’s meant for me 
I have to know, 
But it’s hard to see 
Something’s controlling me. 
Deep inside of me, 
Deep inside of me, 
I see fear 
I see suspicion 
With a new fascination. 
 
I don’t know what this is, 
you’ll know: they’re intuitions,  
warning signs. 
I have to trust myself 
I have to know 
But it’s hard to see 
When something’s controlling me 
I can see and say and feel: 
My mind, sleeping 
Under your influence. 
 
A part of me 
A part of me says STOP 
You went too far 
I can’t control it 
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I try to resist 
I try to resist but in the end 
It’s not a problem 
What a pleasure this sorrow 
If I’d be someone else 
I couldn’t understand it 
But it’s hard to see 
If something controls me 
I can see and feel and say 
My life, sleeping 
This strange influence. 
 
Throughout the film, Carri has refused to ‘run or hide’ from her ‘destiny’ but faced her 
troubled past with a ruthless disregard for herself and with a powerful sense that she must 
‘trust’ herself and her ‘intuitions’. In finding that deep bodily/psychic connection to her 
parents (which might equate to Green’s framing structure), Carri has found that thing 
that’s ‘hard to see’, ‘deep inside’ her, ‘controlling’ her. The song suggests, as one might 
suspect, that the resolution at the end of the film is not a simple-minded vision that 
everything’s fine now but rather a personal accommodation to a traumatic past, a 
pleasurable sorrow. And the song conveys a sense of what drives the whole film; Carri’s 
insistence that ‘I have to know […] I have to trust myself, I have to know’. Carri desperately 
did want to understand and painstakingly worked towards that goal. In so many 
documentaries that treat trauma, whether films with a separate director and protagonist 
or first-person films like The Blonds, the desire to know and to understand is very often the 
driving force of the narrative. As Gabriela Nouzeilles (2005: 267) writes of documentary in 
general and Carri’s documentary in particular: ‘the director and her crew take advantage of 
the resources offered by the documentary as an investigative genre driven by the desire to 
know, and based on the ideal of transparency in opposition to fiction film.’ 
 
The Blonds has one final, post-closing scene which comes in the middle of the end titles. 
This live-action scene sees Albertina Carri on the farm where she grew up, teaching her 
double, Analía Couceyro, to ride a horse and so reprises the film’s opening Playmobil farm 
scene in which we hear two female voices, one teaching the other how to ride (voices 
which continue to be heard in a subsequent scene where the picture has switched from the 
Playmobil farm to the real farm). In the context of these opening scenes, the voices are 
apparently those of the child Albertina Carri being taught to ride by an older woman 
(perhaps her aunt but certainly someone who is “mothering” her). The voices are now 
revealed to be those of Carri and Couceyro recorded during the post-closing scene. 
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The opening and closing scenes bring a structural symmetry to the film and hint at the 
tendency of trauma to repeat either in a cycle of exact repetition – a cycle of re-
traumatisation (which is essentially melancholic) – or in a cycle of repetition susceptible to 
tiny changes, suggesting the possibility of the gradual amelioration of the pain of the 
original trauma and a spiralling out of trauma (a process akin to mourning). For Gabriela 
Nouzeilles, for all the film’s demonstration of the problems of memory, this ‘does not make 
of Los Rubios a melancholic project’ rather the film ‘constitutes in itself a way of dealing 
with loss’; the film is a ‘therapeutic’ process (Nouzeilles 2005: 271). Bystrom in part 
endorses Nouzeilles’s view, seeing the “fictional” devices in The Blonds as creative and 
therapeutic strategies that allow Carri to move beyond ‘the traumatic bind – a way to 
mourn rather than to suffer from melancholy’ (Bystrom 2009: 44). What has changed 
between the opening and closing scenes suggests that Carri is able to mourn.226 The live-
action, post-closing scene not only echoes the film’s opening, “happy” scene from 
childhood, it also echoes (and indeed continues) the optimism of the immediately 
preceding scene, where Carri and her friends (her new family) walk into the distance in the 
dawn sun. The two closing scenes together offer the hint of a better future for Carri, now 
she has put her present together with her past.  
 
The geographical echo between all four of these scenes (the two closing scenes and the 
film’s two opening scenes) also seems significant. If, at the end of the film, we witness 
Carri’s perhaps successful attempt to negotiate maternal (parental) non-existence, then the 
negotiation – in an echo of the infant’s negotiation of the originary trauma – will entail a 
structuring of the subject in both time and space. The structuring in time seems to have 
been attempted in the integration of past with present and future. But the spatial 
structuring is also recognised in the setting of all four of these scenes on the farm of Carri’s 
childhood, where she formed her first memories and where she has said she was happy .  
 
The spatial dimension, like the temporal dimension, is structured in relation to the 
mother’s body, as Perelberg (2008: 21) has argued. In the opening scenes, Carri is 
“mothered” by the woman who teaches her to ride and in the closing scenes there is a 
 
226 Bystrom’s characterisation of the process of making The Blonds as a therapeutic process of 
mourning, is similar to Laplanche’s characterisation of the psychoanalytic process as a process of 
mourning (a coming to terms with loss (see: Ray 2012: 56)); and Alisa Lebow’s (2008) 
characterisation of her own filmmaking practice as a process of coming to terms with loss. 
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return of the mother’s body to the same place. In the closing, dawn scene the mother is 
present on the farm, her part taken by a member of the crew in blonde wig. In the post-
closing horse-riding scene, the mother also returns, but this time as a quality or a psychic 
capacity embodied in the daughter, Albertina Carri. Carri’s capacity to act as a patient and 
loving teacher to Couceyro, suggests that Carri holds enough good mothering inside her to 
be able to use it to care for others (whether or not the source of this psychic capacity is 
Carri’s actual biological mother). One can conceptualise this capacity in Carri either as an 
expression of the internal mother (in the language of object relations) or as a manifestation 
of the introjected framing structure of the mother’s enclosing and protecting arms (in the 
language of André Green). Again, there is a sense of doubling here, with Carri taking the 
role of her mother looking after her daughter, Albertina, represented in this post-closing 
horse-riding scene (as she is throughout the film) by the actress-double, Analía Couceyro. 
In this reading, there is a sense of resolution in this scene. Albertina Carri – at least 
psychically or in fantasy – is reunited with her mother, becoming her mother, embodying 
her mother. Carri’s optimism at the end of the film seems a riposte to, and a resolution of, 
her own pessimistic despair earlier in the film when she said (through Couceyro): ‘To 
develop yourself without the one who gave you life becomes an obsession, at odds with 
daily life, disheartening. Since most of the answers have been lost in time.’ 
 
That Carri has been able to find a positive substitution to replace the negative hallucination 
she so ruthlessly exposed earlier in the film, suggests that she has not fallen into the 
desperate trap Green outlined (2000: 104): that ‘non-existence, will become, the only thing 
that is real’ and that it will take ‘possession of the mind, erasing representations of the 
object that preceded its absence.’ How did Carri avoid this fate? The answer may lie in 
what Green directly goes on to say after this statement: ‘This is an irreversible step, at least 
until treatment.’ The Blonds, I would argue, is the treatment. The film is an extended 
exercise in that enormously difficult task of self-analysis, beset by the dangers of failure, 
collapse into solipsism, self-indulgence, and ‘part explanation, behind which resistance may 
be keeping back something that is more important’ (the ‘faulty action’ that Freud describes 
(1935: 234)).  
 
Watching and re-watching the film, though, the greater danger seemed not to be self-
indulgence but that Carri’s ruthlessness towards herself will leave her more troubled – 
more acutely aware of the constitutional absence at her core – than she was when she 
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started the process. This seemed a particular danger in the manner in which she so often 
employed her double, Couceyro, who was so closely controlled that the double’s ability to 
challenge Carri and confront her like an outsider had been almost completely curtailed, 
with Couceyro as closely controlled and as without agency as the kidnapped Honey 
Whitlock in Cecil B. Demented. In these moments, Carri is the kidnapper forcing her 
narrative on Couceyro (rather than Carri as kidnap victim having other people’s narratives 
foisted upon her in a distant echo of her parents’ predicament as the powerless victims of a 
state kidnapping). But it was in moments of tenderness and in encounters when the double 
failed to provide an adequate substitute for the self that the fictional double served its 
revelatory role. In moments of tenderness – when Couceyro recounted her list of “hates” 
or when Carri taught her double Couceyro to ride – Carri seemed to recover an ability to 
“mother” herself in the person of her double and so recover elements of an introjected 
good mother or good-enough mother. And in that moment of failure in the EAAF office, 
when the double’s blood simply could not stand-in for Carri’s blood, a deeper psychic 
“truth” was revealed in the self-analysis: Carri’s intense connection to her mother 
(parents), which gave some affective content to the void. 
  
But even when in ruthless mode, Carri always appears to be on a quest for ‘self-knowledge 
obtained objectively (like an outsider)’ just as Freud prescribed for a successful self-analysis 
(Freud’s letter to Fleiss in: Freud and Masson 1985); her ruthlessness towards herself 
perhaps just an expression of that necessary, cool objectivity. And by conducting her quest 
in public – or with the knowledge that the film of the quest would become a public object 
viewed by an audience – Carri satisfies Anzieu’s condition (1986: 569) that ‘[t]here can be 
no proper self-analysis unless it is communicated to someone else.’ For any filmmaker, the 
prospect of an audience – with the threat or the promise that the work will be subject to 
criticism and scrutiny – is a powerful incentive to keep the work honest and perpetually 
questioning. Alongside the external “other” of the audience (and of course her film crew), 
Carri manages to conjure internal others – a part of the “self” that can observe another 
part of the “self” ‘like an outsider’ – through her use of a fictional double in the spoken 
film-within-the-film. And crucially, with the device of the two plays-within – both dumb and 
spoken – Carri acquires the tools both to fictionalise aspects of her history and to find 
representational forms flexible enough to describe childhood fantasies which are at once 
fictions and historically real representations of childhood illusions. Bystrom sees the plays-
within as fictions that allow Carri ‘to create a functioning “self” out of her parents’ 
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“absence”.’ They provide ‘a bridge over the hole in the real that allows Carri to move into 
the future while maintaining a connection to the past.’ The bridge may be a fiction, says 
Bystrom, but ‘like many fictions, it operates in reality’ (Bystrom 2009: 45). Bystrom’s 
comments seem particularly pertinent to the closing dawn scene where the crew in blond 
wigs walk towards a better future. The black hole – the absence – remains, but it has been 
bridged. In Green’s terms, the blank canvas within the psychic frame has been “filled in” 
with this fiction or fantasy. 
 
That said, these fictions, although necessary (psychically, therapeutically) are not 
themselves where psychic meaning emerges nor are they the psychic meaning itself. With 
The Blonds as with the other film I have dealt with in detail, The Act of Killing, the plays-
within perform a vital role but more as catalysts for the emergence of psychic meanings for 
the traumatised protagonist in the framing documentary. The revelation of the most 
profound of these psychic meanings – the intense connection of Carri to her parents 
through the blood flowing in her veins that we witness at the EAAF office – emerges when 
the spoken play (the play with the double) reaches the limits of its possibilities, and Carri 
bursts into the play from the framing documentary to say, in effect: that was just a fiction 
but this is real. It is this film’s ‘Look out, Haskell, it’s real!’-moment (recalling the incident 
when a tear gas cannister lands amongst the film crew during the shooting of Haskell 
Wexler’s fictional feature Medium Cool (1969), and the “real’ world bursts through the 
walls of the fictional diegesis). With all these devices, Carri gives herself the sophisticated 
tools required to pursue her elusive quarry: her ‘constitution as a person starting from an 
absence.’ And what she finds is the solid but unrepresented body memory of a mother 
within, which Green (2000: 103) chooses to represent metaphorically as the mother’s 
enclosing arms (‘this psychic frame analogous to the mother’s arms holding the infant’). 
What Carri manages to put in the frame in the closing scenes, is a soothing illusion or 
fiction or fantasy or wish-fulfilment (replacing false pictures and traumatising illusions); a 
bridge over the “unbridgeable” gap. But the core psychic meaning that emerges from The 
Blonds – from Carri’s filmic self-analysis – is the existence of an introjected framing 
structure within Carri, which is given tangible form in the secure frame of her documentary 
in which she places her representations; an unshakeable and steady bedrock expressed in 
her ability to keep generating representations until she finds one which “works” for her. 
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The film itself – the film as a whole – could be theorised in a variety of ways. If The Blonds is 
Carri’s attempt to (re-)negotiate the disappearance of her parents, it is the equivalent of 
Ernst’s cotton reel and piece of string but a cotton reel and a piece of string devised by a 
sophisticated, thoughtful, thirty-year-old filmmaker, not an infant just entering the world 
of representation. The film could be seen as a Winnicottian play space, a potential space 
between the opening and closing credits in which Carri finds/creates objects and arranges 
them in an attempt to represent and then symbolise the trauma. The film could also be 
seen, following Green, as a framing structure. It is a frame into which Carri places and then 
removes a variety of representations – some old representations of her own, some she 
borrows from other people – as she excavates her traumatic past before finding her own 
soothing, “meaningful” picture or fantasy to place in the frame, to fill in the blank canvas 
(the void) that she has systematically revealed in the earlier stages of the film.   
 
In Green’s theory of meaning as outlined in Chapter Three, fictions (like Polonius’s ‘bait of 
falsehood’) are deployed to prompt or catalyse meanings into existence but these 
meanings, Green reminds us, should not be mistaken for the timeless truth (the thing-in-
itself). Instead, the meanings that emerge are perhaps themselves also “fictions”, having 
the ambiguous status of the transitional object: they are both found and created, both the 
truth and a fantasy, perpetually suspended between Sleeping Beauty and Aphrodite, 
between a truth awoken and a fantasy created in the process of analysis. The meanings 
that emerge from The Blonds should be approached in the same way as Green approaches 
the meanings that emerge in analysis. It is not what the meanings are (their ontological 
status as truth or fiction) but what they do that matters. If they allow a traumatised 
protagonist to come to a less painful accommodation with their traumatic past – as seems 





 6.7 Afterlife of The Blonds: the re-kidnapping of Albertina Carri 
 
The fate of The Blonds in its afterlife as an object of academic and cultural study, frequently 
has been to repeat what Carri struggled so hard to avoid within the film. Carri refused 
other people’s memories and the versions of her history, in order to find or create her own 
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unique and personal version of her traumatic history as experienced from the inside and 
her own accommodation with that history. In the making of the film, Carri refused to be 
taken hostage and forcibly peroxided like Honey Whitlock, only for her to be taken hostage 
once more following the release of the film by friends and foes alike: Carri’s film co-opted 
to support other people’s agendas; or used as an illustration of what one is apparently 
forbidden to do in relation to a traumatic set of events. 
 
Martín Kohan is perhaps Carri’s most extreme critic and was one of the first to write about 
the film. He not only issued the Bilderverbot familiar from trauma theory (Kohan was 
outraged that Carri should trivialise the “disappearances” of the 1970s and 1980s by 
employing animated Playmobil toys as representational tools) but accuses Carri of 
narcissistic excess, of disrespect towards her parents (a ‘régimen de la discortesía’) and of 
having a superficial view of Argentina’s past and present, calling the film ‘a game of poses 
and an essay in frivolity’ (‘un juego de poses y un ensayo de levedad’) (Kohan 2004: 28; 
30).227 Kohan, like the The National Film and Audiovisual Arts Institute (whose letter Carri 
and her crew discuss in the film), demands that Carri should employ conventional 
documentary techniques and must tell the story of the parental generation’s heroic 
struggle. Kohan fails to understand that The Blonds is a personal and psychological 
exploration of Carri’s ‘constitution as a person starting from an absence’ and not a political 
film about the disappearances and that the games and the poses (the fictions) are Carri’s 
exploratory tools. Beatriz Sarlo (2007: 153) is more measured but criticises the film for its 
apolitical ‘strong subjectivity’, failing to understand (or to allow) that what Carri is exploring 
is her sense of self. And both Sarlo and Kohan attempt to marginalise Carri’s film by 
claiming it is not representative of the views and political stance of most children of the 
disappeared. 
 
Other more friendly critics try to take Carri “hostage” by co-opting The Blonds under the 
rubric of ‘postmemory’,228 Marianne Hirsch’s conceptual tool used to describe ‘the 
relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that 
preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem 
 
227 Kohan’s criticism of The Blonds is reminiscent of the fierce policing of Holocaust representation 
that was so prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s. Kohan seems to want to set similarly narrow limits to, 
and impose a list of approved methods for, the representation of the Latin American state-
sponsored murders and disappearances of the 1970s and 1980s. 
228 For example: Bystrom 2009: 45; Nouzeilles 2005: 265. 
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to constitute memories in their own right’ (Hirsch 2008: 103; my italics). A special issue of 
the Journal of Romance Studies in 2013 was devoted to questions raised by the films, 
novels, plays, photographs, etc, of the so-called post-revolutionary and post-dictatorship 
generation of Latin American artists and writers (roughly those of Albertina Carri’s 
generation). The whole issue was called “Revisiting Postmemory: The Intergenerational 
Transmission of Trauma in Post-Dictatorship Latin American Culture” (Blejmar and Fortuny, 
eds, 2013) and several of the contributors place Carri and other “artists” with very similar 
traumatic histories, into the category of postmemory. This seems to enact a double 
kidnapping of Carri. First, she is denied recognition of her direct experience of her own 
past: she is not the child of traumatised survivors but the direct subject of a traumatic loss. 
Secondly, and more broadly, there seems to be a kidnapping of the Latin American 
experience of trauma by trauma and memory paradigms developed in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust. Only one contributor resisted the ‘postmemory’ label. Marianna Eva Perez 
points to the intrinsic difference between children ‘raised by traumatized parents who 
survived Nazi concentration camps’ and those whose parents ‘disappeared’. As she puts it, 
the Latin-American filmmakers and writers are ‘orphans without a corpse’ not children of 
the traumatised; they are victims and witnesses in their own right, not secondhand victims 
and witnesses (Perez 2013: 8-9). 
 
Finally, another set of cultural critics co-opt Carri and her film to a political agenda that 
seeks to wrest ownership of the traumatic past from the families of the disappeared and to 
democratise it as the inheritance of everyone in Latin America. At the time of the 
disappearances in Argentina, the call for justice was led by the ‘Abuelas/Madres de Plaza 
de Mayo’ (‘The Grandmothers [or Mothers] of the Plaza de Mayo’) formed in 1977 and, 
with the passage of time, that leading role gradually passed to an organisation set up in 
1995 by the children of the disappeared, ‘HIJOS’ (‘Children’) or ‘Hijos por la Identidad y la 
Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio’ (‘Children for Identity and Justice Against Forgetting 
and Silence’). The political agenda of both organisations, according to Gabriela Nouzeilles 
(2005: 265), was ‘a claim for justice based on biological identity and family ties.’ A number 
of critics object to this ‘discourse of identity and genealogical interpellation’ (Nouzeilles 
2005: 273) – to this ‘DNA performance’ (Taylor 2003: 173-5) – as it excludes those without 
blood ties to victims and obscures the traumatic legacy as it plays out for all Argentinians. 
Other critics, like Cecilia Sosa, object to the conservative, catholic, nuclear-family 
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orientated agenda of (especially) the grandmothers’ organisation, and offer an alternative 
queer reading of Argentinian history and Carri’s film: 
 
For more than thirty years, this bloodline assembly of victims has commanded the 
experience of mourning, transforming the local landscape of memory struggles into 
a family issue. 
(Sosa 2014: 1-2) 
 
Sosa wants to look instead at ‘the experience of mourning beyond the boundaries of those 
who have been “directly affected” by violence’ and ‘[i]n doing so, […] seek to illuminate an 
alternative perspective to understand the transmission of trauma beyond bloodline 
inscriptions’ and so ‘contest the biological normativity that has become hegemonic’ (Sosa 
2014: 1-2). To make her case, Sosa (2013: 77) co-opts Hirsch’s latest iteration of 
postmemory – so-called ‘affliative postmemory’ (Hirsch 2012: 36) – which encompasses 
embodied forms of transmission that transcend familial ties. But affiliative postmemory 
seems a poor fit with Carri’s experience, which is ‘familial’ and is not ‘post’. 
 
Although one suspects that Carri might not object to the politics of these positions, they do 
not seem to fit very comfortably with the film Carri actually produced and the film’s 
presentation of her experience of her constitutional absence. Of The Blonds, Gabriela 
Nouzeilles writes:  
 
Against the compulsory demand of genealogical inscription, Carri suggests the 
desirability of other kinds of communities, beyond the politics of blood and party; 
that is, flexible, open communities, capable of imagining still undefined, alternative 
political projects, helping the members of a wounded society to accomplish what 
Alberto Moreiras has called el duelo del duelo, the mourning of mourning. 
(Nouzeilles 2005: 266)  
 
The optimistic closing scene of The Blonds, as Carri walks towards a new dawn with her 
crew of friends, supports Nouzeilles’s vision of an alternative future, with Carri part of a 
new, non-biological family (a flexible, open community). But this cannot mask Carri’s 
connection to her past through blood and DNA, through an unbreakable bodily bond to her 
parents revealed to the viewer in the scene at the EAAF offices. This is not the ‘politics of 
blood’ – it is not a political position that Carri has adopted – but it is a brute, primitive, 
psychic connection that finds expression in blood. And certainly, for me, Joanna Page 
(2009: 175) goes too far when she writes that ‘Carri prefers to emphasize the absence of 
those links. Rather than claiming authority on the basis of blood-ties, Los Rubios does what 
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it can to insist on the rupture of the family line.’ Whilst I can agree that Carri does not claim 
authority on the basis of blood-ties, she is only able to reclaim something for herself on 
precisely that basis, even if the tie that expresses itself as blood is ultimately an 
unconscious, psychic tie. It is all she has left of her parents; it is that profound link that 
resists rupture.  
 
In their desire to displace the central and conservative metaphor of the ‘wounded family’ in 
the process of national mourning (in which ‘memory has risked being reduced to a matter 
of blood’), Carri’s film has been seized upon by friendly critics as a disruptive, queer, 
questioning, open text that offers the possibility of a better future for Argentina’s past 
(Sosa 2013: 76). Sosa argues passionately that placing the wounded family at the heart of 
the national response to the events of the 1970s and 1980s (and making a blood-tie to one 
of the disappeared into a qualification that permits one to speak about the past), has 
damaged the national debate, undermining the possibility of an open, communal mourning 
process. As she writes: ‘this is the biological normativity that restrains the resonances of 
trauma from traveling throughout a wider society’, stifling ‘a more extensive idea of “us” 
for postdictatorial Argentina’ (Sosa 2011: 66). She writes of the final scene in The Blonds:  
 
the crew wearing blond wigs has the lightness of a visionary dream. The embryonic 
queer family walking towards the horizon has the ability to highlight something 
that is still in a process of emergence in Argentine society: a new lineage where 
past and present are joined together through an experience of shared mourning 
[…] the film enacts a dream that invents its own future.  
(Sosa 2011: 78) 
 
I find nothing to argue with in this reading of the film’s closing scene itself; it is an 
optimistic fiction or fantasy or hallucination or wish-fulfillment which Carri places over the 
blank canvas of absence. But in co-opting this closing vision to a national, political agenda, 
Sosa scotomises the powerful psychic tie expressed through blood and hair that connects 
Carri to the ‘corpses’ of her parents. This is the unrepresented, introjected, psychic framing 
structure that holds everything else in place; a frame that is required as a container for the 
optimistic or soothing fantasies, fictions or hallucinations of the closing scene. Sosa sees 
and celebrates the picture in the frame but cannot see the frame. In doing so, Carri’s very 
personal film about her struggle to find her “disappeared” parents, is taken hostage by a 
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political agenda which was not Carri’s in making this film or at least by an agenda that is not 
supported by this film.229  
 
My views are closer to those of Kerry Bystrom for whom The Blonds (and a number of 
other recent Argentinian films) 
  
present the individual subject, and not the community, society or the nation as the 
basic unit that needs to be reconstructed. They thus point to the limitations of 
filmmaking from any side of the political spectrum that threatens to overwhelm 
individual stories – sublimating individual pain into social catharsis – and suggest 
instead a documentary politics anchored in the painstaking unraveling of one’s own 
complex subject position. 
(Bystrom 2009: 48)  
 
The Blonds is a highly-personal, interior exploration of a private trauma in which the 
director is constantly trying to disentangle her psychic history from other people’s histories 
and from broader political forces that attempt to highjack her story. Carri’s vision of the 
future is important and protean but the core of the film – its profound psychic meaning – 
lies in a bodily connection between Carri and her dead parents. The film is less a political 





6.8 Afterword on fictions and identifications: the emergence of meaning 
in the various frames of The Blonds 
 
The route Carri chose to painstakingly unravel her ‘own complex subject position’ was 
through fictions – films-within-the-documentary – which she conceived and directed, and 
witnessed within the diegesis as an intra-diegetic audience member: a process made 
possible by the self-reflexive form of The Blonds and a process that bears many of the 
hallmarks of an exercise in self-analysis.  
 
 
229 I am aware that Carri has spoken in support of Sosa’s political agenda at conferences organised 
by Sosa. But my point is that notwithstanding Carri’s public political agenda, the film The Blonds 
itself seems to reveal something that challenges or at least complicates this agenda.  
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Fictions appear to have two distinct functions within the film. First, to strip away 
constructions of the traumatic past that were either alien to Carri or were unable to gain 
any purchase on the trauma (that is Carri’s past fictions and fantasies or other people’s 
“truths” that were no longer or never meaningful). Secondly, to provide a soothing vision 
of the future which integrated Carri’s past and present; what might be thought of as a 
curative fiction or at least a fiction that furthered a process of mourning and a letting go of 
the past. But to insist on too rigid a distinction between these different deployments of 
fictions is perhaps to miss the point. Freud’s story of his grandson’s game with cotton reel 
and string combined both these functions in a single fiction: the fictive, enacted narrative 
repeated over time both brought the trauma of maternal non-existence into 
representational form and simultaneously was a representation of the process of 
symbolisation, the process of working through that trauma.  
 
The fictions themselves are unimportant, what is important is what they unearth or reveal. 
Ernst’s fiction revealed – and indeed created – a psychic (developmental) capacity to hold 
aspects of the maternal function within himself: a secure, introjected mother, which 
rescued Ernst from the shapeless, nameless dread of maternal non-existence. Likewise, in 
The Blonds as in The Act of Killing, what seems important are the identifications and dis-
identifications (projections, introjections, empathetic encounters, mental contagions, 
“possessions”, etc) that the fictions bring into play. For Anwar Congo in The Act of Killing, 
some of these identifications proved so disturbing that they could only find expression in 
symptomatology and debilitating affect. The Carri we see within the diegesis of The Blonds 
seems to fare better. The unbreakable bond between Carri and her parents (that emerges 
when the fictional film-within with the double breaks down in the EAAF offices) at first only 
finds expression as affect and somatisation (distortion of vision and hearing engineered in 
the edit to recreate what we assume Carri experiences as she comes into close proximity to 
the parental bodies). But later, these affective and somatic responses are able to find 
representational form in the fiction of Carri and her parents walking into a new dawn and 
in the (non-fictional) scene where Carri teaches Couceyro to ride. The introjected, 
comforting but unrepresented maternal function (the mother’s enfolding arms or the 
framing structure) seems to have found expression and to have become meaningful for 
Carri allowing her to construct a more optimistic vision of her future. My reading through 
Winnicott and Green of an introjected framing structure seems to replicate something of 
Carri’s experience if we accept that the generic lyrics of a popular song are Carri’s 
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commentary on her changed subject position at the end of the film. She found something 
deep inside herself, controlling her, but something which nonetheless allows her to reach a 
less painful accommodation with her past. 
 
For the Carri we see within the diegesis (the inner Winnicottian viewer witnessing and 
responding to her own filmic fictions), the guarded optimism of the closing scenes emerges 
out of the complex set of projections and introjections (identifications) played out between 
herself and her fictional double and ultimately between herself and her mother (parents) 
as internal objects. Her rigid control of Couceyro seems to be an acting out by Carri of her 
experience of being kidnapped by others and being forced to accept other people’s 
accounts of her traumatic past. Carri’s double also allows her to express and witness her 
own rage and frustration through a projection of her feelings (albeit a conscious and 
choreographed projection) into her Doppelgänger. It seems that it was through this 
process, and in witnessing this process, that Carri was finally able to find what was truly 
hers.  
 
But, as I conceded at the end of the previous chapter, ultimate responsibility for the 
reading of the film rests with me as the outer Winnicottian viewer (as an extra-diegetic 
audience member) who has entered into the film and found/created my own meanings. 
The meaningful account that I have constructed began with my counter-transference onto 
the filmic object. My initial irritation developed into an almost unbearable frustration that 
nothing that emerged in the film could be relied upon, that the central character felt 
strangely disconnected from her past and that the usually affecting and meaningful tokens 
of realist documentary were drained of meaning and affect. My reading took shape once I 
recognised these feelings as a reflection – an intuition in the counter-transference – of the 
central character’s psychic predicament, which she described as her ‘constitution as a 
person starting from an absence’. This gaping hole swallowed everything, including the 
central character’s ability to view her own plight without irony, only heightening the 
excruciating feeling of nothingness. Having made some sense of my counter-transference 
onto the filmic object, I was then able to appreciate the last segment of the film as 
transformatory rather than simply as a continuation of a frustrating ‘game of poses and an 





This thesis began as an attempt to understand why a number of recent documentaries that 
deal with traumatic personal histories, reach for fictions or forms of representation more 
usually associated with fiction, and break with the conventions of “realist” documentary 
practice. These documentaries certainly did not appear to have abandoned the desire to 
discover something about the “real” world; rather, something in the nature of trauma 
seemed to demand the deployment of fictions as a route to “truths” or meanings about the 
real, non-fictional world. 
 
The ‘bait of falsehood’ emerged as an organising principle. It draws on a clinical technique 
first suggested in Freud’s radical paper Constructions in Analysis (1937b) – itself drawing on 
speculations in Hamlet about the power of enacted, embodied fictions – where a fiction 
acts as a bait to take an otherwise unavailable truth about the “real” world. It is a 
technique that recognises the profound difficulty in representing trauma whilst rejecting 
the idea that trauma is irrevocably unrepresentable and beyond the reach of 
understanding. The fictional films that appear within the frame of documentaries that treat 
traumatic personal histories, are baits or catalysts for the emergence of meaning in the 
framing documentary (which is perceived to be non-fictional). These fictions take many 
forms, from out-and-out fictions to quasi-historical reconstructions of past events, 
encompassing fictionalised representations that range from the fictive to the ‘factical’, 
through self-protective dissembling and lies, to the fantastic and even the hallucinatory. 
These fictions – when viewed and reflected on with diegetic others over filmic time – are 
capable of taking the ‘carp of truth’: that is, capable of producing psychic insights, “truths” 
or meanings for the diegetic protagonist that might help to ameliorate the pain of 
traumatic experience. It is a contention that sees the documentary-making process as 
having the potential to be a dynamic, therapeutic process which bears comparison with 
aspects of the analytic and self-analytic process: an inter- and intra-personal exploration, 
where a trauma rooted in the past is revivified in current relationships and where it is 
necessary to deploy fictions to bring representational content to otherwise unrepresented 
aspects of traumatic experience. It is an argument that insists that certain documentaries 
do not just show something but do something. The edited films that result are records of a 
creative act playing out over time, in which things that happen in the filmic present, 
transform (and can be seen by the viewer to transform) fixed and intractable patterns of 
psychic behaviour. This dynamic process begins with the provocation of the fiction (the bait 
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of falsehood of the film-within-the-film), kick-starting a self-reflexive process of reflection 
for the filmic protagonist that might lead to symbolisation: to what Freud called a ‘carp of 
truth’ and I would describe as a meaningful account. 
 
Drawing on psychoanalytic models, I have theorised the bait of falsehood in a number of 
ways. The space occupied by the fictional film within the documentary is akin to the 
potential space that Donald Winnicott opened up for his child patients to play with toys 
and other objects, and to create fictional scenarios that might capture aspects of hitherto 
hidden, lost or unarticulated facets of traumatic experience. I have also thought of the 
documentary film-without as a frame, like André Green’s psychic frame, into which the 
protagonist places, removes and re-places a variety of pictures in the struggle to create or 
find representational content for the trauma and ultimately to try to make sense of a 
traumatic past. Representations are conjured up and played with and placed in the frame: 
a process Rithy Panh described as a search for ‘the missing picture’; and Albertina Carri 
experienced as a desperate quest to fill a black hole, a constitutional absence, like a blank 
canvas within the frame of both herself and her documentary that was left by the 
disappearance of her parents. Documentary protagonists use the documentary-making 
process to stage scenes from their inner psychic theatre as Anna O did on the “stage” of 
her analysis with Josef Breuer. Sometimes these “plays” are not conscious, intentional 
constructions – even if they begin as that – but the bizarre performances that Joyce 
McDougall observed in her patients, where the body stages its own scenes, or where the 
unconscious acts-out troubling, “forgotten” relationships and the conscious “I” of the 
protagonist becomes witness to a trauma playing itself out on the stage of their own body. 
To coax these performances from the traumatised actor in the film-within, documentary-
makers have reached for a range of imaginative, provocative devices, often (re-)discovering 
the creative potential of the performative techniques pioneered in psychodrama: role-
playing, role-reversal, doubling, mirroring, soliloquy. All are attempts to lure the buried 
trauma onto the open stage.  
 
If the ‘bait of falsehood’ is the organising principle of the thesis, then it is equally 
concerned with the ‘carp of truth’ – with the psychic meanings the falsehood provokes. The 
bait of falsehood is not in itself meaningful. It is only in the diegetic protagonist reflecting 
on their emotional, affective and somatic responses to the fiction (described by Hamlet as 
blenches and by Freud as touches) – including reflection on the powerful inter- and intra-
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personal identifications generated both within the fictional film-within and in witnessing it 
– that meaning might emerge. The carps of truth that emerge from this process of 
reflection as it plays out over filmic time, are perhaps best understood as tentative, 
contingent meanings that neither conform to an external notion of objectivity nor should 
be mistaken for the absolute truth: the psychic “Real” or “O” (the thing-in-itself). It is never 
possible to know if the meanings that emerge have been created or found (whether they 
are fiction or truth): instead their importance lies in their power to transform psychic 
experience – a pragmatic and therapeutic conception of meaningfulness. Guy Maddin 
certainly thought of his own filmmaking practice as offering this therapeutic potential when 
he announced at the beginning of My Winnipeg (2007), ‘What if … I film my way out of 
here?’ (that is, film his way out of trauma) and Ari Folman confirmed this potential when, 
at the end of the filmmaking process looking back at the making of Waltz with Bashir 
(2008), he described it as ‘four years of therapy’.230 
 
The thesis has concerned itself principally with the processes through which meanings 
emerge for the diegetic protagonist. These processes remain hidden from the viewer in 
many documentaries but are at least partially available in the open, reflexive and self-
reflexive documentaries I have chosen to consider in this study: documentaries that 
foreground the processes and the inter-personal mechanisms that generate diegetic 
meanings through a Brechtian unmasking of the mechanics of the filmmaking process and 
in allowing the process of mediation involved in the reception of the documentary to play 
out within the documentary itself. In these films, the intra-diegetic encounters within the 
documentary are legible to the extra-diegetic viewer: encounters between protagonists, 
between a protagonist and the film-within, between a protagonist and a diegetically-
present director or film crew or imagined audience, or within a single protagonist who 
views and re-views their own performance within the documentary as if looking in on 
themselves as an outsider, and who is then afforded the space to reflect on their changing 
perceptions over the course of filmic time. 
 
But I also wanted to understand and theorise a second locus of meaning-making (a locus 
implied in my comments above) and the one with which documentary theory is more 
usually concerned: that of the extra-diegetic viewer engaging with the film and the on-
 
230 Maddin’s comment was made in voice over in the film; Folman’s in an interview (Schäuble 2011: 
210).  
 258 
screen protagonists. I have conceptualised meaning-making in both loci as occurring 
through a counter-transferential process. This counter-transferential model builds on and 
extends the transferential models of the documentary encounter that have been 
developed by a number of documentary scholars in recent years. A counter-transferential 
model best captures the complex back-and-forth movements of affect and somatic effects 
and forms of identification that take place between viewer and viewed, whether that 
viewer is the intra-diegetic viewer inside the documentary responding to the ‘bait’ of the 
film-within or “us”, as extra-diegetic viewers, responding to the documentary object. In 
both loci, subject and object, viewer and viewed, are enmeshed with one another through 
powerful and various forms of identification. 
 
This counter-transferential methodology (derived and adapted from certain “French” 
psychoanalytic theorists such as André Green, César and Sara Botella, Michel Neyraut, et 
al) is implicit in film phenomenology’s refusal of a simple division between subject and 
object – viewer and viewed – through its positing of a subject who is always an 
experiencing-subject who views an object which is always an experienced-object. Neither 
subject nor object exist separately but each is always implied by the other and implicated 
in the other. This intermingling of viewer and viewed is also at the heart of Winnicottian 
approaches to film (which I have adopted for the study of documentaries from its original 
application to feature films), where the extra-diegetic viewer both finds the documentary 
out there on the screen and creates the documentary in an imaginative encounter with the 
filmic object as it acts back on the viewer and enmeshes with the viewer’s unique subject 
position (including the viewer’s unconscious). This finding and creating of the film by the 
extra-diegetic viewer also describes the diegetic protagonist/viewer’s engagement with the 
filmic fictions – the baits – of the film-within. 
 
As to that perennial question that is asked of those submitting a PhD thesis – what is your 
unique contribution to scholarship? – I would cite four areas.  
 
First, my adoption of the bait of falsehood that takes a carp of truth as a heuristic device, 
opens up innovative ways for documentary scholars to think about the use of fictions in 
documentaries that explore traumatic pasts. It yokes the interpersonal, reflective, 
meaning-seeking, psychological practice of psychoanalysis to the embodied, performative 
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practice of theatre, with both able to throw light on facets of documentary-making 
practice. 
 
Secondly, I have tried to build on the innovative work of several scholars (including Michael 
Renov, Elizabeth Cowie, Diane Waldman and Janet Walker, Alisa Lebow and Agnieszka 
Piotrowska) who have repurposed psychoanalytic approaches to fictional feature films 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and applied them to the study of documentary. These 
scholars look at documentary through a psychoanalytic lens and frequently deploy a 
transferential model both to explore the relationship between the documentary viewer 
and the film and to look at relationships inside the documentary – especially that between 
director and principal protagonist. I have extended this transferential model by 
reconceiving it as a counter-transferential model in order to capture the complex two-way 
movement of affect and unconscious forces between viewer and viewed, subject and 
object, and to avoid the implication that this is a hierarchical relationship that gives pre-
eminence to one term over the other. More specifically, I have advocated a counter-
transferential approach to try to capture the radical nature of the identifications generated 
in documentary spectatorship where, rather than thinking of a two-way movement 
between separate objects, we should think of the objects as becoming the same, becoming 
identical, as they come into contact.  
 
Thirdly, I have taken a Winnicottian approach to feature film developed by scholars such as 
Annette Kuhn, Phyllis Creme and Ira Konigsberg and applied it to documentary – where it 
seems equally illuminating. I have also taken this Winnicottian approach inside the 
documentary, by applying it not simply to the potential space that exists between the 
documentary viewer and the film but to the space that exists between a diegetic viewer 
and the diegetic filmic object in those documentaries that deploy the device of a film-
within-the-film. 
 
Fourthly and finally – and although this is perhaps not a unique contribution but the pursuit 
of an approach to documentary that I feel is sometimes neglected – I have tried throughout 
the thesis to take a determined position within an often unspoken debate about the nature 
of the documentary object and the documentary protagonist. Do we treat documentary 
and its protagonists as if they are fictional and pursue approaches to documentary that 
were developed with a fictional text in mind or do we treat them as “real” and approach 
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them more in the manner of the historian or sociologist or psychologist or anthropologist 
rather than the literary critic? I have tried to draw on both of these theoretical tendencies. 
In speculating about the psychic lives of real on-screen protagonists, I am also fully 
cognisant of the brute fact that my only access to these protagonists is through a mediated, 
edited, manipulated filmic text. My approach has been influenced by Vivian Sobchack who 
insists that when we watch documentary we look both at the screen and through the 
screen; we are dependent upon the screen for knowledge but are ‘also aware of an excess 
of existence not contained by it’ (1999: 246). In looking through the screen, we speculate 
about the lives – including the psychic lives – of protagonists but when we look at the 
screen for knowledge we must interpret a text and understand how that text works. It is an 
approach to filmic texts and filmic protagonists that places the documentary viewer in a 
position akin to that of the reader of a psychoanalytic case study: dependent on the on-
page text for knowledge of Dora or Anna O or the Wolf Man – dependent on the on-screen 
text for knowledge of Anwar Congo or Albertina Carri or Rithy Panh – but also attempting 
to look through the text to a real life beyond. 
 
In taking seriously the idea that these documentaries can open a route to understanding 
real traumas for both the viewer and the viewed, those conventionally fictional elements 
within the diegesis – the fictional-films-within-the-film – can be seen to be fictional in only 
a limit sense. These fictions are the necessary detour, the circuitous route, that must be 
followed to overcome trauma’s resistance to taking representational form; representations 
that act, in turn, as a bait to take a truth, to take a meaningful account of trauma that 
might just prove to be cathartic in a very real, non-fictional life.  
 
Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth; 
And thus do we of wisdom and of reach, 
With windlasses and with assays of bias,  
By indirections find directions out.  
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Figure 1: Suzanne watching a scene in Professor Williams’s film in which a comatose 
“Suzanne” (played by an actress) is rescued by her lover. 









Figure 2: Boaz Rein’s nightmare. Ferocious dogs rampage through the streets of Tel Aviv, 
triggering memories of the war in Lebanon. 






Figure 3: Folman’s hallucination / ‘flashback’. Ari Folman and other young Israeli soldiers 
emerge naked from the sea in Beirut against a bizarrely illuminated sky. 








Figure 4: A middle-aged Rithy Panh (seated) analyses the middle-aged Rithy Panh (lying on 
the couch) beneath a portrait of Freud. 






Figure 5: The middle-aged Rithy Panh analyses his former self, the boy Rithy Panh. The 
“consulting room” is populated with the people who were important in the boy’s life. 









Figures 6 and 7: In a studio-based scene, Herman Koto, playing the part of Aminah (one of 
the “merciless” Gerwani women), saws off Anwar Congo’s head and holds it up as a trophy. 












Figure 8: In a scene shot on location in the “jungle”, Aminah (Herman Koto) taunts the 
decapitated Anwar Congo: his mutilated, headless body in the foreground; his decapitated 







Figure 9: Aminah forces Anwar Congo to eat his own internal organs. 






Figure 10: Poster for John Water’s film Cecil B. Demented (2000), which is visible in the 
background of many shots of Analía Couceyro (playing Albertina Carri) in her editing 
room/office. Cecil B. Demented (Stephen Dorff) is seen here holding a gun to the head of 
the kidnapped Honey Whitlock (Melanie Griffith) moments before Demented and his film 
crew forcibly dye Whitlock’s hair peroxide blonde. 
This image is taken from the internet as the complete poster is not seen in any one shot in 
The Blonds (Carri 2003). This version of the poster is in Spanish although the one in The 







Figures 11 and 12: Analía Couceyro (playing Albertina Carri) passes in front of the Cecil B. 
Demented poster, giving the impression that Demented is holding a gun to Couceyro’s 
head. 











Figure 13: Albertina Carri’s film crew, wearing blond wigs, walk away from the camera in 
one of the closing scenes of the film – the five-person crew seemingly replicating the five 
original members of Carri’s nuclear family. 
Screen grab from Albertina Carri’s The Blonds (2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
